@article{oai:glim-re.repo.nii.ac.jp:00001116,
 author = {岡田, 聡宏 and Okada, Toshihiro},
 issue = {8},
 journal = {言語 文化 社会, Language, Culture and Society},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {application/pdf, Central to the formal semantics tradition, especially to the tradition of truth conditional semantics, has been the equation of the meaning of a sentence with its truth condition (the condition under which a given proposition is true). Some semanticists believe that the sentence meaning is identical to the proposition of the sentence, and the proposition is determined exclusively by semantics without relying on pragmatics, except in very limited cases. Pragmaticists or contextualists, on the other hand, claim that the recovery of the proposition inevitably involves pragmatic processes, and it cannot be determined without considering the context. The sentence meaning itself is incomplete in many ways, because it contains underdetermined elements including indexicals and demonstratives as well as ambiguous words or phrases. It needs to be developed by such pragmatic processes as reference assignment, disambiguation, and saturation in order to be a full-fledged proposition. In her ultra-minimalist view, Carston (2007) claims that semantics is concerned only with LEM (Linguistically Encoded Meaning), which is the only context-free meaning, and that the semantics/pragmatics distinction for at least natural languages holds between LEM and speaker meaning. She also claims that LEM is the ultimate representational output of grammar, and that the only distinction that works may be a syntax/pragmatics distinction. More careful examination may be needed before we accept her claim, but it is true that semantics has no autonomous role in determining the truth condition of a sentence, and the recovery of the proposition always involves pragmatic processes.},
 pages = {55--71},
 title = {語用論と意味論の違い},
 year = {2010},
 yomi = {オカダ, トシヒロ}
}