

**C.S.Lewis: A Christian Objectivist—
His Pursuit and Participation in Reality**

**A Dissertation Submitted to
The Faculty of the Department of
English and American Literature
Gakushuin University**

**In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy**

**By
Mineko Honda
(本多峰子)**

June 2005

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Preface

Clive Staples Lewis (1898-1963) remains one of the most popular and influential Christian authors and lay advocates in the U. S. and in England. Having taught English as a fellow of Magdalen College at Oxford University, he later became the first Professor of Medieval and English Literature at Cambridge. His academic works, such as *The Allegory of Love* (1936) and *English Literature in the Sixteenth Century* (1954)¹ are highly valued. Yet more importantly, he is now well known for his many Christian apologetic works, children's literature, science fiction, and a novel.

He is reported to have predicted no one would read his books after he had been dead five or six years,² but against his expectation, he is now read even more widely than before his death. Not only is *The Chronicles of Narnia* a steady best seller, his science-fiction trilogy and Christian apologetics are also widely read. His works have been translated into French, German, Italian, Japanese, Russian, Spanish and other languages, and new translations and anthologies are still being published every year. Although Lewis belonged to the Anglican Church, Andrew Walker tells us that he is, as "a Christian for all Christians," also "avidly read and admired by thousands of people in the Eastern churches."³ Among Catholics, too, Lewis has a lot of readers and correspondents (for instance, Don Giovanni Calabria of Verona, a Roman

¹ For the references to the texts used in this essay, see the bibliography of Lewis's texts and their abbreviations at the end of this thesis.

² Lyle W. Dorsett, "Researching C. S. Lewis," *A Christian for All Christians: Essays in Honor of C. S. Lewis*, eds. Andrew Walker and James Patrick (Regnery Gateway, 1992), p. 213.

³ Andrew Walker, "Under the Russian Cross: A research note on C. S. Lewis and the Eastern Orthodox Church," *A Christian for all Christians*, eds., Andrew Walker and James Patric (Regnery Gateway, 1992), pp. 63.

Catholic priest⁴), which shows he has gained a great deal of sympathy among them; and Christopher Derrick, a Catholic and long-term friend of Lewis, says, “There is some scanty evidence to suggest that Lewis’s habitual disengagement from the question of Catholicism was less than uniform.” Derrick says that he even had an impression (admitting that “one’s impressions, in such a matter, can only be extremely subjective and unreliable,”) that Lewis was close to becoming a Catholic around the year 1950.⁵ To show Lewis’s popularity, Kathryn Lindskoog in *Light in the Shadowlands* (1994) tells us, “There are five hundred C.S. Lewis societies in the United States, according to British journalists who repeat a wild estimate from Dr. Andrew Walker of King’s College, London,”⁶ and in 1998, to commemorate Lewis’s centenary, many C. S. Lewis societies in and outside England and the United States held special workshops or events. Besides, there is the success of *Shadowlands*, originally a television play (BBC on 22 December 1985), closely based on Lewis’s marriage to Joy Davidman, which has made Lewis, the man, popular even among those who do not read him.

Even those academic scholars who find fault with Lewis’s logic often admit his unfading appeal and influence. Though there are a few devastating critics against Lewis like John Beversluis,⁷ such totally hostile ones are rather the exception.

It is true that although his apologetics are still widely read, there are also those who see them as already obsolete. For instance, John Hick in *The Metaphor of God Incarnate* suggests that Lewis’s case for Jesus’ deity is no longer valid, for Lewis bases it on Jesus’ alleged claim to be the Son of God and

⁴ Cf. *The Latin Letters of C.S. Lewis*, Martin Moynihan, (Crossway Books, 1987).

⁵ Christopher Derrick, *C. S. Lewis and the Church of Rome* (Ignatius, 1981), pp. 214-215.

⁶ Kathryn Lindskoog, *Light in the Shadowlands: Protecting the Real C.S. Lewis* (Multnomah Books, 1994), p. 4.

⁷ John Beversluis, *C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion* (Eerdmans, 1985).

argues, “A man who was merely a man and said the sort of things Jesus said would [...] either be a lunatic--on a level with the man who says he is a poached egg--or else he would be the Devil of Hell.[...] Either this man was, and is, the Son of God: or else a madman or something worse” (*Mere Christianity*, 51-52). Yet, Hick remarks, the modern historico-critical study of the New Testament has brought about a broad agreement among New Testament scholars [...] that the historical Jesus did not make the claim to deity that later Christian thought was to make for him: he did not understand himself to be God, or God the Son, incarnate.”⁸ Thus, he says,

All this rules out the once popular form of apologetic which argues that someone claiming to be God must be either mad, or bad, or God; and since Jesus was evidently not mad or bad he must have been God (e.g. Lewis 1955, 51-2).⁹

In 1989, Thomas Howard also said about Lewis, “We all know how utterly out of fashion his ontology, and hence his epistemology, and hence his way of handling a text, are now.”¹⁰ Yet, Howard also remarks in the same article, “I cannot predict whether Lewis’s work will be in print 200 years from now. But [...] virtually every line he wrote, fiction or argument, is as timely now as the day it was written. It is timely because it is all true.”¹¹ I do not understand in what sense he says “*all true*” [italics mine] after saying Lewis is “utterly out of fashion,” yet, it is at least obvious that he is recognizing some permanent truth in Lewis’s writing that is still powerful enough to move readers today. Howard says, especially referring to the fiction, “My own guess is that if any stories

⁸ John Hick, *The Metaphor of God Incarnate* (SCM,1993), p. 27.

⁹ Hick, p.29.

¹⁰ Thomas T. Howard, “Looking Backward,” in *G. K. Chesterton and C. S. Lewis: The Riddle of Joy*. Eds., Michael H. Macdonald and Andrew A. Tadie (Eerdmans, 1989), p.91.

¹¹ Howard, “Looking Backward,” p.99.

written since Lewis Carroll, Beatrix Potter, A.A. Milne, and Kenneth Grahame have a chance of achieving this sempiternal status, The Chronicles of Narnia are front-running candidates.”¹²

What is Lewis’s attraction that makes even those who see his logic as defective admit that his work has value and will be read for a long time? If his attraction comes only from his conspicuously Christian character, it might lose its power when and where Christianity is losing, or has never had, its influence. Yet the case is otherwise. I have noticed that his Chronicles are very popular among Japanese children who usually know nothing, or very little, about Christianity, and Peter Schakel also remarks, “My students usually admit they loved the Narnia books before they became aware of the Christian themes and parallels; and children from non-Christian homes, many of them reading the stories in state-supported schools where Christianity is not to be mentioned, love them as much as my students with their Christian backgrounds do.” If so, as he continues, “Such popularity of ‘Christian’ stories in a widely secular age must be explained by elements beyond their Christianity.”¹³ How should we, then, interpret the unfading popularity not only of his fiction but also of his apologetic works such as *The Screwtape Letters*, *Mere Christianity*, *Miracles*, and *The Problem of Pain* now that his ontology seems to be “out of fashion”? How can we understand the fact that his Narnian tales are so popular even in such basically non-Christian countries as Japan? In this thesis, I want to show that Lewis’s intrinsic appeal lies in the fact that he is concerned not only with Christianity but also with the whole objective Reality and that he perceives, participates in, and communicates that Reality with all his reason, moral consciousness and, above all,

¹² Howard, “Looking Backward,” p.92.

¹³ Peter Schakel, “Elusive Birds and Narrative Nets: the Appeal of Story in C.S. Lewis’ Chronicles of Narnia,” *A Christian for All Christians*, eds. Andrew Walker & James Patrick (Regnery Gateway, 1992), p. 117.

conspicuously strong imagination. His firm belief in the objective Reality, and his imaginative way to approach that Reality, marks his whole achievement most significantly.

I am grateful for the faculty of the Department of English and American Literature at Gakushuin University, who introduced me to the world of English Literature and instructed me for more than ten years. I especially thank Professor Shoichi Matsushima, who encouraged me to submit this thesis and gave me precious advice as my chief supervisor. I would also like to thank Professor Makinori Hashimoto and Professor Andrew Fitzsimons who read my first draft. I acknowledge with much gratitude the very valuable advice that Professor Fitzsimons gave me in English. I am also thankful to Professor Hisao Kodama who was my supervisor in my student days at Gakushuin University and its Graduate School. I would also like to thank Nishogakusha University for its support and encouragement in my research. This dissertation would not have been completed too without the support of all of my family, both who are still on earth and who are now in heaven.

Introduction

Lewis believes in God as the supernatural, absolute Reality, a being who transcends our spatio-temporal world. He also believes in heaven as the world of objective reality, or the Real World, with his conviction that, "Heaven is reality itself. All that is fully real is Heavenly" (*Divorce*, 69). The world of Reality is, for Lewis, the world of meanings and therefore important. As Robert Houston Smith says, "The term best suited to describe Lewis's philosophy of religion is objectivism." Lewis sees "the phenomenal world as standing in relation to absolute reality."¹ In all his writing, we can see he is assuming the logos and intelligibility of the universe. This assumption is in fact a belief in the rationality of both man and the universe, since it assumes not only the logos of the universe but also the validity of human reason as a means of logically knowing that logos. This belief was one of the most important fundamental presuppositions in Western philosophy until modern times. For instance, St. Thomas Aquinas was assuming the explicable order of the cosmos as a fundamental axiom when he built his argument for the existence of God thus:

Natural causes act for definite purposes under the direction of some higher cause, so that their effects must also be referred to God as the first of all causes. In the same manner contrived effects must likewise be referred back to a higher cause than human reasoning and will, for these are changeable and can cease to be, and, as we have seen, all changeable things and things that can cease to be require some first cause which cannot change and of itself must be.²

He was taking it for granted that every existence and every movement, or any sort

¹ Robert Houston Smith, *Patches of Godlight* (Univ. of Georgia Press, 1981), pp. 12-13.

² St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, vol. 2, *Existence and Nature of God*, Latin text and English translation, Introduction, Notes, Appendices and Glossaries by Timothy Mcdermott O.P. (Blackfriars, 1963), p.17.

of change, has its causes, so that he could infer the existence of God thus:

Now anything in process of change is being changed by something else. This is so because it is characteristic of things in process of change that they do not yet have the perfection towards which they move, [...]; whereas it is characteristic of something causing change to have that perfection already. For to cause change is to bring into being what was previously only able to be, and this can only be done by something that already is: [...] of necessity therefore anything in process of change is being changed by something else. Moreover, this something else, if in process of change, is itself being changed by yet another thing; and this last by another. Now we must stop somewhere, otherwise there will be no first cause of the change, and, as a result, no subsequent causes. For it is only when acted by the first cause that the intermediate causes will produce the change: if the hand does not move the stick, the stick will not move anything else. Hence one is bound to arrive at some first cause of change not itself being changed by anything, and this is what everybody understands by God. [i.e. to be God]³

As late as the 18th century, Samuel Clarke still believed that everything that exists has a sufficient reason:

[T]o Say a Thing is *produced*, and yet that there is no Cause at all of that Production, is to Say that Something is Effected, when it is Effected by Nothing; that is, at the Same time when it is not Effected at all. Whatever Exists, has a Cause, a Reason, a Ground of its Existence (a Foundation, on which its Existence relies; a Ground or Reason why it doth *exist*, rather than not exist;) either in the Necessity of its own Nature, and then it must have been *of itself Eternal*: Or in the Will of some Other Being: [...]⁴

Not all philosophers believe this. For example, David Hume already in the 18th century positively denied the necessity of inferring an explanatory cause of the existence of the world. Hume argues especially against the so-called design argument prevalent in his days which claimed to explain the natural order by tracking its cause to a prior order existing in the mind of the Creator. He asks,

³ Aquinas, *Summa*, vol. 2, pp. 13 & 15.

⁴ Samuel Clarke, from *Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God, Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation*, ninth edition (John and Paul Knapton, 1738), p.9. [Spellings are

“Have we not the same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal world, or new intelligent principle? But if we stop [...] why not stop at the material world?”⁵

And in the present day, more and more people seem to think that there is not any answer about the cause and meanings of the world. Yet, against such a tendency, Lewis firmly believes that there *is* an answer. In fact, though Lewis is well known as an advocate of Christianity, actually he is not only that but an advocate of the whole objective reality that has both logos and meanings.

In the inaugural lecture as the Professor of Medieval and Renaissance English Literature in the University of Cambridge, Lewis says, comparing himself to one of a few “dinosaurs”, a remnant from the medieval times, thus:

I read as a native texts that you must read as foreigners.[...] It is my settled conviction that in order to read Old Western literature aright you must suspend most of the responses and unlearn most of the habits you have acquired in reading modern literature. And because this is the judgement of a native, I claim that, even if the defence of my conviction is weak, the fact of my conviction is a historical datum to which you should give full weight.[...]That way, where I fail as a critic, I may yet be useful as a specimen. (“*De Descriptione Temporum*,” *Selected Essays*, 13-14.)

According to Lewis, “the greatest of all divisions in the history of the west” is the one “which divides the present from [...] the age of Jane Austen and Scott” (“*DeDescriptione*,” 7). Since the 18th century, he points out, there have been great changes in the politics, art and religion. In the politics, where people used to expect “rulers” to govern them with “justice, incorruption, diligence, [and] perhaps clemency,” now “leaders” are called for. And of political leaders, Lewis says, people now ask “dash, initiative, and [...] ‘magnetism’ or ‘personality’” (“*DeDescriptione*,” 8), rather than justice or incorruption. In the arts, he finds such modern work as of the Cubists, the Dadaists, the Surrealists, and Picasso as

modernized by the present author.]

⁵ David Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, ed. J. J. Prince (Oxford, 1976), pp.34-35.

well as modern poetry to be “shatteringly and bewilderingly new.” The unprecedented novelty of modern arts and poetry is that they allow for numbers of interpretations, while the arts and poetry of the former ages are, even when they are difficult, more intelligible and readers can make agreement as to what they mean (“*DeDescriptione*,” 8-9). The great religious change which Lewis remarks is “the un-christening.” We are now in “the post-Christian” era, which is not pagan but “cut off from the Christian past and therefore doubly from the Pagan past” (“*DeDescriptione*,” 9-10).

And on top of these three changes Lewis points out fourthly “the birth of the machine.” He regards this epoch-making change as the greatest of the four because he finds it has changed even people’s value judgment and ways of thinking. In the world of the machine, the newer things are generally better, and this image of progress has become dominant in the mind of ordinary people. Lewis says,

[...] our assumption that everything is provisional and soon to be superseded, that the attainment of goods we have never yet had, rather than the defence and conservation of those we have already, is the cardinal business of life would most shock and bewilder them [i.e., our ancestors] if they could visit ours [i.e., our world]. (“*De Descriptione*,” 11)

In the former times, people believed in the objective, permanent standards of justice, order, meanings in either the actual life or in the arts. They believed in objective values and, especially, believed in Christianity as the objective truth. And Lewis, who sees himself as a “native” in “Old Western” traditions, also believes not only in Christianity but also in the objective standards and values as pertaining to the absolute Reality.

He sees the twentieth century as an age of relativism, and shows his misgivings as he finds that even in the field of ethics, where there used to be a belief in objective standards of good and evil, many people now only find some relative standards (for instance, the newer things are usually assumed to be better

simply because they are newer) or subjective opinions (cf. *Abolition*, 14-15; and “*DeDescriptione*,” 11). His philosophy of religion starts from the question: “Why is there a universe?” “Why does it go on as it does?” “Has it any meaning?” (*Mere Christianity*, 31). It is a search for the absolute metaphysical authority that gives the ultimate meaning of the existence of the universe and of our lives. In a sense, all of his writings, especially the apologetic ones, are an attempt to answer these questions.

He argues for Christianity not because he finds it good but because he finds it objectively true. He argues for the moral law and other standards of values as well because he believes they are also objective reality. For him, the pursuit of good is not any subjective matter. It is a progress according to the unchangeable absolute standards of value towards the ultimate Good. In literary criticism, he insists on the value of allegory and myth which he regards as objective expressions of reality.

Though he finds that God is supernatural and transcends our world of ordinary experience, he believes that God reveals Himself as well as ultimate Reality through our imagination, reason and moral consciousness. Imagination is an intuitive power of Reality, working various important ways. Reason is, for him, the organ of truth. In his argument, reason first of all works as a reasoning power. Secondly, it also serves as a counterproof against naturalism and materialism, being a supernatural element in the human being. Lewis regards it as “God-kindled” (*Miracles*, 33), deriving its rationality from the supernatural, absolute Reason, which must be identified with God. On the other hand, our moral consciousness leads us to perceive the existence of a giver of the moral law, who is to be identified with the absolutely good God.

Yet what is especially characteristic of Lewis is the fact that he not only believes in the world of objective reality but also loves it, yearns for it, and thinks that human beings can actually attain that reality in heaven as Real men or women, becoming a part of the reality. This attainment of Reality is always his first

concern. In Part I of this thesis, then, I shall discuss Lewis's approach to Reality mainly from the side of his apologetic works, taking his arguments from imagination, reason and morality one by one. We shall also discuss his literary theory. Then, we shall also see some of criticisms on Lewis and discuss his style of rhetoric and move onto Part II, where I shall first try to make it clear that, for him, writing stories and fantasies is not a negative attempt at escaping from reality, nor a vainly fantastic play of imagination just for fun, but a positive way of participating in the metaphysical Reality. In the rest of the Part II, then, I shall study his imaginative works one by one, from *The Great Divorce*, one of his earlier pieces of fiction, to *Till We Have Faces*, his last novel, which I find his most representative and finest work. In these works, we shall see how Lewis sees the world of Reality, man's relation to it, and how man can actually attain that Reality. In conclusion, I shall try to form our opinion as to what his approach to reality means to us today in this twenty-first century. We shall also see his significance in the light of religious pluralism, which is now seriously taken up globally and which goes beyond the absoluteness of Christianity as it pursues the ultimate Reality in the wider context.

James Como laments the scarcity of comprehensive attempts to grasp Lewis, saying, "It is unfortunate that there is no one book called Lewis's Topics, although there are several good ones on different aspects of his thinking,"⁶ such as on his image of man, on his case for Christianity, on his case against scientism. I believe that our attempt is one to understand Lewis as comprehensively as possible because his Realism, or Christian objectivism and concern for the ultimate Reality is *the* key that runs through all his writings.

Since in this study the words "Reality" and "Real" are so important as denoting God's attribute, we shall capitalize them, especially when referring to God or to the metaphysical world of God, the world of objective Reality.

⁶ James Timothy Como, *Branches to Heaven, The Geniuses of C. S. Lewis* (Spence Publishing Company, 1998), p. 168.

Chapter 1 Imagination

<Introduction>

In 1954, Lewis wrote to the Milton Society of America that he was intrinsically an imaginative man:

The imaginative man in me is older, more continuously operative, and in that sense more basic than either the religious writer or the critic. It was he who made me first attempt (with little success) to be a poet. It was he who, in response to the poetry of others, made me a critic, and, in defence of that response, sometimes a critical controversialist. It was he who after my conversion led me to embody my religious belief in symbolical or mythopoetic forms [...]. And it was of course he who has brought me, in the last few years, to write the series of Narnian stories for children. (*Letters*, 260)

The imagination he thus sees in himself appears to be the same thing as the “creativity” that we expect of good writers and artists. In fact, however, this “imagination” means a lot more than mere creativity. For Lewis, it is also a power of intuition into the metaphysical reality of this world and heaven, and a power of communication of that reality. It perceives the meaning of the world, expresses that meaning, and enables us to participate in the metaphysical Reality.

<Joy>

He attributes such intuitive power to the human imagination because what convinced him of the existence of heaven is mainly his recurrent aesthetic experiences that he calls “Joy”, which has been the greatest concern in his imaginative life. Since he was a child, he had occasionally been struck by an aesthetic sensation which seemed extremely meaningful. It was a sensation of an extraordinary, indescribable longing caused by quite ordinary things in life. It is numinous, too, because he felt the real object of that longing existed somewhere apart from the thing that brought about it, but he could not specify what that real object was.

In his autobiography, *Surprised by Joy*, Lewis describes his childhood experiences of “Joy”. Its origin goes back to the time when he was around five years old. One day his elder brother Warren made a toy garden in a biscuit-tin and showed it to him.

He remembers it as the first beauty he had ever experienced.

What the real garden had failed to do, the toy garden did. It made me aware of nature--not, indeed, as a storehouse of forms and colours but as something cool, dewy, fresh, exuberant. I do not think the impression was very important at the moment. But it soon became important in memory. (*Joy*, 12)

He says, "As long as I live my imagination of Paradise will retain something of my brother's toy garden" (*Joy*, 12).

The next thing that he remembers in connection with "Joy" is the line of the Castlereagh Hills that he saw from his nursery window. Lewis says that those hills, which were far enough to be unattainable to the children, taught him longing or "*Sehnsucht*" (*Joy*, 12).

The sense of beauty and of longing either in the toy garden or in the hills may be called incipient "Joys". However, Lewis does not count them as genuine "Joy" experiences. The first true "Joy" came a few years later when he was eight or nine years old. Again, it was a sensation of longing mixed with a sense of beauty, but it was far keener than those he had had before. It was a sensation from what he calls "the memory of a memory," which was the memory of that toy garden that his brother had shown him. He says that the memory struck him quite suddenly and made everything else seem insignificant in comparison:

It is difficult to find words strong enough for the sensation which came over me; Milton's "enormous bliss" of Eden (giving the full, ancient meaning to "enormous") comes somewhere near it. It was a sensation, of course, of desire; but desire for what? not, certainly, for a biscuit-tin filled with moss, nor even (though that came into it) for my own past. *Ιουλιανποθω**-- and before I knew what I desired, the desire itself was gone, the whole glimpse withdrawn, the world turned commonplace again, or only stirred by a longing for the longing that had just ceased.

(* Oh, I desire too much) (*Joy*, 19)¹

After that incident, this "joy" continued to come to him when, for instance, he read Beatrix Potter's nursery book *Squirrel Nutkin*, or Longfellow's *Saga of King Olaf*, or northern mythology. He says, "Joy" has always been "unsatisfied desire which is itself more desirable than any other satisfaction" (*Joy*, 20). Although it is called

¹ The asterisk in the quotation means a note in the original.

“Joy”, it is different from both “Happiness” and “Pleasure”:

Joy (in my sense) has indeed one characteristic and one only, in common with them; the fact that anyone who has experienced it will want it again. Apart from that, and considered only in its quality, it might almost equally well be called a particular kind of unhappiness or grief. But then it is a kind we want. I doubt whether anyone who has tasted it would ever, if both were in his power, exchange it for all the pleasures in the world. But then Joy is never in our power and pleasure often is. (*Joy*, 20)

It was natural that an unsatisfied desire caused a sense of unhappiness, but there was something more significant in the way the “Joy” worked on Lewis. The main characteristics of “Joy” can be summarised as follows: 1) that it is a sensation of keen desire; 2) that one cannot know or control when and where it comes or vanishes away; 3) that it suggests some incalculable importance especially when remembered afterwards; 4) that the object of the desire is other than the immediate cause of it and can never be specified; 5) that the desire is never satisfied; and 6) that the desire itself turns out to be the object of the desire. It becomes “a longing for the longing” (*Joy*, 19).

Lewis’s eager pursuit of “Joy” began sometimes between 1911 and 1913. Around that time he had a feeling that he had lost “Joy”, because he had had no “Joy” experiences for quite a long time. But suddenly, and quite unexpectedly, he was caught again. This time, the catalyst was a headline in a literary periodical, which ran “Siegfried and the Twilight of the Gods,” with an illustration by Arthur Rackham. The headline and illustration together brought about such a strong sensation of “Joy” that he felt as if “the sky had turned round” (*Joy*, 62).

When he was first impressed by the headline, he knew nothing about Wagner or about Siegfried, yet somehow the “northernness” about *the Nibelung Saga* fascinated him. It had the same moving power as he had found in Longfellow’s lines. He says,

I knew [...] that Siegfried [...] belonged to the same world as Balder and the sunward-sailing cranes. And with that plunge back into my own past there arose at once, almost like heartbreak, the memory of Joy itself, the knowledge that I had once had what I had now lacked for years, that I was returning at last from exile and desert lands to my own country [...] And at once I knew (with fatal knowledge) that to “have it again” was the supreme and only important object of desire. (*Joy*, 62-63)

Since Lewis did not know the source of “Joy”, his concern was divided into two parts, that is, to know the source, or the true object, of Joy, and to seize as many a catalyst to arouse “Joy” as possible. And though anything that had ever caused “Joy” did not always do so, he found that Wagnerian *Nibelung* gave him “Joy” more often than anything else.

Once he came to have “Joy” again, its pursuit became a matter of such a special significance that, in *Surprised by Joy*, he distinguishes it from every other aspect of life and calls it the “imaginative life”. Many things that are ordinarily regarded as imaginative, such as most of reading and erotic or ambitious fancies, are not regarded as “imaginative” in his context here. His “imaginative life” is only that part of the inner life which is concerned with “Joy” (*Joy*, 66-67).

<The Dialectic of Desire>

The reason why Lewis connects “Joy” with heaven is that it led him to Christianity. In his imaginative life, he was always seeking for the source and satisfaction of “Joy”. He believed that if he found something that satisfied the desire, it must be the real object of “Joy”.

In *The Pilgrim’s Regress*, an allegory of Lewis’s own spiritual pilgrimage towards Christianity, he describes how he pursued the object and satisfaction of “Joy”. In it, John, the protagonist and an allegorical figure of the young Lewis, feels sudden sweet desire for an island which is seen far away through the window. Strangely, the island appears only occasionally as if it were a mere illusion. One day, then, he starts off on a journey, looking for the island. On his way, he also keeps looking for something that might give him ultimate satisfaction and subdue his longing. He tries one thing after another, not only such sensual pleasures as sex and music but also many types of philosophies that seem likely to be the ultimate reality. In that process, anything that is not the true object of the desire betrays its falsity once it is really experienced, even if at first sight it has appeared to be the most desirable thing on earth. For instance, on his way, he meets a “brown girl”, who says, “It was me you wanted [...]. I am better than your silly Islands” (*Regress*, 29). He takes her at her word and embraces her many times. But one morning he suddenly realizes that her appearance is in fact hateful to

him and that his object of desire cannot be that girl at all. Similarly, the wrong philosophies reveal their mistakes or insufficiency when they are tried by experience. Lewis calls this process the “dialectic of Desire”, holding that:

The dialectic of Desire, faithfully followed, would retrieve all mistakes, head you off from all false paths, and force you not to propound, but to live through, a sort of ontological proof. (*Regress*, 10)

The ontological proof referred to here is an apprehensive discrimination of the true object of Joy from false ones. Lewis’s “dialectic” is different from the Kantian or Hegelian “dialectics”, which is a method of solving, or *Aufhebung*, two contradictory characters of the object. In the *OED*, “dialectic” is defined in the first place as “The art of critical examination into the truth of an opinion; the investigation of truth by discussion.” And Lewis’s is rather to be taken as “dialectic” in the sense defined above in the *OED*. This “dialectic of Desire” is, as the dialectic is usually expected to be, logical, though proofs that are employed in it are empirical and may make it seem nonlogical. For, although the faculty in a man² which feels “Joy” and acquires the empirical proofs to use as data is not reason but imagination, the dialectic process itself, in which Lewis eliminates wrong objects one by one, is systematic and, in that sense, quite logical. The important fact here is that Lewis thinks that imagination as well as reason has the capacity to examine the truth.

In actual life, Lewis realized very early that sexual pleasure would never give him lasting contentment, and came to believe that sex could not be the object of “Joy”. In a letter dated on 30th January 1930, to Arthur Greeves, a lifelong friend and correspondent since childhood, he writes of “Joy”:

² To denote an unspecified human individual, we shall use “man” or “a man” and corresponding personal pronoun “he”, “his”, “him”, etc. And when referring to God, I use the pronoun “He”, as in the traditional way. I know more and more people are now concerned that these usages are sexist. Yet, mainly because gender-free pronouns were not much used till recently, Lewis uses “man” to mean “people in general”. And as to the pronoun for God, I do not think this thesis is a proper place to discuss whether the traditional “He” is right or wrong. It is itself a tremendous theological issue. And anyway, Lewis himself always speaks of God as “He.” For these reasons, I think it is better and less complicating to use “man” and “he”, and “He” for God than to try to stick to gender free “one”, “he/her”, etc. This does not mean I think God is male, or I am a sexist.

One knows what a psychoanalyst would say--it is sublimated lust, a kind of defecated masturbation which fancy gives one to compensate for external chastity. Yet after all, why should that be the right way of looking at it? If he can say that *It* is sublimated sex, why is it not open to say that sex is undeveloped *It*?--as Plato would have said. And if as Plato thought, the material world is a copy or mirror of the spiritual, then the central feature of the material life (=sex), must be a copy of something in the spirit: and when you get a faint glimpse of the latter, of course you find it like the former: an Original *is* like its copy: a man *is* like his portrait. (*Letters to Arthur*, 338-339)

His interpretation here is that, though sex gives man pleasure, the sexual pleasure is only a copy of some real pleasure which must exist elsewhere, and because it is a mere copy, it cannot give him real satisfaction but sooner or later reveals its deficiency or irrelevancy. He says, "You might as well offer a mutton chop to a man who is dying of thirst as offer sexual pleasure to the desire I am speaking of [...]. My feeling could rather have been expressed in the words, 'Quite. I see. But haven't we wandered from the real point?' Joy is not a substitute for sex; sex is very often a substitute for Joy. I sometimes wonder whether all pleasures are not substitutes for Joy" (*Joy*, 137-138).

After the disillusionment with sexual pleasure, Lewis turned to occultism, mistaking the occult fever for the essence of "Joy". But soon again, he realized that the occult had nothing to do with his "Joy".

When he saw that neither sex nor the occult was the thing he was after, he consciously proceeded to ask himself if "Joy" itself was what he wanted, pretending to be able to answer "Yes." However, it seemed to him that, "Joy proclaimed, 'You want--I myself am your want of--something other, outside, not you nor any state of you'" (*Joy*, 76).

* * *

Since then, through other paths than his "imaginative life", largely by way of reasoning, he eventually came to believe in an Absolute existence, having realized that "we have, so to speak, a root in the Absolute, which is the utter reality" (*Joy*, 177). Yet, even then, he did not think the Absolute existence to be personal, nor did he expect any possibility that man should ever encounter "the Absolute". However, when he was praying to it, calling it "the Spirit", he had God's revelation.

Perhaps, even now, my Absolute Spirit still differed in some way from the God of religion. The real issue was not, or not yet, there. The real terror was that if you seriously believed in even such a "God" or "Spirit" as I admitted, a wholly new situation developed.[...]Now a philosophical theorem, cerebrally entertained, began to stir and heave and throw off its graveclothes, and stood upright and became a living presence. I was to be allowed to play at philosophy no longer.[...] He only said, "I am the Lord"; "I am that I am"; "I am." (*Joy*, 181)

Lewis says that before his conversion he had always wanted "not to be 'interfered with.'" He says, "I had wanted (mad wish) 'to call my soul my own'" (*Joy*, 182). He was the type who was far more anxious to avoid suffering than to achieve delight. However, God did not allow him to remain his own.

I had pretty well known that my ideal of virtue would never be allowed to lead me into anything intolerably painful; I would be "reasonable." But now what had been an ideal became a command.[...] Total surrender, the absolute leap in the dark, were demanded. The reality with which no treaty can be made was upon me.[...] In the Trinity Term of 1929 I gave in, and admitted that God was God, and knelt and prayed: perhaps, that night, the most dejected and reluctant convert in all England. (*Joy*, 182)

Thus, the personal encounter with God finally made him believe in the Christian God who is the Creator and Lord of the world.

The fact that Lewis feels as if Joy itself spoke shows the strength of its impression and the autonomy Lewis feels in "Joy". Perhaps partly because of this autonomous, influential nature, Lewis came to think that "Joy" has been given from the outside by God to lead him to Christianity. Because the desire of "Joy" had never been satisfied, nor had he been able to find what this desire was really for, he was just forced to continue his spiritual pursuit; yet, as he writes in *Surprised by Joy*, after his conversion, "the subject [of Joy] has lost nearly all interest" (*Joy*, 190) for him; and he somehow finds this to be a proof that, after all, "Joy" has been a pointer to heaven:

It was valuable only as a pointer to something other and outer. While that other was in doubt, the pointer naturally loomed large in my thoughts. When we are lost in the woods the sight of a signpost is a great matter.[...] But when we have found the road and are passing signposts every few miles, we shall not stop and stare. (*Joy*, 190)

He came to regard "Joy" not only as an indication of the existence of heaven but as a foretaste of pleasures to be enjoyed there. It is a medium with which to get a glimpse of supernatural reality. He even thinks that all the pleasures of earth are reflections of those in heaven.

Pleasures are shafts of the glory as it strikes our sensibility. As it impinges on our will or our understanding, we give it different names- -goodness or truth or the like. But its flash upon our senses and mood is pleasure. (*Malcolm*, 89)

From what has been seen above, we can conclude that imagination for Lewis is, first of all, a faculty that leads man to God through the ever unsatisfied desire.

It is characteristic of Lewis, by the way, that he thus compares his "Joy" to a signpost for the travellers on earth. As a metaphor, it gives an impression that the object of the longing is God's country, rather than God Himself, because the thing a signpost is pointing at is always a place, not a person. His "Joy" always seems to have been like a yearning for some faraway unknown land. Lewis's early poems in *Spirits in Bondage*, published in 1919, before his conversion to Christianity and before he came to believe in heaven, already show his longing for an unknown paradise. In such expressions as "Ah, sweet, [...] If you could flee away/ Into some other country beyond the rosy West,/ To hide in the deep forests and be for ever at rest/ From the rankling hate of God and the outworn world's decay" ("Ode For New Year's Day," ll. 43-46,) (*Spirits*, 15), or "by the very God, we know, we know/ That somewhere still, beyond the Northern snow/ Waiting for us the red-rose gardens blow" ("Songs of the Pilgrims," ll. 64-66,) (*Spirits*, 49), or "Beyond the western ocean's glow,/ Whither the faerie galleys steer" ("Ballade Mystique," ll.26-28,) (*Spirits*, 54), we see that Lewis held such yearning continuously, both when he was conceiving God as something hostile to man and after he came to believe in God. As is often pointed out, Lewis's idea of "Joy" is strongly influenced by the Platonic idea of *anamnesis*, or the soul's yearning recollection of heaven which is its real home.³ In fact, in Lewis's fiction, the motif of "Joy" always appears as that of a longing for God's country. In *The Pilgrim's Regress*,

³ Cf. e.g., Lee Alan Brewer, "The Anthropology of Choice," Diss. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary 1989, pp. 83-84; Plato, *Phaedrus*, in *Plato I*, tr. H. N. Fowler, Loeb Classical Library (Harvard Univ. Press; 1914; rpt. 1982), p. 483.

it is expressed as a yearning for a far away island. In the science-fiction trilogy, it is the protagonist Ransom's nostalgic feeling for Perelandra (i.e. Venus) in the heaven. In *The Chronicles of Narnia*, this longing takes the form of longing for the Creator Aslan's country or for Narnia. In *Till We Have Faces*, a retold version of the myth of Amor and Psyche, we see Psyche's yearning for the Gray Mountain where the God lives.

What is also important is the fact that Lewis finds "Joy" to be not merely a pointer to heaven but also as a sort of proof of its existence. For, he infers, if nothing on earth seemed to satisfy "Joy", then it must be because it is the desire for something beyond this natural world, that is, for heaven, and therefore heaven must exist. His reasoning is based on the logic that there cannot be any desire where there is no possible satisfaction:

A man's physical hunger does not prove that that man will get any bread; he may die of starvation on a raft in the Atlantic. But surely a man's hunger does prove that he comes of a race which repairs its body by eating and inhabits a world where eatable substances exist. In the same way, though I do not believe (I wish I did) that my desire for Paradise proves that I shall enjoy it, I think it a pretty good indication that such a thing exists and that some men will. ("The Weight of Glory," *Toast*, 99)

As the words "a pretty good indication" imply, this argument falls short of a logically indisputable proof. It presupposes that everything in the world, including such a desire, has a sufficient reason for its existence, and this presupposition in its turn presupposes a certain Designer of the world, who makes nothing without a purpose. Such a Designer must actually be God. It is to be noted here that Lewis's logic has fallen into the similar mistake that Kant has made (at least, I believe Kant is mistaken) in presupposing immortality of soul and existence of God as necessary conditions of the goodness and realization of the moral ideal: Kant needs to postulate eternity because in this world, no one in his short lifetime can fulfill all the moral obligations that his conscience perceives and therefore there must be a place where man can fulfill them; and Kant also needs to postulate God because there must be someone who justifies the moral law, giving happiness in heaven, if not on earth, to those who try to obey the law conscientiously; though, different from Lewis, Kant avowedly concedes that his belief

is only subjective.⁴ In short, Kant believes that good deeds which are unfulfilled or unrewarded on earth must be fulfilled and rewarded in heaven, and therefore heaven exists. Similarly, Lewis believes his “unsatisfied desire” must be satisfied in heaven, and therefore heaven exists.

In fact, such logic is based on the traditional orthodox belief in the ultimate justice and reasonableness of the universe. However, if we doubt this belief, there is no necessity to believe that every good deed should bring some reward, or that every desire should have the possibility of satisfaction. It may even be that without first postulating some righteous Creator or Designer, it is difficult to believe in such justice or satisfaction as Kant and Lewis conceive. Therefore, although Lewis seems to believe that his logic is sound enough to prove the existence of heaven, or at least to substantiate it, those who do not share this underlying belief in the ultimate rationality of the universe may not find his logic acceptable. However, those people should at least understand that it is because of the fundamental difference in their opinion about the logos of the universe that Lewis’s logic seems insufficient to them.

<Joy as a Romantic Longing>

In the history of English literature, the poets best known to have made much of imagination as one of the highest human faculties are the Romantics such as Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, and Keats. And with them, Lewis as an imaginative man shares many characteristics. Although most of the Romantics are generally considered as modern rather than classical writers, and although Lewis as the professor of Medieval and Renaissance English Literature presents himself to be an “Old Western” man, describing himself as a remnant from the Middle Ages who reads medieval texts with the same mental constitutions as people of medieval times (“*De Descriptione Temporum*,” *Selected Essays*, 14), it is interesting that his Romanticism and medievalism do not clash to exclude each other.

Experiences similar to his “Joy” are common to many English Romantics.

⁴ Cf. Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, WerkeIV: Schriften zur Ethik und Religionsphilosophiem*, herausgegeben von Wilhelm Weischedel (Insel-Verlag, 1956), p. 256.

However, his experience is probably most similar to the well-known madeleine experience in Proust's *À la Recherche du Temps Perdu*, which we shall see before comparing Lewis with other English Romantics. In the first part of this long piece of spiritual journey, the narrator, on tasting a crumb of madeleine soaked in tea, is struck by a sudden strange sensation which is so strong that he is forced to think about its essence and meaning.

Mais à l'instant même où la gorgée mêlée des miettes du gâteau toucha mon palais, je tressaillis, attentif à ce qui se passait d'extraordinaire en moi. Un plaisir délicieux m'avait envahi, isolé, sans la notion de sa cause. Il m'avait aussitôt rendu les vicissitudes de la vie indifférentes, ses désastres inoffensifs, sa brèveté illusoire, de la même façon qu'opère l'amour, en me remplissant d'une essence précieuse: ou plutôt cette essence n'était pas en moi, elle était moi. J'avais cessé de me sentir médiocre, contingent, mortel. D'où avait pu me venir cette puissante joie? Je sentais qu'elle était liée au goût du thé et du gâteau, mais qu'elle le dépassait infiniment, ne devait pas être de même nature. D'où venait-elle? Que signifiait-elle? Où l'appréhender? [...] Il est clair que la vérité que je cherche n'est pas en [le breuvage], mais en moi.

(No sooner had the warm liquid, and the crumbs with it, touched my palate than a shudder ran through my whole body, and I stopped, intent upon the extraordinary changes that were taking place. An exquisite pleasure had invaded my senses, but individual, detached, with no suggestion of its origin. And at once the vicissitudes of life had become indifferent to me, its disasters innocuous, its brevity illusory--this new sensation having had on me the effect which love has of filling me with a precious essence; or rather this essence was not in me, it was myself. I had ceased now to feel mediocre, accidental, mortal. Whence could it have come to me, this all-powerful joy? I was conscious that it was connected with the taste of tea and cake, but that it infinitely transcended those savours, could not, indeed, be of the same nature as theirs. Whence did it come? What did it signify? How could I seize upon and define it? [...] It is plain that the object of my quest, the truth, lies not in the cup but in myself.)⁵

In this as well as in Lewis's "Joy", the sensation is one of strong joy. It comes so suddenly without any warning as if it were from another world. In both cases it is incomprehensible and elusive. And though the sensation has lasted only a moment it leaves such a strong impression of profound meaning on the mind that the pursuit of its

⁵ Marcel Proust, *À la Recherche du Temps Perdu*, Vol. I (Gallimard, 1987), pp. 44-45 as below; the translation, *Remembrance of Things Past*, Vol. I, *Swann's Way*, tr. C. K. Scott Moncrieff (The Modern Library, 1928), p. 62.

meaning becomes the greatest concern afterwards. Proust's experience is almost the same as Lewis's.

* * *

In the preface to *The Pilgrim's Regress*, whose subtitle is *An Allegorical Apology for Christianity, Reason and Romanticism*, Lewis describes his "Joy" as "romantic" (*Regress*, 5). In that preface, he classifies what is generally called "romantic" into seven categories and emphasises that the romanticism he is concerned with in *The Pilgrim's Regress* is different from any of these, and that it refers to the "intense longing" which was the "particular recurrent experience which dominated [his] childhood and adolescence" (*Regress*, 7). On the other hand, however, his "Joy" is not totally alien to what would usually pass for the "romantic." As it has a lot in common with the madeleine experience in Proust, so has it also some quality in common with the English Romantics' concern.

Wordsworth, for example, writes in his autobiographical long poem, *The Prelude*, of having similar experiences to Lewis's "Joy". He had it when he had seen the violent anarchy in France after the Revolution and, suffering from loss of faith in human dignity, turned to Nature. In Wordsworth's case, the aesthetic feelings strike the poet mainly when he remembers certain significant experiences in his childhood. He refers to such moments as "spots of time", finding a reviving power in them.

There are in our existence spots of time,
Which with distinct pre-eminence retain
A vivifying Virtue, whence, depress'd
By false opinion and contentious thought,
Or aught of heavier or more deadly weight,
In trivial occupations, and the round
Of ordinary intercourse, our minds
Are nourished and invisibly repair'd,
[...]Such moments, worthy of all gratitude,
Are scatter'd everywhere, taking their date
From our first childhood.

(*Prelude*, 1805-6, XI, 258-276) ⁶

In such "spots of time", he feels communion between man and nature, in which

⁶ William Wordsworth, *The Prelude*, ed. Ernest de Salincourt (Oxford Univ. Press, 1926), p. 436.

something essential to human dignity is revealed to us.

[I]n life's every-day appearances
I seem'd about this period to have sight
Of a new world, a world, too, that was fit
To be transmitted and made visible
To other eyes, as having for its base
That whence our dignity originates,
That which both gives it being, and maintains
A balance, and ennobling interchange
Of action from within and from without,
The excellence, pure spirit, and best power
Both of the object seen, and eye that sees.
(*Prelude*, 1805-6, , 369-379) ⁷

As another representative English Romantic and a friend of Wordsworth, we may remember that Coleridge has also imaginative aesthetic experiences which he calls "Joy". It is a moment of harmony between man's inner world and the outer: namely, the moment of reconciliation of man and nature, similar to Wordsworth's "spots of time". Coleridge wrote to his wife:

Joy, Sara! is the Spirit & the Power,
That wedding Nature to us gives in Dower
A new Earth & new Heaven
Undreamt of by the Sensual & the Proud!
Joy is that strong Voice, Joy that luminous Cloud--
We, we ourselves rejoice!⁸

Although Lewis's "Joy" is different from Coleridge's in that Lewis's "Joy" points to a supernatural Reality while Coleridge's points to an earthly harmony, it is significant that they both call it "Joy".

