@article{oai:glim-re.repo.nii.ac.jp:00002352,
 author = {長綱, 啓典 and Nagatsuna, Keisuke},
 issue = {56},
 journal = {研究年報, The annual collection of essays and studies, Faculty of Letters},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {application/pdf, Cicero distinguishes ‘perfect duties’（officia perfecta） and ‘mean ones’ （officia media）. While the former are also called ‘absolute’ duties, the latter are defined as duties for the performance of which an adequate reason may be rendered. The ‘perfect duty’ consists of the investigation and discovery of the truths ──something that can only be realized by a few wise men, whereas ‘mean duties’ relate to types of behaviour which protect and support the daily life of the common people. But this does not imply that there is no relationship between ‘mean duties’ and reason as an aspect of human nature. They are derived from four honors, namely: prudence, social instinct, courage and temperance. But these honors were originally formed by certain forms of conduct that human reason urged on people. Therefore reason itself can be regarded as the source of the ‘mean duties’ This line of argument becomes more apparent when considering the virtue called ‘moderation’. The most fundamental duty derived from moderation is that reason should control the various appetites. Otherwise man will surpass the limits that are appropriate for human nature and, consequently, moderation and propriety will not be attained. The adequate motive for an appropriate performance must be sought in the things that human reason shows. Therefore ‘mean duties’ can neither be developped nor observed without reason.},
 pages = {13--28},
 title = {キケローにおける中間義務と理性の関係について},
 year = {2010},
 yomi = {ナガツナ, ケイスケ}
}