@article{oai:glim-re.repo.nii.ac.jp:00000591,
 author = {ディミトリ, リティシェフ},
 issue = {4},
 journal = {學習院大學經濟論集, The journal of Faculty of Economics, Gakushuin University},
 month = {Jan},
 note = {application/pdf, An outside inventor of a new production process seeks to license it to Cournot duopolists which have unequal ex ante costs. Distinguishing “leading-edge” innovations (new cost below both firms’ costs) from “catch-up” innovations (new cost between the two firms’ costs), we compare the equilibria of two license-selling mechanisms: exclusive license auction and non-exclusive price-setting. In contrast to the often-studied case of an innovation that reduces the cost of any licensee by the same amount, we show that licensing of a new process may attenuate the ex ante cost asymmetry, allow the inefficient firm to leapfrog its competitor, and raise the licensee’s net profits.},
 pages = {325--336},
 title = {Licensing of a lower-cost production process to an asymmetric Cournot duopoly},
 volume = {45},
 year = {2009}
}