James Joyce also writes about sudden revelation of hitherto unseen significance in ordinary matters. He treats it as the main theme in *Ulysses* and *Stephen Hero*, and refers to it as an "epiphany". It is a moment in which a thing reveals its essence to

⁷ Wordsworth, *The Prelude*, p. 468.

⁸ S. T. Coleridge, from "A Verse Letter to Sara Hutchinson," 4 April, 1802, *Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, Vol. II. 1801-1806, ed. Leslie Griggs (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1956), p. 798.

man, when "Its soul, its whatness, leaps to us from the vestment of its appearance."⁹

Now what is important about Lewis is that--though in all four writers above, Proust, Wordsworth, Joyce, and Lewis, the moment of revelation of hidden meaning becomes a matter of greatest importance--it is Lewis alone that has come to interpret the sense of revelation as something that is given by the supernatural God to lead man to Christianity. M. H. Abrams, discussing the romanticism in such authors as Proust and Wordsworth, says in his *Natural Supernaturalism*,

[T]he general tendency was, in divers degrees and ways, to naturalize the supernatural and to humanize the divine.[...] The Romantic enterprise was an attempt to sustain the inherited cultural order against what to many writers seemed the imminence of chaos [...]¹⁰

His argument is that the Romantic poets turn to imagination for the means to get over alienation of man from nature, or from the world in general, and that they dream to recover Paradise by means of imagination. In this, he includes T. S. Eliot in the Romantic poets as well, and we shall presently see how Eliot's romanticism has something in common with Lewis's. In Eliot's *Four Quartets*, Abrams points out, the rose garden at the beginning of "Burnt Norton" is associated with the peace and innocence of man's infancy. It is an image of the lost paradise.

The rest of *Four Quartets* is the exploration of the multiple significance of this obsessive image, figured as a spiritual quest, by land and sea and underground, for the lost but unforgotten garden.¹¹

The quest in *Four Quartets* ends with the reconciliation of all oppositions, symbolized by the reconciliation of "the past and future" in "Incarnation."¹² Yet this reconciliation of opposites in an ex-temporal dimension is a recovery of the paradise in the garden at the beginning of "Burnt Norton." And in that circular journey, Abrams sees a Christian type of the Prodigal Son: "Eliot's version of the Romantic genre of the artist's self-formative progress is also a reversion to its Christian prototype, the

⁹ James Joyce, *Stephen Hero* (Jonathan Cape, 1944), p. 218.

¹⁰ M. H. Abrams, *Natural Supernaturalism* (Norton, 1971), p. 68.

¹¹ Abrams, p. 319.

¹² T. S. Eliot, "The Dry Salvages, V," *Four Quartets*, in *The Complete Poems and Plays of T. S. Eliot* (Faber, 1969), p. 190.

Augustinian *peregrinatio vitae*.”¹³ Eliot is then different from those Romantics who pursue their ideal within this three-dimensional world in secular terms. In *Four Quartets*, for example, the timeless world which is seen through the temporal is important, not as a recovered paradise on earth, but as a metaphysical heaven.

Here, Lewis is nearer to Eliot than to Wordsworth in that he also regards the world which “Joy” seems to be pointing at as an eternal world of heaven, which is beyond this spatio-temporal world. Though the concept of God can also be seen in Wordsworth’s *Prelude*, and the significance in Joyce’s “epiphany” is metaphysical, Proust, Wordsworth and Joyce find the significance actually in this universe where they live, or to put it more precisely, within the relationship between the universe and the man who perceives its mystery. They are, in this sense, all man-centred, while Lewis’s idea of “Joy” is God-centred.

To see the difference more closely, it may be well to remark that in Proust’s case, the narrator finds the meaning of the sensation from the cake in the fact that, in the memory of such a strong sensation, he holds the past and present simultaneously within himself; for memory is a common region between the past and the present. This is significant for Proust as a poet because the recovery of the past memory has something similar to the recovery of a lost paradise, which he finds valuable enough to take up as the main theme of his greatest work. He even finds his identity as a poet in that recovery.

Oui, si le souvenir, grâce à l’oubli, n’a pu contracter aucun lien, jeter aucun chaînon entre lui et la minute présente,[...] il nous fait tout à coup respirer un air nouveau, précisément parce que c’est un air qu’on a respiré autrefois [...] car les vrais paradis sont les paradis qu’on a perdus.[...]

[L]a cause de cette félicité, du caractère de certitude avec lequel elle s’imposait [...] cette cause, je la devinais en comparant ces diverses impressions bienheureuses et qui avaient entre elles ceci de commun que je les éprouvais à la fois dans le moment actuel et dans un moment éloigné, [...] au vrai, l’être qui alors goûtait en moi cette impression la goûtait en ce qu’elle avait de commun dans un jour ancien et maintenant, dans ce qu’elle avait d’extra-temporel[...].

(Yes: if, owing to the work of oblivion, the returning memory can throw no bridge, form no connecting link between itself and the present minute [...] it causes us suddenly to breathe a new air, an air which is new precisely because we have

¹³ Abrams, 322.

breathed it in the past [...] since the true paradises are the paradises that we have lost.[...]

[T]he cause of this felicity which I had just experienced,[...]the character of the certitude with which it imposed itself.[...] this cause I began to divine as I compared these diverse happy impressions, diverse yet with this in common, that I experienced them at the present moment and at the same time in the context of a distant moment[...]. The truth surely was that the being within me which had enjoyed these impressions had enjoyed them because they had in them something that was common to a day long past and to the present, because in some way they were extra-temporal[...].¹⁴

Georges Poulet points out that the phenomenon of “memory” was a discovery of the 18th century.¹⁵ Since that time, philosophers have come to realize that a man’s consciousness of his own existence depends not only on his present sensations but also on the memory of his past sensations and experiences. “To exist, then, is to be one’s present, and also to be one’s past and one’s recollections.”¹⁶ The characteristic of the romantics is, according to Poulet, the consciousness that our existence consists of two lives: the life at the present moment and the life in our memory. We live these two lives simultaneously. “It is as if to exist meant to live two lives at the same time: the life lived day by day; and the life lived before and beyond the day or the moment: a life which lengthens into duration.”¹⁷ However, those early romantics also have found that we human beings are almost incapable of remembering and expressing the essential part of our experience. Such awareness has deprived people of their self-identity, tearing it into the momentary present existence, the extinct past existence and yet unrealized future existence. Poulet says, “To possess his life in the moment is the pretension or the fundamental desire of the romantic.”

Sometimes in a kind of lightning flash a moment seems to bring him what he looks for. In communing with nature, in merging himself in love with a being similar but nevertheless different, man can project and find reflected again from

¹⁴ Marcel Proust, *À la recherche du temps perdu*, Vol. III (Gallimard, 1983) pp. 870-871. The translation, *Remembrance of Things Past*, Vol. III, tr. C. K. Scott Moncrieff, Terence Kilmartin, and Andreas Mayor (1981;rpt. Penguin, 1989), pp. 903-904.

¹⁵ Georges Poulet, *Studies in Human Time*, tr. Elliott Coleman (Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), pp. 23-24.

¹⁶ Poulet, p. 24.

¹⁷ Poulet, p.25.

without the total image of his being.[...] More often still, [...] the mind is able to feel an entire past reborn within itself. This past, together with the whole train of its emotions, surges up in the moment and endows it with a life that is not momentary.¹⁸

In such a course of history of the concept of time and memory, it is natural that a twentieth-century writer should be eager to know the meaning of his aesthetic experience. Proust is typical of such Romantics as those discussed by Poulet in that he recognizes his own identity in that recollected experience, regarding it as something that gives significance to his present existence.

Yet, in contrast to Proust, Lewis has never thought that the aesthetic experience of his "Joy" has anything to do with his personal identity, or with his *raison d'être* as a writer. The recollected experience has never seemed to him important because of its influence upon his present consciousness or upon his present self. To Lewis, the glory of remembered beauty lies in its being a foretaste of resurrection.

[T] he glorified body of the resurrection as I conceive it--the sensuous life raised from its death--will be inside the soul. As God is not in space but space is in God. [...] Wordsworth's landscape "apparelled in celestial light" may not have been so radiant in the past when it was present as in the remembered past. That is the beginning of the glorification.[...] Thus in the sense-bodies of the redeemed the whole New Earth will arise. The same, yet not the same, as this. It was sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption. (*Malcolm*, 122)

Lewis is aware of both similarity and difference between other Romantics and himself. For instance, he finds Wordsworth's "spots of time" to be similar to his experience of "Joy", while he also sees that Wordsworth is different from him in his final attitudes towards such aesthetic experiences. He remarks that Wordsworth is clinging too much to the memory of past emotion and mistaking the pointer for the real object.

Wordsworth, I believe, made this mistake all his life. I am sure that all that sense of the loss of vanished vision which fills *The Prelude* was itself vision of the same kind, if only he could have believed it. (*Joy*, 135)

¹⁸ Poulet, p.27.

Of course, *The Prelude* is far more than a mere lamentation for lost feelings. Wordsworth eventually finds comfort and recovers his mental health in the communion with nature. Yet, Lewis thinks Wordsworth should have gone farther so as to attain a Christian belief.

Wordsworthian contemplation can be the first and lowest form of recognition that there is something outside ourselves which demands reverence. To return to Pantheistic errors about the nature of this something would, for a Christian, be very bad. But once again, for “the man coming up from below” the Wordsworthian experience is an advance. Even if he goes no further he has escaped the worst arrogance of materialism: if he goes on he will be converted. (“Christianity and Culture,” *Christian Reflections*, 22)

As a pointer to heaven, or to Christianity, we see that Lewis’s “Joy” is rather alike to St. Augustine’s longing for God which is well known to be expressed thus in *The Confessions*:

The thought of you stirs him [i.e., man] so deeply that he cannot be content unless he praises you, because you made us for yourself and our hearts find no peace until they rest in you.¹⁹

Augustine finds peace of mind for the first time when he is converted, with the feeling that he at last finds what he has wanted throughout his life. This is exactly the case with Lewis.

<Lewis’s Theory of Imagination Compared with Coleridge’s
Romantic Theory of Imagination>²⁰

Lewis’s theory of imagination can be classified as Romantic also because it has a lot in common with Coleridge’s, which is a representative of English Romantic theory of imagination in the 19th century. What is especially important is the fact that both hold imagination to be a bridge between the supernatural and us. In *Biographia*

¹⁹ St. Augustine, *The Confessions*, tr. R. S. Pine-Coffin (Penguin, 1961; rpt. 1971), p. 21.

²⁰ Cf. besides Coleridge’s own works, esp. Owen Barfield, *What Coleridge Thought* (Wesleyan Univ. Press, 1971); James D. Boulger, *Coleridge as Religious Thinker* (Yale Univ. Press, 1961); and John Spencer Hill, *Imagination in Coleridge* (Macmillan, 1978).

Literaria, Coleridge defines the faculty of imagination as follows:

The IMAGINATION then I consider either as primary, or secondary. The primary IMAGINATION I hold to be *the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM.* The secondary I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in *degree*, and in the *mode* of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create[...].(the first italics mine)²¹

The primary imagination is here seen as a faculty of perception.

In his marginalia in Tennemann's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, Coleridge has written down a philosophical scale with a note:²²

<i>Lowest</i>	<i>Highest</i>	
Sense	Reason	Fancy and Imagination
Fancy	Imagination	are Oscillations, this
Understanding	Understanding	connecting R[eason]
-----		and U[nderstanding];
Understanding	Understanding	that connecting Sense
Imagination	Fancy	and Understanding.
Reason	Sense	

Sense, fancy, understanding, imagination and reason are all means of perception. Each of them has a necessary part to play both in the experience of Nature and in the recognition of metaphysical truth. Miscellaneous sensations of the physical senses are not yet knowledge of the external world. They are related in fancy, judged and understood by understanding as a phenomenon, given mental images in imagination, and weighed in relation to the other ideas in reason so that they become a part of the whole personal knowledge. Conversely, abstract ideas in reason are understood or conveyed well for the first time when they are given images by imagination.

In Coleridge's system, as is shown above, imagination is the mediatory faculty between reason and understanding. "Understanding" is "the faculty judging according

²¹ Coleridge, *The Collected Works*, Vol. VII, *Biographia Literaria*, I, eds. James Engell and W. Jackson Bate (Princeton Univ. Press, 1983), p. 304.

²² Coleridge, *Coleridge on the Seventeenth Century*, ed. R. F. Brinkley. (1955; Greenwood Press, 1968), pp. 693-694; quoted in Hill, p. 177.

to sense.”²³ Yet it is short of comprehensive knowledge, because it “concerns itself exclusively with the quantities, qualities, and relations of particulars in time and space”²⁴ so that the knowledge through it is limited. Coleridge says, “The UNDERSTANDING, therefore, is the science of phenomena, [...]. The REASON, on the other hand, is the science of the universal, having the ideas of ONENESS and ALLNESS as its two elements or primary factors.”²⁵

Between these two faculties, imagination works three ways: for the first thing, in experience of the physical world, the primary imagination builds images of the external world which has been understood by understanding, and then conveys the images to reason. This building of images of Nature in the mind of man is what Coleridge maintains in *Biographia Literaria* as “a repetition [...] of the eternal act of creation.” In this, the imagination is “the living power,” because it is the power of “*natura naturans*” that produces and sustains “*natura naturata*” in mind.²⁶ Secondly, it discerns beauty, whose essence is harmony, or “Multĕity in unity.”²⁷ Besides, it not only discerns unity in multitude, but also has “the effect of reducing multitude to unity.”²⁸ Its mediatory nature in this function lies in the fact that “multĕity” is the characteristic of perception through the understanding, while unity or allness is the characteristic of ideas in reason. And thirdly, it conveys metaphysical ideas from reason to the understanding. “An IDEA [...] cannot be conveyed but by a *symbol*,”²⁹ and symbols are works of imagination. Thus, Coleridge calls imagination “that reconciling and mediatory power, which incorporating the Reason in Images of the Sense, and organizing (as it were) the flux of the Senses by the permanence and self-circling energies of the Reason, gives birth to a system of symbols, harmonious in themselves, and consubstantial with the truths, of which they are the *conductors*.”³⁰ When he says this, he seems even to be implying some mythical eucharistic power in imagination, since the words

²³ Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, (1825; rpt. G. Bell and Sons, 1913), p. 143.

²⁴ Coleridge, *The Statesman's Manual in The Collected Works*, Vol. VI, *Lay Sermons* (Princeton Univ. Press, 1972), p. 59.

²⁵ Coleridge, *The Statesman's Manual* pp. 59-60.

²⁶ Barfield, *What Coleridge Thought*, p. 80.

²⁷ Coleridge, *Biographia*, II, p. 23, note.

²⁸ Coleridge, *Biographia*, II, p. 23.

²⁹ Coleridge, *Biographia*, I, p. 156.

³⁰ Coleridge, *The Statesman's Manual*, p. 29.

“consubstantial” and “consubstantiation” especially reminds us of the Eucharist. Just as in the Eucharist ordinary bread and wine are supposed to become “consubstantial” with Christ (the Truth),³¹ in and through imagination, symbols are made to be consubstantial with the truth. Thus, as the intermediary faculty between reason and understanding, the primary imagination works to make the external nature into internal thought, and to make internal thought into the external symbols. Therefore, we see that Coleridge and Lewis are of the same opinion that imagination is a power of intuitive perception as well as a power of creation.

However, there are also differences between Lewis’s idea of imagination as intuition and Coleridge’s. Coleridge sees *imago Dei* even in man’s perceptive imagination, which he thinks to be active and creative. Coleridge’s idea is expressed in his letter to Thomas Poole on 23 March 1801, where he criticizes Newton for taking human mind always as passive. In his opinion, the perceiving mind in man is “made in God’s Image, & that too in the sublimest sense--the Image of the *Creator*”³² because it is the builder of mental images of “*natura naturata*”.

On the other hand, for Lewis the intuitive imagination is not God’s image, but rather the passive medium through which God reveals Himself to man. In *The Pilgrim’s Regress*, God tells John, “For this end I made your senses and for this end your imagination, that you might see My face and live” (*Regress*, 171). Man’s perceptive imagination is here regarded as a receptive faculty, not any creative faculty in the image of God the Creator.

This lack of the idea of *imago Dei* in Lewis comes from his consciousness of radical difference between man’s life and divine life. Jesus is the only one who is a Man and yet shares God’s life as the Son. In *Mere Christianity*, Lewis insists this difference. Man is “made” while the Son is “begotten” (134); and, just as a man’s artifact does not share human life while his son inherits his human life, man, as an artifact of God, does not partake the same kind of life with God the Maker (134-135).


³¹ The literalness of the idea of consubstantiation in the Eucharist is highly controversial and I shall not enter far into that problem here. Instead, I treat it just as a significant Christian tradition which has had great influence on Coleridge and other English poets.

³² Coleridge, *Collected Letters*, Vol. , p. 709.

Our natural self is not *imago Dei* even though we can be sons of God as regenerated “New Men” (*Mere Christianity*, 181) when we wish and continuously try, with God’s assistance, to be like the Son of God both in will and in behaviour (cf. *Mere Christianity*, 157-159).

Lewis and Coleridge are different also in their idea of relation between reason and imagination. Coleridge attributes to reason the power of “an Inward Beholding” of the “Spiritual.”³³ In Coleridge’s system, imagination does not perceive the spiritual truth directly but receives it through reason. However, in Lewis, imagination itself has direct access to divine revelation.

In Lewis’s system, both reason and imagination directly concern themselves with divine reality, and that, in different ways. Therefore, Lewis’s imagination is not opposite of reason nor in a lower position than it, but works side by side with reason, showing God’s reality to man.



* As an intuition that gives meanings to language activities, imagination also works to make logical thinking possible. We shall come back to discuss this process in the next section.

Now, we have seen that Lewis’s idea of imagination as intuitive power is similar to Coleridge’s idea of “primary imagination”, though they are not the same. Yet it is not the only similarity between their imagination theories. Lewis’s idea of imagination as creative power is similar to Coleridge’s idea of the “secondary imagination”. Lewis says that creative activity in man’s imaginative mind has “something that bears a faint resemblance” (*Miracles*, 36) to God’s creation of Nature, as Coleridge holds the secondary imagination to be an echo of the primary imagination.

³³ Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, p. 148.

Besides, as Coleridge holds that the secondary imagination is so limited in its creative power that it needs some materials which it “dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create,” Lewis is also conscious of the limitation of man’s creative power and its inferiority to God’s real creativity:

We fall short of creation in two ways. In the first place we can only re-combine elements borrowed from the real universe: no one can imagine a new primary colour or a sixth sense. In the second place, what we imagine exists only for our own consciousness--though we can, by words, induce other people to build for themselves pictures in their own minds which may be roughly similar to it. (*Miracles*, 36-37)

As is shown here, the differences Lewis finds between God’s creation and man’s are both in the “mode of operation” and in “degree”, which are exactly what Coleridge finds when he compares the “secondary imagination” to the “primary”, that is, to the repetition of God’s creation. Especially important is the fact that they both hold man’s creative power of imagination to be synthetic and incapable of creating *ex nihilo*.

Especially, when we see Lewis’s idea of creative imagination closely in the context of man’s relation to God, we find that Lewis even denies that man can ever be original in his imaginative activity. He says, “‘Originality’ in the New Testament is quite plainly the prerogative of God alone [...]. The duty and happiness of every other being is placed in being derivative, in reflecting like a mirror” (“Christianity and Literature,” *Christian Reflections*, 6). The faculty of man’s creative imagination is thus mimetic. This limitation shows us our status and duty as God’s creatures. Man’s art is valuable only as a reflection of God’s creation.

<Imagination as the Organ of Meaning>

We have seen that “Joy” in his imaginative life leads Lewis to the belief in heaven, which he identifies with the Real World. And in this sense, Lewis finds our imagination to be a faculty to show us Reality.

For Lewis, aesthetic experiences are initiations to Christian life. For instance, he finds his devotion to Wagnerian gods to have been training for the devotion to the real God. When he was a child, he had never understood why the Prayer Book told him to “give thanks to God for His great glory” (*Joy*, 65), rather than for any particular benefit

God conferred upon man. Yet, with the Wagnerian gods, he learned “something very like adoration, some kind of quite disinterested self-abandonment to an object which securely claimed this by simply being the object it was” (*Joy*, 65). Such adoration and self-abandonment are essential in man’s relation to God.

Secondly, he finds that Nature shows him God’s glory. And this is also through imagination. Nature first became important for him as a reminder of scenes and characters in *the Nibelung Saga*, yet soon ceased to be a mere reminder and became itself a medium of “Joy”. In *The Four Loves* he says,

Nature never taught me that there exists a God of glory and of infinite majesty.[...]
But nature gave the word glory a meaning for me. I still do not know where else
I could have found one. (*Four Loves*, 23)

Later, he writes that “the beauties of nature” are “a secret God has shared with us alone” (*Malcolm*, 18). Animals do not know it. It is only we human beings who feel the glory of God through our senses. Thus, once he has become a believer, he finds his appreciation of nature to have been a good initiation to Christian life.

Thirdly, his love for northern mythology, which also became a catalyst of “Joy”, has made it easier for him to accept Christian myth. Lewis later came to understand Christianity as the myth which has become fact, and this belief is partly owing to the significance that he has seen in northern mythology (cf. e.g. “Myth Became Fact,” *God*, 66).

In this section, we shall see that there is yet another sense in which Lewis sees imagination as a faculty of grasping Reality. As we have seen, he says, “[P]leasures are shafts of the glory as it strikes our sensibility” (*Malcolm*, 89). Aesthetic pleasures are, for him, a concrete objectivity which comes from God and shows us His magnificence through our sensibility. In Lewis’s opinion, this “sensibility” is, as the receptacle of aesthetic pleasures, a faculty connected to imagination. Not only spiritual pleasures but also sensual ones convey meanings, and it is by imagination that those meanings are apprehended.

It is interesting to see that Kant sometimes uses the word “*ästhetisch*”³⁴ as a

³⁴ Cf. Kant, *Kritic der Reinen Vernunft*, herausgegeben von Raymund Schmidt (Felix Meiner, 1956), p.11

synonym of “intuitive” and (probably from the Greek *αισθητικός*=aesthetic, sensitive; *αισθησις*=sense, sensation) as a near synonym of “sensuous”, especially when it refers to apprehensive, intuitive recognition of the outer world which gives data to the faculty of logical thinking which, in turn, synthesizes such “*ästhetisch*” data to get comprehensive understanding. For Kant, however, as to many people today, aesthetic perception is a matter of subjectivity. For instance, he says in „*Über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen*“:

Die verschiedenene Empfindungen des Vergnügens, oder des Verdrusses, beruhen nicht so sehr auf der Beschaffenheit der äußeren Dinge die sie erregen, als auf das jedem Menschen eigene Gefühl, dadurch mit Lust oder Unlust gerührt zu werden. (The various feelings of enjoyment or of displeasure rest not so much upon the nature of the external things that arouse them as upon each person’s own disposition to be moved by these to pleasure or pain.)³⁵

It is significant that Lewis’s case is just the opposite. Lewis is an objectivist. He holds that aesthetic sensation is given directly from God, and therefore it has an objectivity derived from the real objectivity of its source. It gives us direct information of heaven. He says that as we do not hear the roar of wind merely as a meaningless noise but know the wind from it, so it is “possible to ‘read’ as well as to ‘have’ a pleasure.”

The distinction ought to become, and sometimes is, impossible; to receive it and to recognise its divine source are a single experience.[...] This sweet air whispers of the country from whence it blows. It is a message. (*Malcolm*, 89-90)

* * *

The third sense in which Lewis calls Imagination “the organ of meaning” is as a means of communication of Reality. This is based on his view that metaphors are fundamental to all linguistic activities without which even no logical thinking can stand. In “Bluspels and Flalansferes,” he argues that man is not capable of purely abstract thinking and therefore has to use some metaphor or analogy whenever he thinks of

³⁵ Kant, *Werke I: Vorkritische Schriften bis 1768* (Insel-Verlag, 1960), p. 825: English translation by John T. Goldthwait, *Observations On the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* (1960; rpt. Univ. of California Press, 1981), p. 45.

something beyond his sensual experience (“Bluspels,” *Selected Essays*, 264-265).

Lewis presents two cases where metaphors are necessary. The first is when we try to express something we ourselves do not understand clearly. The second case is when we try to explain something that we clearly know to those who do not know it. In both cases, without being accompanied by some mental images, the idea remains not only abstract but actually nonsense, and it is imagination that builds mental images with metaphors or analogies so as to concretely express ideas about something unknown by comparison to something clearly known. Therefore, imagination is necessary to acquire knowledge about anything beyond sensual experiences. In the case of things within our experiences, we may be able to perceive them directly, but still, he says, “When we pass beyond pointing to individual sensible objects, when we begin to think of causes, relations, of mental states or acts, we become incurably metaphorical” (“Bluspels,” 263).

Lewis is thus aware of the importance of metaphors and figures in conceptual thinking, and critical about such philosophers as Kant and Spinoza on the ground that their writings are too abstract to have any real meaning (“Bluspels,” 264-265). He makes much more of Plato and says Plato introduces you to “the great creators of metaphor, and therefore [...] the masters of meaning” (“Bluspels,” 265). Since Lewis holds metaphorical thinking as more meaningful than abstract thinking, he even says, for example, “[A] man who says heaven and thinks of the visible sky is pretty sure to mean more than a man who tells us that heaven is a state of mind” (“Bluspels,” 265), though of course, he does not say that all the metaphorical ideas acquired through imagination are physical truth. He says,

[I]t must not be supposed that I am in any sense putting forward the imagination as the organ of truth. We are not talking of truth, but of meaning: meaning which is the antecedent condition both of truth and falsehood, whose antithesis is not error but nonsense.[...] Imagination, producing new metaphors or revivifying old, is not the cause of truth, but its condition. (“Bluspels,” 265)

In 1989, fifty years after Lewis’s “Bluspels and Flalansferes” was first published in 1939, the idea of imagination as the organ of meaning was again proposed in the field of literary criticism by Colin Falck in his *Myth, Truth and Literature* (1989). Between Lewis and Falck, there have been Saussurian literary theory, Structuralism and

post-Structuralism which concentrate on logical or scientific analysis of the text and neglect the questions as to how literary texts and language relate to the dimension of reality. Falck argues against this tendency of modern literary criticisms, insisting that they should allow for the function of imagination that relates sensory perceptions to the language system by giving meaning to sense data:

The notion of the *emerging* of meaning is almost entirely unmarked in our serious thinking, and tends instead to be confined to the--philosophically disreputable--level of folk-wisdom or religious superstition in the form of such notions as "intuition," "hunch," "presentiment," or "sixth sense." [...] Language [...] arises out of, and must continue to rest on, this level of pre-linguistic awareness of other presences--both animate and inanimate--which co-exist with us in the world around us.[...]

All consciousness, we could say, is oriented towards meaning in this fundamental sense, and can only come into existence through the meaning which reveals itself, or is revealed, in this primary process of meaning-creation. It is in fact the revelation of some meaning in reality which makes consciousness possible. This purposiveness, or orientation to meaning, is a pre-subjective and pre-objective intentionality which lies below the level of thought and of the conscious intentions of ordinary life.³⁶

This is almost the same as what Lewis says above. Lewis's argument has not become out of date but still throws light on the problem of alienation of literary criticism from the dimension of reality.

In the idea of imagination as "the organ of meaning," Lewis owes much to Owen Barfield, one of his lifelong friends since their student days at Oxford and the author of *Poetic Diction*. Around the time between 1928 and 1932 Lewis and Barfield held a long enthusiastic debate on imagination, and Lewis acknowledges the influence he has got from Barfield thus: "I think he changed me a good deal more than I him. Much of the thought which he afterwards put into *Poetic Diction* had already become mine before that important little book appeared" (*Joy*, 161).

In the book Barfield argues as follows:

[P]oetic, and *apparently* 'metaphorical' values were latent in meaning from the beginning.[...] that the earliest words in use were 'the names of sensible, material

³⁶ Colin Falck, *Myth, Truth and Literature* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989), pp. 15; 37.

objects' and *nothing more* [...] you must suppose that they were not, as they appear to be at present, isolated, or detached, from thinking and feeling. Afterwards, in the development of language and thought, these single meanings split up into contrasted pairs--the abstract and concrete, particular and general, objective and subjective.³⁷

His point is that even the meanings of those words which seem purely abstract or metaphorical now were concrete and literal in their origin. Though the figurative origin of a word tends to be forgotten in the course of time, and the word will come to appear as a pure concept, its figurative origin will keep its influence on the meaning of the word, never allowing it to be purely abstract in fact. Here, it is imagination that originally finds adequate figures for the things or concepts to be expressed.

Lionel Aday reported from the letters between Lewis and Barfield that at first Lewis "insistently maintained, that truth or falsehood can be predicated only of intellectual judgements, never of things imagined."³⁸ Yet afterwards he came to admit "to having under-estimated importance [of metaphor]. In so far as metaphor brings before the mind images or representations of objects, metaphor, he agrees, gives life to abstractions otherwise lifeless."³⁹ Furthermore, Aday points out, "[H]e was influenced by Barfield's arguments even where he refused to change his mind.[...] [H]e continued to insist that imagination conveyed meaning, not truth. Nevertheless he based his fiction [...] on the assumption that divine truth enters the human psyche via myth, dream or other manifestation of imagination."⁴⁰

Thus, Lewis later holds that the validity of our thinking rests upon the validity of our imagination's intuitive power: It is only as long as the analogies and metaphors are proper that they serve the meaning well and make our thinking valid, and it is only when imagination has real power to apprehend the essence of things that the analogies and metaphors will be proper:

[I]f those original equations, between good and light, or evil and dark, between

³⁷ Owen Barfield, *Poetic Diction*, 2nd ed. (1952; Wesleyan Univ. Press, paperbacks 1984), p. 85.

³⁸ Lionel Aday, *C. S. Lewis's "Great War" with Owen Barfield*, *English Literary Studies* (Univ. of Victoria, 1978), p. 34.

³⁹ Aday, p. 43.

⁴⁰ Aday, p. 17.

breath and soul and all the others, were from the beginning arbitrary and fanciful [...] then all our thinking is nonsensical. But we cannot, without contradiction, believe it to be nonsensical. (“Bluspels,” 265) ⁴¹

Lewis can say this because, at this point, he has come to assume all our thinking more or less depends on some metaphor. Otherwise, he could think that our thinking may be reasonable even when our metaphorical thinking is nonsensical.

Obviously under the influence of Barfield again, Lewis has become conscious of the limitation of pure reason even in the field of logic. Reason draws conclusions from already acquired data, but it does not obtain the data by itself. In *The Pilgrims Regress*, the allegorical Reason says, “I can tell you only what *you* know” (67). It is our empirical senses and intuitive imagination or some trustworthy authorities that gain the data for reason to work on. Barfield maintains that all knowledge depends on the work of the intuitive imagination that finds relations between various sense data and interprets their meaning to make up organized knowledge. Barfield says in *Poetic Diction*, “Science [...] insists on dealing with ‘data’, but there shall no data be given, save the bare percept. The rest is imagination. Only by imagination therefore can the world be known.”⁴²

Lewis has come to see that religious matters especially need imaginative language. In “The Language of Religion,” he contrasts scientific language with poetic language, including the language of philosophy and theology in the former. The scientific description gives us quantitatively precise information in abstract language; while the poetic description gives us concrete, qualitative information. Lewis holds that the language of religion, which is different from what he calls “the language of theology,” is something between the theological and the poetic, but nearer to the poetic. He says,

In it [i.e. theological language] we are attempting, so far as is possible, to state religious matter in a form more like that we use for scientific matter.[...] We are applying precise, and therefore abstract, terms to what for us is the supreme example of the concrete.[...] And this is one of the great disadvantages under

⁴¹ Here Lewis’s logic is that if our thinking is nonsensical, the belief that it is nonsensical is also to be nonsensical and therefore self-contradictory.

⁴² Barfield, *Poetic Diction*, p. 28.

which the Christian apologist labours. Apologetics [sic] is controversy. You cannot conduct a controversy in those poetical expressions which alone convey the concrete: you must use terms as definable and univocal as possible, and these are always abstract. And this means that the thing we are really talking about can never appear in the discussion at all. ("The Language of Religion," *Christian Reflections*, 135-136)

Michael Christensen in *C. S. Lewis On Scriptures* rightly points out that,

Thomas Aquinas [...] concluded that human beings can know that God is [...] but we cannot know in any precise, affirmative sense what God's essence is. The attributes of the Infinite cannot be contained in finite language or thought. Aquinas also asserted, however, that mankind [...] can speak of God in two ways. We can say what God is not (*via negativa*), thereby narrowing the possibilities of what he is. We can also approximate the nature of God by employing useful analogies (what can be termed *via analogia*). [...] Lewis concurs with Aquinas and other theologians who recognize the problem of knowledge as related to the nature of God.⁴³

Lewis says that if one tries to express God in purely abstract language, he has to use a lot of negatives. By way of illustration, he gives us an analogy:

Let us suppose a mystical limpet, [...] who (rapt in vision) catches a glimpse of what Man is like. In reporting it to his disciples, [...] [h]e will have to tell them that Man has no shell, is not attached to a rock, is not surrounded by water. And his disciples, having a little vision of their own to help them, do get some idea of Man. But then there come erudite limpets [...] What they get out of the prophetic limpet's words is simply and solely the negatives. From these, uncorrected by any positive insight, they build up a picture of Man as a sort of amorphous jelly (he has no shell) existing nowhere in particular (he is not attached to a rock) and never taking nourishment (there is no water to drift it towards him). [...] Our own situation is much like that of the erudite limpets. (*Miracles*, 93)

Thus, Lewis is conscious that man cannot know God as He really is, for He is beyond the human senses. All that man can do is imagine by analogies what God is like. He says, "Statements about God are extrapolations from knowledge of other things which the divine illumination enables us to know" (*Four Loves*, 115), and holds that both theological abstraction and concrete metaphors are important in Christianity.

⁴³ Michael Christensen, *C. S. Lewis On Scriptures* (Hodder and Stoughton, 1971), pp. 57-58.

In *Letters to Malcolm*, he says about the anthropomorphic image of God,

[I]t must be balanced by all manner of metaphysical and theological abstractions. But never [...] let us think that while anthropomorphic images are a concession to our weakness, the abstractions are the literal truth. Both are equally concessions; each singly misleading, and the two together mutually corrective. (*Malcolm*, 21)

Lewis admits that sometimes, even when the rational thought is correct, mental images that accompany that thought may fall short of reality. For instance, Lewis says that when he thinks about London, he usually has a mental picture of Euston Station. He may speak of the population of London with this picture in mind, but it does not follow that he thinks several millions of people live in that station (*Miracles*, 72-84). Yet, with the belief in the validity of human thought in general, he maintains that long-enduring traditional metaphors are valid and truly illuminating.

Actually, today, the general validity of metaphor as an objective expression of reality is not a universally accepted truth. It is based on the belief in the validity of human thought which is based on verbal activities employing human language, whether literal or metaphorical, but the objective validity of such human thought itself is today regarded as disputable. Yet, Lewis's belief in the validity of metaphor is important for him as a literary man, especially because it has a great influence on his attitude towards allegory and myth. We shall see in the next section how he believes that traditional allegory and mythology reveal some metaphysical reality.

<Allegory, Symbolism, Sacramentalism and Myth>

Coleridge does not make much of allegory. He says it is "but a translation of abstract notions into a picture-language which is itself nothing but an abstraction from objects of the senses; the principal being more worthless even than its phantom proxy, both alike unsubstantial, and former shapeless to boot,"⁴⁴ while he highly values symbolism, regarding symbols as "consubstantial with the truths." However, to Lewis, allegory means much more.

In *Allegory of Love*, Lewis defines "allegory" in contrast to "symbolism". His way of contrasting them is, however, different from Coleridge's. He defines allegory

⁴⁴ Coleridge, *The Statesman's Manual*, p. 30.

as an attempt to express something immaterial in the form of personification: to embody, for example, love or two opposite views in *bellum intestinum* in human figures (*Allegory*, 55); while symbolism is an attempt to grasp and express things beyond our sensual experiences. Lewis says, "Symbolism is a mode of thought, but allegory is a mode of expression" (*Allegory*, 48).

Allegory aims at revealing the reality of things indescribable otherwise. Lewis says,

[A]ll good allegory exists not to hide but to reveal; to make the inner world more palpable by giving it an (imagined) concrete embodiment. (*Regress*, 13)

On the other hand, however, when Lewis says Allegory is a mode of expression, he does not mean that allegorical figures are arbitrary. What is expressed by allegory is the reality and essence of things and feelings, which are, in a sense, given to the author. The allegorical codes such as giants, dragons, paradises, etc. are not chosen by him but somehow imposed on him. Thus it is revelation not only to the readers but to the author himself. He does not create or invent allegorical figures in the same sense as a modern novelist creates his characters. Nor does he aim at novelty or something specific. Allegories are expressions of the universal.

About the allegorical embodiments, Lewis says, "[T]hey are more like words--the words of a language which speaks the else unspeakable--than they are like the people and places in a novel. To give them radically new characters is not so much original as ungrammatical" (*Preface*, 57). Likewise as figures in metaphor, embodiments or personifications in allegory are also attained through imagination. They are essentially undemonstrable by way of logic and yet true. Lewis says, "[W]hen allegory is at its best, it approaches myth which must be grasped with the imagination, not with the intellect" (*Regress*, 13).

* * *

As for myth, then, Lewis regards it as something above allegory. Allegory is basically some expression of what the author knows, though its traditional codes hold more significance than he knows. On the other hand, the meanings of myth are totally out of the author's control.

Lewis saw his contemporary twentieth century as an age that was dominated by a

scientific way of thinking, according to which ordinary people tended to believe that everything that exists can be proved by science. Yet, he points out, while admitting that science is important and useful as a means to grasp physical facts about the world, what science shows us is short of the comprehensive reality. For instance, the question concerning the ground of the existence of the world and human beings is beyond the means of science (*Mere Christianity*, 31). In his opinion, the comprehensive reality is to be approached not only with science but also with metaphysics and theology.

The deeply ingrained habit of truncated thought--what we call the "scientific" habit of mind--was indeed certain to lead to Naturalism, unless this tendency were continually corrected from some other source [...] men of science were coming to be metaphysically and theologically uneducated. (*Miracles*, 46)

On this awareness of insufficiency of the scientific, materialistic view of the universe, he finds validity also in such mythological models of the universe as the medieval, Ptolemaic and other myths and mythological systems. The older mythical model of the universe is a work of imagination, but it is no less true for that. On the contrary, if the metaphysical meanings of the world are ever to be attained, they may as well be attained and expressed by imagination: for Lewis regards imagination as "the organ of meaning" while taking reason as "the organ of truth" ("Bluspels and Flalansferes," *Selected Essays*, 265). The older model is a comprehensive attempt to combine as much truth and reality as possible. In many aspects it is scientifically wrong, but sometimes this is only because it gives metaphysical or theological meanings the precedence over scientific, physical facts. For instance, the earth occupies a large, central part of the cosmos in the medieval world picture. Yet, Lewis points out, this is not because the scholars of medieval and Renaissance times believed this condition accorded with geometrical facts, but because they thought it was theological truth (*Studies*, 46). Lewis says in his lecture note on the medieval model of the universe, published posthumously as *The Discarded Image*,

In every age it will be apparent to accurate thinkers that scientific theories [...] are never statements of fact. That stars appear to move in such and such ways, or that substances behaved thus and thus in the laboratory--these are statements of fact. The astronomical or chemical theory can never be more than provisional. (*Discarded*, 15-16)

Therefore, the medieval, mythopoetic, world picture, which aims at expressing both the facts and the meanings, is in a sense nearer to the whole Reality than the scientific model of the universe, which is exclusively concerned with the facts.

Ever since he was fascinated by northern mythology as a child, he felt profound significance in the world of mythologies. Therefore, it seems natural that he finds profound meanings also in the Old Western world picture with all its mythological bearings, especially after he has read much of medieval and Renaissance literature.

In holding that the medieval model of the world expresses reality in a different way but no less truly than science, he has apparently been influenced by G. K. Chesterton, especially by his *The Everlasting Man*. Lewis acknowledges the book as the one which enabled him to see “for the first time [...] the whole Christian outline of history set out in a form that seemed [...] to make sense” (*Joy*, 178). Chesterton says in defence of primitive mythology,

Moreover, even where the fables are inferior as art, they cannot be properly judged by science; still less properly judged as science. Some myths are very crude and queer like the early drawings of children; but the child is trying to draw. It is none the less an error to treat his drawing as if it were a diagram, or intended to be a diagram. The student cannot make a scientific statement about the savage, because the savage is not making a scientific statement about the world. He is saying something quite different; what might be called the gossip of the gods. We may say, if we like, that it is believed before there is time to examine it.⁴⁵

In Lewis’s view, what is expressed in myth is divine metaphysical reality. Myth comes to the author as a real revelation since it expresses “what he does not yet know and cd. [sic] not come by in any other way” (*Letters*, 271).

In his idea of allegory and myth, Lewis has again been much influenced by Owen Barfield. In *Poetic Diction*, Barfield places myth above allegory in its revelatory capacity:

The distinction between true and false metaphor corresponds to the distinction between Myth and Allegory, allegory being a more or less conscious hypostatization of *ideas*, followed by a synthesis of them, and myth the true child of Meaning, begotten on imagination.[...] The modern poet has created a new

⁴⁵ G. K. Chesterton, *The Everlasting Man* (Image Book, 1955), p. 105.

myth or made a true use of an old one, according as the myth in question is the direct embodiment of concrete experience and not of his *idea* of that experience--in which case he has only invented an allegory, or made an allegorical use of a myth, as the case may be.⁴⁶

Here in Barfield, myth is regarded as something quite beyond the narrator's control, as it is "direct embodiment of concrete experience" or true revelation of the concrete Reality.

Lewis's idea of myth can be seen most clearly in *The Pilgrim's Regress* where God tells John, the allegorical figure of the young Lewis:

The words of Wisdom are also myth and metaphor: but since they do not know themselves for what they are, in them the hidden myth is master, where it should be servant: and it is but of man's inventing. But this is My inventing. This is the veil under which I have chosen to appear even from the first until now. (*Regress*, 171)

What is said here is that such words as are used in science and those in myth are similarly metaphorical in their origin, and that mythical words are above scientific ones in that they know their own origin and how their original meaning is influencing the reader's imagination. It is also suggested that the myth of Christianity is truly revelational because it is God's own myth.

Actually, even in pagan mythology, Lewis recognizes some significant truth foreshadowing Christianity. For example, the myth of the fertility god who dies and is reborn every year is understood as a herald of the Son's Death and Resurrection. This is why he calls Christianity "Myth [which] became Fact" ("Myth Became Fact," *God*, 63).

My present view [...] would be that just as, on the factual side, a long preparation culminates in God's becoming incarnate as Man, so, on the documentary side, the truth first appears in *mythical* form and then by a long process of condensing or focusing finally becomes incarnate as History. This involves the belief that Myth in general is not merely misunderstood history [...] nor priestly lying [...]but, at its best, a real though unfocused gleam of divine truth falling on human imagination. (*Miracles*, 137-138n.)

⁴⁶ Barfield, *Poetic Diction*, p. 201.

Besides, Lewis is conscious of the limit of language in expressing reality, and thinks that a pictorial and mythical presentation sometimes conveys the reality better. He says, “[I]n a sense all words except proper names are general--too general ever to be exactly right” (*Spenser’s*, 115). In *Perelandra*, the second of his space trilogy, the protagonist Ransom finds difficulty in describing what he saw on the planet Venus.

[I]t is words that are vague. The reason why the thing can’t be expressed is that it’s too *definite* for language. (*Perelandra*, 33)

Here, the virtue of myth lies in its capacity to present such “definite” Reality concretely. Rational interpretation of myth does not reveal Reality better than myth itself, for Reality loses some of its truth when reduced to words. Lewis wrote to Arthur Greeves on 18th October 1931:

The ‘doctrines’ we get *out of* the true myth are of course *less* true: they are translations into our *concepts* and ideas of that wh. [sic] God has already expressed in a language more adequate, namely the actual incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection. (*Letters to Arthur*, 428)

He says, “What flows into you from the myth is not truth but reality (truth is always *about* something, but reality is *about which* truth is)” (“Myth Became Fact,” *God*, 66). In fact, it is only those stories which reveal metaphysical reality that Lewis calls “myth”. If a story fails to call our attention to such reality, or the Real World, Lewis does not see it as a myth even when it is generally accepted as such.

