@article{oai:glim-re.repo.nii.ac.jp:00002743,
 author = {渡邊, 裕一 and Watanabe, Yuichi},
 issue = {21},
 journal = {学習院大学人文科学論集, Gakushuin University studies in humanities},
 month = {Oct},
 note = {application/pdf, This paper considers Locke’s concept of a right to charity which figures in
his system of political theory. There are three questions to be considered. First,
what does Locke mean by a ‘right to charity’? Second, what roles does it play
in his political theory? Third, how is the right to charity, or a correlative duty of
charity, to be realized in political society? In dealing with the third question, I
will not only clarify Locke’s own position but also try to unfold its implications
by reconstructing his arguments.
The right to charity, as Locke sees it, is a natural right. The natural right is to
be preserved in political society. A government is expected to preserve each
person’s natural rights; or more precisely, his ‘property’ in the broad sense, i.e.
his life, liberty, and estate. The right to charity is a means to preserve each person’s
life and liberty. However, we tend to lose sight of this fact, since we often
confine our attention to the last item of property, i.e. each one’s estate or his
external goods.
This paper tries to make it clear that the right to charity enables a poor person
to request rich people to transfer some of their goods. This right serves to
preserve his life, while it functions to secure his voluntary consent and the liberty
of his choice. Life and the liberty of choice are essential to Locke’s property
theory. Locke did not seem to assign a government the task of realizing the
poor person’s right to charity. However, since the end of political society is to
preserve each person’s ‘property’ which includes his life and liberty, it follows
that a government can legitimately transfer goods from rich people to poor people
insofar as it is required by that end.},
 pages = {1--31},
 title = {ジョン・ロックにおける慈愛の権利 : その性質と役割についての検討},
 year = {2012},
 yomi = {ワタナベ, ユウイチ}
}