In *An Experiment in Criticism* (43-44), Lewis goes even so far as to define myths by their effect on the reader. According to Lewis, a myth is first of all “extra-literary”; that is, its story has a value and moving power in itself, independent of the style and quality of its narrative. Secondly, it introduces the reader to a permanent, rather than temporal, object of contemplation. Thirdly, the story is to be preternatural, and the reader never projects himself into the characters. Finally, the experience of reading a myth is always grave and awe-inspiring. It is numinous. He says that the same story may be a myth to one man and not to another because the effect of the same book is various on different readers: “The degree to which any story is a myth depends very largely on the person who hears or reads it” (48). Therefore, there are those who never

read stories as myths. This view of Lewis is accorded with Jesus' attitude in teaching people by parables. Jesus said to his audience, "He who has ears to hear, let him hear!" (Mark, 4:9, *NKJV*) One may hear his story and yet failed to see its hidden metaphorical connotation. Whether or not one can receive God's message depends on that person's readiness, or condition.

As Lewis thus defines myths by their effects rather than by the author's intention, his idea may be regarded as a forerunner of receptionist theory. Yet he concentrates on the reader probably because he believes that myth reveals reality even when the author does not know it, not because he thinks all kinds of texts and narratives are infinitely open or because there are no fixed meanings in literary works. He writes to C. S. Kilby on 7th May 1959.

If every good and perfect gift comes from the Father of Light then all true and edifying writings, whether in scripture or not, must be *in some sense* inspired.[...] Inspiration may operate in a wicked man without his knowing it, and he can then utter [...] the truth he does not intend. (*Letters*, 287)

Besides, the literature he highly values, such as medieval poetry and allegory, is often anonymous or written by plural writers as is the case with *The Romance of the Rose* that Lewis discusses in *The Allegory of Love*. This must be another reason why he does not lay much stress on the author's intention.

In *An Experiment in Criticism*, which is a book on literary criticism, Lewis does not preach any of his religious convictions about myth. However, when he defines myth thus by the effect on the reader, those who, like us, know his belief that myth is a form of divine revelation may well take his warning against our missing God's messages because of our inattention. Imagination is capable of receiving God's revelation, but when it is in the wrong condition, it would take any revelational myth as no more than an ordinary invented tale.

* * *

Lewis's ideas of symbolism and sacramentalism are expressed most clearly in "Transposition," originally a sermon given at Mansfield College, Oxford, where he explains sacramentalism by the concept of what he calls "Transposition".

Lewis distinguishes symbolism and sacramentalism as this: when there is

complete discontinuity between the things and the signs that denote them, it is symbolism. For example, the relation between speech and writing is one of symbolism. “The one is simply a *sign* of the other and signifies it by a convention” (“Transposition,” *Toast*, 83). On the other hand, when the thing signified is really in a certain mode present in the sign, Lewis calls it sacramentalism. An example is painting. The sunlight in a picture, for instance, is not related to the real sunlight simply as the written words are to the spoken. “The suns and lamps in pictures [...] seem to shine a great deal because they really shine a little in reflecting their archetypes” (“Transposition,” 83).

Lewis’s idea of sacramentalism is similar to Coleridge’s idea of symbolism. Coleridge holds that “a Symbol [...] is characterized [...] by a translucence of the Eternal through and in the Temporal. It always partakes of the Reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part in that Unity, of which it is the representative.”⁴⁷ Symbolism here is seen not only as true operation of intuitive imagination but also some mystic, eucharistic revelation of reality.

What Lewis calls Transposition as a mode of expression occurs whenever a thing in a richer system is expressed or translated in a poorer system: for example, when a three-dimensional world is drawn on a flat, two-dimensional sheet of paper, or when an orchestra piece is re-written into a piano version. In such cases, one single shape or note in the poorer medium has to express more than two forms or notes of the richer original. In a picture, an acute angle may represent what is also an acute angle in the actual world, or it may represent, in perspective, a right angle. A triangle in a picture may represent an actual triangle or a dunce’s cap.

This idea of “Transposition”, together with the idea of sacramentalism, is theologically significant to Lewis, as it concerns man’s capacity for perceiving Reality. When Transposition is made, “what is happening in the lower medium can be understood only if we know the higher medium” (“Transposition,” 82). Suppose a person had been living in a two-dimensional world all his life. He would not understand our three-dimensional world correctly when he sees it drawn on the paper. On the paper, it should be full of lines. And when he is told that the three-dimensional

⁴⁷ Coleridge, *The Statesman’s Manual*, p. 30.

world does not consist of pencilled lines, all he could understand would be the negative fact of its lack of lines. Thus, if one tries to describe or to understand the higher dimensional world from below, one has to employ many negatives though, actually, the higher dimensional world is more real and more visible than the lower. By an analogy, therefore, Lewis thinks it impossible for us to comprehend God or our spiritual life in heaven, because God and heaven must necessarily be in a higher dimension than the world we now live in. Then, he further believes “that this doctrine of Transposition provides for most of us a background very much needed for the theological virtue of Hope” (“Transposition,” 86):

“We know not what we shall be”; but we may be sure we shall be more, not less, than we were on earth. Our natural experiences (sensory, emotional, imaginative) are only like the drawing, like pencilled lines on flat paper. If they vanish in the risen life, they will vanish [...] not as a candle flame that is put out but as a candle flame which becomes invisible because someone has pulled up the blind, thrown open the shutters, and let in the blaze of the risen sun. (“Transposition,” 89-90)

With such an idea of sacramentalism in the light of the idea of Transposition, he believes that our earthly life reflects our life in heaven by already holding a part of it.

For we are told in one of the creeds that the Incarnation worked “not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the Manhood into God.” And it seems to me that there is a real analogy between this and what I have called Transposition. (“Transposition,” 91)

In these ideas of sacramentalism and Transposition, we learn what limitation and capacity Lewis sees in the human imagination. It falls short of comprehending Reality as it is, but capable of guessing what it would be like in heaven by the analogical thinking of sacramentalism and Transposition.

* * *

Thus, Lewis finds imagination as a necessary means of grasping reality, apprehending its meaning and having glimpses of the Real world, or heaven.

Chapter 2

Reason

<Argument from Reason>

Lewis calls himself “a rationalist” (“Bluspels,” *Selected Essays*, 265). When he says this, he means that he believes in man’s reason as a faculty of intellectual pursuit of truth and reality. In his writings, Lewis uses the word “reason” mainly in these three senses:

1. Cause, motive, or argument to do or believe something.
2. Intellectual faculty for logical thinking.
3. Rational, or mental part of man, especially such a part as is deemed to be “the Supernatural element in man,” which is conceived of in contrast to the physical, physiological organs (*Miracles*, 33).

The faculty of intuition that provides man with *a priori* moral principles such as discussed by Kant in his *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*¹ is translated into English as “reason”, but Lewis does not refer to this faculty as reason but calls it “morality” (*Pain*, 9, et passim), which we shall see in Chapter 3.

We start our discussion on Lewis’s idea of reason by comparing it with Coleridge’s idea. Coleridge says,

The Reason, (not the abstract reason, not the reason as the mere *organ* of science, or as the faculty of scientific principles and schemes a priori; but reason) as the integral *spirit* of the regenerated man[...] the breath of the power of God, and a pure influence from the glory of the Almighty; which remaining in itself regenerateth all other powers, and in all ages entering into holy souls maketh them friends of God and prophets [...] the Reason without being either the SENSE, the UNDERSTANDING or the IMAGINATION contains all three within itself, even as the mind contains its thoughts, and is present in and through them all.²

Since he finds the reason thus, to him, “REASON and Religion differ only as a

¹ Cf. Immanuel Kant, „*Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*,” *WerkeIV: Schriften zur Ethik und Religionsphilosophie*.

² Coleridge, *The Statesman’s Manual*, in *Collected Works*, VI. pp. 69-70.

two-fold application of the same power.”³ They both concern themselves in “the comprehension of all as One,”⁴ or the “union of the Universal and the Individual,”⁵ or the union of the Infinite and the One as is realized in God. To Coleridge, the Reason is the power of direct insight into the religious reality, “a direct aspect of Truth, an inward Beholding, having a similar relation to the Intelligible or spiritual, as SENSE has to the Material or Phenomenal.”⁶ It is a faculty Lewis attributes to imagination. In this, Lewis makes even more of imagination than does Coleridge, one of the greatest Romantic advocates for imagination.

Lewis says, “Reason knows that she cannot work without materials” (*Miracles*, 94). In his opinion, reason is not a direct insight into reality but rather the faculty of logical thinking using the data which have been acquired through senses and intuitive imagination or from some established authorities. Yet, as he himself says, Lewis is a rationalist as well as an imaginative man, and reason has played as great a role as imagination in his pursuit of reality and in his conversion to Christianity.

Reason serves Lewis in two important ways. First, it works as the organ of logic which is indispensable in the pursuit of the objective, comprehensive Reality. Secondly, as we are going to see now, its non-materiality is a datum from which he infers the objective existence of a God who is the supernatural absolute Reason. In this, Reason is, if not a direct insight into Reality, another faculty in man which is directly connected to Reality.

* * *

In *Miracles*, Lewis argues for the existence of God and the probability of God’s miracles, grounding his argument on the existence and work of man’s reason. There, he first of all refutes “Naturalism”, which he defines as the belief “that nothing exists except Nature” (*Miracles*, 9). By *reductio ad absurdum* logic, he argues as follows: Materialism may see even man’s reason in terms of chemical reactions in the brains, but, if materialism were right, it would be hard to believe that the materialistic theory itself, which has been attained by such chemical reactions, is right. He says,

³ Coleridge, *The Statesman’s Manual*, p. 59.

⁴ Coleridge, *The Statesman’s Manual*, p. 60.

⁵ Coleridge, *The Statesman’s Manual*, p. 62.

⁶ Coleridge, *Aids to Reflections*, p. 148.

Thus a strict materialism refutes itself for the reason given long ago by Professor Haldane: "If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true...and hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms." (from J. B. S. Haldane, *Possible Worlds*; quoted in Lewis, *Miracles*, 19)

Thus, to Lewis, materialism is self-contradictory and cannot be true, and Naturalism is discredited for the same reason.

For that theory would itself have been reached by thinking, and if thinking is not valid that theory would, of course, be itself demolished. (*Miracles*, 19)

Actually, however, Lewis's definition of "Naturalism" as the belief "that nothing exists except Nature" is not the one that is accepted by everyone. For instance, P. F. Strawson in his *Skepticism and Naturalism* distinguishes what he calls "reductive (or strict) naturalism" from "nonreductive (or liberal or catholic) naturalism."⁷ He points out that "reductive" or "strict" naturalism is the sort that may be pejoratively referred to as "scientism". It rejects everything that cannot be objectively explained away by natural science. On the other hand, "nonreductive" naturalism, such as Hume's, simply accepts our belief in the validity of reason as our natural disposition:

Our inescapable natural commitment is to a general frame of belief and to a general style (the inductive) of belief-formation. But within that frame and style, the requirement of Reason, that our beliefs should form a consistent and coherent system, may be given full play.⁸

Though "reductive" naturalism undermines the validity of our reasoning and knowledge altogether, "nonreductive" naturalism does not. It admits the need of suspension of disbelief as to the validity of reason, because anyway we "cannot help forming beliefs and expectations in general accordance with the basic canons of induction."⁹ The "Naturalism" in Lewis's sense should be classified into the "strict" naturalism as Strawson calls it, and therefore his charge on Naturalism is irrelevant to the other type. Lewis, however, takes it as axiomatic that if man's reason is caused by

⁷ P. F. Strawson, *Skepticism and Naturalism* (Columbia Univ. Press, 1985), p. 40.

⁸ Strawson, p. 14

⁹ Strawson, p. 11.

some natural phenomenon and is fully explicable in naturalistic terms, namely, if reason is a part of material nature, it should be a non-rational phenomenon and would never be able to build a right theory about nature, even about itself. Then the very presupposition that man's reason is explicable in naturalistic terms could not stand any longer.

Besides, not only does he believe that nothing that is caused non-rationally can reason validly, he also assumes that a part cannot comprehend and judge the whole:

[T]he Gulf Stream [...] does not produce [...] maps of the Gulf Stream. But if logic, as we find it operative in our own minds, is really a result of mindless nature, then it is a result as improbable as that.[...] It is as if cabbages, in addition to resulting from the laws of botany also gave lectures in that subject: or as if, when I knocked out my pipe, the ashes arranged themselves into letters which read: 'We are the ashes of a knocked-out pipe.' ("De Futilitate," *Christian Reflections*, 64-65)

Some people might find Lewis's logic unacceptable here. To those who are critical of Lewis's supernaturalism, the analogies of human reason with Gulf Stream and cabbages might seem rather far-fetched. However, his analogy here in fact works for illustration of absolute impossibility than for logical proof. And as such, these analogies are quite persuasive. And logically speaking, even if a part cannot judge the whole, and if reason obtains us concepts of nature, it does not necessarily follow that the reason is, therefore, not a part of nature. Suppose reason is a natural phenomenon and a part cannot judge the whole nature, we could also conclude that therefore the concept of nature that reason gives us should be wrong. However, for Lewis, the validity of reason is axiomatic. He bases his logic on it without bothering to prove it at all. As we have mentioned, the intelligibility of the universe has been a traditional orthodox belief in the Western world, shared by such philosophers as Thomas Aquinas and Samuel Clarke. Though today the ultimate intelligibility of the universe is, generally, no longer assumed axiomatically, Lewis, who deems himself as an "Old Western" man, is indeed still in the old Western tradition, sharing this belief in the logos as objective metaphysical reality. Without this assumption, Lewis's argument--1) if human reason is a part of nature, it could not reason validly, 2) human reason is valid, 3) and therefore, man's reason is supernatural--could not stand, because, in that case, the second proposition (i.e. human reason is valid) does not stand. Or rather, it may be that to

Lewis, the supernaturalness of our reason is itself axiomatic though he felt it necessary to show the absolute impossibility of naturalistic view. I think these are among Lewis's most successful analogies which work through both reason and intuitive imagination, showing how they can work together as faculties of grasping reality.

And then, another important aspect of Lewis's logic here is, not only does he share the same belief with Aquinas, his argument follows the same course as Aquinas's famous "Five Ways" argument for the existence of God. The first three of Aquinas's so called "Five Ways" are all inference from dependent nature of earthly objects to some autonomous existence, which is identified with God. Aquinas's first way is a chain of inference from movement of a physical object to the first Mover, the second is one from the immediate cause of something to the first Cause, and the third is one from the world's contingent, dependent existence to the necessary Existence: every movement in the world needs its mover ("movement" here includes formal and qualitative change as well as topological one), an effect needs its cause, and an existing being needs a giver of its existence. And that mover, or cause, or giver of existence, in turn, needs their own mover, or cause, or giver of existence. Yet it is impossible to go back on like this endlessly. There must be the first Mover or the first Cause or the first and the necessary Existence. Otherwise there would be no movements, or effects or existences now. Then Aquinas identifies such an ultimate ground or cause with God as: "*et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum* (this everyone understands to be God),"¹⁰ as if it were too obvious to call for any further proof.

Then, from the non-natural character of man's reason, he infers the existence of an absolute Reason, which is to be identified with God. As he holds that man's reason is not a part of nature, he says, "Reason is given before Nature and on reason our concept of Nature depends. Our acts of inference are prior to our picture of Nature as the telephone is prior to the friend's voice we hear by it" (*Miracles*, 27). And at the same time, he reminds us that though one man's reason is sufficiently independent of nature to know it objectively from the outside, it is usually only by being dependent on some authority that it can be trustworthy enough on its judgments. Without help, it would be

¹⁰ Thomae Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, prima pars. ed. Petri Caramello (Marietti, 1952), QuaestioII, p.13: The translation from William Rowe & William Wainwright eds., *Philosophy of Religion*, 2nd ed. (Harcourt, 1989), p. 129.

impossible for a man's personal reason to know anything that is outside his own experience. For instance, he should be largely dependent on the former generations for his knowledge of the universe.

One man's reason has been led to see things by the aid of another man's reason, and is none the worse for that. It is thus still an open question whether each man's reason exists absolutely on its own or whether it is the result of some (rational) cause--in fact, of some other Reason. That other Reason might conceivably be found to depend on a third, and so on [...] It is therefore obvious that sooner or later you must admit a Reason which exists absolutely on its own. (*Miracles*, 31-32)

Here Lewis uses the word "Reason" with a capital R so as to imply that it is an absolute reality.

From the conclusion that there is a self-existent Reason, Lewis moves on to prove that it exists incessantly from eternity:

[...] for if anything else could make it begin to exist then it would not exist on its own but because of something else. It must also exist incessantly.[...] For having once ceased to be, it obviously could not recall itself to existence, and if anything else recalled it it would then be a dependent being. (*Miracles*, 32)

Thus, he infers from validity of man's reason an absolute, eternal, self-existent Reason. Furthermore, just as Aquinas identifies the first Mover, the first Cause and the necessary Existence with God, so does Lewis also axiomatically identify the absolute Reason with God:

Human minds, then, are not the only supernatural entities that exist.[...] Each has come into Nature from Supernature: each has its tap-root in an eternal, self-existent, rational Being, whom we call God. (*Miracles*, 32)

And thus, he infers the existence of God and regards the human reason as owing to God. He says, "Where thought is strictly rational it must be, in some odd sense, not ours, but cosmic or super-cosmic" (*"De Futilitate," Christian Reflections*, 65). He says human reason is "God-kindled" and "not God's" (*Miracles*, 33), as he is conscious that man's reason is different from God's Reason because it is affected by the physical condition and may make mistakes. With this awareness, he sees Reason in man as "an offshoot, or spearhead, or incursion of that Supernatural reality into Nature" (*Miracles*,

32). It is, therefore, as important a bridge between God the supernatural Reality and us human beings as imagination.

Today, different from the time of Aquinas, it cannot possibly be said that “everyone” understands the first mover or the first cause or the necessary existence to be God, nor even that everyone admits the existence of those ultimate things at all. The first movement might have occurred suddenly and accidentally. The causes of movements, or of existences, may go back in infinity without having the ultimate first Cause. From a modern point of view, it is also possible that things might have appeared *ex nihilo*, without any eternal, necessary existence. And neither does everyone that admits the self-existent ultimate Reason identify it with God.

However, Lewis, likewise as Aquinas, presupposes that nothing comes from nothing and that it is God alone that could have brought the world *ex nihilo*. He maintains that at least God Himself exists from eternity. This presupposition seems to be given *a priori*, and, in that sense, it is a matter of faith beyond the scope of logical proof. Yet still, different from St. Aquinas, Lewis sees it necessary to prove that this supernatural, eternal God is the God of Christianity. He does not terminate with the claim that “*et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum*” but goes on to refutation of other philosophies and religions which he thinks are the rivals of Christianity: Dualism, Pantheism, Life-Force philosophy and other mono-Theisms.

* * *

As to Dualism, Lewis uses the word “Dualism” to denote either the metaphysical Dualism of Nature and the supernatural God, or the ethical, or ethicoreligious Dualism of good and evil.

In his argument from reason, Lewis refutes the Dualism of Nature and the supernatural God, whose existence has been inferred from human reason. The idea of this Dualism is that though God exists, He has not created Nature; that God and Nature are both self-existent and totally independent of each other. In this, Lewis finds two difficulties. The first difficulty is that it is impossible for God and Nature to coexist both as an absolute, all-inclusive existence. “[I]f they were both in a common space, or a common time, or in any kind of Common medium whatever, they would both be parts of a system, in fact of a ‘Nature’” (*Miracles*, 35). Secondly, there is what Lewis calls “unsymmetrical character of the frontier relations” (*Miracles*, 35). Man’s system

works well when physical emotions and sensations are obeying rational judgments, and goes wrong when the reason submits to the emotion. "When the physical state of the brain dominates my thinking, it produces only disorder. But my brain does not become any less a brain when it is dominated by Reason" (*Miracles*, 35). Lewis says, "from observing what happens when Nature obeys it is almost impossible not to conclude that it is her very 'nature' to be a subject" (*Miracles*, 36). According to Lewis, the relation between Nature and the supernatural God should be the same as the relation between physical and the rational elements in each human mind. Lewis says, "To believe that Nature produced God, or even the human mind, is, as we have seen, absurd" (*Miracles*, 36). And having thus rejected Dualism between Nature and God, he holds it is far more reasonable to believe that God produced Nature.

As for the Dualism of good and evil, Lewis again first stresses the impossibility of their coexisting side by side both as the absolute, all-inclusive reality.

You cannot accept two conditioned and mutually independent beings as the self-grounded, self-comprehending Absolute. On the level of picture-thinking this difficulty is symbolised by our inability to think of Ormuzd and Ahriman without smuggling in the idea of a common space in which they can be together and thus confessing that we are not yet dealing with the source of the universe but only with two members contained in it. ("Evil and God," *God*, 22)

Secondly, the good and evil do not stand equal also because evil is judged to be bad from the standpoint of righteousness and good. For example, cruelty is condemned because one should be kind to others, but "if a taste for cruelty and a taste for kindness were equally ultimate and basic, by what common standard could the one reprove the other?" ("Evil and God," 23) This shows the superiority of the good over evil. Thirdly, Lewis thinks that those who do some evil deed do not do it just because it is evil, while those who do good may do it just because it is good. Evil deeds, as well as good deeds, come in pursuit of some good, such as pleasure, wealth and happiness, but they turn out to be evil when the pursuit is done by wrong means or excessively. Lewis follows St. Augustine in regarding evil as "*privatio boni*."¹¹ Evil is nothing more than lack or perversion of good. St. Augustine says,

¹¹ St Augustine, *City of God*, tr. Henry Bettenson (1972; rpt. Penguin, 1984), p. 440.

[...] it is not a falling away to evil natures; the defection is evil in itself, as a defection from him who supremely exists to something of a lower degree of reality; and this is contrary to the order of nature.

Greed, for example, is not something wrong with gold; the fault is in a man who perversely loves gold and for its sake abandons justice, which ought to be put beyond comparison above gold. Lust is not something wrong in a beautiful and attractive body; the fault is in a soul which perversely delights in sensual pleasures, to the neglect of that self-control by which we are made fit for spiritual realities far more beautiful, with a loveliness which cannot fade [...] By the same token, anyone who perversely loves the goodness of any nature whatsoever, even if he obtains the enjoyment of it, becomes evil in the enjoyment of the good, and wretched in being deprived of a higher good.¹²

In this light, Lewis sees evil as something like a parasite on the good. In order to be effectively evil, a man needs to exist in the first place and has to have intelligence and strong will. However, existence, intelligence and will are in themselves good. Therefore, even in order to be evil, one has to depend on good, which shows the parasitical nature of evil (*Mere Christianity*, 46).

Here, incidentally, Lewis is again in the medieval tradition. In addition to agreeing with St. Augustine in his idea of evil, which is one thing, Lewis assumes that existence, will, and intelligence are all good in themselves, while many people today see them to be morally neutral. It is a Western, and Christian, tradition that regards existence as good. St. Anselm, for example, sees existence as a greatness-making quality and makes an ontological argument for the existence of God by defining God as “something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought”:

[...] whatever is understood is in the mind. And surely that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought cannot exist in the mind alone. For if it exists solely in the mind even, it can be thought to exist in reality also, which is greater.[...] therefore there is absolutely no doubt that something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists both in the mind and in reality.¹³

* * *

As for Pantheism, Lewis says it is unacceptable because he believes that a religion should tell us what God does toward man, and not what man says about God.

¹² Cf. St Augustine, *City of God*, pp. 480-481.

¹³ St. Anselm, *Proslogion*, with English tr. and introd. by M. J. Charlesworth (Oxford Univ. Press, 1965; Notre Dame, 1979), p. 117.

As we have seen, he had an experience of getting God's self-revelation, in which he felt that God demanded him total surrender. From this personal experience of the encounter with God, he insists that God should be alive and pursues man as "the hunter, king, husband" (*Miracles*, 98). In *Surprised by Joy*, he describes his feelings at the moment of his own conversion:

Amiable agnostics will talk cheerfully about "man's search for God." To me, as I then was, they might as well have talked about the mouse's search for the cat. (*Joy*, 181-182)

God is for him first of all the Lord, who is personal, real, and overwhelming. He rejects all the religions that hold impersonal or conceptual idea of a God, or gods. Pantheism is unacceptable because "[t]he Pantheist's God does nothing and demands nothing" (*Miracles*, 97).

Besides, it is impossible for him to accept Pantheism as a sufficient religion also because it does not answer such ultimate metaphysical questions as concerning the origin and meaning of the universe. Since he believes in the ultimate intelligibility of the universe, he is convinced that the ground and meaning of the existence of the world and of human beings should be a greatest concern of philosophy and religion. Therefore, Lewis could not possibly accept any philosophy or religion unless it embodies or explicates the comprehensive reality.

Actually, Lewis's argument against Pantheism may not be accepted by everyone in this century. Many a philosopher no longer believes that there is an answer for the meaning of the existence of the universe. As we have seen in the introduction, David Hume in the eighteenth century already doubted it, and if we do not believe in the intelligibility of the universe, we would not seek the ground of such meaning and intelligibility at all. In fact, the presupposition that the world is metaphysically explicable already involves a belief in rationality and logos of the world, which easily leads to the belief in the Designer. Therefore, when Lewis has started his inquiry into reality on the assumption that the right philosophy should be one that explains the meaning and cause of the universe, he has already chosen his course of inquiry and half determined its result: with the premise that implies the rational Designer, probably he should have sooner or later come to the conclusion that there is God the Designer.

* * *

Lewis finds it also necessary to point out the insufficiency of Life-Force philosophy or Creative Evolution, or Emergent Evolution as Bergson and George Bernard Shaw hold. The idea of evolution is often called Darwinism, but had been in fact prevalent since before Darwin. Therefore, Bernard Shaw does not refer to the evolution theory as Darwinism but as "Life-Force" philosophy. What Shaw believes in as Life-Force is a sort of God, but different from the traditionally believed all-loving and omnipotent God of Christianity. He cannot believe that a God of Love who is also omnipotent should ever leave man to suffer such pains as cancer, epilepsy and war. His argument is this:

I believe that the universe is being driven by a force that we might call the life-force. I see it performing the miracle of creation, that it has got into the minds of men as what they call their will. Thus we see people who clearly are carrying out a will not exclusively their own.

To attempt to represent this particular will or power as God--in the former meaning of the word--is now entirely hopeless; nobody can believe that. In the old days the Christian apologists got out of the difficulty of God as the God of cancer and epilepsy, and all the worst powers that were in one, by believing in God and the devil.[...] People always used to assume that the only way in which the devil could carry out his will was by inspiring or tempting people to do what he wanted them to do.[...] Let me therefore ask you to think of God in a somewhat similar nature, as something not possessing hands and brains such as ours, and having therefore to use ours, as having brought us into existence in order to use us [...]

We are all experiments in the direction of making God. What God is doing is making himself, getting from being a mere powerless will or force. This force has implanted into our minds the ideal of God [...] we are the instruments through which that ideal is trying to make itself a reality--we can work towards that ideal until we get to be supermen, and then super-supermen, and then a world of organisms who have achieved and realized God.¹⁴

Lewis calls the popular belief in "'Evolution' or 'Development' or 'Emergence'" ("The Funeral of a Great Myth," *Christian Reflections*, 83) as "the great Myth of the nineteenth and early twentieth Century" ("The Funeral of a Great Myth," 82). He calls it a "myth" not in his usual sense as God's revelation through man's imagination but in

¹⁴ George Bernard Shaw, "The Religion of the Future," *The Religious Speeches of Bernard Shaw*, ed. Warren Sylvester Smith (Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1963), pp. 33-35.

the sense as a popular belief that is not really based on the fact or truth. It is also a work of imagination, but only an imaginary product. Lewis does not think the intuitive power of human imagination as infallible. As long as it is human, not divine, it may make mistakes, and this “great Myth” is a case of its error. He points out that “the Myth” of evolution is different from the scientific doctrine of Evolution that is held by practicing biologists. Lewis shows that the general belief in progress was already seen even long before the publication of Charles Darwin’s *Origin of Species* (1859), and what the book did was only to confirm and give form to it. As a proof, he presents a clear manifestation of this belief in Keats’s “Hyperion” (1819), published even forty years before Darwin’s book:

As Heaven and Earth are fairer, fairer far
Than Chaos and blank Darkness, though once chief;
[. . . .]
So on our heels a fresh perfection treads,
A power more strong in beauty, born of us,
And fated to excel us, as we pass
In glory that old Darkness.
(quot. in “The Funeral of a Great Myth,” *Christian Reflections*, 84)

Lewis says that by the time George Bernard Shaw expressed his belief in the Life-Force philosophy of Evolutionism, the “Myth” had already been “fully digested and already senile” (“The Funeral of a Great Myth,” 84).

Lewis understands Evolutionism as the belief that “the small variations by which life on this planet ‘evolved’ from the lowest forms to Man were not due to chance but to the ‘striving’ or ‘purposiveness’ of a Life-Force” (*Mere Christianity*, 33). However, in science, Evolution is a theory about changes. And in evolution, he points out quoting J. B. S. Haldane, “[progress] is the exception, and for every case of it, there are ten cases of degradation” (J. B. S. Haldane, ‘Darwinism Today’ quot. In “The Funeral of a Great Myth,” 85). Lewis says, “Thus a real scientist like Professor J. B. S. Haldane is at pains to point out that popular ideas of Evolution lay a wholly unjustified emphasis on those changes which have rendered creatures (by human standards) ‘better’ or more interesting” (“The Funeral of a Great Myth,” 85).

Lewis argues that though those who believe in Life-Force may or may not conceive the Force as something with a mind, in either case they are deceiving

themselves. “[A] mind bringing life into existence and leading it to perfection’ is really a God, and their view is thus identical with the Religious” (*Mere Christianity*, 34), though the believers of Evolutionism may think themselves as atheists. What they actually believe in is “a sort of tame God” who gives them emotional comfort to believe but who does not impose them any moral injunction as the God of Christianity does. On the other hand, if they believe in the Life-Force as something without a mind, “what is the sense in saying that something without a mind ‘strives’ or has ‘purposes’?” (*Mere Christianity*, 34)

Thus he holds that if people ever believe some creative mind, they should know that it is in reality “God”. To Life-Force philosophy as to Pantheism, Lewis’s objection is that it does not understand God’s vigorous personality and irresistible influence and power on man.

[...] the Life-Force, being only a blind force, with no morals and no mind, will never interfere with you like that troublesome God we learned about when we were children.[...] You can switch it on when you want, but it will not bother you. All the thrills of religion and none of the cost. Is the Life-Force the greatest achievement of wishful thinking the world has yet seen? (*Mere Christianity*, 34)

Lewis is aware that the Myth, or the belief in general progress is now getting out of date but not yet completely dead.

all the immediate plausibility of the Myth has vanished. But [...] it will remain plausible to the imagination, and it is imagination which makes the Myth: it takes over from rational thought only what it finds convenient. (“The Funeral of a Great Myth,” 91)

The Myth will keep on influencing our imagination, because, first of all, the idea of progress is psychologically flattering. Secondly, it pleases those who want to sell things. People who believe in progress tend to buy new models even before the old ones are broken, simply believing that the newer things are better. Finally, Lewis says, the Myth even contributes to modern politics. The Myth concentrates on progress and ignores the possibility of degradation in every change. “If the cases of degradation were kept in mind it would be impossible not to see that any given change in society is at least as likely to destroy the liberties and amenities we already have as to add new

ones” (“The Funeral of a Great Myth,” 92). In this comment on the naive belief in “Evolution”, we again hear his voice as an Old Western man. Lewis is conscious that the newer things are not necessarily better or preferable, and he himself often prefers the older things. Indeed, it seems that he not only finds the theory of Creative Evolution wrong but also finds it unacceptable temperamentally.¹⁵

Thus, after rejecting Dualism, Pantheism, and Creative or Emergent Evolution, Lewis concludes that only a theism that holds one absolute God can be right, though he does not, at this stage, say that Christianity is that single right religion.

* * *

In *The Problem of Pain*, Lewis points out three characteristics common to all developed religions. Or, since Lewis does not clarify on what standard a religion is to be classified “developed”, we may as well say that he points out three characteristics which he thinks all developed religions share. It is not clear either whether he thinks a religion is developed because it has these three characteristics or whether these characteristics happen to be common to all developed religions.

The first characteristic is the believer’s experience of what Rudolf Otto calls “the Numinous”. It is an experience of uncanny awe. The numinous awe is something like uncanny fear of a ghost, which is different from ordinary fear in that while the ordinary fear usually has a specific object that appears dangerous or harmful, the numinous awe does not. Lewis says of this awe of the Numinous:

[E]ither it is a mere twist in the human mind, corresponding to nothing objective [...] or else it is a direct experience of the really supernatural, to which the name Revelation might properly be given. (*Pain*, 8-9)

The second is the morality that has an absolute standard which is given *a priori*. The third characteristic is the identification of “the guardian of the morality” (*Pain*, p. 10) with the numinous power to which men feel awe. This identification is not any logical necessity. Though it is in a sense natural that the giver of moral laws inspires the feeling of guilt and awe in human minds, the identification of the Numinous and the

¹⁵ In a letter to a lady Lewis wrote, “I would like everything to be immemorial--to have the same old horizons, the same garden, the same smells and sounds, always there, changeless” (*Letters*, p. 306).

righteous moral giver is not in the least obvious when we see that the numinous world bears little resemblance to that which the moral law demands. “The one seems wasteful, ruthless, and unjust; the other enjoins upon us the opposite qualities” (*Pain*, 10). Actually, there have been a lot of religious sects without high morality, as well as ethics without religiosity. This identification of the Lord and the moral authority is in a sense pressed upon man by revelation. Lewis says that the Jews are perhaps the only people that came to believe, as a race, in the Numinous as “‘the righteous Lord’ who ‘loveth righteousness’ (Ps.xi,8)” (*Pain*, 11). Historically, it was the divine revelation to Abraham that originally made the Jews believe in such a Lord, or God.

Lewis stresses that none of these three characteristics are explicable by reason alone. Each of them demands man to jump into the field beyond experience and logical thinking, into the region where things are to be judged with intuition or imagination that is apprehensive of reality. Yet, Lewis holds that these are all indispensable to the right religion. It is important that although Lewis is a rationalist, he also admits the limitation of man’s reason in the field beyond our experiences and turns to the imagination as a valid organ to grasp Reality.

Now, besides these three characteristics, Lewis points out that Christianity has another and unique characteristic: namely, the historicity of Jesus Christ. He finds that the claim of Jesus to be the Son of God must have been very shocking among the Jews. It would not have been so shocking among Pantheists who believe everything is a part of God. However, since Jesus comes from the Jewish people for whom “God” means the absolute Creator who is transcendent of this world and infinitely different from any human being, Jesus cannot have meant by “God” anything like Pantheistic gods. Therefore, according to Lewis, this claim is so shocking, so paradoxical and even horrible that only three views of this man is possible: either he is “a lunatic--on a level with the man who says he is a poached egg,” or “the Devil of Hell,” or else he is really the Son of God and therefore all his words and deeds should be accepted as such (*Mere Christianity*, 52). The apparent preposterousness of Jesus’ claim is thus taken as a proof of the truth of Christianity.

Besides, Jesus’ claim that he has the authority to forgive other people’s sins, which is a part of the claim of being the Son of God, is also preposterous unless he is really the Son. Because, though a man may rightly forgive those who have done

offences against himself, it would be wrong for a man to forgive offences to others, for instance, to forgive someone for treading on other men's toes or stealing some other man's money without consulting the injured party. However, Jesus told people that their sins were forgiven, regardless of the opinion of those who had actually suffered from those sins. Jesus behaved as if he was the one who had really been offended, and this would have been nonsensical and tremendous conceit unless he really was God whose laws are broken and whose love is wounded by every sin committed by His creatures. On this ground, too, Lewis argues that either Jesus was the Son of God as he himself said or else a lunatic, or a Devil of hell:

Now it seems to me obvious that He was neither a lunatic nor a fiend: and consequently, however strange or terrifying or unlikely it may seem, I have to accept the view that He was and is God. God has landed on this enemy-occupied world in human form. (*Mere Christianity*, 53)

Though some people see Jesus as nothing more than one of the greatest human moral teachers, Lewis rejects the view completely.¹⁶

Now, in addition to these arguments for the existence of God and for the Sonship of Jesus, Lewis presents us yet another logic with which he argues for the doctrine of the Incarnation. It is an analogy with music and literature: just as the main theme of a symphony or the central part of a novel illuminates all the other parts of the work, the doctrine of the Incarnation should necessarily illuminate the whole system of nature if it is true. Because, such an event of great importance as God's Incarnation cannot be but the central theme of the whole creation.

The credibility will depend on the extent to which the doctrine, if accepted, can illuminate and integrate the whole mass. It is much less important that the doctrine itself should be fully comprehensible. We believe that the sun is in the sky at midday in summer not because we can clearly see the sun (in fact, we cannot) but because we can see everything else. (*Miracles*, 114)

With this assumption, he finds that the Incarnation actually integrates the whole Nature; and concludes that the doctrine is true. To illustrate how the doctrine

¹⁶ Cf. Lewis's critical comment on "Historical Jesus," in *Screwtape*, p.118; and also our pp. 70-79 below.

illuminates the whole of Nature's system, he points out four main characteristics of Nature which can be regarded to have their archetypes in God's Incarnation: namely, "the composite nature of man, the pattern of descent and re-ascension, Selectiveness, and Vicariousness" (*Miracles*, 123).

The first of them, the composite nature of man, is actually about the frontier between Nature and Supernature than something exactly within the boundary of Nature. It refers to the rational activity in every human being, which is in a sense supernatural and yet united with a part of Nature, i. e. with a human body. Lewis says it must have been just what happened when God became Man, that is, when the Supernatural Creator united Himself with a natural creature.

The pattern of descent and re-ascent is the pattern of death and re-birth. Lewis illustrates this with vegetables and animals, which belittle themselves once as seeds in a death-like condition so as to re-ascend as new lives in a newer generation. This pattern of death and re-birth is seen all over the world in the myth of a "corn-king"--Adonis, Osiris, etc. And it is significant because Lewis finds a figure of Christ in the corn-king. Although there is no corn-king myth in the New Testament, he paradoxically deems this absence to be a proof of the Incarnation: "Where the real God is present the shadows of that God do not appear" (*Miracles*, 120).

In this pattern of descent and re-ascension is a key principle of "the power of the Higher [...] to come down, the power of the greater to include the less" (*Miracles*, 115), which also shows the propriety of the Incarnation.

We can understand that if God so descends into a human spirit, and human spirit so descends into Nature, and our thoughts into our senses and passions, and if adult minds (but only the best of them) can descend into sympathy with children, and men into sympathy with beasts, then everything hangs together and the total reality, both Natural and Supernatural, in which we are living is more multifariously and subtly harmonious than we had suspected. (*Miracles*, 115)

As for Selectiveness, Lewis gives us, as its examples in nature, the smallness of the portion that matter occupies in the space, the fewness of the planets that support organic life, and in the transmission of organic life, how few of the countless number of seeds and spermatozoa are selected for fertility. In Christianity, Abraham was first chosen to follow God; the Jewish people are "chosen" people; and Mary was selected to

be the Man's mother.

Such selectiveness has nothing to do with God's favoritism, especially in Christianity. There it is connected with the fourth principle of Vicariousness. The people who are selected by God are selected to bear burden for those who are not. Abraham was chosen so that "in his seed, all nation shall be blest." The Jewish nation has thus been chosen for suffering, and as Isaiah sees, their sufferings heal others. Mary had to suffer the utmost maternal anguish, and her Son, the incarnate God, was "a man of sorrows" (Isaiah, 53,5). Thus, the principle of Vicariousness that "The Sinless Man suffers for the sinful, and in their degree, all good men for all bad men" (*Miracles*, p. 122) is a deep-rooted principle in Christianity.

In the natural world, this principle of Vicariousness is seen in interdependence and mutual sacrifice of things in the whole system of Nature. Lewis does not think of the vicariousness in Nature as something exclusively related to the vicarious suffering for redeeming others. The cat living on the mouse or the bees and the flowers depending on each other are also examples to show the vicariousness in nature. "Self-sufficiency, living on one's own resources is a thing impossible in her [i.e. Nature's] realm. Everything is indebted to everything else, sacrificed to everything else, dependent on everything else" (*Miracles*, 122).

Lewis adopted this idea of Vicariousness from Charles Williams, one of his closest friends. Williams expresses the idea of what he maintains as the "doctrine of Substituted Love":

I think when Christ or St. Paul, or whoever said bear [...] he meant something much more like carrying a parcel instead of someone else. To bear a burden is precisely to carry it instead of. If you're still carrying yours, I'm not carrying it for you--however sympathetic I may be. And anyhow there's no need to introduce Christ, unless you wish.[...] You must give your burden up to someone else, and you must carry someone else's burden. I haven't made the universe and it isn't my fault. But I'm sure that this is a law of the universe, and not to give up your parcel is as much to rebel as not to carry another's. You'll find it quite easy if you let yourself do it.¹⁷

In actual life, it is reported that Lewis truly believed that he was actually bearing the pain of his wife, Joy, who was suffering from bone cancer. According to

¹⁷ Charles Williams, *Descent into Hell* (1937; rpt. Eerdmans, 1983), pp. 98-99.

Humphrey Carpenter, Lewis told a friend:

The intriguing thing is that while I (for no discoverable reason) was losing the calcium from my bones, Joy, who needed it much more, was gaining it in hers. One dreams of a Charles Williams substitution!¹⁸

Lewis finds that all the four principles, namely, the composite nature of man, the pattern of descent and re-ascension, Selectiveness, and Vicariousness, are illuminated by the Incarnation. “The pattern is there in Nature because it was first there in God” (*Miracles*, 116).

This is his case for the Incarnation.

<Lewis and Liberal Christianity>

Lewis is keenly conscious that the twentieth century is an age of science. As he is aware, not only products of scientific technology have changed our way of life, but the method of science has changed our way of thought. Science does not hold a proposition to be true until it has proved it by some objective means, such as experiments and statistics, and today this way of suspension of belief affects even theology and philosophy. Lewis is anxious about what he sees to be the general contemporary tendency to disparage all that are scientifically unprovable as “merely” subjective, or unreal.

A movement in theology that is influenced by the scientific way of thought is the liberal Christianity that originated in 19th century Germany. Liberal Christians tend to reject miracles and to regard God not as supernatural and transcendent of this natural world but rather as present within the world so that there is no discontinuity between the natural and the supernatural. They also reject religious dogmas and rituals that are based on authority alone. All beliefs must be assessed by experience and reason. Even the Scriptures are not wholly and uncritically acceptable as divine revelation. Because the Bible was written by writers limited by their historical background, it cannot be an infallible record of divine revelation. Besides, they insist that because the world has changed since the time Christianity was founded, biblical terminology and creeds have become incomprehensible to the ordinary people today, so that it is now

¹⁸ Humphrey Carpenter, *The Inklings* (Unwin, 1978; paperbacks 1981), p. 246.

necessary to reinterpret the Bible.

In this section we shall survey this movement of liberal Christianity and then study Lewis's criticism against it.

* * *

In 1835, D. F. Strauss published *The Life of Christ*, a biography of Jesus as a human personage. It was probably the first of a series of biographical attempts to follow the life of historical Jesus, made by such historians as Ernest Renan and Adolf Harnack.

In 1901 Adolf Harnack, a German theologian and church historian, published *Das Wesen des Christentums (What Is Christianity)*, which became a best-seller. In this widely read book, he presents Jesus as an example of higher righteousness governed by the law of love that exists independent of religious worship. He presupposes as if axiomatically that there cannot be miracles that break the law of Nature.¹⁹ In this, he is a naturalist who denies the possibility of God's working on Nature from outside of it or from above. However, he does not deny the existence of the supernatural God altogether. While denying the possibility of miracles, he still says it is possible that Nature as a whole serves a higher end.²⁰ Besides, he is conscious that we do not yet know all the powers working in the natural cause and effect system. His denial of miracles as violations of the laws of Nature is thus weakened by his modesty about man's knowledge of the laws of Nature themselves.

Forty years after Harnack's *What is Christianity*, a German theologian Rudolf Bultmann positively rejects the miracles and mythological elements in the New Testament. On April 21, 1941, he delivered a lecture which was to be published later as "New Testament and Mythology," where he says:

We cannot use electric light and [...] at the same time believe in the spirit and wonder world of New Testament.²¹

¹⁹ Adolf Harnack, *Das Wesen des Christentums*, 1950, tr. into Japanese by Syogo Yamatani (山谷省吾) as *What is Christianity* (『キリスト教の本質』) (Tamagawa Univ. Press, 1977), p. 39.

²⁰ Harnack, p. 40.

²¹ Rudolf Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology," *New Testament and Mythology and Other Basic Writings*, ed. and tr. Schbert M. Ogden (Fortress Press, 1984), p. 4. [Here, however, we may as well notice that Bultmann does not deny the transcendence

Here is seen a manifest belief that science refutes miracles just by showing them to be “unscientific”.

Against such a theological movement to regard miracles as incredible in the age of science, Lewis positively believes the miracles in Scriptures to be true. In *Miracles*, Lewis defines “Miracle” as “an interference with Nature by supernatural power,” as he thinks the word would mean to “the common reader” (*Miracles*, 9 and in its note). If materialism or naturalism is true, and nothing exists outside the interlocking cause and effect system of Nature, we cannot believe in any miracles. However, as we have seen, in an argument for the existence of the supernatural, Lewis denies such materialism, presenting us human reason as a counterproof. Since Lewis believes in the existence of God who is the absolute “Supernatural Reality”, he finds it quite possible that God works miracles. In his opinion, those who deny miracles on the ground that such phenomena should be “unscientific” are off the mark:

Experiment finds out what regularly happens in Nature: the norm or rule to which she works. Those who believe in miracles are not denying that there is such a norm or rule: they are only saying that it can be suspended. A miracle is by

of God. Rather, he believes in God who is beyond all sorts of human language. Where Lewis turns to imagination to see some truth in imaginative mythological pictures, Bultmann even sees God’s absolute invisibility not only to the human reason but also to the imagination:

If we speak of God as acting in general, transcendence would indeed be a purely negative conception, since every positive description of transcendence transposes it into this world. It is wrong to speak of God as acting in general statements, in terms of the formal analysis of man's existence. (Bultmann, *Jesus Christ and Mythology* (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958), p. 66)

He also says,

Christian preaching, in so far as it is preaching of the Word of God by God’s command and in His name, does not offer a doctrine which can be accepted either by reason or by a *sacrificium intellectus*. Christian preaching is *kerygma*, that is, a proclamation addressed not to the theoretical reason, but to the hearer as a self. (Bultmann, *Jesus Christ and Mythology*, p. 36)

Thus, he is now regarded not as a liberal Christian but a Christian existentialist that affirms God’s transcendence but doubts man's capacity to know God directly.

definition an exception. How can the discovery of the rule tell you whether, granted a sufficient cause, the rule can be suspended? (*Miracles*, 50)

Lewis reminds us that in order to say that miracles never occur, we have first to assume absolute uniformity of Nature. This assumption in fact implies the belief that there is some design covering the whole system of the universe, which in fact assumes the existence of God the Legislator, though most people are not conscious of it.

If Naturalism is true we have no reason to trust our conviction that nature is uniform. It can be trusted only if quite a different Metaphysic is true. If the deepest thing in reality, the Fact which is the source of all other facthood [...] if it is a Rational Spirit and we derive our rational spirituality from It--then indeed our conviction can be trusted.[...] Men became scientific because they expected Law in Nature, and they expected Law in Nature because they believed in a Legislator. In most modern scientists this belief has died. (*Miracles*, 109-110)

Lewis admits that the belief in miracles is not a corollary of the belief in the supernatural God. He says, "That is the bargain" (*Miracles*, 110). However, he finds it necessary to choose between naturalism and Christianity, and in the alternative, takes Christianity to be more probable. While naturalism gives us no ground to believe in the absolute uniformity of the natural phenomena, Christianity gives us a ground to believe in almost absolute uniformity, while leaving the probability of miracles. The very Christianity that shows us God the Creator and Legislator of the world says miracles have occurred, and Lewis finds it reasonable to accept that doctrine. As to the Miracle of the Incarnation, he not only believes it but, as we have seen, sees it as the central event or main theme of history. He says, "the more we understand what God it is who is said to be present and the purpose for which He is said to have appeared, the more credible the miracles become.[...] The mind which asks for a non-miraculous Christianity is a mind in process of relapsing from Christianity into mere 'religion'" (*Miracles*, p. 137).

First of all, Lewis is against such an attempt at seeing Jesus exclusively as a natural historical personage. In *The Screwtape Letters* his devil Screwtape says, "In the last generation we promoted the construction of such a 'historical Jesus' on liberal and humanitarian lines; we are now putting forward a new 'historical Jesus' on Marxian, catastrophic, and revolutionary lines" (117). Lewis holds that the documents about

Jesus are so limited that any attempt at writing a biography of historical Jesus cannot be free from suppressions, exaggerations and unreliable guessings (*Screwtape*, 117). Besides, such an attempt, which presents Him as a “great man”, is to “distract men’s minds from Who He is, and what He did” and “make Him solely a teacher” (118). Lewis’s point against the “historical Jesus” movement is then, that we should always remember that Jesus has supernatural divinity while being a Man, because he is the second person of the Trinity.

Lewis accepts myth as divine revelation. He also accepts dogmas and rituals as essential parts of Christianity. Yet before seeing Lewis’s views on religious myth, dogmas and rituals, we shall see how other leading philosophers of the twentieth century saw them.

Jung is well-known as one who makes much of myth and archetypes. In *Psychologie und Religion*, Jung finds the origin and essence of religion in the experience of the Numinous. He then sees truths in dogmas and mythical rituals that can express even more comprehensive reality than theological theories.

[D]ogma expresses the psyche more completely than a scientific theory, for the latter gives expression to and formulates the conscious mind alone. Furthermore, a theory can do nothing except formulate a living thing in abstract terms. Dogma, on the contrary, aptly expresses the living process of the unconscious in the form of the drama of repentance, sacrifice, and redemption.²²

Jung is here conscious that human reason alone is not capable enough of grasping comprehensive reality.

Bultmann says in *New Testament and Mythology*,

For the history-of-religions school,[...] the essential thing in the New Testament is not its religious and moral ideas but rather its religion or piety, in relation to which everything dogmatic, and hence also all objectifying mythological representations are secondary and indifferent.²³

What he thinks essential is religious life, i.e., “to be one with Christ, in whom

²² C. G. Jung, *Collected Works*, Vol. XI, *Psychology and Religion*, 2nd ed., eds. H. Read, M. Fordham, G. Adler, W. McGuire, tr. R. F. C. Hull (Princeton Univ. Press, 1969), p. 46.

²³ Bultmann, p. 13.

God has taken symbolic form.”²⁴ He says, as an existentialist Christian, “Basically, the mythological talk seeks to do *nothing other than to express the significance* of the historical event” (my italics).²⁵ In his opinion, the New Testament has a mythological framework only because it was written in an age when the generally accepted world picture was mythological. Therefore, he holds,

Insofar as it is mythological talk it is incredible to men and women today because for them the mythical world picture is a thing of the past. Therefore, contemporary Christian proclamation [...] has to face the question whether the New Testament proclamation has a truth that is independent of the mythical world picture, in which case it would be the task of theology to demythologize the Christian proclamation.²⁶

It is to be pointed out that while denying miracles and mythology of the New Testament, Bultmann still believes in the Incarnation as God’s eschatological act, though it is paradoxical to him. Finding it impossible to prove the historicity of Jesus to be eschatological, he commits himself to say,

The transcendence of God is not made immanent as it is in myth; rather, the paradox of the presence of the transcendent God in history is affirmed: “the word became flesh.”²⁷

In this, we see Bultmann’s voluntary will to believe against the difficulty in believing in religious dogmas in the age of science. In “Theology as Science,” (1941) he says,

[I]n the course of the nineteenth century and by the beginning of the twentieth, theology became essentially the science of religion.[...] This kind of theology speaks of faith on the presupposition that the object of faith is inaccessible to scientific research. Thus, it speaks of believing, not of what is believed in.[...] For orthodoxy the *fides quae creditur* [i.e., what is believed in] is right teaching,[...] If the *fides qua creditur* [i.e., believing] is viewed as assent to a *fides quae creditur*, itself understood as a sum of doctrines that one is supposed to believe [...] which one could hold to be true only by a partial if not total *sacrificium intellectus*, then the *fides qua creditur* has become a human work [...] one cannot believe in a doctrine but can only hold it to be “credible” or

²⁴ Bultmann, p. 13.

²⁵ Bultmann, p. 35.

²⁶ Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” pp. 2-3.

²⁷ Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” p. 42.

“incredible,” right or wrong.²⁸

After Bultmann, Roland Barthes and Northrop Frye see myth to be a tool to stir and enchant the public imagination to make certain social ideologies socially accepted. Frye writes:

[T]he stories that tell a society what is important for it to know, whether about its gods, its history, its laws, or its class structure. These stories may be called myths.[...] They thus become “sacred” as distinct from “profane” stories, and form part of what the Biblical tradition calls revelation.[...] a unified mythology is a powerful instrument of social authority and coercion, and it is accordingly used as such. About two generations ago there was a fashion for crying up the Middle Ages as a golden era in which all aspects of human life were united in a common body of beliefs and values. The intellectual unity of that time, however, was largely a rationalizing of its centralized authority. Marxism makes a similar appeal today as a unifying instrument of authority which includes an all-encompassing metaphysic, though of course it is not called that.²⁹

In René Girard, a French anthropologist, we find total denial of supernatural eschatological elements in religion and mythologies. In *La violence et le Sacré* (1972)³⁰, in *Le bouc émissaire* (1982)³¹, and in *La route antique des hommes pervers* (1985)³², he maintains that any religious ritual or myth has its origin in an actual historical event in which some innocent man has been killed as a scapegoat in a social crisis, especially when potential energy of social violence has been heightened. This scapegoat is accused of being responsible for the crisis, directed the whole society's hatred and killed, but by being so killed assuages the energy of social violence and, consequently, serves for keeping social stability; and from this, the apotheosis occurs.

In *Essays on Literature, Mimesis, and Anthropology*, Girard expresses his belief that the contemporary scientific hypotheses about myth and rituals illuminate them better than the past theological, philosophical, or even anthropological interpretations:

²⁸ Bultmann, “Theology as Science,” *New Testament*, pp. 51-52.

²⁹ Northrop Frye, *The Great Code* (1982; Ark Paperbacks, 1983), p. 33 & p. 51.

³⁰ Girard, René, *La violence et le Sacré* (1972), Japanese tr. (『暴力と聖なるもの』) by Sachio Yoshida (吉田幸男), (Housei Univ. Press (法政大学出版局), 1982).

³¹ Girard, René, *Le bouc émissaire* (1982), Japanese tr. (『身代りの山羊』) by Toshikazu Oda (織田年和) & Shigeki Tominaga (富永茂樹), (Housei Univ. Press (法政大学出版局), 1985).

³² Girard, René, *La route antique des hommes pervers* (1985), Japanese tr. (『邪な人々の昔の道』) by Takeo Koike (小池健男), (Housei Univ. Press (法政大学出版局), 1989).

I take the death of philosophy seriously, I repeat, but to me this death can only mean once more what it has already meant in the other areas from which philosophy and the philosophically inspired dogmatic methodologies have been successfully dislodged: the crossing of scientific threshold. *Questions these methodologies cannot successfully answer will be answered in a scientific framework.[...] Judging from past history it can already be seen that the old effort to turn the study of man into a science is far from dead and ultimately it will triumph. (my italics)*³³

In this statement, we see his belief in scientific method that does not demand us “*sacrificium intellectus.*” His rejection of eschatological, or revelational elements in mythological dogmas comes from the assumption that whatever is true must be rationally explicable and that religious dogmas cannot endure rational criticism but can be held only by suppressing intellectual judgement.

* * *

Against this tendency of the contemporary age not to see myth and dogmas as rationally acceptable truth, Lewis not only believes in eschatological divine elements in the Christian myth and dogmas but also thinks them compatible with reason. Reason is the faculty of logical thinking that infers truth from given data. The data, however, need not necessarily be scientific. They can be given either by experience or by authority, and can be metaphysical or theological. Lewis is conscious that science by nature has to neglect the religious or the supernatural since it exclusively deals with empirical natural facts. He says that during the time when science was born and made progress “men of science were coming to be metaphysically and theologically uneducated” (*Miracles*, 46).

What he thinks can make up for the deficiency of science by supplying people with metaphysical or theological knowledge are myths and authorized dogmas in church.

All over the world, until quite modern times, the direct insight of mystics and the reasonings of the philosophers percolated to the mass of the people by authority and tradition. They could be received by those who were no great reasoners themselves in the concrete form of myth and ritual and the whole pattern of

³³ René Girard, “To double business bound,” *Essays on Literature, Mimesis, and Anthropology* (The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 216-217.

life.[...] A society where the simple many obey the few seers can live: A society where all were seers could live more fully. But a society where the mass is still simple and the seers are no longer attended to can achieve [...] in the end extinction.(*Miracles* , 46-47)

Myth is God's revelation to man and it is no less true just because it cannot be logically explained away. As Lewis says, "knowledge by revelation is more like empirical than rational knowledge" (*God*, 277).

Lewis is openly against such a liberalistic view of dogmas and mythology to see them as something unessential or even unnecessary to Christianity. For instance, when he heard a lecture delivered by Professor Price at the Oxford Socratic Club, a debate club between Christians and atheists at the Oxford University, suggesting "that in most actual religions the essence is found in connection with 'accretions of dogma and mythology' which have been rendered incredible by the progress of science;[...] that it would be desirable, if it were possible, to retain the essence purged of the accretions,"³⁴

³⁴ H. H. Price, "The Grounds of Modern Agnosticism," *Phoenix Quarterly*, vol. I, No. 1 (Autumn, 1946), p. 25, quoted in Lewis, *God in the Dock*, p. 129.

Dr. Price does not say that science and religion are inconsistent. Rather, he admits that "Theism as such, it is suggested, is in no way inconsistent with science. Indeed, if anything, Science supports it, by giving us a fuller insight into the wisdom and power of the Creator."(*The Socratic Digest*, vol. 3. p. 10) He says that "Our reasons [sic] for believing in His existence must be non-scientific, from the nature of the case. But they are not on that account unscientific.[...] scientific method can never establish the existence of such a Being, but equally can never disprove it. Thus scientific method as such is perfectly compatible with theism"(ob. cit. p. 13). It is true that Dr. Price argues that some people will "distinguish between the essence of Religion, and the accretions which have gathered around it in the course of ages: accretions of custom, tradition, mythology and theological drama. The essence is belief in God and immortality" (p. 9) and it seems that Dr. Price is favourable to that opinion. Though Lewis says that "Professor Price maintains the following positions (1) That the essence of religion is belief in God and immortality; (2) that in most actual religions the essence is found in connection with 'accretions of dogma and mythology' which have been rendered incredible by the progress of science (3) that it would be very desirable, if it were possible, to retain the essence purged of the accretions; but (4) that science has rendered the essence almost as hard to believe as the accretions" (*God*, p. 129), it is wrong of him to summarize Dr. Price's position thus. Here we see what Beversluis has pointed out to be Lewis's aggressive "tendency to rush into battle, misrepresent the opposition, and then demolish it. The demolition is often swift and the victory decisive, but the view refuted is seldom a position anyone actually holds" (Beversluis, p. 41). Lewis is so much conscious of the modern tendency of what he sees as scientism that regards miracles and mythological world pictures as unscientific superstition that he must have

Lewis argues that it would be impossible to believe in God without any dogma and really act on that belief.

As soon as you do anything you have assumed one of the dogmas.[...] The god of whom no dogmas are believed is a mere shadow. . He will not produce that fear of the Lord in which wisdom begins, and, therefore, will not produce that love in which it is consummated. (*God*, 141-143)

Conscious of man's creaturely relation to God the Creator as well as of human limitation in insight, Lewis thinks it "almost axiomatic" that if God can be known, "the initiative lies wholly on His side.[...] it will be by self-revelation on His part, not by speculation on ours" (*God*, 144). When God reveals Himself in revelation, we have to take it as a whole, without intellectually analysing it.

In *Letters to Malcolm*, discussing exegetics, he says that though the biblical images are not to be taken literally, when the purport of the images seems to conflict with the theological abstractions, we should trust the purport of the images:

For our abstract thinking is itself a tissue of analogies: a continual modeling of spiritual reality in legal or chemical or mechanical terms. Are these likely to be more adequate than the sensuous, organic, and personal images of Scripture--light and darkness, river and well, seed and harvest, master and servant, hen and chickens, father and child? The footprints of the Divine are more visible in that rich soil than across rocks or slag-heaps. Hence what they now call "*demythologising*" Christianity can easily be "*re-mythologising*" it--and substituting a poorer mythology for a richer. (my italics) (*Malcolm*, 52)

Thus, Lewis openly criticizes Bultmann's proposal to de-mythologize Christianity. His point is that true religion must not be too rationally simplistic but both "thick" and "clear":

By Thick I mean those which have orgies and ecstasies and mysteries and local attachments: Africa is full of Thick religions. By Clear I mean those which are philosophical, ethical and universalising: Stoicism, Buddhism, and Ethical Church are Clear religion. Now if there is a true religion it must be both Thick and Clear: for the true God must have made both the child and the man, both the savage and the citizen, both the head and the belly.[...] Christianity really breaks down the middle wall of the partition.[...] The savage convert has to be Clear: I have to be Thick. That is how one knows one has come to the real religion.

rashly mistaken Dr. Price's position for one of that scientism.

(*God*, 102-103)

The liberal Christians neglect the thick side of the true religion. Yet, God's mystery should be accepted as mystery.³⁵ Christianity is not always clear nor is meant to be. Against liberal Christians he insists, "We, therefore, look for Him where it is claimed that He has revealed Himself by miracle, by inspired teachers, by enjoined ritual" (*God*, 27).

* * *

Lewis calls himself "a rationalist." He never believes in God against his reason. On the contrary, he rationally accepts Christianity and argues for the existence of God more logically and rationally than many of the Christian apologists in this century. However, he is also conscious of the limitation of reason and admits the role of mythological imagination and the importance of submissive acceptance of authority in the life of faith. In the general atmosphere of scientism, Lewis thus warns against neglect of the supernatural reality of God.

³⁵ Though Lewis criticizes the "de-mythologizing" movement thus, Bultmann himself admits God's mystery and believes in the transcendental God, as we have seen above in this section. Bultmann actually holds that the existence of God is to be accepted rationally on the following reason:

Myths give worldly objectivity to that which is unworldly.[...] All this holds true also of the mythological conceptions found in the Bible. According to mythological thinking, God has his domicile in heaven.[...] In a crude manner it expresses the idea that God is beyond the world, that He is transcendent.[...] When mythological thinking forms the conception of hell, it expresses the idea of the transcendence of evil as the tremendous power which again and again afflicts mankind. The location of hell and of men whom hell has seized is below the earth in darkness, because darkness is tremendous and terrible to men. (Rudolf Bultmann, *Jesus Christ and Mythology* (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp. 19-20)

Chapter 3

Morality

<Argument from Morality>

In the previous chapters, we have seen Lewis's arguments for Christianity from imagination and from reason. The third of his main arguments for Christianity is based on morality.

Lewis's argument from morality takes the form of inference of the absolute Moral Giver from moral conscience in individual human beings. This argument most clearly shows us Lewis as the objectivist against the twentieth century relativism. This is not only an argument for Christianity but for the objective reality of the moral law as well. He is conscious that in this century, not everyone regards the moral law as the objective and absolute law of right and wrong. Therefore, in *Mere Christianity*, he starts his argument by pointing out its objectivity.

As the first step, he calls the reader's attention to the fact that no sensible man finds fault with another person's conduct just because it happens to be inconvenient to him. When a person blames another, he would say that it is because the other person is wrong and, saying that, would be assuming some standard of good and evil, or of right and wrong. He would also be assuming that the standard is unique and absolute and that the other person must necessarily share the same standard. Lewis says it is in fact impossible to think of several moralities, of which some must be better and some must be worse.

The moment you say that one set of moral ideas can be better than another, you are, in fact [...] comparing them both with some Real Morality, admitting that there is such a thing as a real Right, independent of what people think, and that some people's ideas get nearer to that real Right than others. (*Mere Christianity*, 23)

Lewis rejects naturalistic positions about the moral law. For instance, he maintains, though morality is often regarded as a product of human instincts, or as social convention which has been formed gradually in order to keep the society in peace and order, neither of these views is correct.

The reason why he rejects the view of morality as man's herd instinct is this. For one thing, the moral law sometimes judges between two instincts. For instance, when you hear a cry for help from a man in danger, Lewis says, "You will probably feel two desires--one a desire to give help (due to your herd instinct), the other a desire to keep out of danger (due to the instinct for self-preservation)" (*Mere Christianity*, 20). In this case if the moral law tells us to help him instead of running away, it cannot be our herd instinct because "this thing that judges between two instincts [...] cannot itself be either of them" (*Mere Christianity*, 20). Secondly, the moral law often enjoins us against our strong natural instincts such as the instinct for self-preservation in the case above. And thirdly, Lewis says, there are no human impulses that the moral law would never demand to suppress. Even such instinctive impulses of apparent supremacy as maternal love or patriotic love have to be suppressed in some occasions lest they should lead to unfairness towards other people's children or countries. "The moral law is not any one instinct or any set of instincts: it is something which makes a kind of tune [...] by directing the instincts" (*Mere Christianity*, 22).

He rejects the view of the moral law as a social convention formed for man's convenience because, first of all, he finds it universal. Though there appear to be various moral systems in the world and there seem to be differences between moralities of different civilizations of different ages, when compared, their similarities to each other are greater than their differences. For instance, they have all agreed that you ought to be unselfish, though they have been different as to whom you ought to be unselfish to: to your family, to your country,

or to everyone (*Mere Christianity*, 17-18). Secondly, it is beyond man's control. It is forced on us whether or not we like. It is even impossible for us to logically explain it away. For example, if you ask, "Why should I be unselfish?" and get the answer, "Because it is good for society," you may ask again: "Why should I care what's good for society unless it pays me personally?" and the answer would have to be "Because you ought to be unselfish," which leads back to the first question. Thus, Lewis says, it is no use asking the explanation of morality. "The law of Right and Wrong" is simply given *a priori* (*Mere Christianity*, 28-29).

It is truer when we realize that the behaviour we call bad or unfair is not exactly the same as the behaviour we find inconvenient and that the behaviour we call good or fair is not always what we want. Therefore, he finds the moral law to be "a real law, which none of us made, but which we find pressing on us" (*Mere Christianity*, 29).

The autonomy of the moral law is seen also in the fact that we cannot invent a thoroughly new morality. When one tries to establish a totally new morality, he has to turn at least to some of the existing codes of right and wrong in order to have his morality authorized. Besides, in order to make a completely new morality, he should once go out beyond all the codes of moral law, and then, he would never enter any ethical system again, because "[a] man with no ethical allegiance can have no ethical motive for adopting one. If he had, it would prove that he was not really in the vacuum at all" ("On Ethics," *Christian Reflections*, 48). Thus, Lewis holds that the moral law is objective, metaphysical reality. It is the "Law of Human Nature, or of Right and Wrong" (*Mere Christianity*, 29) which exists independently of human arbitrariness. Yet, on the other hand, he admits that none of us fully meets the obligation we feel. He finds that the consciousness of "a moral law at once approved and disobeyed" is one of the universal elements of developed religions (*Pain*, 10). Cardinal J. H. Newman says,

If, as is the case, we feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened, at transgressing the voice of conscience, this implies that there is One to whom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed, whose claim upon us we fear.¹

Lewis likewise concludes that there is someone behind the law who has given it to us through our conscience. He admits that this law-giver may not necessarily be the God of Christianity. Yet, Lewis moves on to say, that law-giver at least must be an absolute good governor:

If the universe is not governed by an absolute goodness, then all our efforts are in the long run hopeless. But if it is, then we are making ourselves enemies to that goodness every day, and are not in the least likely to do any better to-morrow, and so our case is hopeless again. We cannot do without it, and we cannot do with it. God is the only comfort, He is also the supreme terror. (*Mere Christianity*, 37)

This reminds us of the Jewish law, or the law in the Old Testament. Originally it was given by grace of God who had led the people of Israel from Egypt. When God gave them the Ten Commandment, He begins: "I am the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage." "You shall have no other gods before Me." "You shall not make for yourself a carved image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth [...]" (Exodus 20:2-4, *NKJV*) For the Jewish people, the law was and is blessing and comfort that has guaranteed them God's favour. Yet, at the same time, when they are conscious of their inability of keeping the law, they cannot but remember God's inexorable warning: "Hear, O Israel [...]/You shall fear the Lord your God and serve Him, and shall take oaths in His name.[...]/ lest the anger of the Lord your God be aroused

¹ J. H. Newman, *An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent*, introd. Etienne Gilson (Image Books, 1955), p. 101.

against you and destroy you from the face of the earth.” (Deuteronomy, 6:4,13&16, *NKJV*)

In the logic above Lewis presupposes that if there ever is an absolute good governor of the universe, it is God. Otherwise, even when he concludes that the moral-giver who is absolutely good is the governor of the universe, he would have no reason to introduce God who is “the only comfort” as well as “the supreme terror”. And here, he is in the Western tradition that axiomatically identifies the absolute good with God. Besides, his logic here is again based on the traditional Western belief in the logos of the world, that the world is in order and not absurd: the belief that “all our efforts are” not “in the long run hopeless.”

Lewis says, “God neither obeys nor creates the moral law” (“The Poison of Subjectivism,” *Christian Reflections*, 80), because he believes that the moral standard is itself absolute and autonomous. The moral law is “the reality beyond all predicates, the abyss that was before the Creator Himself” (*Abolition*, 28). However, he does not infer from this that therefore God and the moral standard are mutually independent and both of them exist apart autonomously. Following the Greco-Jewish-Christian tradition, Lewis axiomatically identifies the Good with God the Creator:

The good is uncreated; it never could have been otherwise [...] it lies, as Plato said, on the other side of existence.[...] But we, favoured beyond the wisest Pagans, know what lies beyond existence, what admits no contingency [...] is not simply a law [...] God is not merely good, but goodness; goodness is not merely divine, but God. (“The Poison of Subjectivism,” 80)

As A. J. Ayer points out, there are roughly two kinds of moral arguments for the existence of God: “first, that only the agency of God can account for the existence of morality, and, secondly, that God’s authority is needed to give our

moral standards some objective validity.”² We see that it is the first kind that the argument of Lewis and Newman belongs to. The representative of the second kind is Kant’s argument, which we shall compare with Lewis’s in the next section.

<Lewis’s moral theory compared with Kantian theory>

Lewis believes in the objectivity of the moral law, and in that, he is different from such philosophers as Kant who regard this law as essentially subjective. Kant postulates God’s existence as a want, not reality, when he senses moral obligations.

[...] wir sollen das höchste Gut (welches also doch möglich sein muß) zu befördern suchen. Also wird auch das Dasein einer von der Natur unterschiedenen Ursache der gesamten Natur, welche den Grund dieses Zusammenhanges, nämlich der genauen Übereinstimmung der Glückseligkeit mit der Sittlichkeit, enthalte, postuliert. Diese oberste Ursache aber soll den Grund der Übereinstimmung der Natur nicht bloß mit einem Gesetze des Willens der vernünftigen Wesen, sondern mit der Vorstellung dieses Gesetzes, so fern diese es sich zum obersten Bestimmungsgrunde des Willens setzen, also nicht bloß mit den Sitten der Form nach, sondern auch ihrer Sittlichkeit, als dem Bewegungsgrunde derselben, d.i. mit ihrer moralischen Gesinnung enthalten.[...]Nun ist ein Wesen, das der Handlungen nach der Vorstellung von Gesetzen fähig ist, eine Intelligenz (vernünftig Wesen) und die Kausalität eines solchen Wesens nach dieser Vorstellung der Gesetze ein Wille desselben. Also ist die oberste Ursache der Natur, so fern sie zum höchsten Gute vorausgesetzt werden muß, ein Wesen, das durch Verstand und Willen die Ursache (folglich der Urheber) der Natur ist, d.i. Gott. Folglich ist das Postulat der Möglichkeit des höchsten abgeleiteten Guts (der besten Welt) zugleich das Postulat der Wirklichkeit eines ursprünglichen Guts, nämlich der Existenz Gottes. Nun war es Pflicht für uns, das höchste Gut zu befördern, mithin nicht allein Befugnis, sondern auch mit der Pflicht als Bedürfnis verbundene Notwendigkeit, die Möglichkeit dieses höchsten Guts vorauszusetzen, welches, da es nur unter der Bedingung des Daseins Gottes stattfindet, die Voraussetzung desselben mit der Pflicht unzertrennlich verbindet, d.i. es ist moralisch notwendig, das

² A. J. Ayer, *The Central Questions of Philosophy* (1973; Penguin, 1990), p. 223.

Dasein Gottes anzunehmen.

Hier ist nun wohl zu merken, da diese moralische Notwendigkeit subjektiv, d.i. Bedürfnis, und nicht objektiv, d.i. selbst Pflicht sei[...]

(...we ought to endeavour to promote the *summum bonum*, which, therefore, must be possible. Accordingly, the existence of a cause of all nature, distinct from nature itself, and containing the principle of this connexion [sic], namely, of the exact harmony of happiness with morality, is also *postulated*. Now, this supreme cause must contain the principle of the harmony of nature, not merely with a law of the will of rational beings, but with the conception of this *law*, in so far as they make it the supreme determining principle of the will, and consequently not merely with the form of morals, but with their morality as their motive, that is, with their moral character.[...] Now, a being that is capable of acting on the conception of laws is an *intelligence* (a rational being), and the causality of such a being according to this conception of laws is his *will*; therefore the supreme cause of nature, which must be presupposed as a condition of the *summum bonum*, is a being which is the cause of nature by *intelligence* and *will*, consequently its author, that is God. It follows that the postulate of the possibility of the *highest derived good* (the best world) is likewise the postulate of the reality of a *highest original good*, that is to say, of the existence of God. Now it was seen to be a duty for us to promote the *summum bonum*; consequently it is not merely allowable, but it is a necessity connected with duty as a requisite, that we should presuppose the possibility of this *summum bonum*; and as this is possible only on condition of the existence of God, it inseparably connects the supposition of this with duty; that is, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God.

It must be remarked here that this moral necessity is *subjective*, that is, it is a want, and not *objective*[...] ³

Kant's point is that if we ought to endeavour for the supreme goodness, the supreme goodness should be possible; and that in order to make the supreme goodness possible, God should exist. For Kant, the most important thing is the observation of the moral injunctions, which is the primary reality to him. It is necessary to believe in God not because God really exists but because God, if ever

³ Kant, „*Kritik der practischen Vernunft*,“ *WerkIV Schriften zur Ethik und Religionsphilosophie*, pp. 255-256: English tr. T. K. Abbot, *Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works* 4th ed. (Longmans, 1889), pp. 221-222.

He existed, would approve man's moral endeavour and pay for it. In other words, Kant is proposing "suspension of disbelief" in God, in order to get reassured about his moral life. On the other hand, for Lewis, it is God who is the primary Reality, though the moral law is itself also an objective reality.

In *The Abolition of Man*, Lewis tells us of the moral law:

It is the reality beyond all predicates, the abyss that was before the Creator Himself. It is Nature, it is the Way, the Road. It is the Way in which the universe goes on, the Way in which things everlastingly emerge, stilly and tranquilly, into space and time. It is also the Way which every man should tread in imitation of that cosmic and supercosmic progression, conforming all activities to that great exemplar [...] It is the doctrine of objective value, the belief that certain attitudes are really true, and others really false, to the kind of thing the universe is and the kind of things we are. (*Abolition*, 28-29)

In *The Pilgrim's Regress*, Lewis writes of a personified "Vertue" who makes a point of observing the moral law while yet failing to believe the existence of the absolute Good which that law is pointing at. Vertue says, "To travel hopefully is better than to arrive.[...] I must admit, now that you press me, I have not a very clear idea of the end. But that is not the important question.[...] I have made the best rules I can. If I find any better ones I shall adopt them. In the meantime, the great thing is to have rules of some sort and to keep them" (*Regress*, 40). He thinks he must observe moral imperatives wholly disinterestedly, but he does not see even why he feels it his duty to observe them. Later, he becomes uncertain of the authenticity of the imperatives he feels, and says,

I meant to choose things because I chose to choose them--not because I was paid for it. Do you think I am a child to be scared with rods and baited with sugar plums? It was for this reason that I never even inquired whether the stories about the Landlord [i.e. God] were true; I saw that his castle and his black hole were there to corrupt my will and kill my freedom. It [sic] it was true it was a truth an honest man must not know. (*Regress*, 113)

He loses his voice and eyesight as if to show his inner reluctance and failure to

see God and the consequent inability to move himself or to instruct others. Vertue's fault is that he makes too much of the disinterestedness of the motive of his deeds. Too much concern about one's own disinterestedness keeps a man from doing good works altogether.

About the rules imposed by the Landlord, Vertue is troubled by this dilemma:

If we obey through hope and fear, in that very act we disobey: for the rule which we reverence most [...] is that rule which says that a man must act disinterestedly. To obey the Landlord thus, would be to disobey. But what if we obey freely, because we agree with him? Alas, this is even worse. To say that we agree, and obey because we agree, is only to say again that we find the same rule written in our hearts and obey that.[...] and the Landlord is a meaningless addition to the problem. (*Regress*, 127-128)

In these words, there are two problems involved. The first is whether it is possible to obey God wholly disinterestedly, not for reward or to avoid punishment. And the second is whether we should obey God's words because they are God's words or because we find them good. This is the same problem as Socrates (or Plato) has taken up in *Euphyphro*, namely, the problem that whether good is good because God wills it or God wills it because it is good. Socrates's question is, "whether where the right is, there also is holiness, or where holiness is, there also is the right."⁴ Socrates thinks the right involves holiness, but not vice versa. Lewis, however, answers to the problem as that God's will is good for the very reason that it is God's will but at the same time Good becomes God's will because it is good. Since he believes in the absolute autonomy and objectivity of the moral law while identifying God and the goodness, to him, the two propositions in Plato are not the alternatives but two sides of one and the same thing. Lewis maintains,

⁴ Plato, *Euthyphro*, in *Plato I*, Loeb Classical Library, with English tr. by Harold North Fowler (Harvard Univ. Press, 1914; rpt. 1982), pp. 45&47.

The content of our obedience--the thing we are commanded to do--will always be something intrinsically good, something we ought to do if (by an impossible supposition) God had not commanded it. But in addition to the content, the mere obeying is also intrinsically good, for in obeying, a rational creature consciously enacts its creaturely role. (*Pain*, 88-89)

Lewis's opinion about the need of disinterestedness in our moral acts is expressed in his answer to those who, like Vertue in *The Pilgrim's Regress*, fear that their effort to be a good Christian might be mercenary if they make it with a hope of entering heaven:

Those who have attained everlasting life in the vision of God doubtless know very well that it is no mere bribe, but the very consummation of their earthly discipleship: but we who have not yet attained it [...] cannot even begin to know it at all except by continuing to obey and finding the first reward of our obedience in our increasing power to desire the ultimate reward. Just in proportion as the desire grows, our fear lest it should be a mercenary desire will die away and finally be recognised as an absurdity. ("The Weight of Glory," *Toast*, 96)

Our desire for heaven is itself a gift from God. It is nothing of the sort that impairs our effort to be good. It is rather help and encouragement given by God. Lewis finds that God often gives us power or will to try to be good instead of simply turning us to be good. In *Mere Christianity* he says that to have faith in God means "trying to do all that He says [...] Not hoping to get to Heaven as a reward for your actions, but inevitably wanting to act in a certain way because a first faint gleam of Heaven is already inside you" (*Mere Christianity*, 127).

Lewis finds that "The rational and moral element in each human mind is a point of force from the Supernatural working its way into Nature" (*Miracles*, 43): that is, we, as a natural creature, are to know the supernatural Reality through our reason and morality, as well as through our intuitive imagination.

<Morality, reason, and feelings>

Lewis does not think that moral conscience and reason are mutually independent. He says on moral judgments, "Some people think that when we make them we are not using our Reason, but are employing some different power. Other people think that we make them by our Reason. I myself hold this second view" (*Miracles*, 38). He believes that "the primary moral principles on which all others depend are rationally perceived" (*Miracles*, 38).

Their intrinsic reasonableness shines by its own light. It is because all morality is based on such self-evident principles that we say to a man, when we would recall him to right conduct, "Be reasonable." (*Miracles*, 39)

His argument here may sound like a pun or word game of the two meanings of the "reasonable," i.e. 1) having sound judgment, sensible; and 2) in accordance with reason (*OED*). He seems to be mixing up moral reasonableness with logical rationality. However, for Lewis, who believes that rationality and morality both come from God's Reason, it is not a pun at all. What is morally sensible is in accordance with reason as well. In *The Discarded Image*, Lewis points out that "Nearly all moralists before the eighteenth century regarded Reason as the organ of morality" (*Discarded*, 158). The Rational Soul of a man was regarded to have two faculties of *ratio* and *intellectus*: the former being the power of deducing a truth by progressing from an understood (*intellecto*) point to another; and the latter, i.e. *intellectus*, being the simple and direct grasp of an intelligible truth. This *intellectus* perceives moral axioms, while reasoning on those axioms is an affair of *ratio*. It is in the eighteenth century that some people came to think that good conduct comes from some types of feelings, such as domestic affections, or that morality has its source in the heart (*Discarded*, 157-159). Lewis is, then on the side of older Western tradition also about the concept of morality.

Yet on the other hand, Lewis is also conscious of the role that feelings and

emotions play in man's perception of, and obedience to, the moral law. In a school textbook, Lewis finds the idea that when a man feels something sublime, or good, or bad, such moral responses are only subjective. In *The Abolition of Man*, Lewis condemns modern education for teaching such subjectivism, thus quoting the following passage from a textbook:

When the man said *That is sublime*, he appeared to be making a remark about the waterfall.[...] Actually [...] he was not making a remark about the waterfall, but a remark about his own feelings. What he was saying was really *I have feelings associated in my mind with the word "Sublime"* or shortly, *I have sublime feelings.* (*Abolition*, 14)

Lewis argues:

the man who says *This is sublime* cannot mean *I have sublime feelings*.[...] The feelings which make a man call an object sublime are not sublime feelings but feelings of veneration. If *This is sublime* is to be reduced at all to a statement about the speaker's feelings, the proper translation would be *I have humble feelings.*(*Abolition*, 14-15)

In *The Abolition of Man*, Lewis rejects the Kantian notion, which we have already seen in Chapter I, that the ethical reaction and feelings of man "rest not so much upon the nature of external things that arouse them as upon each person's own disposition to be moved by these to pleasure or pain,"⁵ and emphatically insists that the value and moral standard of good and evil exist objectively, independent of man's feelings and that when man should abandon the traditional value and morality, nothing but power and desire would move him. Lewis calls the reader's attention to the fact that ever since the ancient times, the Platonists, Aristotelians, Stoics, Christians and Chinese philosophers have all believed in "the doctrine of objective value" (*Abolition*, 29). People who know the moral

⁵ Kant, English tr. by John T. Goldthwait, *Observations On the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* (c. 1960; rpt. Univ. Of California Press, 1981), p . 45.

law, or the law of objective value, “can hold that to call children delightful or old men venerable is not simply to record a psychological fact about our own parental or filial emotions at the moment, but to recognize a quality which demands a certain response from us whether we make it or not” (*Abolition*, 29).

St. Augustine defines virtue as *ordo amoris*, the ordinate condition of the affections in which every object is accorded that kind and degree of love which is appropriate to it. Aristotle says that the aim of education is to make the pupil like and dislike what he ought.[...] Plato before him had said the same. The little human animal will not at first have the right responses. It must be trained to feel pleasure, liking, disgust, and hatred at those things which really are pleasant, likable, disgusting, and hateful. (*Abolition*, 26-27)

Thus, while Lewis thinks that moral judgments are made by reason, he thinks it important to encourage appropriate emotions that accompanies those judgments: “The heart never takes the place of the head: but it can, and should, obey it” (*Abolition*, 30).

Lewis is conscious that human beings are moved by emotions as well as by reason and that sometimes rational judgments are affected by emotions. A man’s virtue depends not only on his reason but also on his emotional temperament. “It still remains true that no justification of virtue will enable a man to be virtuous. Without the aid of trained emotions the intellect is powerless against the animal organism” (*Abolition*, 33-34).⁶

The head rules the belly through the chest--the seat [...] of emotions organized by trained habit into stable sentiments. The Chest--Magnanimity--Sentiment--these are the indispensable liaison officers between cerebral man and visceral man. It may even be said that it is by this middle element that man is man: for by his intellect he is mere spirit and by his appetite mere animal. (*Abolition*, 34)

⁶ Cf. Lewis, *The Discarded Image*, pp. 165-169, where he discussed the medieval model of man consisting soul-spirit-body.

<The Problem of Evil>

The objective value and correctness of the moral law, or the law of Right and Wrong is axiomatic to Lewis. He also believes in the absolute goodness of God the Moral Giver who is identified with the Creator. On the other hand, he is conscious of the present evil state of the world and knows that the existence of evil has been one of the greatest problems for the believers and advocates of the Divine Goodness. It is the problem already presented by Epicurus; as Lucretius, a follower of Epicurus, writes, "*nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam naturam rerum: tanta stat praedita culpa*" ("the world was certainly not made for us by divine power: so great are the faults with which it stands endowed."⁷ Lewis in *The Problem of Pain* summarises the problem as follows:

If God were good, He would wish to make His creatures perfectly happy, and if God were almighty, He would be able to do what He wished. But creatures are not happy. Therefore God lacks either goodness, or power, or both. (*Pain*, 14)

In that book, Lewis attempts at a logical solution to this problem.

As to the origin and the existence of evil, Lewis follows St. Augustine's so-called Free Will defence. In the creation of man, God has given him free will so that he may voluntarily obey Him, for voluntary obedience is better than forced obedience. However, freedom to obey is by logical necessity also freedom to disobey; and man has misused this freedom to turn from God to himself, wishing to be his own master rather than obeying God. This is the original sin of man, and from this comes a lot of evil.⁸

Though God is omnipotent, God's omnipotence cannot possibly prevent

⁷ Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, with tr. W. H. D. Rouse, 2nd ed. in Loeb Classical Library (Harvard Univ. Press, 1982), pp. 394-395.

⁸ Cf. St. Augustine, *City of God*, pp. 568-569; St. Augustine, *On Free Will* (『自由意思論』), Japanese tr. Saburou Imaizumi 今泉三良 & Yasuo Izawa 伊沢彌男 (Souzousha (創造社), 1969), pp. 67-69.

this fall because giving free will to man and binding him so as not to let him fall is logical incompatibility, and even nonsensical. God's omnipotence is the power to do anything logically possible, and not the sort of power to do anything nonsensical. Thus, Lewis insists that God is good and omnipotent although there is evil in the world.

Furthermore, Lewis even takes up the seeming absurdity and cruelty of the world and makes an argument from it for the existence of an objective standard of good and evil, and hence argues for the existence of the good Creator behind that standard. Rejecting the pessimistic view of the world such as of Hardy's that assumes "a Brute" or a "Blackguard" (*"De Futilitate," Christian Reflections, 66*) to be the creator of the world, Lewis says,

If a Brute and Blackguard made the world, then he also made our minds. If he made our minds, he also made that very standard in them whereby we judge him to be a Brute and Blackguard.[...] If we reject him we ought also to reject all his works. But one of his works is this very moral standard by which we reject him. If we accept this standard then we are really implying that he is not a Brute and Blackguard.[...] You must trust the universe in one respect even in order to condemn it in every other. (*"De Futilitate," 66-67*)

* * *

Thus, he argues from the morality of human nature the existence of the absolute good God who is not only the moral-giver but also the Creator of the universe and of human beings. It must be the God of Christianity, because, as we have already seen in the previous chapter, other theisms are all unacceptable.

Chapter 4 Lewis's Literary Theory

Lewis often shows quite an apparent antipathy against the modern literary tendency of writing poetry which is too difficult to understand, making severe statements against his contemporaries. He says that even seventeenth century metaphysical poetry such as Donne's had "one correct interpretation of each [conceit] and Donne could have told it to you" ("*De Descriptione*," *Selected Essays*, 9), while modern art and literature, which is bewilderingly new, seem to allow whatever interpretation we like. In a poem, "A Confession," originally published in *Punch*¹ in 1954, he expresses his attitude against modernism thus:

I am so coarse, the things the poets see
Are obstinately invisible to me.
For twenty years I've stared my level best
To see if evening--any evening--would suggest
A patient etherized upon a table;
In vain. I simply wasn't able.
To me each evening looked far more
Like the departure from a silent, yet crowded, shore
Of a ship whose freight was everything, leaving behind
Gracefully, finally, without farewells, marooned mankind. (*Poems*, 1)

This is obviously an attack on T. S. Eliot's "Prufrock":

Let us go then, you and I,
When the evening is spread out against the sky
like a patient etherised upon a table.²

¹ "A Confession" was a revised version of the poem originally published as "Spartan Nactus" in *Punch*, Vol. CCXXVII (Dec. I, 1954), p. 685. As noted in Walter Hooper ed. C. S. Lewis *Poems* (Geoffrey Bles, 1964), p.140.

² T. S. Eliot, "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock," *The Complete Poems and Plays*, p.13.

Charles A. Huttar remarks,

[...] in 1954, a few months before "A Confession" appeared in *Punch*, we find Lewis referring explicitly to the image from "Prufrock" with which his poem commences, as he writes to Kathryn Farrer concerning a widespread tendency in modern literature which strikes me as horrid: I mean, the readiness to admit extreme uses of the pathetic fallacy in contexts where there is nothing to justify them and always of a kind that belittles or "sordidises" ("sordidifies") nature. Eliot's evening "like a patient etherised upon a table" is the *locus classicus*. I don't believe one person in a million, under any emotional stress, will see evening like that. And even if they did, I believe that anything but the most sparing admission of such images is a v[ery] dangerous game. To invite them, to recur willingly to them, to come to regard them as normal, surely poisons us? [the second square brackets Huttar's]*
(*Letter to Kathryn Farrer, 9 February 1954, Wade Center.)³

This letter shows Lewis's antipathy to modern poetry which is sordidly unique and catches the reader's attention by the unpleasant conceit.⁴

In *The Pilgrim's Regress*, first published in 1933, Lewis supplies a chapter in which he satirizes modern poetry with the running headline "The poetry of the Silly Twenties" (50). There, John, the protagonist, meets some artists, one of whom suddenly slaps him on the face without any particular reason. Here, thinking of his "A Confession," we may probably be sure that Lewis has Eliot in mind. For Lewis, who finds the value of art in its faculty of giving us glimpses

³ Charles A. Huttar, "C. S. Lewis's Poetry," Peter Shakel, J. and Charles A. Huttar eds. *Word and Story in C. S. Lewis*, (University of Missouri Press, 1991), pp.95-96.

⁴ Lewis is generally thought to have disliked Eliot's poetry but as Stephen Medcalf notices, he sometimes shows sympathy with Eliot. For instance, he praises the "penitential qualities" of Eliot's "best work" (*Preface*, 137) and remarks that the method of Hamlet is close to Eliot's own method in poetry ("Hamlet: The Prince or the poem?" in *Selected Literary Essays*, p. 102). Cf. Stephen Medcalf, "Language and Self-Consciousness: The Making and Breaking of C. S. Lewis's Personae," Peter Schakel, J. and Charles A. Huttar eds.

of Heaven, such modern poetry as is represented by that of the early Eliot, "Prufrock" or *The Waste Land* (1921), must have been hard to approve.⁵

Another chapter in *Regress* with the headline "The Swamp-literature of the Dirty Twenties" (52) shows us a man who "suddenly [...] began to beat on an African tomtom and to croon with his voice, swaying his lean, half-clad body to and fro and staring at them all, out of eyes which were like burning coals"(52). Because his impression of modern poetry is thus very unfavourable, he, as an Old Western man, makes all the more of Medieval and Renaissance poetry than that of his contemporaries: more of Milton and Spenser than Eliot or Lawrence.

In fact, it is perhaps largely his misgivings about our getting more and more man-centred that makes him turn against modern literature, which apparently expresses the tendency. He excluded from the syllabus for the Final Honours School at Oxford the study of all English literature written after 1830, with even Victorian literature being made optional. Helen Gardner remarks that the syllabus embodied "his belief in the value of medieval (especially Old English) literature, his conviction that a proper study of modern literature required the linguistic training that the study of earlier literature gave, and his sense of the continuity of English literature."⁶ And here we see that the value he finds in medieval literature is just the opposite of that which moderns are seeking after.

Lewis critically sees the modern movement in the history of the Western thought as a "movement of internalization" (*Discarded*, 42), calling it the movement towards the "universal black-out" ("Bulverism," *God*, 271).

It is a disastrous discovery [...] that we exist. I mean it is disastrous when instead of merely attending to a rose we are forced to think of ourselves

Word and Story in C. S. Lewis, University of Missouri Press, 1991), p. 144.

⁵ I myself, however, see deep religious meanings and quest theme in the *Waste Land* which lead to *Four Quartets*.

⁶ Helen Gardner, "Clive Staples Lewis," *The Proceedings of the British Academy*, vol. 21 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1965), pp.422-423.

looking at the rose [...] It is disastrous because, if you are not very careful, the colour of the rose gets attributed to our optic nerves and its scent to our noses, and in the end there is no rose left. ("Bulverism," *God*, 271)

As we shall see in his fiction, that black-out from the significant world of heaven is a conspicuous characteristic which Lewis attributes to hell. Therefore, in modern culture, he sees a downward slope into hell, though he does not oppose culture itself. (cf. for example, "Christianity and Culture," *Christian Reflections*, 12-27) This misgivings about the direction toward man-centredness is expressed also in his literary criticism. He says,

Literature exists to teach what is useful, to honour what deserves honour, to appreciate what is delightful. The useful, honourable, and delightful things are superior to it [...] its own use, honour, or delightfulness is derivative from theirs. In that sense the art is humble even when the artists are proud; proud of their proficiency in the art, but not making for the art itself the high Renaissance or Romantic claims....

In this great change [...] century by century, item after item is transferred from the object's side of the account to the subject's. And now [...] the subject himself is discounted as merely subjective; we only think that we think. Having eaten up everything else, he eats himself up too. And where we 'go from that' is a dark question. (*Discarded*, 214-215)

Thus standing against man-centred tendency, he cannot agree with the view that literature should necessarily reveal some truths of human life. And therefore, he also disapproves the modern "Realism" in literature which assumes that books should give us the impression that "This is what life is like" (*Experiment*, 62) and that "a fiction cannot fit for adult and civilised reading unless it represents life as we have all found it to be [...] in experience" (*Experiment*, 60). Lewis says that earlier audience would have seen no point in hearing a story about anything that happens everyday. People wanted to hear something queer, something which broadened their minds, something which made them feel "Life is such that this is possible" (*Experiment*, 64). Lewis's argument

against what we call "realism"⁷ comes also from his deeply rooted awareness of the limit of human imagination.

Actually it seems to me that one can hardly say anything either bad enough or good enough about life. The one picture that is utterly false is the supposed realistic fiction of the XIX century where all the real horrors and heavens are excluded. The reality is a queer mixture of idyll, tragedy, farce, melodrama: and characters (even the same character) far better and worse than are ever imagined. (*Letters*, 266)

When men began to study themselves, their own reason became the object. Now reason appears to many people as the epiphenomenon which accompanies a chemical or electrical events in a cortex. Then man began to assume that if our rational thinking is a natural phenomenon caused by some condition, even our moral or value judgments are not really valid but are sentiments or attitudes caused by the environmental conditions and therefore has no authority. Lewis thus points out man's twofold retreat from God. Man first turned his eyes from God; and next, stopped his ears to His messages. God still keeps on sending us messages through our imagination, reason, and morality as well. It is we that are wrong if we cannot receive them. "Good beats upon the damned incessantly as sound waves beat on the ears [which have lost the power of hearing], but they cannot receive it" (*Divorce*, 123).

Myth, allegory and fairy tales are, then, valuable for Lewis also as literary defenses against the "Internalization," the process of promoting this self-centredness of man.

* * *

Lewis demands that we should open our eyes and ears wholeheartedly toward God and to His message. First of all, we should have "[t]he taste for the other, that is, the very capacity for enjoying good" (*Pain*, 111). As a scholar, his

⁷ What I refer to as "realism" here is of course not an attempt at expressing what

attitudes are the same. In appreciating Nature, he says, "Look. Listen. Attend" (*Four Loves*, 23), is the first step, and so is it in appreciating art, music and also literature. In either case what the object demands of us is total surrender to it. In order to enjoy either an art or literature truly, we should first receive it indifferently, without any prejudice on our part. "We must empty our minds and lay ourselves open" (*Experiment*, 116).

Books will provide open-minded readers with telling illustrations by which they may interpret their own experience in their life. Yet, it is not their main role. As Lewis remarks when he is discussing fairy tales, they "can give us experiences we have never had and thus, instead of 'commenting on life' can add to it" ("Sometimes Fairy Stories May Say Best What's to be Said," *Of This & Other Worlds*, 74). This is, however, only when we read books with a proper attitude which allows them to work on us. We should not consciously ferret about for "truth about life" or seek self-improvement by means of reading. If we try to use literature for our own end, we should after all fix our attention on ourselves; and then, Lewis says, we should see nothing but the "mirrored face" in ourselves in literature (*Experiment*, 74). Even though such reading might brighten our life, it could add nothing to it; many of the comments on life which we find in literature can be got in ordinary actual life, too. What instruction we may think we have drawn from literature is in effect only a confirmation to what we had expected to find in it.

When we read, we should surrender to the work and enter fully into "the opinions [...] attitudes, feelings and total experience, of other men" (*Experiment*, 85). Then, in a paradoxical way, books may profitably enlarge us.

We want to be more than ourselves. Each of us by nature sees the whole world from one point of view with a perspective and a selectiveness peculiar to himself.[...] One of the things we feel after reading a great work

Lewis holds to be the metaphysical Real world.

is 'I have got out'. Or from another point of view, 'I have got in'; pierced the shell of some other monad and discovered what it is like inside. (*Experiment*, 138)

Therefore, those who seek only vicarious pleasures in reading are decried by Lewis as "the lowest class" of readers:

lowest, because reading takes them least out of themselves, confirms them in an indulgence which they already use too much, and turns them away from most of what is most worth having both in books and life. (*Experiment*, 55)

The process of enlargement of ourselves, of wearing other people's total experience, begins with the "negative effort" and proceeds to "the positive." First, we should get ourselves out of the way. "Look. Listen. Receive" is the primary experience (*Experiment*, 19). Only when we abandon ourselves, can we really appreciate the work itself instead of reading ourselves in it. Until then we cannot even know whether the work before us deserves such a self-surrender, because it is not until then that the work really begins, if ever, to work on us. We must not "use" literature before we "receive" it. Lewis thus emphasizes the need for the receptive reading. In that he seems to have much in common with Arnold who stresses that the important thing is "to see the object as in itself it really is."⁸ And with this view, he goes on to accuse some critics of hindering the right way of reading.

Those whom Lewis refers to as "the Vigilant school of critics" (*Experiment*, 124) are always on their guard and ready to criticize such things as vulgarity, superficiality, false sentiment, four-letter words; in short, anything which is offensive to their sense of decorum in the actual life. Lewis says they hinder readers from appreciating the elusive merit of good works and make the primary

⁸ Matthew Arnold, "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time," *Lectures & Essays in Criticism*, ed. R. H. Super (The Univ. of Michigan Press, 1962), p.258.

literary experience impossible. Any work that is approached by a suspicious critic will necessarily seem to confirm his suspicions and give him nothing worth accepting. Thus the Vigilant school is not only a hindrance but a positive threat to the proper appreciation of literature.

Evaluative critics also should not be overestimated. "The truth is not that we need the critics in order to enjoy the authors, but that we need the authors in order to enjoy the critics" (*Experiment*, 123). He finds it worth some while to read good criticism, but it is not because of the help critics are generally expected to give in understanding literature but because we naturally enjoy the "responses of a first-class mind" (*Experiment*, 124) to a very great work. Lewis thus regards criticism as a sort of readable literary work, and that dependent on, and not supervising, the primary literary work.

When he studies old texts, either Medieval or Renaissance, he takes his position as a literary historian and makes more of what the poem once meant than of what it now means to the exclusively modern sensibility. The first impression of a poem on our modern mind has to be transcended so that we may re-enter the poem after the study of the old words, the background and real implications of the poem as it was written; re-enter it "with eyes more like those of the natives" (*Studies*, 3).

In so far as you succeed, you may more and more come to realize that what you enjoyed at the first reading was not really any medieval poem that ever existed but a modern poem made by yourself at a hint from the old words.[...] I should hope to be led [...] to newer and fresher enjoyments, things I could never have met in my own period, modes of feeling, flavours, atmospheres, nowhere accessible but by a mental journey into the real past.[...] it would seem to me a waste of the past if we were content to see in the literature of every bygone age only the reflexion of our own faces. (*Studies*, 3-4)

Those who apply to their first impression of an old poem "the detailed methods of 'practical' criticism" are only "passing from uncorrected illusions to

positively invited illusions" (*Studies*, 4). Lewis regards this as the worst method of all criticisms. A "real and present experience" (*Experiment*, 100) that is, what happens to us when we read it, is often based on our mistranslations or misunderstandings of it. With the help of textual critics, commentators, and lexicographers we can first enjoy "the poet's poem, not necessarily instead of, but in addition to, our own one" (*Experiment*, 101), the poem with the meaning which Donne or Chaucer actually intended it to have.

While Lewis insists that we should receive the poem as it really is, he knows that we sometimes need humbly to consult other sources than the poem itself in order to enjoy the poem as it really has been.

* * *

Lewis insists that "all criticism should be of books, not of authors" (*Studies*, 38). This is partly because some books, especially those written in olden times, have no one author who deserves the name of the author in the full sense: for, the texts were often retold or rewritten and did not remain the same, while they did not become wholly new either. Therefore, "the Author-Book unit" (*Studies*, 38) which we apply to modern literature does not work for the old texts. For instance, Malory's *Le Morte Darthur* is a retold version of the older texts, and Malory has only a "shared authorship" (*Studies*, 38) of this book. Another ground for Lewis to insist that we should concentrate not on the author but on the book itself is that the meaning of a book is not necessarily the same as that which the author intended to give it.

The meaning of a book is the series or system of emotions, reflections, and attitudes produced by reading it.[...] The ideally true or right 'meaning' would be that shared [...] by the largest member of the best readers after repeated careful readings over several generations, different periods, nationalities, moods, degrees of alertness, private pre-occupations, states of health, spirits, and the like cancelling one another out when (this is an important reservation) they cannot be fused so as to enrich one another. ("On Criticism," *Of This & Other World*, 177)

This opinion leads him to concentrate more and more on the part of reader in his literary criticism. For example, he begins his *An Experiment in Criticism* by distinguishing good readers from bad ones. What he calls good readers are those who read the same work again and again when they are deeply impressed by it, and for them reading is never a means of killing time as it often is for unliterary readers. Good readers read books with their whole attention. Sometimes they meet some book which moves them so much that their whole consciousness is changed by it. They often repeat their favourite lines in their minds or talk to one another about books. This is the right sort of reader who can really receive and find the meaning of literary works. Lewis does not think that good readers are good because they read good books but, on the contrary, books can be regarded as good when they are enjoyed by good readers. Thus Lewis makes much of the readers and of the meaning received by them.

On the other hand, however, he also makes much of the author's intention, that is, of what the author meant the work to be. Lewis is conscious that the work is not only *logos*, that is, something said, but also *poiema*, or something made. Literary works are "complex and carefully made objects" (*Experiment*, 82).

Not to treat the works as made both with form and content but to value them chiefly or solely for the content, the moral or any meaning we may draw from them is one instance of "using" them before "receiving" them as they really are.

On the other hand, he is also against such a view as "a poem should not mean but be," which wholly neglects the *logos*, or content, of the poem. Lewis argues that the words in a poem obviously mean because a word "which simply 'was' and didn't 'mean' would not be a word" (*Experiment*, 28). We should fully attend both the sound and the sense, holding ourselves "ready to conceive,

imagine, and feel as the words invite us" (*Experiment*, 32). For the same reason, those who are concerned solely with the style of, or words in, a poem are unqualified for literary criticism.

Lewis, as a man and Christian, finds it important for us to know what we are intended to be by our Creator, God, and insists that we should listen to Him for His words. Likewise, as a literary critic, he thinks it important to see what the author intended the work to be. In *A Preface to 'Paradise Lost'*, for instance, arguing against those who criticize Milton's style as too remote and artificial, he stresses that Milton's style is "a ritual style" (61) which ought to be artificial, and that just as when we perfectly participate in the ritual, we do not think much about the ritual itself but wholly occupied by the thing about which the rite is performed, so when we are absorbed in the poem, we are no longer conscious of the "grand" style as a style but notice afterwards that this "grand" ritual style was the only method by which this depth of concentration into the poem could be attained. Lewis here points out that if we refuse to be wholly caught up by the poem and try to find fault with it only because it is unlike the poetry of our own age, we are to misjudge Milton's great achievement. We mistake his success for a failure because his style does not naturally express his ideas. But in reality, Milton chose to use the "grand" style even before he chose what he would write about (cf. *Preface*, 2 & 61). The style is not merely a means of expression, and this style itself is part of Milton's artistic work which is also a great success.

* * *

Lewis's attitude towards the problem of originality is in sharp contrast with that of T. S. Eliot. A touchstone for Eliot in deciding the greatness of a poem is whether it is "genuine" poetry or not.

Has this poet something to say, a little different from what anyone has said before, and has he found, not only a different way of saying it, but the different way of saying it which expresses the difference in what he is

saying?⁹

As the personality of the poet is important for Eliot, so is that of the reader. Eliot finds an opportunity for self-development, or for enlargement of our personality, in reading many books by various authors.

The very different view of life, cohabiting in our minds, affect each other, and *our own personality asserts itself* and gives each a place in some arrangement peculiar to oneself. (Italics mine)¹⁰

Eliot's celebrated "impersonal theory" does, after all, aim to achieve a poet's originality which is genuinely original not only among his contemporaries but in the whole history of Western culture.

What is to be insisted upon is that the poet must develop or procure the consciousness of the past and that he should continue to develop this consciousness throughout his career.

What happens is a continual surrender of himself as he is at the moment to something which is more valuable. The progress of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality.¹¹

Eliot rightly expresses his aim by "self-sacrifice." "Sacrifice" means the "giving up of valued thing for the sake of another that is more worthy or more important" (*COD*). It is different from Lewis's simple self-surrender. Lewis's aim is not self-development but the appreciation and enjoyment of the work for itself. Eliot never tries to give up his innermost-self. He keeps his own self looking back at the whole tradition or criticizing various authors so that in the end he may be more personal or more original than any other author. Such an

⁹ T. S. Eliot, "What is Minor Poetry?" *On Poetry and Poets* (Faber and Faber, 1957), p.50.

¹⁰ Eliot, "Religion and Literature," *Selected Proses of T. S. Eliot*, ed. with an Introduction by Frank Kermode (Faber and Faber, 1975), p. 102.

¹¹ Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual Talent," *Selected Essays* (Faber and Faber,

attitude has self-centredness which Lewis decisively rebukes as Pride.

In reading, Lewis emphatically refuses the idea that we are to find the poet's character or "state of mind" (*Personal Heresy*, 2) in poetry.

When we read poetry as poetry should be read, we have before us no representation which claims to be the poet, and frequently no representation of a man, a character, or a personality at all. (*Personal Heresy*, 4)

Lewis holds that the personality cannot be enjoyed except by loving it, and those who enjoy the "mental pattern" (*Personal Heresy*, 50) of the poet are pervertedly responding to the poetry. The "I" in a poem is not the poet himself expressing his own personality. Even in an autobiographical poem, the real poet who describes the "I" to be in the grip of some emotion has already escaped from that emotion, as he can see it objectively enough to make poetry of it. What are presented in poetry are the things or persons, often including the poet himself, who are seen by the poet:

I look with his [i.e., the poet's] eyes, not at him [...] The poet is not a man who asks me to look at him; he is a man who says 'look at that' and points; the more I follow the pointing of his finger the less I can possibly see of Him.[...] To see things as the poet sees them I must share his consciousness and not attend to it[...] (*Personal Heresy*, 11-12)

If one is interested only in the "mental pattern" of the poet, he will overlook "that downright interestingness in the real world which meets, or even besieges him, daily whenever he is not ill, or tired, or preoccupied" (*Personal Heresy*, 96). We must open our eyes to the world, not concentrate on the human mind lest we should miss what is given to us.

We must go to books for that which books can give us--to be interested,

1932), p. 17.

delighted, or amused, to be made merry or to be made wise. But for the proper pleasure of personality, that is, for love, we must go where it can be found--to our homes or our common rooms [...] (*Personal Heresy*, 68)

Lewis keeps the traditional view that literature should give us both "pleasure and profit", and in that sense the poet's aim is "ethical as well as aesthetic" (*English Literature in the Sixteenth Century*, 322). Lewis says in *English Literature in the Sixteenth Century* that for the poets of that age, "Virtue is lovely, not merely obligatory" (322), and therefore didactic purpose was wholly consistent with pleasure. For them, and also for Lewis as an Old Western man, such things as good and beauty were God's messages. They saw the world with the whole-hearted receptiveness. They speak in their books about God, Heaven and the celestial hierarchy not to teach us the glory of God but because they want to "participate as far as [they] can in the glory" (*Studies*, 61). What they did not do is to express their personality in their work.

Lewis thus warns the readers against what he calls "personal heresy", which assumes that "to read poetry means to become acquainted with the poet [...] to steep ourselves in his personality" (*Personal Heresy*, 1) and even that "all poetry is about the poet's state of mind" (*Personal Heresy*, 2). E.M.W. Tillyard argues against Lewis that the uniqueness of a work of art reveals the personality of the artist. Lewis is against Tillyard's view of uniqueness, or originality. Contrary to Tillyard, he finds little value in the uniqueness of the poet. He even holds that the pursuit of originality both on the part of readers and on the part of poets themselves is wrong.

In the New Testament the art of life itself is an art of imitation: can we, believing this, believe that literature [...] is to aim at being 'creative', 'creative', 'original', and 'spontaneous'.[sic] 'Originality' in the New Testament is quite plainly the prerogative of God alone [...] I am saying that the highest good of a creature must be creaturely--that is, derivative--good. ("Christianity and Literature," *Christian Reflections*, 6-7)

Concentration on nothing but humanity is, for Lewis, a hell. It is nearly the same thing as to abandon the human condition altogether. So that, he is also critical about the modern poets who are devoted to expressing their own psychology.

The older poetry, by continually insisting on certain Stock themes--as that love is sweet, death bitter, virtue lovely, and children or gardens delightful [...] 'instructed by delighting', for poetry was formerly one of the chief means whereby each new generation learned, not to copy, but by copying to make, the good Stock responses. Since poetry has abandoned that office the world has not benefited. While the moderns have been pressing forward to conquer new territories of consciousness, the old territory, in which alone man can live, has been left unguarded, and we are in danger of finding our enemy in our rear. (*Preface*, 57)

Lewis here holds that those who have abandoned imagination to guide them on the right way should be lost. He sees that the moderns, having so given up the right way, are losing the elementary rectitude of responses to the outer world, and with it our virtues, moral standards, and even the condition of being human beings. The danger "in our rear" is that of our losing humanity altogether.

Chapter 5

Some Criticisms of the works of Lewis and his style of rhetoric

Lewis's critics sometimes find some inconsistency, insufficiency, or logical flaws in his apologetic works. For example, G. E. M. Anscombe in 1948 criticizes him for the misleading ambiguity of some key words in his arguments in *Miracles*.¹ Kathleen Nott in *The Emperor's Clothes* (1958) criticizes Lewis for his dogmatism, calling him a "neo-scholastic".² Then more extendedly, John Beversluis in his *C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion* (1985) systematically attacks Lewis's case for Christianity by separately criticizing his argument from Desire (that is an argument based on Imagination), his argument from Reason and his argument from Morality, which are the three main strands in his apology.³ Some of the flaws that such critics find in Lewis come from real mistakes on his part. However, as we shall see in this chapter, Lewis often employs pseudo-logic or rhetoric which, though they are unacceptable in a strictly logical argument, in fact come from Lewis's understanding of human nature as well as from his view of language. Such pseudo-logic and rhetoric should not be regarded as mere flaws if we consider his apology as a whole. Sometimes, his claims seem to lack sufficient proof, but it is usually when they are based on the traditional Western belief in the intelligibility and the rationality of the world, which is simply axiomatic to him. In this chapter, we shall discuss the "flaws" which adverse critics find in Lewis's apologetic works, thereby trying to clarify his style of rhetoric and his characteristics as an advocate for Christianity and

¹ G. E. M. Anscombe, "A Reply to Mr. C. S. Lewis' Argument That 'Naturalism' is Self-refuting," *Socratic Digest*, No. 4 (1948), p. 8. (*Socratic Digest, the bulletin of the Oxford Socratic Club*, is now held in the Bodleian Library, Oxford.)

² Kathleen Nott, *The Emperor's Clothes* (Indiana Univ. Press, 1958), p. 4.

³ John Beversluis, *C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion* (Eerdmans,

objective metaphysical Reality.

* * *

The most serious charge against Lewis's logic is probably the one made by G.E.M. Anscombe at the meeting of the Oxford Socratic Club on February 2, 1948, and published later in the bulletin of that club, *Socratic Digest*, No. 4. In the first edition of *Miracles* (1947), Lewis denies naturalism and argues for the existence of God as the supernatural absolute Reason. Anscombe's criticism is of Lewis's Chapter 3, "The Self-Contradiction of the Naturalist," where he uses *reductio ad absurdum* argument to refute Naturalism. There he says, "We may in fact state it as a rule that no thought is valid if it can be fully explained as a result of irrational causes" (*Miracles*, 1st ed. 27). He then argues,

Each particular thought is valueless if it is the result of irrational causes. Obviously, then, the whole process of human thought, what we call Reason, is equally valueless if it is the result of irrational causes. Hence every theory of the universe which makes the human mind a result of irrational causes is inadmissible, for it would be a proof that there are no such things as proofs. Which is nonsense.

But Naturalism, as commonly held, is precisely a theory of this sort. (*Miracles*, 1st ed., 28)

Anscombe criticizes Lewis for this "rule" because here he fails to distinguish between irrational and nonrational causes. She points out that by "irrational causes" he seems to mean "any cause that is not something rational." Actually, however, what can be called "irrational causes" are qualities such as passion, self-interest, obstinacy and prejudice, which actually discredit the validity of thought; while physical or physiological ones such as tumours on the brain and tuberculosis are nonrational causes, which are actually not causes but "conditions which we know to go with irrational beliefs or attitudes with sufficient regularity for us to call them their causes" (Anscombe, 8). Though Anscombe agrees with

1985), p. 73.

Lewis that if irrational causes supply a satisfactory explanation for a belief, that belief is discredited, she says, against Lewis, that since naturalists explain reasoning in terms of nonrational, physiological causes, that is, since they explain only how one has come to hold a belief, their explanation does not impugn the validity of thought itself. Her point is this:

Whether [a man's] conclusions are rational or irrational is settled by considering the chain of reasoning that he gives and whether his conclusions follow from it. When we are giving a causal account of this thought, e.g. an account of the physiological processes which issue in the utterance from the point of view of evidence, reasoning, valid argument, truth, at all; we are considering them merely as events. Just because that is how we are considering them, our description has in itself no bearing on the question of "valid," "invalid," "rational," "irrational," and so on. (Anscombe, 10)

Beverluis agrees with Anscombe and says that even if our mental processes can be fully explained by the motions of atoms in our brain, our beliefs can still be valid as long as they are based on "good reasons" (Anscombe, 10), that is, on good grounds to prove the conclusions.

Furthermore, Beverluis points out that although Lewis, in the revised edition of *Miracles*, has admitted his confusion between "irrational" causes and "nonrational" ones and rewritten relevant passages throughout Chapters 3 to 5, replacing "irrational" with "nonrational" whenever Anscombe's distinction between them requires it, he still "continued to think, that if human reasoning were 'fully explicable' in terms of nonrational causes, it could not be valid." Beverluis continues to say,

Lewis was wrong about this. To say that something is fully explicable in purely causal terms is only to deny that it is random, unintelligible, the result of "blind caprice" (Beverluis, 73).

Here I do not either agree or disagree with Beverluis, but this critical comment of

Beverluis makes it clear that the main point of disagreement between Naturalists and Lewis is that Lewis thinks nothing that is in any sense nonrationally caused can be rational, while Naturalists holds that it is possible for a thought to have some nonrational cause and yet to have valid rationality. It is almost impossible to make up for this difference by adjusting any logical flaw or misunderstanding either on Lewis's part or Beverluis's or Anscombe's, because it is a difference in their axiomatic premises which cannot be easily changed by logical argument.

Yet there is one thing to be remembered here. Lewis is convinced that a part cannot judge the whole, and therefore believes that our reason should be discredited if it is wholly explicable in terms of scientific natural causations. If our reason can be explained in naturalistic terms, it should be a natural phenomenon, and as a part of nature, it would not be able to establish any correct theory about nature, i.e. about the phenomenal world (cf. "*De Futilitate*," *Christian Reflections*, 64).⁴ However, Beverluis and Anscombe do not seem to think that the validity of our reasoning on nature depends on whether or not it is independent of, and not a part of, nature.

Besides, in order to criticize Lewis further, Beverluis quotes from the first edition of *Miracles*:

It is clear that everything we know, beyond our own immediate sensations, is inferred from those sensations [...]" Since I am presented with colours, sounds, shapes, pleasures and pains which I cannot perfectly control, and since the more I investigate them the more regular their behaviour appears, therefore there must exist something other than myself and it must be systematic.

He then takes up Lewis's words: "All possible knowledge [...] depends on the validity of reasoning,"⁵ and in them reads the implication that "we never

⁴ See our discussion in Chapter 2, p. 54 above.

⁵ Lewis, *Miracles*, first ed., pp. 25 & 26, quoted in Beverluis, pp. 60 & 61.

directly perceive persons and things” (Beverluis, 61) so as to charge Lewis for altogether denying the validity of inductive inference, which is based on empirical knowledge.

[H]e overlooked the fact that it is experience, not reason, that provides us with truths about the world. It is only because we already know some truths about the world that we can employ your “powers” of reasoning to deduce other truths from them [...] All we have to grant is that the truth of the statements contained in an argument are inductively inferred from experience and that on the basis of them we can deductively infer other statements. But this solution is not open to Lewis because when he rejects inductive inferences as a means to “genuine knowledge,” he is left with the barren prospect of validity as our only road to truth. (Beverluis, 77)

However, here, Beverluis is beside the mark; for, in fact, Lewis does not disparage sense-data. Lewis says, “it is clear that everything we know, beyond our own immediate sensations, is inferred from those sensations,” thus admitting their validity. That is, he does not reject inductive inference from sensuous experiences. It is only that Lewis’s emphasis is on the rational power of man that infers knowledge from such data as other men’s knowledge and authorized given propositions as well as from immediate sensations.

Beverluis often seems too keen to find fault with Lewis. Another criticism that he makes of Lewis’s argument is that though Lewis maintains that all possible knowledge depends on the validity of reasoning, the validity of reasoning *per se* does not necessarily lead to a genuine insight into the world. In deductive argument, knowledge depends not only on the validity of argument, namely, the logical consistency and soundness of procedure, but also on the truth of each proposition employed in that argument. Of course, Beverluis’s charge would be right, if Lewis said that “all possible knowledge *solely* depends on the validity of reason.” But Lewis does not say so. What he says is that “all possible knowledge [...] depends on the validity of reason,” which does not mean soundness of the reasoning process is all that is required to get the right

conclusion. Therefore, Beversluis's criticism here is again irrelevant to Lewis's argument from Reason.

* * *

Beversluis's criticism of Lewis's argument on imagination is roughly divided into two, namely, of its logical flaws and of its theological inconsistency. In order to point out Lewis's logical flaws, Beversluis first paraphrases Lewis's fundamental principle into the statement: "Anything that does not ultimately satisfy us cannot be what we really wanted," and then attacks this, saying, "the fact that Sam is hungry again four hours after breakfast" does not prove "that it is not food that he really wanted" (Beversluis, 16). Beversluis's argument is that if food is what is really wanted even if it fails to give us "ultimate" satisfaction, then, the aesthetic experiences that caused "Joy" in Lewis and gave him great pleasure should likewise be what were really wanted even though they did not satisfy the "Joy" ultimately.

I do not say Beversluis's paraphrase is wrong, but his counterproof seems to me to be a little off the mark. First of all, hunger is satisfiable by food completely, at least for a while, and it is in this sense able to give "ultimate" satisfaction, though it is not final or eternal. On the other hand, "Joy" is never, even for a moment, completely satisfied by anything on earth. As Lewis's point lies in this fact that "Joy" is "never" satisfied, Beversluis's case of hunger does not disprove that "Joy" is a desire and pointer to heaven and a proof of its existence as well.

Secondly, Lewis's point is not merely that such pleasures as originally cause joy fail to give full satisfaction but that, when the pleasures are most strong, they cause some numinous desire for some other thing that cannot be specified. It is this other desire felt in the fulfillment of the original desire for those aesthetic pleasures, rather than the insufficiency of the fulfillment itself, that makes Lewis suspect that those pleasures are "pointers", rather than the real object.

There is yet another flaw that Beversluis finds in Lewis's logic here. In the preface to *The Pilgrim's Regress*, Lewis talks of the desire which is unsatisfiable in this world:

This Desire was, in the soul [...] the chair in which only one could sit. And if nature makes nothing in vain, the One who can sit in this chair must exist. (10)

Referring to this, Beversluis remarks that “[Lewis’s] claim is that Nature does nothing in vain,” and points out, by way of refutation, that though the Natural Law tradition in philosophy from Aristotle to Richard Hooker endorses the idea that nature does nothing in vain or that “it is an axiom of Nature that natural desire cannot utterly frustrate”(17),⁶ this belief itself has no ground. “The desire in and of itself proves nothing, points to nothing” (19).

Besides, Beversluis argues, even if earthly pleasures are pointers to something other than the immediate object, “the existence of the object desired does not follow from the mere fact that someone desires it, not even from the fact that someone has a desire that nothing on earth can satisfy. From this fact alone we could just as well conclude that some desires cannot be satisfied.” (25).

As we have seen, Lewis holds that just as there would be no hunger in the world in which no food exists, so would there be no desire for Paradise if there were no heaven. Against this, Beversluis says the existence of an edible thing cannot be proved by anything but by eating. Discovery of the existence of food is an empirical one. In the same way, the existence of Paradise is to be proved, if ever, only by experience (Beversluis, 18-19). Thus, Beversluis holds that Lewis's analogy between hunger and Joy fails from the ground up.

Beversluis's logic is right. If Lewis claimed the existence of Paradise this

⁶ Cf. Richard Hooker, *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Policy*, ed. A. S. McGrade and Brian Vickers (Siegwick and Jackson, 1975), 1., p. 4, quoted in Beversluis, p. 17.

way, he would be wrong. However, Lewis never claims it, nor insists it can be logically proved. Lewis only says “my desire for Paradise [...] I *think* it a pretty good *indication* that such a thing exists” (my italics. “The Weight of Glory,” *Toast*, 99). He only holds he can substantiate it, or proposes it only as a supposition. In *Letters to Malcolm*, he frankly admits, “[A]fter all. I know. It is venture. We don’t *know* it will be” (120-121).

Lewis’s inference of the existence of heaven is therefore based on his faith rather than logic. In fact, it is not until his conversion that he comes to interpret his “Joy” as a desire for heaven and infer its existence from such a desire.

On the other hand, the fact that Beversluis has taken Lewis’s words as a claim is significant. Actually, I don’t think Beversluis is altogether misinterpreting Lewis when he takes Lewis’s case for the existence of heaven for a claim. Lewis often gives the impression that he decisively claims some belief even when he makes such apparent claims with some reservation. This effect is probably intentional and comes from Lewis’s style of rhetoric, which we shall discuss presently.

Actually, in addition to the point of Beversluis’s criticism, Lewis’s inference of the existence of heaven on the premise that Nature does nothing in vain has another weak point. Such a belief already postulates the existence of some perfect designer that has created Nature with order, and therefore the logic which uses that belief as a premise and draws the existence of heaven which is God’s country, already implies a part of the conclusion [i.e. God exists] in the premise. The whole logic is founded on his faith, and therefore tautological. If Lewis were an agnostic, he would not even suppose that nature does nothing in vain, nor come to believe in heaven or God.

However, when reading Lewis, we cannot simply dismiss his logic as tautology, for, by the analogy between hunger and “Joy”, he imaginatively illustrates his belief so as to substantiate it. As this also concerns his apologetic

style, we shall discuss his use of analogy later when we consider his rhetoric.

The theological inconsistency that Beversluis finds in Lewis's desire argument is the confusion of Greek philosophy with Christian theology. Lewis says that he was "the most dejected and reluctant convert in all England" (*Joy*, 182). But Beversluis says, if "God is the ultimate object of desire [...], then it makes no sense to talk about shrinking from him the moment he is found" (21). Beversluis says that the seemingly unreasonable attitude of Lewis comes from the confusion of a Platonic view of God with the biblical one. Lewis's Desire for God is solely Platonic while his fear of God, which must be from the consciousness of his own sinfulness, is biblical:

To say, with Lewis, that we desire God in his attractiveness but flee from his severe side is to give birth to a philosophical hybrid, a conceptual mongrel that lacks the authentic pedigree of either parent. (Beversluis, 22)

However, actually, it is not only Lewis who, after pursuing true happiness for a long time without knowing that God is the happiness he desires, shrinks from God when he finds that He is the only source of happiness. St. Augustine, for example, finding his pursuit of happiness to have been a pursuit of God, paradoxically recoiled from Him. He says in *Confessions* (VI.11):

Time was passing and I kept delaying my conversion to you, my God. Day after day I postponed living in you, but I never put off the death which I died each day in myself. I longed for a life of happiness but I was frightened to approach it in its own domain; and yet, while I fled from it, I still searched for it.⁷

In the 20th century, T.S. Eliot also expresses the same complex feelings of seeking happiness under God and yet fearing Him.

Do not let me hear

⁷ St. Augustine, *Confessions*, tr. R. S. Pine-Coffin (Penguin, 1961), p. 128

Of the wisdom of old men, but rather of their
folly,
Their fear of fear and frenzy, their fear of
possession,
Of belonging to another, or to others, or to God.
The only wisdom we can hope to acquire
Is the wisdom of humility: humility is endless.
("East Coker, II")⁸

Therefore, Lewis's ambiguous attitude is nothing new to the Western Christian tradition.

Anders Nygren in his *Agape and Eros*, a book by which Lewis was much impressed, discusses the history of the Christian idea of love. There, Nygren makes it clear that the catholic idea of love synthetically holds two apparently contradictory types of love, i.e. Agape and Eros, which respectively come from original Christianity and Greek Platonism. He also points out that Jesus' teaching of love was in contrast to the contemporary Jewish value standard of Nomos. Nomos is a Jewish tradition in which one sees love within the legal framework of the Old Testament. There, the relationship between God and man is based on justice and regulated by the law. According to Nygren, Eros is an egocentric, acquisitive kind of desire and longing, primarily man's love. This love is an upward movement towards God, and God is its object, not its giver. In the Eros tradition, it is assumed that man's salvation is achieved through his own work. On the other hand, Agape is unselfish, self-sacrificial, giving love. It is primarily God's love, and it comes down to man as the only means of his salvation. In the Agape tradition, the salvation of man is the work of divine love.

Nygren points out that the Agape motif in the first century appeared as an absolutely new fundamental motif in religion and ethics, standing in sharp contrast to the contemporary fundamental motifs of Judaism and Hellenism,

⁸ Eliot, "East Coker, II," *Four Quartets*, in *The Complete Poems and Plays* (Faber, 1969), p. 179.

Nomos and Eros. But inevitably these three were soon brought into contact, and as a result, brought about “a compromise containing clear reminiscences of the Agape motif, though this is so far modified as to be scarcely any longer an independent motif.”⁹

The Nomos motif of the Old Testament first reconciled itself with the Agape motif. Then, in the Middle Ages, St. Augustine synthesized the motifs of Agape and Eros into the motif of “Caritas”, which has become the dominant concept of love in the Catholic Church. As in the Eros tradition, Augustine finds that all love is acquisitive love, but this acquisitive love is itself neither good or bad; to desire is simply human, for it is God alone who is self-sufficient. “God has created man such that he must desire, must love and long for something [...] that he should seek and desire his ‘good,’ his ‘sufficiency.’”¹⁰ “In Caritas, both tendencies--upwards and downwards--are united. The *foundation* of the life of Caritas is Divine grace; but this is the same as Incarnation, descent, humilitas, and so the Christian life also is marked by humilitas. But the *goal* of the life of Caritas is to attain to God in His sublimity, to reach up with love’s longing towards His perfection; therefore, there is also an upward tendency in the Christian life.”¹¹ St. Augustine was deeply aware that Eros, which is intrinsic in man, tends to produce pride and a feeling of self-sufficiency, for the soul in the rapture of Eros can easily feel as if it had already attained the higher world, become self-sufficient and forget the distance between itself and the divine. On the other hand, in God’s Agape, he sees the example of humbleness “*exemplum humilitatis*.”

To cure man’s superbia God’s Son descended and became humble. Why art

⁹ Anders Nygren, *Agape and Eros* (Part I, 1930; Part II, 1936; English tr. I, 1932; II, 1939), Tr. Philip S. Watson, revised ed. 3 vols. in one (SPCK, 1953), p. 449. Lewis refers to Nygren in *English Literature in the Sixteen Century*, p. 383.

¹⁰ Nygren, p.482.

¹¹ Nygren, pp. 531-532.

thou proud, O man? God has for thy sake become humble. Thou wouldst perchance be ashamed to imitate a humble man; imitate at least the humble God.¹²

Thus in St. Augustine, the Eros motif and the Agape motif coexist. Man's desire for the higher world, or for God, and humility before a God who has descended to save man work together in salvation.

When the three ideas of love, namely, Agape, Eros, and Nomos, were thus synthesized, Christian love inevitably came to contain these apparently contradictory feelings of awe (as Nomos calls for towards the God of Justice), longing (as of Eros), and humbleness (as before God of Agape). As a result of such complex feelings, it is possible that a man hesitates before God when he comes to realize that God demands his self-surrender and obedience, even though he has been longing for happiness and now knows God is the only source of any sort of happiness. This is possible, especially when the man is the type who wants to live on his own.

Such is the case with Lewis. In *Surprised by Joy*, where he writes of his unwillingness to convert, he describes his mentality thus: "I had always wanted, above all things, not to be 'interfered with.' I had wanted (mad wish) 'to call my soul my own'" (*Joy*, 182). Besides, more importantly, it is actually after surrendering to God that Lewis really came to understand that his longing had been a longing for God. At the moment of surrender, he was given no guarantee of happiness or of satisfaction. This fact made it even more natural for him to hesitate before God.

Therefore, whether or not there is some confusion here of Platonism with Christianity does not seem to matter so much as to make Lewis's view unacceptable. The history of the mingling of these actually contradictory ideas of love goes back even to the first centuries. Nygren, who stresses the difference

¹² Nygren, pp. 473-474.

between the original evangelical idea of love and the medieval, neo-Platonic and Augustinian ideas of love does not show an altogether negative attitude to the latter. While he points out,

The real and deep contrast between the Evangelical and the Mediæval conception of grace is as follows: the latter regards grace essentially as a means for man's ascent, whereas the former knows of no such ascent. The meaning of grace is plainly quite different according as fellowship with God is conceived in the Catholic manner as fellowship on God's level, or in the Evangelical manner as fellowship on our level. In the former case, grace is the Divine assistance man needs in order to be able to ascend to God. In the latter, it is the gracious condescension of God.¹³

He also says,

We discover how much Augustine has done to deepen the Christian idea of love, and we find that Neoplatonism has played a positive part towards this. It has in fact helped Augustine to see more deeply into the essential nature of the Christian love-motif; and it has done this, oddly enough, not in virtue of other elements which it contains, but precisely in its capacity as Eros theory. Indeed, we might say that, for Augustine, Neoplatonic Eros has become the means of discovering Christian Agape.¹⁴

In fact, Lewis himself believes that Platonism is not altogether incompatible with Christianity (cf. "Religion without Dogma," *God*, 132). Besides, as L. A. Brewer points out, the complex mixture of fear and love is "exactly the reaction biblical figures have when encountered with the reality of God, as in Isaiah 6."¹⁵ When the prophet Isaiah saw God, he cried out with joy and fear, "Woe is me, for I am undone! Because I am a man of unclean lips, And I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips; For my eyes have seen the King, The Lord of hosts" (Isaiah, 6:5, *NKJV*). In the New Testament, too, it is reported that St. Peter, who

¹³ Nygren, pp. 473-474.

¹⁴ Nygren, pp. 459-460.

¹⁵ Lee Alan Brewer, "The Anthropology of Choice," Diss. Southwestern Baptist

was such an eager adherent of Jesus, expressed the same feeling of awe when he was revealed the true divinity of Jesus: “he fell down at Jesus' knees, saying, ‘Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord!’” (Luke, 5:8, *NKJV*)

Thus, Lewis’s attitude is nothing contrary to the biblical tradition.

* * *

As to Lewis’s moral arguments, Beversluis criticizes their rhetoric and style of discussion. We might as well consider now Lewis’s rhetoric altogether in the light of his criticism, and then discuss Lewis’s attitudes as a Christian apologist.

Beversluis condemns Lewis for talking as if a naturalistic view of the world should necessarily make us think of the moral law as “subjective”:

Lewis was enamored of the view that neither naturalists nor ethical subjectivists are entitled to their moral judgments [...] on [...] the ground that they cannot satisfactorily account for moral obligation. This unqualified rejection is surprising in view of the fact that he examines only two versions of the position he opposes, and only the weakest and most carelessly formulated ones at that: the view that morality is either a “herd instinct” or a mere subjective preference on the same level as a fondness of pancakes or a dislike for spasm.(40)

He points out that Lewis not only fails to consider many historically influential versions of ethical subjectivism, but also “bypasses without a word a host of objectivist ethical theories.[...] Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, hedonism, natural law theories, moral sense theories, self-realization theories, Kantianism, act utilitarianism, rule utilitarianism, general utilitarianism, act deontology, rule deontology, and so on” (40). In Lewis’s rhetoric, Beversluis sees a characteristic tendency “to rush into battle, misrepresent the opposition, and then demolish it. The demolition is often swift and the victory decisive, but the view refuted is seldom a position anyone actually holds” (41). Beversluis writes, “My complaint [...] is not that Lewis fails to be as thorough as the subject matter

Theological Seminary 1989, p. 83, note.

demands, but that he gives the impression of being thorough” (42).

Thus, Beversluis criticizes Lewis for his “fondness for the false dilemma,” that is, for confronting his readers “with the alleged necessity of choosing between two alternatives when there are in fact other options to be considered” (43). Indeed, we see that Lewis’s fault is that he neglects, or fails to see, what D. F. Strawson calls “non-reductive naturalism” that does not disparage the moral law as illusory or subjective. D. F. Strawson in his *Skepticism and Naturalism* points out that:

It is reductive naturalism which holds that the naturalistic or objective view of human beings and human behavior undermines the validity of moral attitudes and reactions and displays moral judgment as no more than a vehicle of illusion. Nonreductive naturalism does not attempt to counter this alleged conclusion with argument [...] alleging some non-natural, metaphysical foundation to validate our general disposition to moral response and moral judgment [...] The non-reductive naturalist simply urges, once again, the point that it is not open to us, it is simply not in our nature, to make a total surrender of those personal and reactive attitudes, [...] which the reductive naturalist declares to be irrational as altogether lacking rational justification. The non-reductive naturalist’s point is that there can only be a lack where there is a need.¹⁶

Beversluis charges Lewis’s tendency of presenting false alternatives as “One of Lewis’s most serious weaknesses as an apologist”(43). However, here, as was the case with his desire-argument, we are confronted by the fact, as Beversluis himself notices, that the philosophically unsophisticated readers will take Lewis’s argument as satisfactory. They will get the impression that Lewis is covering the ground, and feel the supernaturalistic view of the moral law to be more convincing than naturalistic ones.

The way Lewis presents his “false dilemma” is indeed characteristic of his rhetoric. One of the most successful examples is in his argument for the divinity

¹⁶ P. F. Strawson, *Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties* (Columbia Univ.

of Jesus, which we have seen before.¹⁷ He finds that the claim of Jesus to be the Son of God must have been very shocking among the Jews for whom “God” means the absolute Creator, transcendent of the world and infinitely different from any human being. According to Lewis, this claim must have been so paradoxical and even horrible that only two views of this man is possible: either he is “a lunatic--on a level with the man who says he is a poached egg” if not “the Devil of Hell,” or else he is really the Son of God and therefore all his words and deeds should be accepted as such.¹⁸ Lewis says,

Now *it seems to me obvious* that He was neither a lunatic nor a fiend; and consequently, however strange or terrifying or unlikely it may seem, *I have to accept the view that He was and is God. God has landed on this enemy-occupied world in human form. (my italics, Mere Christianity, 53)*

This way, Lewis completely rejects the view of Jesus as a great moral teacher (*Mere Christianity*, 53; *Screwtape Letters*, 117-118).¹⁹ Of course, his logic is not persuasive enough to those who are determined not to believe in Jesus. “Seeming to be obvious” is not the same as “obvious” at all. Lewis seems to be saying that if Jesus was not the Son nor a fiend, he was a lunatic and his words and behaviour must have shown his insanity. However, even if Jesus was mistaken about his identity, if he was not a true Son of God, it will not necessarily follow that his words had to be unreasonable: that is, if he was a megalomaniac, his abnormality may not have been so “obvious” as Lewis expects it to have been.

Press, 1985), pp. 40-41.

¹⁷ Cf. our pp. 65-66 above.

¹⁸ It is not Lewis alone that have employed this logic. Yet, Lewis’s argument is at least regarded as a representative, for example, by John Hick. (Cf. *The Metaphor of God Incarnate*, p. 29 as we have seen above in our Preface, p. 3.)

¹⁹ In the *Screwtape Letters*, Lewis satirically criticizes the Historical Jesus of the 19th century as well as Marxian, catastrophic, and revolutionary view of Jesus that see him a human personage (pp. 117-119), taking such views as favourable to the devils.

Conversely, though Jesus' moral teaching is reasonable and good, that is, if he is neither a complete lunatic nor a fiend, it is quite possible that he was still mistaken in taking himself for the Son of God. Actually, as Beversluis points out, though the Jewish authorities in Jesus' time did not accept Jesus as God, neither did they regard Jesus as a lunatic or a liar (cf. Beversluis, 56). Against the background of Jewish eschatology and the expectation of the imminent coming of messiah, the claim of Jesus was quite rational; it was the sort of claim that could have been true. The Jews recognized that Jesus did in fact believe his own claim; only they did not agree with Jesus' belief for various reasons.

Besides, since it is also possible that a devil disguises himself as something good, neither is it obvious that Jesus was not a fiend, though in this twentieth century the real existence of the devil is no less difficult to believe than the existence of God or the Sonship of Jesus. The reason why it is obvious to Lewis that Jesus was not a lunatic nor a fiend but the Son is that Lewis already believes in Christianity. Or we may say that the way of saying "it seems to be obvious to me [...] and consequently [...] I have to accept [...]" is Lewis's rhetoric which is, in fact, only a pseudo-logic. Since "seems to be obvious to me" in the premise is a subjective statement, the conclusion "I have to accept [...]" is also subjective. Such pseudo-logic is employed to convert those readers who nearly, but not yet, believe in Christianity. Considering that Lewis uses this logic about Jesus' identity when he has concluded after a long argument that the true religion should be monotheism, this passage apparently expects that the reader should already have come to think that Christianity might be the one which is true.

Beversluis complains that Lewis habitually advances his argument with such expressions as: "we are *forced* to believe...," (*Mere Christianity*, 18) "we shall *have* to admit...," (*Mere Christianity*, 29) "I *have* to accept the view that...," (*Mere Christianity*, 53; italics in these three quotations are Beversluis's). He continues that

Anyone who couches his argument in terms like these cannot fail to give the impression of discovering important truths rather than simply casting about for a possible way of looking at things. This is not a fussy point about terminology. It is a problem that plagues many of Lewis's arguments and infects his apologetic writings with a fundamental ambiguity (51-52).

However, though such readers as Beversluis, who are critical or philosophically trained, find Lewis's way of employing emotional terms annoying, it is meaningful that these emotional terms have their effect on a wider, less sophisticated public.

Actually, we cannot deny that Lewis's apology has been quite a success, because he has in fact converted a lot of readers even though, as I admit, there is some logical insufficiency in his arguments (for example, his argument from morality indeed fails to cover the ground). After all Lewis as the writer of *Mere Christianity* is a lay advocate rather than a philosopher, and we should not blame him as if he were evading logic if he does not thoroughly pursue philosophically complex arguments. Besides, he is actually not merely evading the issue when he avoids taking all the conceivable alternatives into consideration. Usually, when he is neglecting logical strictness, he strongly addresses the reader's imagination or emotions instead of reason. For instance, in the course of his argument for God's creation of Nature, having denied the dualism of Nature and God, he says, "To believe that Nature produced God, or even the human mind, is, as we have seen, absurd" (*Miracles*, 36). Here, "absurd" is an emotional term rather than a logical one. Having dismissed the possibility of Nature having produced God by calling it "absurd," Lewis goes on to say that "There remains, then, the belief that God created Nature" (*Miracles*, 36). When Lewis says this, many readers may swallow his statement without criticizing it rationally because then they have already been moved emotionally and come to feel that Lewis has said enough to prove his case.

Thus, although from the viewpoint of logic alone it should be one of Lewis's weak points that he often moves from rational logic to emotional oratory as if to cover a certain insufficiency and weakness, from the point of the effectiveness of argument, it can be seen as one of his strong points that he can manipulate readers sometimes on the logical plane and sometimes on the emotional one.

Another and even more important characteristics of Lewis's rhetoric is his imaginative style, always with a lot of analogies and illustrations in his arguments. Perhaps one of his most well-known analogies is the one in which he compares the Trinity of God to a cube: "He contains 'persons' (three of them) while remaining one God, as a cube contains six squares while remaining one solid body" (*Miracles*, 84). He says, just as people in a two-dimensional world would not be able to comprehend our three-dimensional world, we are not able to comprehend God's reality which must have higher dimensions than our world. When we read such an ingenious argument, we are so deeply impressed by the analogy itself that we could not easily suspect that it might be mere conceit. At least, we are made to realize that the apparently axiomatic proposition that three things cannot be one is not always true. In the case of Lewis's argument for the existence of heaven based on the desire for it, too, we are easily swept by his analogy between a desire for food and a desire for heaven. An analogy is a work of imagination, and when we think by analogy, we are using imagination as well as reason. When imagination works more strongly than reason, our conclusion should be made largely by imagination. Sometimes, as is the case of the analogy between the Trinity and a cube, imagination presents some truth that reason has failed to see.

* * *

Kathleen Nott in *The Emperor's Clothes* criticizes Lewis together with T. S. Eliot, T. E. Hulme, Dorothy Sayers and some of the other Christian writers in the

20th century for their dogmatic orthodoxy. As I mentioned above, she calls their orthodoxy “neo-scholasticism”, and blames Lewis and Sayers for turning to religious dogmas instead of carrying on truly logical arguments to the end of their discussion. She says,

Lewis and Sayers have had their effect on the neo-scholastic movement only in so far as nobody has seriously read them. Authority has to speak in closed books; and the authorities are quoted, not for knowing, but for appearing to know. (Nott, 106)

She sees Lewis as a follower of such writers as Hulme, who is “an overt apologist for the theological attitude, [whose] expressed aim was to provide it with an objective intellectual basis” (105). She finds their arguments to be intellectually so naïve that it would be only because of the reader’s psychological need of apologetic works for Christianity that they are accepted so widely.

[Hulme’s] intellectual arguments, which are seldom more than superficially convincing and are often surprisingly naïve, largely because of this expressed aim, which is of a kind to leave a substantial residue of hope in the minds of those *who want the consolations of a satisfactory intellectual conviction without undertaking the labours of establishing it.*

This applies to a great number of artists, critics and writers. (my italics, 105)

Richard B. Cunningham, one of those critics who are more favourable to Lewis, expresses the same feeling about the popularity of Lewis:

Most conservative Christians find that Lewis states eloquently what they would like to state and gives an “intellectual respectability” to orthodox positions; hence, they find the didactic Lewis logically coercive and literarily scintillating.²⁰

²⁰ Richard Cunningham, *C. S. Lewis: Defender of the Faith* (The Westminster Press, 1987), p. 201.

On the other hand, Cunningham also realizes such weakness in Lewis's logic as is challenged by Nott and Beversluis:

It would appear that although the didactic writings are highly appealing to certain types of minds, for the skeptical, critical, questioning seeker they are weakened [...] by the tendencies to oversimplify difficult issues, to cover a weak argument with a felicitous phrase, to evade while giving the appearance of answering an objection, and to contrive an either-or which does not exhaust the genuine logical alternatives. And for anyone who is not receptive to the moral or rational arguments for God, they are hardly persuasive at all.²¹

Thus, those critics of Lewis who approach his works critically would see both appealing power and weakness in logic in his apologetic works. Even Kathleen Nott, one of the severest challengers to Lewis, does not deny Lewis's influence on the readers. After all, while she criticizes Lewis together with other "neo-scholastics" for their "superficially convincing" arguments, she is conscious that "on matters of emotional importance, as we all know, people are hardly ever converted by intellectual argument" (Nott, 105).

* * *

From our discussion above, we see that Lewis is criticized for roughly two reasons: first, for turning to imagination and emotion in his logic, where he is supposed to be thoroughly rational; and secondly, for turning to dogmas instead of presenting sufficient logical grounds for his belief.

In Lewis's opinion, however, imagination, dogmas, and emotions are all proper means of religious apology. In "Religion: Reality or Substitute?" he says, "Authority, reason, experience; on these three, mixed in varying proportions all our knowledge depends" (*Christian Reflections*, 41). One has to depend on the authority of some other person or of the former generations in order to know things outside one's own experience, or beyond one's personal reasoning ability.

²¹ Cunningham, p. 201.

And in religion, traditional dogmas work as authority. Experience is attained through imagination that sees God's revelation in pleasures, myths, natural beauties and so on and thus gets a foretaste of heaven; for, Lewis says, "Knowledge by revelation is more like empirical than rational knowledge" ("Bulverism," *God*, 277).

Besides, Lewis is conscious that a person's belief is influenced by that person's own temperament and feelings. He sees man as a creature that occupies the position between angels (that are rational without being physical) and animals (that are physical without being rational) in such a ladder as what A. O. Lovejoy has called a "Great Chain of Being".²²

In the preface to *The Pilgrim's Regress*, Lewis says, "We were made to be neither cerebral man nor visceral men, but Men. Not beasts nor angels but Men--things at once rational and animal" (13). Between rationality and animality are feelings and sentiment.

The Chest--Magnanimity--Sentiment--these are the indispensable liaison officers between cerebral man and visceral man. It may even be said that it is by this middle element that man is man: for by his intellect he is mere spirit and by his appetite mere animal. (*Abolition*, 34)

Men are given senses, feelings and imagination as well as reason, and are supposed to use all of them to grasp both the physical and metaphysical Reality. Thus, man's knowledge of God and heaven depends not only on his reason but also on his imagination and emotions, as well as on the authority of the dogmas.

Indeed, Lewis is conscious that a person's feelings and emotions much affect his rational judgment. In *Miracles*, he says that even if a man once theoretically accepts God's miracles, he may easily relapse into his old belief that miracles do not occur just because miracles feel incredible (170-171). In *The*

²² Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Harvard Univ. Press, 1936), p. 59.

Screwtape Letters and *Perelandra*, Lewis has his devils tempt man not only through intellect but also through feelings and emotions, and thus shows his conviction that when emotions and feelings are in adverse conditions, reason does not work properly to attain Reality.

As an apologist, therefore, Lewis thinks it depends much on the mental attitude of the readers whether or not his apologetic works succeed in convincing them of the truth of Christianity and Christian view of the world. In *The Discarded Image*, he says about the change from the Ptolemaic Medieval world picture to the contemporary scientific model of the world that

We are all, very properly, familiar with the idea that in every age the human mind is deeply influenced by the accepted Model of the universe. But there is a two-way traffic; the Model is also influenced by the prevailing temper of mind. We must recognise that what has been called 'a taste in universe' is not only pardonable but inevitable. We can no longer dismiss the change of Models as a simple progress from error to truth. No Model is a catalogue of ultimate realities, and none is a mere fantasy.[...] each reflects the prevalent psychology of an age almost as much as it reflects the state of that age's knowledge. (*Discarded*, 222)

Lewis thinks it possible that our scientific model of the universe will be replaced by a new one when the mental temper of the people changes and demands it.

The new Model will not be set up without evidence, but the evidence will turn up when the inner need for it becomes sufficiently great. It will be true evidence. But nature gives most of her evidence in answer to the questions we ask her. (*Discarded*, 222-223)

With this conviction, he tries to bring back the general reader's world picture into a Christian one, though not to a Medieval one. It is natural then that Lewis in his apology addresses the reader's imagination and emotions as well as reason. This is not an evasive way of making up for his intellectual weakness but

rather a positive reflection of his awareness that man is emotional as well as intellectual. When he addresses the reader's feelings he prevents the reader's emotions from hindering proper reasoning, and makes them, rather, help the reasoning. Lewis is, as he himself notices it, intrinsically an "imaginative man" (*Letters*, 260) and is capable of finding effective analogies and metaphors to do so.

Besides, there is yet another and more important reason for him to employ imagination so often while many philosophers and theologians make their apologetic works almost totally in abstract, purely rational, terms. For Lewis, imagination is as important an organ for attaining Reality as reason is. Man cannot know God as He really is, for He is beyond the human senses. All that man can do is imagine by analogies what God is like. Such analogies are works of intuitive imagination. Lewis says that "Statements about God are extrapolations from knowledge of other things which the divine illumination enables us to know" (*Four Loves*, 115). Because the idea to be conveyed has been thus attained by imagination, it is natural or even inevitable that it should be conveyed by imagination.

Besides, Lewis is conscious of the limitation of reason alone even in the field of logic. Reason draws conclusions from already acquired data, but it does not obtain the data by itself. It is our empirical senses and intuitive imagination or some trustworthy authority that gain the data for reason to work on. Here we see a noteworthy influence of Owen Barfield, a life-long friend of Lewis, who even thinks all knowledge depends on the work of the intuitive imagination that finds relations between various sense data and interprets their meanings to make up organized knowledge. Barfield says in *Poetic Diction*, "Science[...]insists on dealing with 'data', but there shall no data be given, save the bare percept. The rest is imagination. Only by imagination therefore can the world be known."²³

²³ Barfield, *Poetic Diction: A Study in Meaning* (Wesleyan Univ. Press, 1973), p.

On the other hand, even when Lewis relies on his imagination in his apology, his reason is in a sense still at work. In *The Pilgrim's Regress*, Reason says to John "I can tell you only what you know" (67). It is reason itself that discovers its own limitation. As Lewis says that "reason is the natural organ of truth; but the imagination is the organ of meaning" ("Bluspels and Flalansferes," *Selected Essays*, 265), reason authorizes the truth of imagination as the intuitive power, while imagination gives meaning to logical conclusion which is provided by reason.

Lewis is not alone in the 20th century to be aware of the interdependence and collaboration of man's reason, senses and imagination. Paul Tillich tries to make us remember in *The Courage to Be*:

One of the unfortunate consequences of the intellectualization of man's spiritual life was that the word "spirit" was lost and replaced by mind or intellect, and that the element of vitality which is present in "spirit" was separated and interpreted as an independent biological force. Man was divided into a bloodless intellect and a meaningless vitality.[...] But in man nothing is "merely biological" as nothing is "merely spiritual." Every cell of his body participates in his freedom and spirituality, and every act of his spiritual creativity is nourished by his vital dynamics.²⁴

Herbert Read in *Reason and Romanticism* then sees the interdependence of reason and imagination:

A religion like Christianity is built up largely of unconscious symbols: it finds its most powerful forces in subconscious processes, like prayer, grace, and faith. The effect of experimental science has been to destroy the unconsciousness of these symbols: it understands them and therefore equates them with conscious equivalents, which are no longer symbols and which on that account no longer compel the imagination[...]

[S]cience cannot know; art or religion may guess. This limits, not the sphere of science, but the scope of the intellect. But it is mere superstition to

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²⁴ Paul Tillich, *Courage To Be* (Yale Univ. Press, 1952), pp. 82-83.

imagine that what cannot be known in the mind and by intellectual symbols may be apprehended in some other indefinite way.[...]Art can indeed suggest--can guess at what lies beyond scientific facts, which admittedly do not account for everything, or for enough. That is the highest function of art, and always has been.²⁵

Their remarks are all against such a contemporary tendency as to see man's reason as quite independent of his physical conditions and imagination. Reason and imagination, senses and other physical conditions and desires are all indivisible parts of man.

Furthermore, Lewis is also conscious that religious matters cannot be expressed by abstract rational language alone. In "The Language of Religion," he contrasts scientific language with poetic language, including the language of philosophy and theology in the former. The scientific description gives us quantitatively precise information in abstract language; while the poetic description gives us concrete, qualitative information. Lewis holds that the language of religion, which is different from what he calls "the language of theology", is something between the theological and the poetic, but nearer to the poetic. He says,

In it [i.e. theological language] we are attempting, so far as is possible, to state religious matter in a form more like that we use for scientific matter.[...] We are applying precise, and therefore abstract, terms to what for us is the supreme example of the concrete.[...] And this is one of the great disadvantages under which the Christian apologist labours. Apologetics [sic] is controversy. You cannot conduct a controversy in those poetical expressions which alone convey the concrete: you must use terms as definable and univocal as possible, and these are always abstract. And this means that the thing we are really talking about can never appear in the discussion at all. ("The Language of Religion," *Christian Reflections*, 135-136)

Michael Christensen in *C. S. Lewis On Scriptures* points out that "Thomas

²⁵ Herbert Read, *Reason and Romanticism* (Faber and Gwyer, 1926), pp. 16-19.

Aquinas [...] concluded that human beings can know that God is [...] but we cannot know in any precise, affirmative sense what God's essence is. The attributes of the Infinite cannot be contained in finite language or thought. Aquinas also asserted, however, that mankind [...] can speak of God in two ways. We can say what God is not (*via negativa*), thereby narrowing the possibilities of what he is. We can also approximate the nature of God by employing useful analogies (what can be termed *via analogia*).[...] Lewis concurs with Aquinas and other theologians who recognize the problem of knowledge as related to the nature of God."²⁶ Actually, Lewis himself says that if one tries to express God in purely abstract language, he has to use a lot of negatives. By way of illustration, he gives us an analogy:

Let us suppose a mystical limpet,[...]who (rapt in vision) catches a glimpse of what Man is like. In reporting it to his disciples,[...] [h]e will have to tell them that Man has no shell, is not attached to a rock, is not surrounded by water. And his disciples, having a little vision of their own to help them, do get some idea of Man. But then there come erudite limpets [...] What they get out of the prophetic limpet's words is simply and solely the negatives. From these, uncorrected by any positive insight, they build up a picture of Man as a sort of amorphous jelly (he has no shell) existing nowhere in particular (he is not attached to a rock) and never taking nourishment (there is no water to drift it towards him).[...] Our own situation is much like that of the erudite limpets. (*Miracles*, 93)

Furthermore, in his scientific trilogy, Lewis has Ransom, the protagonist, explain why man cannot clearly describe the reality of heaven. He says that "it is words that are vague. The reason why the thing can't be expressed is that it's too definite for language" (*Perelandra*, 33). Therefore, the use of metaphors and analogies in his logical arguments for Christianity is, for Lewis, a way of making up for the limitation of the rational, abstract language of theology. In his

²⁶ Michael Christensen, *C. S. Lewis On Scriptures* (Hodder and Stoughton, 1971), pp. 57-58.

apologetic works, both reason and imagination, theological abstraction and concrete metaphors, are important. In *Letters to Malcolm*, he says about the anthropomorphic image of God,

[I]t must be balanced by all manner of metaphysical and theological abstractions. But never [...] let us think that while anthropomorphic images are a concession to our weakness, the abstractions are the literal truth. Both are equally concessions; each singly misleading, and the two together mutually corrective. (21)

As to dogmas and myths, he does not turn to them for the negative purpose of evading the logical argument, but on the positive conviction that those dogmas and myths are such truth and reality as revealed by God.

All over the world, until quite modern times, the direct insight of the mystics and reasonings of philosophers percolated to the mass of the people by authority and tradition [...] A society where the simple many obey the few seers can live: a society where all were seers could live even more fully. But a society where the mass is still simple and the seers are no longer attended to can achieve only superficiality, baseness, ugliness, and in the end extinction. On or back we must go; to stay here is death. (*Miracles*, 46-47)

This is Lewis's conviction in turning to authority and myth.

* * *

From the ancient days of early Christian fathers, a lot of pious advocates have tried to prove the existence of God. However, no one has succeeded in making such a successful argument as is accepted by everyone without being criticized for any logical defects. St. Anselm's ontological argument, Thomas Aquinas's Five Ways, Kant's moral argument, are all representatives of Christian apologetics, but none of them are free from logical flaws. Against the background of such a history of cases for Christianity, Lewis's strength lies in the fact that he can not only make logical arguments which substantiate the belief but also make

vivid imaginative appeal on the readers, while presenting dogmas when necessary.

In fact, Lewis's apologetics address reader's whole personality that consists of intellect, imagination and moral feelings. What makes the appeal even stronger is his Christian objectivism, that is, his firm belief that the world has objective reality and logos, and that Christianity tells us the ultimate Reality. All of his apologetics are based on that objectivism, which makes his arguments not only a case for Christianity but for the objective Reality as well. He says in "Christian Apologetics,"

Our Faith is not very likely to be shaken by any book on Hinduism. But if whenever we read an elementary book on Geology, Botany, Politics, or Astronomy, we found that its implications were Hindu, that would shake us. It is not the books written in direct defence of Materialism that make the modern man a materialist; it is the materialistic assumptions in all the other books. In the same way, it is not books on Christianity that will really trouble him. But he would be troubled if, whenever he wanted a cheap popular introduction to some science, the best work on the market was always by a Christian. (*God*, 93)

What Lewis says here about Christianity is also true of objectivism. Those who read the works of Lewis, which all assume the objective Reality and the logos of the world, are likely to be moved by that latent objectivism. Lewis's assumption of the logos of the universe affects the readers without their knowing it, and when they come to follow his argument on the same assumption, his apology is already half done. Affected by his firm belief and imaginative appeal, the reader will not only intellectually accept his argument for the Real world, but also feel it really exist, and come to hope to enter that world someday. I believe this cannot be done by such purely logical arguments as Beversluis and Knott appear to demand of him.

PartII

Chapter 1

Lewis's Works of Fiction--Participation in Reality

In all his writings, not only apologetics but literary criticisms and fiction as well, his main concern is the absolute and eternal Reality. As we have seen in Part I, Lewis finds in imagination a power of intuition into reality. Yet if he is correct, stories written by imagination can reflect that reality. His works of fiction are, then, illustrations of his idea of that ultimate Reality--God and His world, relations between men and God, the way for men to attain true reality in that World of Reality--to share foretastes of that World with the readers.

In this chapter, we shall see how even writing stories and fantasies is for Lewis not any negative attempt at escaping from reality nor mere fantastic play of imagination in a less real world than ours but a positive way to participate in Reality. We shall consider essential characteristics of Lewis's fiction in order to clarify his attitudes as an imaginative author--how he relates himself to the world of objective reality by way of imagination.

* * *

The most conspicuous characteristics of Lewis's stories are, first of all, their moral character and pleasure-giving quality which co-exist harmoniously. As Clyde S. Kilby points out about *The Chronicles of Narnia*, "Concerning Lewis's Christian purpose in these stories there can be no possible doubt.[...] Yet there is seldom the sense of contrived situations for didactic purposes."¹ They have, on one hand, such manifest Christian bearings as to even tempt allegorical interpretations, and yet, on the other hand, they are enjoyable also when read without any doctrinal concern. Secondly, the theme of Lewis's fiction is always

¹ Clyde S. Kilby, *The Christian World of C.S. Lewis* (Eerdmans, 1964), p. 136.

the conflict or contrast between good and evil, which involves the theme of salvation. Thirdly, except for *The Screwtape Letters*, all his fiction is written in a mythopoeic form, taking place in another world or in the world of metaphysical reality. For example, the space where his science-fiction trilogy takes place is not such a scientific universe as is usually conceived by ordinary modern people but the medieval, mythopoeic cosmos which has been conceived by those who identified the sky and heaven. There, Venus and Mars appear as guardian angels of the planets, and their characters are those attributed to them in medieval astrology rather than those of the Greek, or Roman, Venus and Mars.

Now, the most important thing about these characteristics is that all of these must have come from his desire to express Reality, since, in Lewis's opinion, Christianity, the moral standards of good and evil, and myth are all concerned with the ultimate metaphysical reality.

* * *

After the publication of *Miracles* (1947), Lewis wrote no apologetic books which aimed at the logical substantiation of either the existence of God or the truth of Christianity. His works became more and more imaginative and mythopoeic. The *Chronicles of Narnia* (1950-1964), and such theological works as *Reflections on the Psalms* (1958), and *Letters to Malcolm* (1963) are all mythopoeic in that they are, at least in part, an imaginative approach to the metaphysical reality.

Peter Schakel, in *Reason and Imagination in C. S. Lewis*, remarks that after the forties Lewis turned from reason to imagination, and from logical arguments to mythological writings. Schakel considers this "suggests that Lewis has reassessed his earlier heavy reliance upon reason," and suspects three causes for the change. G. E. M. Anscombe's severe criticism of his logic is one possible cause. Secondly, Schakel thinks of "the expanded conception of myth Lewis arrived at in the mid-1940s"; and the third and most important cause of the change

must have been “an acknowledgment that an element of subjectivity is inherent in perception, and that a degree of self-consciousness is necessary to sound understanding.”²

In any case, as Schakel suggests, after *Miracles* Lewis must have become strongly conscious of the limitation of rational argumentative form and found the mythopoetic form more and more suitable for what he wanted to express. Schakel rightly points out, “His turning to myth is not a rejection of his earlier mode, but an effort to go beyond it and to offer a reader not ‘knowledge’ of God but a ‘taste’ of Divine Reality.”³ Indeed, just as Lewis was conscious that the true taste of reality can never be transmitted by rational arguments, he also wrote in “The Decline of Religion” (1946):

[With respect to] the spread of an intellectual (and imaginative) climate favourable to Christianity[...] [t]hose who help to produce and spread such a climate are [...] doing useful work: and yet no such great matter after all.[...] Far higher than they stands [...] the *Preacher* in the full sense, the Evangelist, [...] the man who infects. (*God*, 221-222)

Thus, he has admitted that the apologist cannot really “infect”, that is, cannot have irresistible power to convert his readers. Though apologetics may make the reader intellectually accept the doctrine, intellectual assent is different from conversion to a practising Christian. In his apologetics, Lewis uses a lot of analogies and metaphors to avoid abstract discussion, and those analogies and metaphors serve to move the reader by imagination as well as by reason. However, the above passage suggests that Lewis does not think even such apologetics as his is enough to give them the taste of reality. He then suggests that if there is anything that gives it, it is myth. In “Myth Became Fact” Lewis says,

² Peter Schakel, *Reason and Imagination in C. S. Lewis* (Eerdmans, 1984), pp. 149-150.

This is our dilemma--either to taste and not to know or to know and not to taste--or, more strictly, to lack one kind of knowledge because we are in an experience or to lack another kind because we are outside it.[...] You cannot *study* Pleasure in the moment of the nuptial embrace, nor repentance while repenting, nor analyse the nature of humour while roaring with laughter.[...]

Of this tragic dilemma myth is the partial solution. In the enjoyment of a great myth we come nearest to experiencing as a concrete what can otherwise be understood only as an abstraction. (*God*, 65-66)

In fact, Lewis's adoption of mythological form for his fiction goes back to 1938 when he published his first science fiction, *Out of the Silent Planet*. Chad Walsh discussed Lewis as a "Myth-maker"⁴ even before Lewis published any of the Narnian tales, which I find to be far better Christian mythological stories than the science-fiction trilogy.

Besides, as Lewis says in *Reflections on the Psalms* published in 1958, "A man can't be always defending the truth; there must be a time to feed on it" (7). The later Lewis is thus conscious of the need of nourishing the readers with Christianity instead of merely urging them to accept it intellectually. The mythical form is, for him, a means to feed on the truth of Christianity, because, after all, Christianity is God's own special myth that became fact.

* * *

Lewis says, "The poet is not a man who asks me to look at him; he is a man who says 'look at that' and points" (*Personal Heresy*, 11). And in *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Literature*, he says that the medieval people enjoyed expressing their mythical world views in art and literature. "It was rather the spontaneous desire of us 'aliens outside the city wall' to participate as far as we can in the glory of the life of the city" (61). Yet Lewis himself, who calls himself an "Old Western" man ("*De Descriptione Temporum*," *Selected Essays*,

³ Schakel, *Reason and Imagination*, p. 150.

⁴ Chad Walsh, *C. S. Lewis: Apostle to the Skeptics* (Macmillan, 1949), pp. 39-47.

14), apparently shares this desire, for in his essay entitled "Is Theology Poetry?" he says, "Every man, I believe, enjoys the world picture which he accepts: for the gravity and finality of the actual is itself an aesthetic stimulus" (*Toast*, 45). The Christian mythical view of the world is a literary stimulus for Lewis. He enjoys writing about it because he is attracted by it.

Actually, the reason why Lewis's stories are so much concerned with morality, that is, with the good and evil, and yet are not boringly nor strictly didactic at all must be that morality is for him greatly attractive as a part of the Real World of God for which he has been yearning. Indeed, if his stories have strong morality, it is first of all because they reflect his longing for the world of goodness. They communicate this longing to the reader, and as a result, as Paul Holmer says, "[H]is works, especially the novels, have a way of creating a kind of longing for innocence, for purity, for humility, candor, and contentment."⁵ Thus, they have even stronger moral effects on the readers than intentionally didactic teachings of many other authors. C. N. Manlove, in his study on "Modern Fantasy," says,

Narnia (at times), Malacandra, Perelandra: these are not only beautiful, but in those mortals who visit them, and undoubtedly in their author, they awaken inarticulate joys and longings which, rightly followed, are a mystic experience of divine immanence.⁶

Richard Purtill points out that "'moral didacticism,' [...] it is not, rightly understood, a charge [Lewis] would reject--though, as Lewis said of Milton, we may sometimes be in 'danger of supposing that the poet was inculcating a rule when in fact he was enamoured of a perfection.'"⁷ This remark is true in many places in Lewis's fiction. For example, in *Perelandra*, Lewis gives us a sort of

⁵ Paul Holmer, *C. S. Lewis: The Shape of His Faith and Thought* (Harper & Row, 1976), p.67.

⁶ Collin N. Manlove, *Modern Fantasy* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1975), p. 110.

hymn expressing Christian ethical codes over four pages long (214-218). Donald G. Glover, one of the most sensitive and trustworthy scholars of Lewis, criticizes this part for being “pure information which once digested hardly awakens interest in repeated readings of the book.[...] Myth cannot exhort; it can move us only by the subtlety of its suggestion; it cannot be too explicit.”⁸ Yet, I think Glover is wrong here in taking Lewis's hymn as if it were written for purely didactic purpose. Rather, Lewis must have given us the “information” simply because he has been enamoured by it. In *Reflections on the Psalms*, Lewis remarks that probably the Psalmist who wrote the Psalm 27 “drew no distinction between ‘beholding the fair beauty of the Lord’ and the acts of worship themselves. When the mind becomes more capable of abstraction and analysis this old unity breaks up”(48). In this light, we suspect that the hymn in *Perelandra* is an attempt at recovering the state of true worship in which seeing the truth and admiring it is one.

* * *

Lewis's view on the morality in his own work is expressed in his essay “Sometimes Fairy Stories May Say Best What's to Be Said.” According to it, in the case of his own writing, “[T]here are usually two reasons for writing an imaginative work, which may be called Author's reason and Man's.” What he refers to as “Author's reason” is the aesthetic impulse. He says that his story “invariably begins with Mental pictures.[...] accompanied with the longing for a Form: Verse or prose, short story, novel, play or what not” (*On Stories*, 45). This Author's motive always comes before the Man's motive that concerns moral effects of the work. Lewis writes of his process of writing *The Chronicles of Narnia*, an imaginative history of a fantasy world of Narnia from its creation to eschatology under the providence of its creator, Aslan:

⁷ Richard L. Purtill, *Lord of the Elves and Eldils* (Zondervan, 1974), p. 60.

⁸ Donald G. Glover, *The Art of Enchantment* (Ohio Univ.Press, 1981), p. 103.

Some people seem to think that I began by asking myself how I could say something about Christianity to children [...] then drew up a list of basic Christian truths and hammered out 'allegories' to embody them. This is all pure moonshine. I couldn't write in that way at all. Everything began with images; a faun carrying an umbrella, a queen on a sledge, a magnificent lion. At first there wasn't even anything Christian about them, that element pushed itself of its own accord.[...] Then came the Form. As these images sorted themselves into events (i.e., became a story) they seemed to demand no love interest and no close psychology. But the Form which excludes these things is the fairytale. And the moment I thought of that I fell in love with the Form itself[...]. Then of course the Man in me began to have his turn. I thought I saw how stories of this kind could steal past a certain inhibition which had paralysed much of my own religion in childhood. Why did one find it so hard to feel as one was told one ought to feel about God or about the sufferings of Christ? I thought the chief reason was that one was told one ought to. An obligation to feel can freeze feelings.[...] But supposing that by casting all these things into an imaginary world, stripping them of their stained-glass and Sunday school associations, one could make them for the first time appear in their real potency? [...] I thought one could. That was the Man's motive. ("Sometimes," *On Stories*, 46-47)

While a lot of people see allegories in Narnia, his words, "Everything began with images", have become so well-known among Lewis critics that sometimes comments are misleadingly written as if Lewis denied moral motives in his imaginative activity.⁹ Actually, however, Lewis says he has "Man's", that is, moral, motives as well as "Author's". What is then important here is the relation between the two sorts of motives. In his case, what the "Man" does is to notice the potential morality in the original motifs of the story, and make that moral element "appear in their real potency." Therefore, the moral has already been latent in his first aesthetic impulse.

About the process of writing *Perelandra*, the second of his science-fiction trilogy, Lewis says,

⁹ Cf. e.g., Smith, p. 143.

The starting point of the second novel, *Perelandra*, was my mental picture of the floating islands. The whole of the rest of my labours in a sense consisted of building up a world in which floating islands could exist.[...] I've never started from a message or a moral [...]. The story itself should force its moral upon you. You find out what the moral is by writing the story. ("Unreal Estates," *On Stories*, 144-145)

Here again, he started with an aesthetic reason, and yet the moral was also potentially there from the outset so that story itself may "force its moral" even upon Lewis himself. This is because the world of reality, which has been a great aesthetic stimulus for him is the world of ultimate good, and the aesthetic stimulus and moral stimulus are in fact one in Lewis.

Lewis finds a truth in the classical poetic theory that poetry instructs by delighting and says in *The Personal Heresy*, a critical controversy with E. M. W. Tillyard:

It is all of a piece with what we want in other departments of life: a man wants his food to be nourishing as well as palatable, his games to be healthy as well as enjoyable, his wife to be a good companion and housekeeper as well as a pleasing sexual mate. I conclude, then, that the old critics were perfectly right when they demanded of literature the *utile* and the *dulce*, *solus* and *doctryne*, pleasure and profit. (119)

In literature, "pleasure and profit" should work together undividedly.

Besides, as a cause of the moral bearings in his fiction, some critics find an intrinsic moralistic character in Lewis's personal constitution. Helen Gardner, for instance, comments on him thus:

Lewis established his reputation as a scholar with his first book, *The Allegory of Love: A Study in Medieval Tradition* (1936). This remains a great and profoundly original contribution to literary history.[...] Lewis recovered for the ordinary reader what had been lost for centuries, the power to read allegory and to respond to the allegorical mode of thinking. He was able to do so because he was a born allegorist himself. His

imagination was stirred by ideas and concepts and their congruity, and they came to life in his mind almost as persons. He was, besides, a moralist to the depths of his being, and was deeply moved by allegory's power to embody moral concepts and illuminate moral experience.¹⁰

Gardner's view is right. Apparently, the Christian doctrines that he believes in and the Ptolemaic world picture that he studies as a literary scholar stir his imagination and take almost allegorical forms. In him, the religious belief and philosophical convictions are indivisible from literary expressions. The fact that he is, as a scholar, familiar not only with the medieval mythical world picture but also with the allegorical form of expression makes it even more natural for him to take mythical and allegorical elements into his fiction.

From this, we can understand the second characteristic of Lewis's fiction, the allegorical conflict between the good and evil. Lewis says of Edmund Spenser, the author of *Faerie Queene*, that "he is endlessly preoccupied with such ultimate antitheses as Light and Darkness or Life and Death," (*Allegory*, 313) and this is also true of Lewis himself. He is occupied in expressing good and evil because he finds the ultimate antithesis between them. Furthermore, another comment he makes on Spenser is also true of himself:

And yet it is characteristic of him that the constant pressure of this day and night antithesis on his imagination never tempts him into dualism. He is impressed, more perhaps than any other poet, with the conflict of two mighty opposites--aware that our world is dualistic for all practical purposes, dualistic in all but the very last resort: but from the final heresy he abstains, drawing back from the verge of dualism to remind us by delicate allegories that though the conflict seems ultimate yet one of the opposites really contains, and is not contained by, the other. Truth and falsehood are opposed; but truth is the norm not of truth only but of falsehood also. (*Allegory*, 314-315)

¹⁰ Helen Gardner, "Clive Staples Lewis," *The Proceedings of the British Academy*, vol. 21 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1965), pp. 417-428; quotation, p. 423.

His fiction, especially *The Chronicles of Narnia*, *Out of the Silent Planet*, and *Perelandra*, without preaching or exhorting makes the readers naturally long to be good. This is because his conviction that the reality is ultimately good and the good is pleasant and stronger than evil is transmitted to them through imagination. They are given some foretaste of the world of reality, or of heaven, so as to share Lewis's hope and longing for it.

* * *

From the next chapter, we shall discuss Lewis's fiction to see how Lewis expresses his ideas of Reality in his imaginative world.

Chapter 2

The Great Divorce (1946)

<Introduction>

Lewis wrote more than a dozen imaginative stories, and among them *The Chronicles of Narnia* and *The Screwtape Letters* are the best known. However, here, I discuss *The Great Divorce* first, because in this book, Lewis's idea of the Real World as heaven is most clearly shown, and in contrast, the essential character of hell is also presented. Heaven is concrete and strong, while hell is insubstantial and shadowy. Besides, Lewis is also showing what is necessary if man is to go to heaven, and although it is one of his earliest fictions, most of his ideas about conditions of salvation are already present here, even in a rudimentary form.

This is a narrative story written in a form of dream literature, and can be briefly summarized as follows:

The narrator is Lewis himself. In the story, he is one of the "Ghosts" who take an omnibus from Purgatory, which is called the "grey town", or "the Valley of the Shadow of Death"(67). The place at which they arrive is "the Valley of the Shadow of Life" (67), which is in the outermost part of heaven. There, Lewis witnesses several encounters of other Ghosts with bright Spirits, or Angels, from heaven. Each Spirit has come down from deeper heaven to see his or her life-time acquaintance, to tell the acquaintance's ghost to join the people in heaven. However, for some reason or another, most of the Ghosts would rather go back to the grey town than go to heaven. The Spirits cannot nor would do anything to prevent them from going back. Lewis begins to wonder why the Spirits do not try harder if they truly want to bring their friends to heaven. He feels that they

might as well even go down to hell to bring the friends out of it. Then, the Spirit of George Macdonald, an author whom Lewis in his autobiography *Surprised by Joy* acknowledges as the one who opened his eyes to “the Holiness” (*Joy*, 145), appears. Macdonald shows Lewis around the Valley of the Shadow of Life, and tells him the reason why it is impossible for the Spirits of heaven to go down into hell. While he is talking with Macdonald, everything suddenly begins changing, and Lewis finds himself awake in his study, realizing the whole trip to have been only a dream.

Kazuo Takeno remarks that Lewis probably got the conception of the ghosts' trip to heaven from the theological idea of “*Refrigerium*”, temporary remission of the punishment of hell, which he probably learned about in the works of Jeremy Taylor, an Anglican theologian, and Prudentius, the 4th century Church father, because the George Macdonald in the book tells the narrator Lewis, “Did ye never hear of the *Refrigerium*? A man with your advantages might have read of it in Prudentius, not to mention Jeremy Taylor”(66) .¹ And the important thing in this book is that the trip should not necessarily be a temporary remission of hellish punishment but may become a one way trip to heaven, if only the ghosts themselves choose heaven and wish to remain there.

<Choice between Heaven and Hell---Unavoidable “Either-Or”>

In the introduction to *The Great Divorce*, Lewis refers to William Blake's *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell* and says,

Blake wrote the *Marriage of Heaven and Hell*. [...] But in some sense or other the attempt to make that marriage is perennial. The attempt is based on the belief that reality never presents us with an absolutely unavoidable “either-or” [...] that mere development or adjustment or refinement will

¹ Kazuo Takeno (竹野一雄), *The World of C. S. Lewis* (『C.S.ルイスの世界』) (Sairyusha (彩流社), 1999), p.120.

somehow turn evil into good without our being called on for a final and total rejection of anything we should like to retain. This belief I take to be a disastrous error [...]. Evil can be undone, but it cannot “develop” into good. Time does not heal it.[...] It is still “either-or.” If we insist on keeping Hell (or even earth) we shall not see Heaven. (5-6)

In respect of actual content, Lewis’s *The Great Divorce* has almost nothing to do with Blake’s *The Marriage*. While Blake’s “Hell” is not necessarily the place of sinners’ damnation, Lewis’s is nothing other than that. Northrop Frye points out:

By “hell” Blake means an upsurge of desire and passion within the rising body so great that it will destroy the present starry heaven, and hell, and he calls it “hell” because that is what the orthodox call it. Here Blake’s meaning has been misunderstood, and deserves more explanation.[...] And though the prophet is regarded by society as a devil or messenger from hell, he never practises the vice of “hindering another.” There is much that is really good in moral good: the prophet is concerned only to disentangle it from the easy virtue of moral cowardice.[...]

Blake attaches two meanings to the word “hell,” one real and the other ironic. There is a real hell in human mind, and it achieves the physical form of dungeons, whips, racks and all the miserable panoply of fear. Such a hell consolidates a moral virtue founded on terror with a moral evil founded on cruelty, and it exists because it is believed to be a part of “necessity.” The more degenerate the society, the more obvious this alliance of moral good and evil against the power of genius becomes.²

Thus, Blake’s “hell” has such a complicated meaning as to get the above commentary, and this is natural if the implication of the “marriage” in Blake’s poem is that what is virtue for some people is taken as vice by others. Yet, Lewis’s hell will never be taken as heaven or *vice versa*. What Lewis is stressing in *The Great Divorce* is the importance of choosing heaven instead of hell as soon as possible. The moral is so apparent throughout this book that D.E.

² Northrop Frye, *Fearful Symmetry: A Study of William Blake* (Princeton Univ. Press, 1947: paperback, 1969), pp. 197-198.

Glover, for example, says that “the tone of the book is that of instruction rather than self-transcendent enlightenment, just as the method used is that of a lecture illustrated by examples.”³ Lewis writes,

We are [...] living [...] in a world where every road, after a few miles, forks into two, and each of those into two again, and at each fork you must make a decision.[...] It does not move towards unity but away from it and the creatures grow further apart as they increase in perfection. (5-6)

The further you go along the wrong road the more difficult it becomes to go back into the right one. Then there will be a point where it becomes impossible to return. A minor sin, such as grumbling, may be harmful enough to draw a person into hell when it is continuously repeated so as to become his or her central nature and destroy his or her humanity altogether. A Spirit says of a woman,

The question is whether she is a grumbler, or only a grumble. If there is a real woman--even the least trace of one--still there inside the grumbling, it can be brought to life again.[...] But if there's nothing but ashes [...] [t]hey must be swept up. (74)

In *The Problem of Pain*, Lewis points out that Jesus describes hell under three symbols: “that of punishment,” “that of destruction,” and “that of privation, exclusion, or banishment into ‘the darkness outside’”(112-113). In an attempt to illustrate what destruction of a soul would be like, Lewis compares it to burning a log. He says that a soul destroyed in hell would not be totally annihilated but its remains would be left; just as a log, having been burnt, leaves its ashes. The grumbling woman, having turned into ashes, is therefore in hell, already destroyed. One has to give up any sinful, wrong habit immediately or it will become too late.

The importance of immediate cutting off of one's wrong part is seen in the words of an Angel, who has come to meet a Ghost with a red lizard on his

³ Glover, p. 130.

shoulder. The lizard is an incarnation of the Ghost's lust, and the Angel asks the Ghost to let him kill it. The Ghost pleads with him to do it "Some other day, perhaps"(100), for a man in his natural state tends to shrink from being remade. Lewis writes in *Mere Christianity*,

The natural life in each of us is something self-centred, something that wants to be petted and admired [...]. And especially it wants to be left to itself: to keep well away from anything better or stronger or higher than it, anything that might make it feel small. It is afraid of the light and air of the spiritual world [...]. It knows that if the spiritual life gets hold of it, all its self-centredness and self-will are going to be killed [...] (*Mere Christianity*, 151)

Thus, the Ghost, while wishing to enter heaven, still instinctively hesitates to give himself up and wishes to postpone the vital step. Yet the Angel tells him, "There is no other day. All days are present now"(100). In heaven, which is in God's dimension, all time is eternally present. Lewis, following St. Augustine, says in *Mere Christianity*,

All the days are 'Now' for Him. He does not remember you doing them, because, though you have lost yesterday, He has not. He does not 'foresee' you doing things to-morrow; He simply sees you doing them: because, though to-morrow is not yet there for you, it is for Him. (145)⁴

Therefore, there can be no putting off the operation. Though it is painful for a man to part with his self-indulging tendency, such as greed and lust, it is necessary to give it up immediately if he is to enter heaven. The Ghost with the lizard also suffers a great deal when the Angel approaches him to seize the lizard, for he feels the Angel burning hot. As Eugene Warren points out, this Angel reminds us of the Old Testament image of the Law in Psalm 19, which Lewis finds to be connected to the Sun: "luminous, severe, disinfecant, exultant" (Lewis,

⁴ Cf. St. Augustine, *City of God*, p. 452.

Psalms, 64).⁵ The Ghost even suspects that the Angel might kill him. However, finally he decides that “It would be better to be dead than to live with this creature”(101) and tells the Angel to “Get it over,” whimpering, “God help me. God help me”(101). This whimper is heard by God literally. In the Bible, it is said: “[I]t is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell” (Matthew, 5, 29), yet Lewis’s God not only enjoins thus but also helps man to get rid of the wrong part and enter heaven. The moment the Spirit kills the lizard, the Ghost starts growing “solider,[...] brighter still and stronger,” to be “an immense man, naked, not much smaller than the Angel”(102). Even the lizard turns into a magnificent stallion. They are turned into the glorious image of God as St. Paul prophesies, “from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord” (II Corinthians, 3,18).

The important points about this Ghost and the lizard are that the Spirit will kill the lust only with the permission of the Ghost, and that when the lust dies, it will resurrect as such a magnificent being as a stallion, even though “Lust is a poor, weak, whimpering whispering thing” (104-105). Macdonald says to Lewis,

Ye must ask, if the risen body even of appetite is as grand a horse as ye saw, what would the risen body of maternal love or friendship be? (105)

It is also significant that none of the Ghosts that choose heaven and get transformed thus gloriously have expected such transformation until they actually undergo it. In the case of this Ghost with the lizard, he is even suspecting that he might be killed in the operation. Yet he decides, “It would be better to be dead than to live with this creature” (101). Therefore, choosing heaven is an act of

⁵ Eugene Warren, “The Angel of the Law in *The Great Divorce*,” *The Bulletin of the New York C. S. Lewis Society*, Vol.8, No. 8 (1977), p.5.; quot. from Lewis, *Reflections on the Psalms*, p. 64.

faith, without any mercenary motive. In *Surprised by Joy*, Lewis remembers his own conversion and tells us that when he came to believe in God, he felt no promise nor threat about the future life or anything, but “God was to be obeyed simply because he was God.[...] To know God is to know that our obedience is due to Him” (185). What is demanded of the Ghosts is total commitment, or total self-surrender, to the Spirits, with the result that they will follow them to Heaven. Yet, it is not so easy, especially for self-centred ones to give up that self and choose happiness in heaven.

In the case of one Ghost, who is too self-conscious and ashamed to enter into heaven because she is afraid of being seen by the heavenly people, she cannot get courage enough to follow the Spirit. The Spirit tells her “Don’t you remember on earth--there were things too hot to touch with your finger but you could drink them all right? Shame is like that. If you will accept it [...] you will find it very nourishing.” The Ghost almost believes these words, yet at the last moment, she says, “No, I can’t. [...] For a moment, while you were talking, I almost thought...but when it comes to the point.... You’ve no right to ask me to do a thing like that” (61-62). And so she remains in hell after all.

* * *

In this book, Lewis especially shows us that the choice between heaven and hell is made not necessarily between any categorically definite virtue and vice, but often between God and natural objects which in themselves are nothing bad. Everything in Nature is in itself neither good or evil, but becomes good or evil in relation to God.

There is but one good; that is God. Everything else is good when it looks to Him and bad when it turns from Him. And the higher and mightier it is in the natural order, the more demoniac it will be if it rebels. (97-98)

This is one of the most important arguments that Lewis makes in this book. In the preface, Lewis writes,

Earth, I think, will not be found by anyone to be in the end a very distinct place. I think earth, if chosen instead of Heaven, will turn out to have been, all along, only a region in Hell: and earth, if put second to Heaven, to have been from the beginning a part of Heaven itself. (7)

Everything on earth, however good and heavenly it is itself, should be put second to the real Good, or it should go bad and be an obstacle to heaven.

Macdonald says to Lewis, the narrator, "Hell is a state of mind [...] [E]very shutting up of the creature within the dungeon of its own mind [...] is in the end, Hell." (69) Lewis here refers to Milton's Satan in *Paradise Lost*, who boasts,

The mind is its own place, and in itself
Can make a heav'n of hell, a hell of heav'n.
[...]To reign is worth ambition though in hell:[.] (Book, ll. 254-262)

while within himself knowing that, far from enjoying heaven and hell at his own will, he is actually trapped by his own mind most miserably. Satan is lamenting when he is alone,

Me miserable! which way shall I fly
Infinite wrath, and infinite despair?
Which way I fly is hell; myself am hell;[.] (Book, ll. 73-75)⁶

Those who reject heaven on any account are rejecting joy, and it is a sort of self-imprisonment. As Macdonald says,

Milton was right [...]. The choice of every lost soul can be expressed in the words 'Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven.' There is always something they insist on keeping, even at the price of misery. There is always something they prefer to joy--that is, to reality. (69)

⁶ John Milton, *Paradise Lost*, ed. Scott Elledge, Norton Critical Edition (Norton, 1975).

Throughout *The Great Divorce*, Lewis presents various obstacles to heaven that hinder people from choosing heaven: for example, perverted, futile sexuality, or desire for money (13), or revengefulness (84).

Yet, above all, the greatest obstacle to heaven is Pride, or self-centredness, as it has always been regarded as the greatest evil in orthodox Christianity. St. Augustine speaks of the essence of “sin” as:

When we ask the cause of the evil angels’ misery, we find that it is the just result of their turning away from him who supremely is, and their turning towards themselves, who do not exist in that supreme degree. What other name is there for this fault than pride? ‘The beginning of all sin is pride.’ (Ecclus.,10,13) [...] [I]n preferring themselves to him [i.e., God] they chose a lower degree of existence.⁷

Pride is the sin of Satan in his rebellion against God. Lewis follows St. Augustine in this, too, and says in *Mere Christianity*,

Pride or Self-Conceit [...]. It is the comparison that makes you proud: the pleasure of being above the rest [...]. In God you come up against something which is in every respect immeasurably superior to yourself. Unless you know God as that--and, therefore, know yourself as nothing in comparison--you do not know God at all. As long as you are proud you cannot know God. A proud man is always looking down on things and people: and, of course, as long as you are looking down, you cannot see something that is above you. (106-109)

In actual life people tend to see what is called “Achilles’ wrath and Coriolanus’ grandeur, Revenge and Injured Merit and Self-respect and Tragic Greatness and Proper Pride” (*Divorce*, 70) as if they were a sort of virtue. However, Macdonald reminds Lewis that they are actually nothing but childish “Sulks” (*Divorce*, 70), which are far from meritorious. Throughout Lewis’s works Pride is evil without exception. There is no such thing as proper pride.

⁷ St. Augustine, *City of God*, p. 477.

Pride always separates man from heaven and Reality.

A painter, for example, who was famous in his life is shocked to hear that he has already been forgotten by his posterity on earth and thinks he should hurry back to life to mend his fame. The Spirit who has met him in heaven notices pride in his feelings and warns him that such pride is a snare every artist is likely to fall into:

Every poet and musician and artist, but for Grace, is drawn away from love of the thing he tells, to love of the telling till, down in Deep Hell, they cannot be interested in God at all but only in what they say about Him.[...] They sink lower---become interested in their own personalities and then in nothing but their own reputations. (81)

Thus an artist is fallible to a five-step degradation from a disinterested appreciation of God's creation to exclusive self-interest. It is a process of turning his attention from God to himself, which is the core of man's original sin. Unlike Plato, Lewis does not disparage art as a mimetic form. Yet he gives such cultural activities as art, music, or literature only a secondary importance. In "Christianity and Culture," Lewis says that culture is not particularly good in itself, though when it gives an innocent pleasure, it is good because pleasure is itself a good thing, and when such pleasant cultural act is done to God, that is, offered to God, it is done to glorify Him and becomes "a means of grace" ("On Church Music," *Christian Reflections*, 97), and then, it is better than when merely being pleasant (cf. *Christian Reflections*, 12-25). In short, the worth of an artist's work lies in its faculty of reminding us of God and Heaven. Lewis is critical about the people who disregard God and substitute culture for religion. In his view, "they have taken on an independent and therefore a soon withering life" (*Psalms*, 49). He writes to Dom Griffiths that art and literature are healthy only when they aim at "innocent recreation" such as *Pickwick* gives or serve

“religious or at least moral truth” as Dante’s works do (*Letters*, 182). He therefore rejects the “Epicurean-aesthetic” position, such as Pater’s⁸ as “all nonsense” (*Letters*, 148). He says, “[T]he great serious irreligious art--art for art’s sake--is all balderdash; and incidentally never exists when art is really flourishing” (*Letters*, 182). So here, the Spirit says to the painter, “Why, if you are interested in the country only for the sake of painting it, you’ll never learn to see the country” (81).

When you painted on earth--at least in your early days--it was because you caught glimpses of Heaven in the earthly landscape. The success of your painting was that it enabled others to see the glimpses too. But here you are having the thing itself. It is from here that the messages came. (80)

In a debate with E. M. W. Tillyard, later published as *Personal Heresy*, Lewis argues against Tillyard’s comment on Milton’s *Paradise Lost* that “what the poem is really about” is “the true state of Milton’s mind when he wrote it.”⁹ He says that a poet’s role is to open our eyes to the world, not to write about himself:

I look with his [i.e. the poet’s] eyes, not at him [...] The poet is not a man who asks me to look at *him*; he is a man who says ‘look at that’ and points; the more I follow the pointing of his finger the less I can possibly see of *him*. (*Personal Heresy*, 11)

In “Christianity and Literature” Lewis reminds us that “‘Originality’ in the New Testament is quite plainly the prerogative of God alone” and “the highest good of a creature must be creaturely--that is, derivative or reflected--good.[...] [P]ride does not only go before a fall but is a fall--a fall of the creature’s attention

⁸ Walter Pater. His famous proposal of “art for art’s sake” is in *The Renaissance* (Macmillan, 1873; rpt. 1900), p. 252.

⁹ E. M. W. Tillyard, *Milton*, revised ed. (1966; Penguin with Chatto and Windus, 1968), p. 201.

from what is better, God, to what is worse, itself" (*Christian Reflections*, 6-7). He does not regard the work of an artist merely as mimesis of something in Nature. It can sometimes show the deeper reality behind her. But in any case, the artist's heart and mind should be devoted to the object given him in Nature, not to himself. To turn our eyes from God to ourselves--this is a perennial sin of man ever since the Fall.

In heaven, no one is more distinguished than the others. "The Glory flows into everyone, and back from everyone: like light and mirrors. But the light's the thing" (82-83). People in heaven look glorious because the light of God shines on them. However, theirs is reflected light--or derivative light--not the original. Those who are proud of their assumed distinction are wrong and unable to stay in heaven. This is the case also with the painter in *The Great Divorce*. And thus, preoccupied with his reputation, the artist after death shares even less in the Reality of heaven than he did on earth when he started painting.

An unrecognized poet whom the narrator meets in hell is the same. He complains about "the lack of 'Recognition'" (16) of his genius on earth, about money, about his wife, etc., because he thinks he deserves more. He is self-deluded. If he were a truly good poet, his concern should not be his own reputation or "recognition."

Actually, complaint is a characteristic of hell. Since pride is the essential character of the damned, those in hell would rather blame others than humbly admit their fault when something goes wrong or when they are not paid as much attention as they want. Lewis hears from a Ghost that Napoleon in hell keeps complaining,

It was Soult's fault. It was Ney's fault. It was Josephine's fault. It was the fault of the Russians. It was the fault of the English. (20-21)

Thus, complaint is an expression of a proud nature.

However, it is not only pride that leads men to hell. Lewis also shows that things that are generally supposed to be even meritorious, such as an intellectual pursuit of theological problems or love for others, sometimes turn out to be obstacles to heaven. He is conscious that meritorious things on earth tend to become the supreme objectives of people's life and take the place of God who should be the only ultimate objective of human life.

A Ghost, who was a theologian and bishop in his lifetime, holds that "a literal Heaven and Hell" is "superstitious or mythological"(38), and though he has been in hell and is now in a part of heaven, he does not recognize either place. As the Spirit remarks, his problem is one of the "sins of intellect"(39). He makes most of what he calls an "atmosphere of free inquiry" (43) and argues that "honest opinions fearlessly followed" (39) through free inquiry are not sins. He cares about the inquiry itself even more than the answer. He says,

For me there is no such thing as a final answer. The free wind of inquiry must *always* continue to blow through the mind, must it not? Prove all things' [...]. But you must feel yourself that there is something stifling about the idea of finality? Stagnation, my dear boy, what is more soul-destroying than stagnation? (43)

Because heaven is "the land not of questions but of answers" (43), the Episcopal Ghost refuses to go there. He does not care for God Himself but only for the theological inquiry that he calls "religious life"(43), and in this, he is mistaking a means to heaven for the end itself. The Spirit says to him, " We know nothing of religion here: we think only of Christ. We know nothing of speculation," but the Ghost does not understand this (44). For him, God is and should be mystery. When the Spirit asks him if he does not believe that God exists, the Ghost answers:

Exists? What does Existence mean?[...] If there were such a thing [...] quite

frankly, I should not be interested in it. It would be *no religious* significance. God, for me, is something purely spiritual. (45)

In the end, the Ghost parts himself with the Spirit and walks in a different direction from heaven.

This Ghost's words, "honest opinion," remind us of J. A. T. Robinson, one of the liberal, or existentialist Christians of this century, especially of his book, *Honest to God* (1963). As Lewis almost always stresses the supernatural transcendence of God and understands Christianity as God's own myth that became fact at the Incarnation, he is against the movement of theological liberalism--as we have seen in our Chapter 2, Part I.¹⁰ Most of all, he is against the de-mythologizing movement of this century as is most expressedly proposed by Rudolf K. Bultmann.¹¹ Though it would be an anachronism to see any influence of Robinson's book on *The Great Divorce*, which appeared in 1946, seventeen years earlier than *Honest to God*, it cannot be denied that Lewis here gives warning against the danger implied in such liberal Christianity as was later clearly proposed by Robinson. According to Robinson,

Without the constant discipline of theological thought, asking what we really mean by the symbols, purging out the dead myths, and being utterly honest before God with ourselves and the world, the Church can quickly become obscurantist and its faith and conduct and worship increasingly formal and hollow.¹²

In stressing the importance of re-assessing the traditional symbols and mythical elements in Christianity by ourselves, he is incurring the risk of involving people in an intellectual inquiry into something which must be in fact grasped through mythological revelation and direct apprehension rather than through rational

¹⁰ Cf. our section on "Lewis and Liberal Christianity," especially pp. 71-79.

¹¹ Rudolf Bultmann, *New Testament and Mythology*, ed. and tr. Schbert M. Ogden (Fortress Press, 1984), especially pp. 2-3.

reasoning. Though Robinson, in *Honest to God*, is not necessarily trying to throw away all traditional mythological elements from Christianity, he is willing to replace them with something more appealing to the modern mind and imagination. For example, man has long referred to God and heaven with the adjective “high,” but Robinson thinks it more suitable now to describe God as deep because now the adjective of depth is more often used to suggest a “profound” meaning.¹³ Paul Tillich describes God, who concerned the deepest part of human beings, as the “ultimate concern.”¹⁴

Such theologians as Tillich and Robinson seek God in the deepest part of man’s existence. Although Lewis shares their belief that God is the root or source of our existence,¹⁵ he is different from them in that he is expressly against the modern existential movement of coming to pay more and more attention to the faculty of man’s mind as a means of perception and builder of a world picture. He calls this movement a “process of Internalization”, expressing his anxiety thus:

Always, century by century, item after item is transferred from the object’s side of the account to the subject’s. And now, in some extreme forms of Behaviourism, the subject himself is discounted as merely subjective; we only think that we think. Having eaten up everything else, he eats himself up too. And where we ‘go from that’ is a dark question. (*Discarded*, 215)

He fears that the “honest” attitude on the part of preachers might involve people in the “process of Internalization,” and unintentionally alienate people from God. Though Lewis does not criticize Tillich or Robinson by name here, in an article in *Observer* (24 March, 1963), he comments on Robinson’s opinion, referring to Robinson’s article of the previous Sunday:

¹² John A. T. Robinson, *Honest to God* (SCM, 1963), p.133.

¹³ Robinson, p. 132.

¹⁴ Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, 3 vols. in one (The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1967), Vol. I, p. 211.

¹⁵ Lewis, *Observer*, 24 March, 1963, rpt. in *The Honest to God Debate*, ed. David

We have long abandoned belief in a God who sits on a throne in a localized heaven.[...] We have always thought of God as being not only 'in' and 'above', but also 'below' us: as the depth of ground. We can imaginatively speak of Father 'in heaven' yet also of the everlasting arms that are 'beneath'. We do not understand why the Bishop is so anxious to canonize the one image and forbid the other. We admit his freedom to use which he prefers. We claim our freedom to use both.¹⁶

In *Letters to Malcolm*, published the same year as *Honest to God* (1963), Lewis avowedly criticizes liberal Christianity, and though it is very rare that Lewis publicly criticizes anyone by name, his charge there is obviously against Robinson. Richard B. Cunningham also notices this and points out, in that book, that Lewis is sarcastically referring to J. A. T. Robinson, the bishop at Woolwich, "by saying that God's immanence must be emphasized among deists, then cautiously adding, '--or perhaps in Woolwich, if the laity there really think God is to be sought in the sky.'"¹⁷

Lewis in *The Great Divorce* gives the reader a warning that honest intellectual speculation does not necessarily lead man to the true God. What is yet to be noted here is that Lewis himself is not denying the immanence of God. Although he usually describes God as someone who is infinitely above us and, for instance, pressing on us with the moral law which is "above and beyond the ordinary facts of men's behaviour" (*Mere Christianity*, 29), actually, he holds God as immanent as well as transcendent, conceiving the mystery thus:

All creatures, from the angel to the atom, are other than God; with an otherness to which there is no parallel; incommensurable.[...] But also, no

L. Edwards, with a new chapter by J. A. T. Robinson (SCM, 1963), p.91.

¹⁶ Lewis, *Observer*, 24 March, 1963, rpt. in *The Honest to God Debate*, eds. John A.T. Robinson & David L. Edwards (SCM, 1963), p.91.

¹⁷ Lewis, *Malcolm*, p. 74; quoted in Richard Cunningham, *C. S. Lewis: Defender of the Faith*, p. 181.

creature is other than He in the same way in which it is other than all the rest. He is in it as they can never be in one another. In each of them as the ground and root and continual supply of its reality.[...] Therefore of each creature we can say, "This also is Thou: neither is this Thou" (*Malcolm*, 73-74).

This recognition that the ultimate transcendental Other who exists absolutely outside oneself also exists at the same time in one's inmost self is seen in St. Paul, too, when he says "it is no longer I who live, but Christ lives in me" (Galatians, 2:20, *NKJV*), and Lewis is not denying what St. Paul says. Therefore, Lewis's apparent emphasis here on God's transcendence must be a deliberate corrective to the movement of "internalization" that he fears.

Thus theology is one thing which is usually considered to lead man to God but may centrally become a snare that keeps man from God and heaven.

Earthly love is another example of good thing which may turn to be an obstacle to heaven. For example, maternal love, which is naturally a most unselfish love and seems heavenly, becomes such a snare when it comes to be possessive and jealous. A mother Ghost comes to heaven to see her son there. However, because she does not seek God but wishes nothing except to see her son, Michael, she is not prepared for heaven that is God's country. Consequently, she fails to be seen even by her son because she is still no more than a ghost of hell and as such only a shadowy creature without real substance. Before she can meet him, she should first of all learn to love God, and that, for God's sake and not as a means to meet him. Only by doing so, she would be one of the Spirits in heaven that can see each other. A Spirit tells her:

You exist as Michael's mother only because you first exist as God's creature. That relation is older and closer. (92)

Yet she does not understand this. She argues:

No one has a right to come between me and my son. Not even God.[...] I want my boy, and I mean to have him.[...] He is mine, do you understand? Mine, mine, mine, for ever and ever.[...] I hate your religion and I hate and despise your God. I believe in a God of Love. (95)

Her problem is that of one who mistakes “God is Love” for “Love is God.” Maternal love is a natural feeling, and as the Spirit says, “[N]o natural feelings are high or low, holy or unholy, in themselves. They are all holy when God’s hand is on the rein. They all go bad when they set up on their own and make themselves into false gods” (93). She is also wrong in that she takes her son for her own possession. It is this possessiveness which comes from self-centredness that makes her mistake “God is Love” for “Love is God.”

Lewis’s awareness of the danger of degradation of natural, or what we may call earthly, love is also seen in the case of a woman’s Ghost who complains about her husband. In her own way, she has lived for him, motivating him, taking away his hobby to make him work harder for worldly success, and cutting him off from unfavourable friends. Deprived of relaxation, the hobby and the friends he cared for, he got depressed and came to hate her, yet she does not see why he changed thus. When she visits heaven she demands to take back her husband who is now in heaven and thus outside her reach.

How could I help it if he *did* have a nervous breakdown in the end? My conscience is clear. I’ve done my duty by him, if ever a woman has.[...] I will not meet him, if it means just meeting him and no more. But if I’m given a free hand I’ll take charge of him again.[...] He’s not fit to be on his own. Put me in charge of him.[...] Don’t consult *him*: just give him to me. (88-89)

She takes him for her possession to work on. She needs him “to do things to” (89). It is a conspicuous example of possessive, self-centred love. In fact, it might do for her if she were given some other man, as long as she can meddle with him. She says, “It’s simply frightful down there. No one minds about me

at all. I can't alter them. It's dreadful to see them all sitting about and not be able to do anything with them" (89). Later, in *Till We Have Faces* (1956), Lewis illustrates such self-centred possessiveness of love as has been seen in Michael's mother or in this wife, and analyses it psychologically; but here in *The Great Divorce*, he only presents it a little to show that natural loves are, if left alone, likely to be devilish.

Lewis is aware that loves on earth usually need to be needed. One example he gives in *The Four Loves* is the love of a mother for her baby:

She gives birth, gives suck, gives protection. On the other hand, she must give birth or die. She must give suck or suffer. That way, her Affection too is a Need-love. There is the paradox. It is a Need-love but what it needs is to give. It is a Gift-love but it needs to be needed. (33-34)

On earth, therefore, even what can be called Gift-love is in need. In heaven, however, no one needs those whom one loves. A Ghost is told by his wife's Spirit who has come from heaven:

What needs could I have [...] now that I have all? I am full now, not empty. I am in Love Himself, not lonely. Strong, not weak. You shall be the same. Come and see. (113)

However, to the Ghost who belongs to hell, love without need is totally inconceivable. The fact that she does not need him means to him simply that she loves him no longer. He would not go to heaven with her unless she needed him. Nor does he want her to be happy in heaven while he himself is in hell. She calls it "blackmailing"(117). Lewis is conscious that there are people who use the love of those who love them as a weapon to control them. Such "blackmailing" is to be illustrated most dramatically later in *Till We Have Faces*. Yet this Ghost is also the case. While accusing her of loving him no longer, he still knows half unconsciously that she loves him and is using her "pity, in the wrong way" (117),

in an attempt to have her in hell with him. He is, in fact, trying to be a god to her, to replace God in the centre of her world, which is impossible. In fact, no Ghosts can bring heavenly Spirits to hell in any way. They should learn to be in heaven themselves or they have to go back to hell alone.

* * *

In this book, Lewis shows several attitudes that are required of a man if he is to share in the Reality of heaven. First, the example of the Ghost with the lizard shows that a man can be cured of his evil part and stay in heaven but, in order for that, he has to surrender himself to the hand of heaven. This surrender is not to be passive but positive in that it should be made by his free will. Humbleness and a hope to be cured, as seen in the whimper "God help me," are also necessary.

Another thing which is necessary for salvation is repentance. Lewis stresses an almost too obvious a fact here probably because he is conscious that many a man today lacks a sense of guilt. The self-righteous Ghost, who regards himself fit for heaven is not saved, while a murderer is now gloriously in heaven and meets him. The murderer has been saved because he had to give up any self-righteousness after killing a man and has asked for God's mercy and been heard. He now sincerely admits, "I haven't got my rights, or I should not be here," and tells the Ghost, "You will not get yours either. You'll get something far better" (33-34). Thus, he is truly acknowledging that God with mercy gives us more blessings than we deserve. Yet, the self-righteous Ghost, on the contrary, boasts, "I gone [sic] straight all my life.[...] I'm asking for nothing but my rights.[...] I'm not asking for anybody's bleeding charity," though it is only by the atonement of Jesus, by His bleeding love, that is, by his charity on the cross that men are saved. The murderer's Spirit tells him literally to "Ask for the Bleeding Charity" (34) but the man does not understand this. Yet as long as he is as self-righteous as this he cannot be saved. Therefore, paradoxically but not

surprisingly, sometimes those who are very wicked on earth are nearer to heaven than others, as in the case of the murderer.

Those who oppose heaven may be near to it, too. Just as Job in the Old Testament is nearer to God than are his self-righteous friends when he is complaining against God for his suffering, Macdonald says,

Those that hate goodness are sometimes nearer than those that know nothing at all about it and think they have it already. (79)

Indifference to God is worse than hostility against him. Later in *Till We Have Faces*, Lewis shows how one who is hating God can be actually on the way to heaven.

Another point which is emphasized in *The Great Divorce* is, as is the same almost in all his work and especially in *The Chronicles of Narnia*, the importance of the desire for heaven:

There are only two kinds of people in the end: those who say to God, 'Thy will be done,' and those to whom God says, in the end, 'Thy will be done.' All that are in Hell, choose it. Without that self-choice there could be no Hell. No soul that seriously and constantly desired joy will ever miss it. (72-73)

As the surrender of the self to God should be voluntary, so should this desire for heaven be held freely by His creatures.

<Contrast between Heaven and Hell>

When we contrast heaven and hell presented in *The Great Divorce*, what impresses us most is the solid reality of heaven and the unsubstantial shadowy unreality of hell. "Heaven is reality itself" (69), says Macdonald to Lewis, the narrator. It is a traditional Judeo-Christian idea that existence is good and that the Supreme Good, i.e. God whose name is "I AM," has the utmost Existence, or

Reality. Therefore, it is according to the traditional idea that Lewis describes heaven as solid Reality. Likewise, it is also traditional and religiously orthodox to describe hell as unreality. Lewis must have been especially conscious of St. Augustine's thought: "Evil is not a positive substance: the loss of good has been given the name of 'evil.'"¹⁸

The Spirits, who are from heaven, are all solid and bright while the Ghosts, who are from hell, are all transparent and shadowy. The Ghost of Michael's mother is not seen by him, and this is because she is not substantial enough. The Ghosts are described as "man-shaped stains on the brightness of that air.[...] [T]he grass did not bend under their feet: even the dew drops were not disturbed" (27). Lewis the narrator, being himself a Ghost, suffers severe pains walking on the grass, which feels as "hard as diamonds" or "wrinkled rock" (31) to his shadowy feet. He also finds that everything in heaven is so much solidier than things on earth or in hell that he cannot even pluck a daisy. Its stalk is too strong to break(28). However, to the solid heavenly people, things in heaven are not especially harder than things on earth are to us. When they walk, they crush the grass under their feet, and the earth is shaken with their strong steps.

The actual Lewis believes in heaven as the world of objective Reality to which our present world is, as it were, only a world of subjectivity. In *Letters to Malcolm*, he imagines what it would possibly be like to see heaven:

It is like seeing nature itself rising from its grave. What was sown in momentariness is raised in still permanence. What was sown as a becoming, rises as being. Sown in subjectivity, it rises in objectivity. The transitory secret of two is now a chord in the ultimate music.[...] [T]he hills and valleys of Heaven will be to those you now experience not as a copy is to an original, nor as a substitute is to the genuine article, but as the flower to the root, or the diamond to the coal. (123)

¹⁸ St. Augustine, *City of God*, p. 440.

In *Out of the Silent Planet*, too, this substantiality of heaven is stressed by the solidity of angels, or “*eldila*” as they are called in the story. Man cannot see angels clearly, and this is not because angels are unsubstantial but because human eyesight is too weak. For instance, we cannot see things that are moving faster than light; and, in a similar way, we are incapable of seeing angels thus.

To us the *eldil* is a thin, half-real body that can go through walls and rocks: to himself he goes through them because he is solid and firm and they are like cloud. (*Silent Planet*, 95)

Another difference between heaven and hell is in the size and weight. Heaven is large and hell is small. A Ghost tries to pick up some apples in heaven and carry them back to hell in his pocket. However, he can hardly carry one apple, for the apples in heaven are too heavy for a Ghost to carry. All he can manage to lift up and carry staggeringly is the smallest one of all, but when he draws himself to the bus, a bright angel stops him with a loud voice:

Fool [...]. You cannot take it back. There is not room for it in Hell. Stay here and learn to eat such apples. (52)

As Kazuo Takeno points out,¹⁹ his attempt to bring the apple into hell symbolically expresses an attempt to bring hell into heaven, which Lewis shows to be vain. Hell, which is only “*privatio boni*” (the privation of good), virtually has no entity. Macdonald says to Lewis,

All Hell is smaller than one pebble of your earthly world: but it is smaller than one atom of *this* world, the Real World. Look at yon butterfly. If it

¹⁹ Kazuo Takeno(竹野一雄), “Theological Context in *The Great Divorce*” (「C・S・ルイスの *The Great Divorce* について——選択としての救いと墮地獄」), *Joshi Sei Gakuin Tanki Daigaku Eibun Gakkai Kaishi* (女子聖学院短期大学『女子聖学院短期大学英文学会誌』), vol. 18 (1986), p.103.

swallowed all Hell, Hell would not be big enough to do it any harm or to have any taste. (122-123)

Therefore, nothing that belongs to heaven, where everything is real and has substantial existence, can be brought nor held in hell. And this is one of the reasons why Angels or Spirits in heaven cannot go down to hell to save their friends. Hell is too small for them to enter. It is only "the Greatest of all" i.e. Christ the Son who "can make Himself small enough to enter Hell. For the higher a thing is, the lower it can descend" (123-124).

As things belonging to heaven are large, while those belonging to hell are small, sometimes the same Ghost gets larger or smaller according as his spiritual condition changes. A dwarfish Ghost who is chained to a big one meets his wife's Spirit, who died earlier than he, and now has come from heaven to bring him there. When she kisses him, he grows a little larger and more visible, which shows that his mind has approached the deep heaven. Yet, then, the big Ghost, the Tragedian, who is his alter ego and an embodiment of his pessimistic side, accuses her of having been happy in heaven in spite of being away from him. He insists that he has been sad without her, and she should be, and should have been, as miserable as he has been. While the Tragedian is talking to her, the Dwarf-ghost shrinks again to be finally too small to be seen, reflecting the fact that his mind has moved back toward the non-entity world of hell.

This encounter between the Dwarf/Tragedian and his wife shows us the third difference between heaven and hell, that is in strength. When her husband has shrunk to nothing, the Spirit says to the Tragedian, without becoming sad or miserable though she has lost her husband:

You made yourself really wretched. That you can still do. But you can no longer communicate your wretchedness. Everything becomes more and more itself. Here is joy that cannot be shaken. Our light can swallow up your darkness: but your darkness cannot now infect our light.[...] Can you really have thought that love and joy would always be at the mercy of

frowns and sighs? Did you not know they were stronger than their opposites? (118)

Her words would sound a little harsh to the ear of those who, like most Buddhists, find a virtue in the will to share the misery of others and suffering together with them as long as there remain miserable people in hell. Yet actually, what she says expresses heaven's justice as well as its strength over hell.

At first, Lewis wonders why those in heaven can be happy if they are really good when even one soul is lost in hell. He feels that they should feel sad and sorry for the lost. However, Macdonald tells him in answer that if they should be unhappy in sympathy for those in hell, it follows that "till [those in Hell] consent to be happy (on their own terms) no one else shall taste Joy" and in that case, "Hell should be able to *veto* Heaven" (120).

Christopher Marlowe's devil, Mephostophilis in *Doctor Faustus*, says, "*Solamen miseris socios habuisse doloris*" (To the unhappy, it is a comfort to have had companions in misfortune).²⁰ This is also true of the Ghosts in *The Great Divorce*, as "the desire to *extend* Hell [...] into Heaven" is "very common among the Ghosts" (77). However, heaven's happiness is not at all so weak as to be affected by the misery of hell. Though the damned try to use the pity of those in heaven to destroy their happiness, "the cunning tears of Hell" are never able to "impose on good the tyranny of evil" (121). Indeed, almost the greatest and surely an essential difference between heaven and hell is complete lack of happiness in hell. The joy of heaven and misery of hell can even be regarded as what makes heaven, heaven, and hell, hell.

Heaven is in every respect stronger than hell. Its substantiality and larger size are expressions of its powerfulness derived from the Reality of God the

²⁰ Christopher Marlowe, *Doctor Faustus*, ed. John D. Jump (Methuen, 1965; rpt. 1969), Scene V, 42.

almighty. Macdonald says,

Heaven is not a state of mind. Heaven is reality itself. All that is fully real is Heavenly. For all that can be shaken will be shaken and only the unshakable remains. (69)

The actual George Macdonald in his written sermon says, "He [i.e., God] will shake heaven and earth, that only the unshakable may remain, (verse 27): he is a consuming fire, that only that which cannot be consumed may stand forth eternal."²¹ Lewis must have had this in mind when he made his Macdonald thus stress heaven's unshakable reality.

* * *

In *The Great Divorce*, all these are shown to be essential for salvation: desire for heaven, surrender of the self with all earthly love and attachment, repentance, and prayers for God's mercy. In this work Lewis presents various cases of men and women who choose hell instead of heaven. Yet all those who belong to hell are depicted as shadowy Ghosts and give us a weak impression. Their shadow does not darken or weaken the Spirits' brightness and strength but rather shows them off. The readers are impressed much more by the gloriously regenerated Ghost with the lizard or by the blessed Spirit inviting her husband to heaven than by any of the Ghosts who are damned.

Lewis's stress in this book is not on man's sins and damnation but on the importance of choosing heaven which is open to all those who sincerely hope to go there.

No soul that seriously and constantly desires joy will ever miss it. Those who seek find. To those who knock it is opened. (73)

This must be Lewis's most important message in *The Great Divorce*.

²¹ George Macdonald, *Unspoken Sermons*, Series One (J. Joseph Flynn Rare

Books, in association with Sunrise Books, 1989), p. 31.

Chapter 3

The Screwtape Letters (1942)

On 20 July 1940, Lewis wrote to his brother Warren:

After the service was over [...] I was struck by an idea for a book which I think might be both useful and entertaining. It would be called 'As one Devil to another' and would consist of letters from an elderly retired devil to a young devil who has just started work on his first 'patient'. The idea would be to give all the psychology of temptation from the other point of view [...] (*Letters*, 188)

The imaginary epistles written according to this idea is published as *The Screwtape Letters*, letters from a veteran devil Screwtape, to his nephew Wormwood.

In *An Experiment in Criticism*, Lewis points out that literature consists of "Poiema" (something made)" and "Logos" (something said)" and that the content is much influenced by the form (132). In the case of *The Screwtape Letters*, this is especially true. We shall, therefore, discuss this book from the two viewpoints of form and content, clarifying, first, the effects of its epistolary form and, next, the important points in terms of content. These letters especially illustrate Lewis's idea of evil as perversion of good and ultimate weakness of evil.

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In terms of form, *The Screwtape Letters* is, first of all, an epistolary fiction. It has also an aspect of medieval morality play: in the preface to "Screwtape Proposes a Toast," published in 1960 as a sequel to *The Screwtape Letters*, Lewis writes,

Ideally, Screwtape's advice to Wormwood should have been balanced by archangelical advice to the patient's guardian angel. Without this the picture of human life is lop-sided. ("Screwtape Proposes a Toast," *Toast*, 9)

The 'patient' here is not what we call a 'patient' in the modern sense of a person under medical treatment but a person worked on by a devil. The concept of such a 'patient' and 'guardian angel' must have come from traditional morality plays which Lewis in his academic career has been familiar with. The reason why this "guardian angel" does not appear in *The Screwtape Letters* is that Lewis finds it impossible for a man to make up a character so good as to counterbalance the devil's evil nature. In discussion on Milton's *Paradise Lost*, he sees the reason why Milton's Satan appears more lively and vigorous than God as follows:

To make a character worse than oneself it is only necessary to release imaginatively from control some of the bad passions which, in real life, are always straining at the leash.[...] But if you try to draw a character better than yourself, all you can do is to take the best moments you have had and to imagine them prolonged and more consistently embodied in action. But the real high virtues which we do not possess at all, we cannot depict except in a purely external fashion. We do not really know what it feels like to be a man much better than ourselves. (*Preface*, 100-101)

Then, as to his own *The Screwtape Letters*, too, he finds the lack of angelic advice as unavoidable:

But who could supply the deficiency? Even if a man--and he would have to be a far better man than I--could scale the spiritual heights required, what "answerable style" could he use? For the style would really be part of the content. Mere advice would be no good; every sentence would have to smell of Heaven. ("Toast," 9-10)

As the morality play is a sort of allegory, so *The Screwtape Letters* holds some characteristics of that style. Allegory is an attempt at expressing universal truth behind some typical case or instance of human story, and so is this work. *Screwtape* reveals what is universal not only of human nature but of the good and evil behind the particular case of Wormwood's patient. The effect is in a sense the same as that of St. Paul's Epistles. Likewise as St. Paul's letters address us

today beyond their historical recipients and tell us universal truth and Reality of God, Screwtape's letters show us the truth and Reality though here the truth and Reality is often presented in a crooked, reversed way by the devil, who would present truth as falsehood and falsehood as truth. Though Lewis says Screwtape's evil advice should have been balanced by angelic advice, lack of the guardian angel produces several positive effects.

For one thing, when the good angel is missing, the reader is forced to think by himself what counter arguments are to be made against the devil and to participate in the work more actively than when the good advice were already presented in an angel's voice. In that process, the reader cannot be merely passive but reflect on what is good and what is evil, and on whether or how far the devil's remarks are true. He would also be forced to reflect on himself. Thus, the reader of *The Screwtape Letters*, by lack of angelic advice, should play the part both of a good angel and a patient, rather than only of a patient as the audience of a traditional morality play would.

Secondly, a devil's letters will necessarily show what the devil sees and what he does not, betraying what it is like to be a devil. Sometimes Screwtape tells Wormwood about devils' characteristic weaknesses, which he has to hide from man. Yet from Lewis's viewpoint, it is these weak points of theirs that every man must know.

The third advantage that Lewis has got by using epistolary form is that it makes it easy for him to express the relation between devils, for the letters are direct words from one devil to another. For example, we see they take for granted falsehood and one's devouring of others. Screwtape's words as follows show that love in hell is literally "devouring" love.

Rest assured, my love for you and your love for me are as like as two peas.[...]The difference is that I am the stronger.[...] Love you? Why yes. As dainty a morsel as ever I grew fat on. (156)

For him, “a human is primarily food” (45).

Then, the fourth advantage of its epistolary style is that it enables Lewis to express without hortatory didacticism what otherwise tends to be boringly didactic.

Thus, without angelic advice, *The Screwtape Letters* has many successful points that medieval morality plays do not. And now we shall see what the content of these epistles. Especially, we are to be concerned about Lewis’s idea of evil and human nature expressed in them.

<Weakness of Evil>

In all the books by Lewis, what strikes us about the nature of evil is perversion and ultimate powerlessness before God. This is also true in *The Screwtape Letters*. Clyde S. Kilby remarks, “In the preface to the new edition Lewis adds a note on the source of his names, saying that Screwtape probably arose from such phonetic associations as Scrooge, screw, thumbscrew, tapeworm, and red tape.”¹ Since Lewis says “probably,” these are not necessarily the exact sources of the devil’s name, but it can at least be said that when Lewis wrote that preface, these were associated in his mind with the name “Screwtape”, so that the devil should be as self-centred and mean as the stingy Scrooge, and a cruel, exacting, worm-like, vainly red-tape thing. Robert Houston Smith says, “‘Always,’ [Lewis] wrote in one of his poems, ‘evil was an ape.’ Lewis and the church fathers who used the analogy of the Devil as an ape owed much to Plato, who thought not only of lower levels of reality as imitating higher ones, but also of wrong institutions as perversely mirroring right ones. Just as images are reversed in mirrors, so false structures reversed the proper values, often on a one-to-one basis. This reversal is thus a form of imitation and at the same time a

¹ Clyde S. Kilby, *The Christian World of C. S. Lewis* (Eerdmans, 1964), p. 38.

total distortion of reality.”² Indeed, what Screwtape rejoices in is what the good ones find unfavourable or wrong, and therefore the devil’s value standard is reverse to the right one. Yet more exactly, Lewis’s evil is, as St. Augustine teaches us, perversion of good. Screwtape says “Everything has to be twisted before it’s any use to us”(112) . He knows that every existence and other good things (i.e. “good” from Lewis’s point of view) such as pleasures are all God’s creation, and admits thus:

Our research department has not yet discovered [...] how to produce any virtue. This is a serious handicap. To be greatly and effectively wicked a man needs some virtue. What would Attila have been without his courage, or Shylock without self-denial as regards the flesh? (146)

Since evil needs some virtue or good things to twist in order to do any evil, it is actually dependent on God, who alone can produce that virtue. When Screwtape thus admits that the evil cannot produce even evil but can only twist good things into evil, while the Good, i.e. God, can produce good, Screwtape is admitting the evil’s inferiority to the Good. It is also noteworthy that Screwtape also admits virtue as virtue which God has made as good. In judging virtue and vice with the standard of heaven, Screwtape is unconsciously adopting God’s law of good and evil or of the right and wrong.

We remember that Lewis denies Dualism of Good and Evil on the ground that, first, we call something good and something evil by the standard of good, approving good as right and disparaging evil as wrong; and secondly, evil is nothing but perversion of good, that is, it only comes out of pursuing some sort of good by wrong means. Therefore, Screwtape is admitting his defeat by both of Lewis’s two grounds for denial of Dualism.

Besides, evil is not only incapable of creating any virtue but also blind to it.

² Lewis, “Sweet Desire,” *Poems*, p. 115; Smith, *Patches of Godlight*, pp. 212-213.

It is significant that while Screwtape has a remarkable insight into human nature in respect of its frailty, once it comes to any real virtue or good, he fails to understand it at all. Screwtape's words about human weakness can be taken as what Lewis means to be true, but about God or about virtue, Screwtape's words are far from the truth and often its reverse. For instance, devils do not understand disinterested love. They suspect some hidden motives behind God's creation instead of believing it to be an act of love. Since the first principle of hell is self-interestedness, they cannot help thinking disinterestedness of God's love and charity as mere propaganda.

[...]that the Enemy really loves the humans. That, of course, is an impossibility. He is one being, they are distinct from Him. Their good cannot be His. All His talk about Love must be a disguise for something else--He must have some real motive for creating them and taking so much trouble about them.[...]We know that He cannot really love: nobody can: it doesn't make sense. If we could only find out what He is really up to!
(96-98)

Screwtape does not understand a Christian family at all, either, because they act on genuine charity which he axiomatically denies as "an impossibility." Screwtape says thus:

We are certain [...] that each member of the family must in some way be making capital out of the others--but we can't find out how. They guard as jealously as the Enemy Himself. (113)

The central principle in Heaven is so far from that of hell that it is simply unthinkable to the devils. Moreover, the evil is incapable of understanding even evil itself. As Richard Purtill points out, in Lewis's works "the evil characters essentially expect their opponents to be like themselves."³ Screwtape does not know that his own self-centred principles are applied only to the hellish mind but

³ Purtill, *Lord of the Elves and Eldils*, p. 80.

thinks them universal. As in the relation between Jekyll and Hyde,⁴ good understands evil well but not *vice versa*. Therefore, while he is trying to hide the good and the true morality from man, he does not himself know either good or evil, and in fact, ironically for the devil, trying to hide what he himself does not know. It is a miserable attempt. Lewis's devil has nothing heroic. Commenting on Milton's *Paradise Lost*, Lewis says, "What we see in Satan is the horrible co-existence of a subtle and incessant intellectual activity with an incapacity to understand anything" (*Preface*, 99). This comment is perfectly true also of his own Screwtape. And here, we see Lewis's warning that if we fall into evil, we, too, will be incapable of seeing God's reality, which is to be shown again in his later works such as *The Chronicles of Narnia* and *Till We Have Faces*.

A corollary of the fact that evil does not understand good nor evil is that those who come to understand them are no longer evil however evil they might have been so far. Just as Plato nearly identifies "knowing good" and "being good,"⁵ In many of his stories Lewis illustrates the idea that "knowing good" necessarily leads to "being good". All his evil characters regard themselves as good and righteous through self-deception or self-justification. When one realizes one's own sin, one will repent and get atonement. This should be another reason why Screwtape tries to hide both the good and evil from man.

Besides, because no one tries to hide what does not exist (for if it is not there at all, it would not need to be hidden), Screwtape's attempt to hide the real absolute good and evil turns out, to the reader's eye, to be testimony of its existence. Thus while trying to hide the world of reality from the patient, Screwtape is in a way insisting on its existence to the readers. Lewis says that an evil person will, in doing evil, be "used by God, without his own knowledge or

⁴ Robert Louis Stevenson, "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde," *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde and Other Stories*, ed. Jenn Calder (Penguin, 1980), *passim*.

⁵ Plato, *Plato V: The Republic I*, Loeb Classical Library, with English tr. by Paul Shorey (Harvard Univ. Press, 1930; rev. 1937; rpt. 1982), pp. 92-93.

consent, to produce the complex good” so that he should serve God “as a tool” (*Pain*, 99), for anyone will certainly carry out God’s purpose, however he may act. It is true of Screwtape. All his manuals to lead the patient into hell turn out to be manuals to lead the reader to God and heaven. Likewise as Goethe’s Mephistopheles, Screwtape will be “Ein Teil von jener Kraft, Die stets das Böse will und stets das Gute schafft.”⁶

<Man’s Weakness>

What Screwtape directly teaches Wormwood is a devil’s strategy to turn a man towards hell. In his advice, he shows keen insight into human weakness which could be available in temptation. In this book, Lewis reveals the ambivalence of human nature which has the potentiality of participating in God’s Reality in heaven while also having the possibility of falling into hell. On one hand, as we have seen in Part I of our thesis, he holds reason, imagination and morality as three important faculties that enable man to perceive Reality. Imagination is an intuitive power into metaphysical meanings behind the factual world. It recognizes reflections of heaven, makes man yearn for heaven so as to lead him there and to God. Reason logically shows the truth of Christianity and existence of God, while itself participating in God’s absolute Reason. Morality shows us the objective law of good and evil, or of right and wrong. Yet on the other hand, Lewis is also conscious that these faculties in man are not perfect. Screwtape tries to keep man’s reason, imagination and morality from working properly. Through his strategies, then, we shall see what weaknesses and fallibilities Lewis sees in these faculties of man.

Among those human faults some are universal and some are particularly

⁶ Johann Wolfgang Goethe, *Faust, I* (Reclam, 1986), p. 39. ll. 1335-1336. [“A part of that power, which always wills the evil and always produces the good.”]

modern. As Kazuo Takeno points out, *The Screwtape Letters* is twofold satire.⁷ Through the letters by Screwtape, a devil working in the twentieth century, Lewis is, at the same time, making satire on the modern ways of thought, customs and manners and mocking what he finds to be the devils' essential foolishness and incapability of seeing truth and reality.

As to the matter of reason or the way we think, contemporary relativism is ironically criticized through Screwtape's voice. Lewis believes in Absolute objective standards in philosophy, ethics, and human thought in general, regarding them as having their root in the world of objective Reality. On the other hand, he sees such objective standards are being lost nowadays and has great misgivings about it. Screwtape in his first letter writes of the young man whom Wormwood is in charge of:

He doesn't think of doctrines as primarily "true" or "false", but as "academic" or "practical", "outworn", or "conventional" or "ruthless" (11)

As long as a man weighs the value of thoughts and ways of life with such relative standards as contemporariness, novelty, and conventions, he is neglecting essential concerns such as Truth, Reality, or Good. These are objectivity derived directly from God, and beyond any relative value. When he seriously begins to pursue Reality and Truth, believing that things have their objective reality, he will sooner or later encounter God, who is the ultimate Reality. Screwtape therefore tells Wormwood, "Keep his [the patient's] mind off the plain antithesis between True and False"(52).

Screwtape advises Wormwood to avoid philosophical argument altogether because argument awakes man's reason to attend to "universal issues." (12) Lewis

⁷Kazuo Takeno (竹野一雄), "A Study of *The Screwtape Letters*," (『*The Screwtape Letters* 研究』) *Joshi Seigakuin Tanki Daigaku Kiyo* (『女子聖学院短期大学紀要』), 17 (1985), pp.47-48.

says in *Miracles*, that our reason is “God kindled” (*Miracles*, 33). Human mind, or reason, “has its tap-root in an eternal, self-existent, rational Being, whom we call God. Each is an offshoot, or spearhead, or incursion of that Supernatural reality into Nature” (*Miracles*, 34). Therefore, Screwtape the devil tells his nephew that argument merely “moves the whole struggle onto the Enemy’s own ground” (12). Though a man may be dissuaded from Christianity by logical argument, it is more likely that rational thinking leads him to Christian belief. And in this respect, relative thinking is not in fact either logical or philosophical because it is not concerned with any ultimate reality which is the proper concern of true logic and philosophy.

Since human reason is not God’s but only “God-kindled,” it sometimes sleeps or fails to function well. Lewis says that human reason is “the natural organ of truth”(“Bluspels and Flalansferes,” *Selected Essays*, 265) and as long as it is “natural” and human, it might be kept, by relative thinking, from pursuit of Reality. Relativism, which denies objective standards and therefore necessarily fails to pursue objective values and truth, keeps human reason from pursuit of Reality. If a man says, for example, materialism is worth holding because it is strong, or because it will be the philosophy of the future, and not because it is true, it is in reality “practical propaganda” (12) and not argument at all.

Another thing that Screwtape encourages, and therefore Lewis warns against, is what Screwtape calls “the Historical Point of View” in reading old books. It demands the reader’s attention to be focused on such matters as influences on the author, or on its textual consistency rather than the truth of what he says. It reduces ancient writers to be no more than subjects of historical study who are to be judged by the present standards. It takes them as simply wrong or primitive if their views are different from modern ones, instead of taking them as sources of living knowledge or thoughts that can still now enlighten and modify people’s life. However, in fact, there are cases in which generally accepted

views of the present age are wrong and those of former ages are right, since human reason is so limited that it is impossible for the reason of one generation alone to grasp the whole reality. Each generation has its own characteristic errors. Reading old books as living texts is a way of correcting such contemporary mistakes, but “the Historical Point of View” would cut that way.

Screwtape says as a tempter,

[W]here learning makes a free commerce between the ages there is always the danger that characteristic errors of one may be corrected by the characteristic truths of another. But thanks to our Father [i.e. the Father Below, or Satan] and the Historical Point of View, great scholars are now as little nourished by the past as the most ignorant mechanic who holds that “history is bunk.” (140)⁸

T. S. Eliot, who claims himself to be a classicist, in “What is a Classic?” finds in the literature of former ages a power of correcting contemporary “provincialism of time.”⁹ He maintains that “the perfect classic must be one in which the whole genius of a people will be latent, if not all revealed; and that it can only appear in a language such that its whole genius can be present at once.”¹⁰ Therefore, a classic has such comprehensiveness¹¹ and universality¹² as modify and correct each generation’s provincialism. With this idea, Eliot tries to evaluate the modern age objectively in the whole perspective of tradition. Lewis also finds it greatly illuminating and even necessary to know both ancient thoughts and contemporary ones, though different from Eliot, he seems to hold it impossible for a single generation to grasp the whole tradition, for he says,

Perhaps every new learning makes room for itself by creating a new

⁸ The “danger” here is a danger from Screwtape’s viewpoint.

⁹ T. S. Eliot, “What is a Classic,” *On Poetry and Poets* (Faber, 1957), p. 69.

¹⁰ Eliot, p. 67.

¹¹ Eliot, p. 67.

¹² Eliot, p. 67.

ignorance [...] Man's power of attention seems to be limited. (*English Literature*, 31)

In his inaugural lecture at Cambridge, he says,

In the individual life, as the psychologists have taught us, it is not the remembered but the forgotten past that enslaves us. I think the same is true of society. To study the past does indeed liberate us from the present, from the idols of our own market place. But I think it liberates us from the past, too. I think no class of men are less enslaved to the past than historians. The unhistorical are usually, without knowing it, enslaved to a fairly recent past. ("*De Descriptione Temporum*," *Selected Essays*, 12)

What is important is to read the text of the past as a living nourishing thing. In the twentieth century, many people accept scientific texts on the universe as true and neglect mythological ones as simply fantastic. Even theology sometimes sees the old mythological world picture as obsolete, and proposes to demythologize Scriptures. Against such a tendency, Lewis proposes true impartial historical points of view, instead of simply modern point of view which Screwtape ironically calls "Historical." As a scholar and loving reader of medieval and Renaissance literature, Lewis calls himself an Old Western Man, and seems temperamentally to be so. (*Selected Essays*, 14) Yet, as Dabney Adams Hart points out,

Sometimes Lewis seemed to be guilty of chronological snobbery in reverse, that is, of assuming that the past was superior to the present. His designation of himself as "Old Western Man" can be thus interpreted, his role seen as exemplar--but [...] Lewis's frequent disparagement of the present "period" was a deliberate corrective to some moderns' patronizing attitudes toward earlier periods.¹³

In the above mentioned lecture at Cambridge University Lewis warns against

¹³ Dabney Adams Hart, *Through the Open Door* (The Univ. of Alabama Press,

what he thinks to be the dominant contemporary tendency of taking it for granted that the newer things are always better. In this as well as in the criticism of “the Historical Point of View,” Lewis insists we should judge the things and opinions with the objective standard of the true or false, using our reason properly, and not with relative standards. The pursuit of newness or novelty as such is wrong. Screwtape says,

The humans live in time, and [...] they must experience change. And since they need change, the Enemy [i.e. God] (being a hedonist at heart) has made change pleasurable to them.[...] He has balanced the love of change in them by a love of permanence. He has contrived to gratify both tastes together [...] by that union of change and permanence which we call Rhythm. He gives them the seasons, each season different yet every year the same, so that spring is always felt as a novelty yet always as the recurrence of an immemorial theme.[...] Now just as we pick out and exaggerate the pleasure of eating to produce gluttony, so we pick out this natural pleasantness of change and twist it into a demand for absolute novelty. This demand is entirely our workmanship. (126-127)

* * *

Lewis follows St. Augustine in holding that the evil is privation or perversion of good.¹⁴ This idea is clearly demonstrated in *The Screwtape Letters*. Too eager a demand for novelty is an inordinate exaggeration or perversion of natural pleasure of change. Lewis sees sensual pleasures as foretaste of heaven. They reveal a part of its Reality. And he thinks it is imagination as an intuitive power of reality that receives such revelation. However, in man, imagination, as is the case with reason, has limitation. It is sometimes perverted or spoiled. Especially, when reason is asleep, imagination is liable to be affected by feelings, emotions, and mood of the person, which are changeable and easily affected by physical conditions. In such a case, it ceases to be a true intuitive power and may even affect man’s rational belief adversely so as to draw him back from

1984), p.122.

¹⁴ Cf. St. Augustine, *City of God*, pp. 480 & 569: Lewis, “Evil and God,” *Dock*,

Reality. For instance, the natural pleasure of change, when turned into a demand for novelty for the novelty's sake, may be aggravated into what Lewis calls through Screwtape's mouth, "the horror of Same Old Thing"(128). People's tendency to be moved by new vogues or current fashions, for example, comes from this "horror of Same Old Thing." Lewis interprets "the general Evolutionary or Historical character of modern European thought," that is the general tendency of Evolutionism, to be a philosophical justification of this horror, and expresses his critical attitudes through Screwtape's statement as a tempter:

Now if we can keep man asking "Is it in accordance with the general movement of our time? Is it progressive or reactionary? Is this the way that History is going?" they will neglect the relevant questions. And the questions they do ask are, of course, unanswerable; for they do not know the future [...] Once they knew that some changes were for the better, and others for the worse, and others again indifferent. We have largely removed this knowledge. For the descriptive adjective "unchanged" we have substituted the emotional adjective "stagnant". (129-130)

Thus Lewis warns us against the confusion between "Evolution" and "progress for the better," reminding us that evolutions and changes are not necessarily for the better. His point is again that we should go back to the objective value standard of good and evil, knowing that the newer is not always the better.

Lewis calls the popular version of Evolutionism as "a Great Myth" ("The Funeral of a Great Myth," *Christian Reflections*, 82).¹⁵ and points out that for the real scientist, "Evolution" is a theory about changes and not belief in progress, as he quotes J. B. S. Haldane, "We are [...] inclined to regard progress as the rule in evolution. Actually it is the exception, and for every case of it there are ten of

p.23.

¹⁵ Here "The Great Myth" refers to Evolutionism and not to a story which truly reveals metaphysical reality or meanings.

degeneration.”¹⁶ In *The Screwtape Letters*, Lewis presents the belief in general progress as the devil’s work who has concealed the real nature of evolution. Here, so-called Evolutionism is presented as a serious sin that keeps man away from God. In fact, in this work, Lewis shows relative thinking combined with this Evolutionism as a characteristically modern vice which is as serious as pride, which has traditionally been regarded as the greatest sin in Christianity.

* * *

As the devil also knows, there are yet other cases in which human imagination goes wrong and misleads man away from Reality. For instance, Lewis points out that when a man rationally came to believe that Christianity is true, and that God and heaven are real, his mental habits will take longer to get accustomed to the new belief. At first it will be difficult for him to feel it true and real, for it is naturally difficult for a man to feel something beyond his sensual experience to be real. His mental habit is likely to make him think that the visible daily life is more real than God. Screwtape advises his nephew to take advantage of this human tendency:

Your business is to fix his attention on the stream [of immediate sense experiences]. Teach him to call it “real life” and don’t let him ask what he means by “real”. (12)

In *Miracles*, after presenting a rational argument for the existence of Christian God and truth of His miracles, Lewis says,

And yet...and yet...It is that *and yet* which I fear more than any positive argument against miracles [...] The moment rational thought ceases, imagination, mental habit, temperament, and the “spirit of the age” take charge of you again. New thoughts until they have themselves become habitual, will affect your consciousness as a whole only while you are actually thinking them. (*Miracles*, 170)

¹⁶ J. B. S. Haldane, “Darwinism Today,” *Possible Worlds*, p. 28; quoted in Lewis, “The Funeral of a Great Myth,” p. 85.

Lewis points out in *Mere Christianity* that it is not always easy for a new convert to keep his faith. There will be some moment when Christianity seems unlikely or inconvenient to him, for instance, when there is a bad news, or he is in trouble, or he wants to do something that Christianity forbids. In such a moment, Lewis says, “The battle is between faith and reason on one side and emotion and imagination on the other” (*Mere Christianity*, 120). Thus, although human imagination is in itself a reality perceiving faculty, it is liable to be misled by wrong emotions and give man wrong idea of the world and Reality. For example, in the case of the new convert, discrepancy between his preconceived image of what Christians would be like and the actual Christians he meets in church can be an obstacle. Where he was expecting especially spiritual people, he would find ordinary people who seem no different from others outside church. He may feel disappointed about the church people, and then about Christianity as a whole. Yet, in reality, if the church people do not look pious, it does not falsify Christianity at all. Such disappointment is in a way God’s ordeal to strengthen the new convert and make him obstinate in his belief. Screwtape knows this, and warns about the ambivalent effect of this first disappointment. He says to Wormwood,

The Enemy allows this disappointment to occur on the threshold of every human endeavour.[...] In every department of life it marks the transition from dreaming aspiration to laborious doing.[...] If once they get through this initial dryness successfully, they become much less dependent on emotion and therefore much harder to tempt. (17-18)¹⁷

Lewis finds faith to be “the art of holding on to things your reason has once accepted, in spite of your changing moods” (*Mere Christianity*, 121-122). So:

¹⁷ The “successfully” here is told from Lewis’s viewpoint

If we wish to be rational, not now and then, but constantly, we must pray for the gift of Faith, for the power to go on believing not in the teeth of reason but in the teeth of lust and terror and jealousy and boredom and indifference that which reason, authority, or experience, or all three, have once delivered to us for truth. (“Religion: Reality or Substitute?” *Christian Reflections*, 43)

Faith is not an art of belief against reason. On the contrary, we need faith to keep our rational belief. Screwtape points out thus:

Human’s are amphibians--half spirit and half animal.[...] As spirits they belong to the eternal world, but as animals they inhabit time. This means that while their spirit can be directed to an eternal object, their bodies, passions, and imaginations are in continual change, for to be in time means to change. (44)

Imagination which is connected with feeling and emotion is likely to draw man back to the mutable world. In order to avoid that, man has to know that feeling real is one thing and being real is another.

* * *

Likewise as reason and imagination, morality of man, which is capable of connecting man to reality, can also be perverted or kept from working well and lead man astray.

As to the moral law, all that the devil can do is to hide or pervert it. They cannot re-create it wholly anew as they like, for they are after all no more than perversion of good, while the moral law is an autonomous objective reality which cannot be changed by anything. Screwtape therefore says,

humans must not be allowed to notice that all great moralists are sent by the Enemy not to inform men but to remind them, to restate the primeval moral platitudes against our continual concealment of them. (118)

Yet, what Screwtape thus wants to keep man from noticing is, of course, a vital truth Lewis wants us to remember. All that the devils can do about the

good moral law is to conceal it, and this fact again reveals their powerlessness. They cannot even demolish the law, to say nothing of making an alternative.

When the patient is getting near to hell, the devil tries not to let him realize his fate until it is too late to repent. It is another concealment. The way to hell should be unnoticed:

Murder is no better than cards if cards can do the trick. Indeed the safest road to Hell is the gradual one--the gentle slope, soft underfoot, without sudden turnings, without milestones, without signposts. (65)

Hell does not want the patient to notice his own degradation because once he notices it, he may turn back toward God. Lewis finds that a man would go deeper into evil when he does not know he is committing a sin than when he is consciously or even determinedly doing evil. Evil is weak before Good. If it openly fights with God in the heart or mind of the patient, there is no possibility of its victory.

Now, in *Mere Christianity*, Lewis points out that morality is concerned with three things: first, with relation between man and man; secondly, with harmony inside each man; and thirdly with relation between man and God (cf. 67-70). A Christian is enjoined to have love, faith and hope. Among these three, faith is the particular virtue concerning man's relationship to God. Love is concerned with morality between man and man, and hope is a matter of harmony inside each man. These Christian virtues should also fail when morality fails.

In *The Screwtape Letters*, perversion of morality is shown to occur through self-deception, self-righteousness, and most of all through man's pride which is traditionally identified with man's original sin,¹⁸ and which Lewis is always reminding us of as the greatest sin. As Lewis sees ambivalence of human nature which has both potentialities of attaining reality in heaven and of falling

¹⁸ Cf. e.g., St. Augustine, *City of God*, p.477.

into hell, a man may waver between pride and humility: Satan's vice and Christ's virtue. In the relationship between man and God, humility, or humbleness on the part of man is indispensable. Lewis says, "In God you come up against something which is in every respect immeasurably superior to yourself. Unless you know God as that--and, therefore, know yourself as nothing in comparison--you do not know God at all" (*Mere Christianity*, 108).

When Lewis became a Christian, one of the greatest problems for him is apparent impossibility of sincere prayer. In a letter to one of his life-long friends, Arthur Greeves, he writes how he finds it difficult to make prayer without feeling proud of being humble enough to pray:

What worreys [sic] me much more is Pride [...] Sitting by, watching the rising thoughts to break their necks as they pop up, one learns to know the sort of thoughts that do come. And, will you believe it, one out of every three is a thought of self-admiration: when everything else fails, having had its neck broken, up comes the thought 'What an admirable fellow I am to have broken their necks!' I catch myself posturing before the mirror, so to speak, all day long.[...] Its [sic] like fighting the hydra (you remember, when you cut off one head another grew). There seems to be no end to it. (*Letters to Arthur*, 339)

When a man is conscious of his humbleness, he easily gets proud of his humbleness, and it is the end of the true humbleness. His humbleness will then be no more than disguised pride, even though he may still believe it to be sincere humility. Screwtape advises Wormwood:

Catch him at the moment when he is really poor in spirit and smuggle into his mind the gratifying reflection, "By jove! I'm being humble", and almost immediately pride--pride at his own humility--will appear. If he awakes to the danger and tries to smother this new form of pride, make him proud of his attempt--and so on, through as many stages as you please. (71)¹⁹

¹⁹ In this quotation, "danger" is danger from Lewis's viewpoint, showing how

Thus, once a man gets conscious of his humility, he may be driven into a vicious circle of getting the more humble, the more proud. Lewis's suggestion against such a vicious circle is to stop taking the dilemma between pride and humility too seriously. Screwtape tells Wormwood that when a man comes to see the dilemma with a "sense of humour and proportion, [...] he will merely laugh at you and go to bed" (71-72). This is especially an important remark. Naoyuki Yagyū even sees this as the main theme of *The Screwtape Letters*.²⁰ In the epitaph at the beginning of this book, Lewis quotes Luther and Thomas More:

"The best way to drive out the devil, if he will not yield to texts of Scripture, is to jeer and flout him, for he cannot bear scorn." *Luther*
"The devil ... the prowde spirite ... cannot endure to be mocked." *Thomas More* (7)

The sense of humour protects a man from being proud because it enables him to see himself in a detached manner and laugh at his own pride as absurdity. If he can so laugh at his pride, he is no longer proud but rather humble.

In some cases, pride appears with self-deception. Lewis shows how man can disguise his pride in humility, even to himself. Whenever one thinks he is consciously showing condescension to others, he is actually proud. For example, if an intellectual thinks of himself as above the others in his church and "thinks that he is showing great humility and condescension in going to church with these 'smug', commonplace neighbours at all" (18-19), he does not have any real humility at all. It is an example of self-deception into which man easily falls.

Moreover, while he inwardly believes he is intellectually superior to others in church, he may be also feeling to be spiritually superior, for example, to his intellectual circle outside church. In that case he is actually proud in two

difficult it is to keep diabolical viewpoint.

²⁰ Naoyuki Yagyū(柳生直行), *Theology of the Fairy Land* (『お伽の国の神学』(Shinkyō (新教出版社), 1984), p.43.

self-conceited ways, as Screwtape says,

Thus, while being permanently treacherous to at least two sets of people, he will feel, instead of shame, a continual undercurrent of self-satisfaction. (56)

In this case self-deception spoils the person's morality in respect not only of things within himself but also in respect of relation between he and other people.

Among the weaknesses of human nature that Lewis presents in this book, tendency to self-deception that comes from the original sin of pride is the most serious one. It is natural for a self-conceited, self-righteous, proud man to hesitate to stand before God and show Him his real self which he is hiding even to himself. Screwtape says that "real nakedness of the soul in prayer [...] the humans themselves do not desire it as much as they suppose" (28). This hesitation to stand before God will be a central problem in Lewis's last novel *Till We Have Faces*, which shows the depth of his concern about the difficulty man has in facing God honestly. Until self-conceit is overcome, man cannot be in the right relation to God, and therefore never attain Reality either.

Love, a matter of morality between man and man, is also shown to be corruptible. An example in this book is prayer. Lewis shows that self-deception can also occur in prayer for others. When one prays for another person's soul, or asks God for forgiveness of the person's sin, he will likely to count as sin any of the person's actions which is not itself wrong but happens to be inconvenient or unpleasant to himself. Then the devil "can keep rubbing the wounds of the day a little sorer even while he is on his knees" (21). It is difficult for a man to forgive others from the bottom of his heart while it is quite easy to feel self-righteous. Thinking himself to be asking God forgiveness of the other's sin, he is likely, in fact, to be judging and punishing the other inwardly. Such self-righteousness is hidden even to himself, for he would really think that the other person's action is a

sin.

In *The Screwtape Letters*, Lewis appears to be opposed to prayer for the others' souls altogether, though as for petitionary prayer, he elsewhere recommends it to us not only for ourselves but also for others.²¹

In prayer for the soul of others, besides the danger of disguised self-righteousness, there is danger that the prayer should be made for an imaginary person, because a man's ideas about another person's soul will be necessarily crude and erroneous. Screwtape tells Wormwood to have his patient pray for his mother's soul and, in that, to "make that imaginary person daily less and less like the real mother" (21). The devil wants the cleavage to be so wide that people "could be turned at a moment's notice from impassioned prayer for a wife's or son's 'soul' to beating or insulting the real wife or son without a qualm" (22). It is another case of a man's self-deception that he often mistakes unreality (in this case, for example, the imaginary wife, or son) for reality and self-contentedly acts on the illusion. In this self-deception, man can wrong others without guilty conscience. Because he consciously wishes the others' good at least on one hand, he does not notice that he is actually doing wrong to them on the other.

It is further shown that a man would sometimes hurt others without feeling guilty even when he knows he is hurting them. As long as he believes he is doing or saying the right things, he can think it is the party who is being hurt that is wrong. The devil Screwtape recommends Wormwood to take advantage of such self-righteous cruelty in man. In domestic life, for example, Screwtape points out that people hurt each other often by the tone and timing of remarks without using harsh, offensive words. Because those words would be innocent if taken literally, even when they are in such an unmistakably offensive tone as never to be taken literally, the one who has said them could feel it wrong for the other to get offended. Screwtape says,

²¹ Cf. Lewis, *Malcolm*, pp.37-39, 40, & 50.

You know the kind of thing: "I simply ask what time dinner will be and she flies into a temper." Once this habit is well established you have the delightful situation of a human saying things with the express purpose of offending and yet having a grievance when offense is taken. (23)

This is another self-righteous, self-conceited tendency of man which is available to the devil in order to pervert human morality.

Lewis finds that other sorts of vices such as gluttony may be combined with self-conceitedness and spoil the right relation between individuals. An example he shows in this book is what he calls "All-I-want" state of mind"(87). Screwtape writes of the patient's mother.

She is always turning from what has been offered to her to say[...] "Oh please, please ... *all* I want is a cup of tea, weak but not too weak, and the teeniest weeniest bit of really crisp toast". You see? Because what she wants is smaller and less costly than what has been set before her, she never recognises as gluttony her determination to get what she wants [...] At the very moment of indulging her appetite she believes that she is practicing temperance. (86-87)

A man generally does not want to appear selfish. As another example of perverted morality between individuals, Lewis points out a case in which seeming unselfishness together with self-righteousness produce an effect Screwtape likes. He calls it "the Generous Conflict Illusion" (133). Suppose one person wants to do something and other person consents to do it not because he wants to do it himself but just because he does not want to appear selfish, the first person will know it and will withdraw the proposal to show he is as unselfish as the other. In such a situation, nothing but bitterness will occur.

[J]ust because the contention is reversed and each side is fighting the other side's battle, all the bitterness which really flows from thwarted self-righteousness and obstinacy [...] Each side [...] manages to feel blameless and ill-used itself, with no more dishonesty than comes natural to a human.

(134)

As we see from his words: “with no more dishonesty than comes natural to a human,” Lewis sees such self-righteousness as an almost unavoidable natural tendency of man. All the same, however, he gives us warning through Screwtape.

It is because self-sacrifice and self-abandonment are principles of heaven that Screwtape tries to hinder true self-sacrifice and generosity. In *The Problem of Pain* Lewis points out that God Himself obeys that principle. “What is outside the system of self-giving is not earth, nor nature, nor ‘ordinary life’ but simply and solely Hell” (*Pain*, 140). Yet, the true self-abandonment in heaven is not at all painful but as pleasant and joyful as a dance.

The golden apple of selfhood, thrown among the false gods, became an apple of discord because they scrambled for it.[...]But when it flies to and fro among the players too swift for eye to follow, and the great master Himself leads the revelry, giving Himself eternally to His creatures in the generation, and back to Himself in the sacrifice, of the Word, then indeed the eternal dance “makes heaven drowsy with the harmony”.[...]As we draw nearer to its uncreated rhythm, pain and pleasure sink almost out of sight. There is joy in the dance, but it does not exist for the sake of joy.[...] It is Love Himself, and Good Himself, and therefore happy. (*Pain*,141)

In *The Four Loves*, Lewis illustrates how supposedly selfless love may be twisted into false by an example of a lady, who boasted herself “that she lived for her family” and spent all her life in taking care of them, doing everything she could, even things they did not want nor did they need. In reality, her devotion is only for her self-satisfaction (*Four Loves*, 48). Her needless devotion enables her to enjoy not only the sense of selflessness but also “the pleasures of resentment,” because her family do not appreciate it and she is able “to feel ill-used, therefore, to have a continual grievance” (*Four Loves*, 54). In *The Screwtape Letters*, too, what is originally selfless love between family members is

shown to be liable to turn into self-centred noxious love, boasting self-righteous false selflessness and enjoying the pleasures of resentment.

In morality between individuals, where love is the most important virtue, it is natural that Lewis emphasizes the importance of the actual Christian deed. Thus, Screwtape tries to prevent the patient from performing real acts of charity by sticking him to the self-examination of his own inner life and “spiritual” prayer for others:

Keep his mind on the inner life [...] Keep his mind off the most elementary duties by directing it to the most advanced and spiritual ones.[...] Make sure that [the prayers] are always very “spiritual”, that he is always concerned with the state of her soul and never with her rheumatism. (20-21)

Whether one actually behaves as a Christian is a matter of will and not one of feelings. Whatever virtue a man may have, it means nothing unless it is put into practice by will. Hence, Screwtape says,

It is only in so far as they reach the will and there embodied in habits that the virtues are really fatal to us [...] All sorts of virtues painted in the fantasy or approved by the intellect or even, in some measure, loved and admired, will not keep a man from our Father’s house. (37-38)

Fantasy virtues, that is, virtues which a person does not have at all but vainly imagines what it would be like if he had, have no meaning. (Here, what he calls “fantasy” has nothing to do with the intuitive faculty of “imagination”; for Lewis does not use the word “fantasy” as a synonym of “imagination”).²² Approvement of any sort of virtue by heart or mind, that is, in feelings or in intellect, is also different from realization of that virtue. Screwtape knows this well.

Conversely, if a man feels any weakness or flaw in himself, it does not

²² Cf. “a safe god [...] soon proclaims himself to any sound mind as a fantasy” (Lewis, *Malcolm*, p.76).

matter seriously if it does not influence his actual behaviour. If a man feels himself a coward, for example, and yet acts bravely in some crisis, he is in fact brave, not a coward. As Screwtape says, "the act of cowardice is all that matters" (150), it is no sin to feel fear. Only, we have to get over it and act courageously. Paradoxically, if a man feels himself cowardly, it can even do him good, for it may make him humble before God, and this humbleness is the opposite of pride and a virtue in itself.

The same as feeling real and being real are not the same, "feeling faithful" is different from "being faithful". The sincerity of faith does not depend on devotional feelings. What is important is to be faithful, loving, and courageous instead of merely feeling to be such. Screwtape tells Wormwood,

Keep them watching their own minds and trying to produce feelings there by the action of their own wills. When they meant to ask Him for charity, let them, instead, start trying to manufacture charitable feelings for themselves and not notice that this is what they are doing. When they meant to pray for courage, let them really be trying to feel brave. When they say they are praying for forgiveness, let them be trying to feel forgiven. (26)

Lewis always stresses the importance of expressing faith in the form of action. Faith without action is not in fact real faith because to have faith in God means "trying to do all that He says." When Wormwood's "patient", who has strayed from real faith for some time, makes repentance, Screwtape says,

As long as he does not convert it into action, it does not matter how much he thinks about this new repentance. (69)

It should be noted, however, that Lewis does not think that the feelings have no importance or meanings nor that they are not real at all. On the contrary, in the matter of morality, Lewis stresses the objective reality of ethical emotional reactions and moral feelings. As we have seen, Lewis is against the

contemporary moral theories which regard man's moral feelings as merely subjective and which tend to bring about general loss of confidence in the authenticity of the moral law. Later in *That Hideous Strength*, Lewis is to express at length his misgivings about such moral subjectivism and consequent corruption of morality. Yet here in *The Screwtape Letters*, he only suggests, through Screwtape's words, the mistake and inconsistency of those who would not recognize objective meanings in feelings:

The general rule which we have now pretty well established among them is that in all experiences which can make them happier or better only the physical facts are "real" while the spiritual elements are "subjective"; in all experiences which can discourage or corrupt them the spiritual elements are the main reality and to ignore them is to be an escapist. Thus in birth the blood and pain are "real", the rejoicing a mere subjective point of view, in death, the terror and ugliness reveal what death "really means".[...] Your patient, properly handled, will have no difficulty in regarding his emotion at the sight of human entrails as a revelation of Reality and his emotion at the sight of happy children or fair weather as mere sentiment. (155)

These words expresses Lewis's misgivings about the general loss of normal sensibility and moral reaction. There may be those who ignore their pleasures as nothing more than a state of mind, yet they could not help feeling their own pains or anguish as irresistible reality. For, though pleasures can be ignored, pains and anguish cannot be ignored so easily. But then, they see only half of reality. Lewis finds a lot of people today see the world in such a wrong way. To hide half of reality and present the rest as if it were the whole is a way the devil twists reality.

<"Screwtape Proposes a Toast," (1960)>

In "Screwtape Proposes a Toast," the sequel to *The Screwtape Letters*, Screwtape addresses young devils at the Tempters' Training College. In it he especially draws the audience's attention to those faults of modern democracy

which are favourable to the devils. In terms of content, then, this is Lewis's criticism of the modern democratic society.

Democracy is, as Lewis remarks, "properly the name of a political system, even a system of voting [...] And of course it is connected with the political ideal that men should be equally treated" ("Toast," 18). Yet, this ideal is now transformed into "a factual belief that all men are equal" ("Toast," 18). Lewis criticizes this because he finds this belief leads to approve jealousy against those who are superior. Since there is perversion in this change of an ideal into a false belief, it must have been convenient for him to use the form of the devil's speech, because perversion of the truth is, in Lewis, devil's work. Through Screwtape's remarks Lewis expresses his opinion thus.

[Y]ou can use the word Democracy to sanction in his thought the most degrading (and also the least enjoyable) of all human feelings. You can get him to practise, not only without shame but with a positive glow of self-approval, conduct which, if undefended by the magic word, would be universally derided. The feeling I mean is of course that which prompts a man to say I'm as good as you.[...] The claim to equality, outside the strictly political field, is made only by those who feel themselves to be in some way inferior.[...] Under the name of Envy it has been known to the humans for thousands of years. ("Toast," 18-19)²³

Screwtape remarks that modern men not only tend to disapprove someone else's superiority to or even mere difference from others as "undemocratic" but sometimes those who have good qualities suppress them since they are afraid of becoming "undemocratic" and want to be the same or as low as the others ("Toast," 20). Talented children in modern "democratic" education are not given enough opportunity to improve their quality. In such a society today, Screwtape sees "the vast, over-all movement towards the discrediting, and finally the elimination, of every kind of human excellence--moral, cultural, social, or

²³ The "least enjoyable" here means least enjoyable from Lewis's viewpoint.

intellectual” (“Toast,” 20-21). He says, “‘democracy’ in the dialobical [sic] sense (I’m as good as you, Being like Folks, Togetherness) is the finest instrument we could possibly have for extirpating political Democracies from the face of the earth” (“Toast,” 24). The society which is opposed to every sort of excellence will produce no excellent personage who will lead and improve it. Therefore, “the whole attitude of mind, which democracies naturally like and enjoy [...] will destroy democracy” (“Toast,” 25). Lewis criticizes this feeling of “I’m as good as you” especially because he finds this “as a state of mind [...] necessarily excluding humility, charity, contentment, and all the pleasures of gratitude or admiration, turns a human being away from almost every road which might finally lead him to Heaven” (“Toast,” 25-26).

If *The Screwtape Letters* shows us individual human beings’ weakness and obstacles to heaven, “Screwtape Proposes a Toast” expresses Lewis’s anxiety about the loss of individuality in modern society. That loss is serious. Screwtape says, “the real end is the destruction of individuals. For only individuals can be saved or damned” (“Toast,” 25).

* * *

In *The Screwtape Letters* and “Screwtape Proposes a Toast,” Lewis thus criticizes such modern tendencies as relativism, materialism, and false democracy. Yet these are not at all mere works of didacticism.

Wormwood’s patient after all goes through the devil’s fingers and is saved by God. Then Screwtape, condemning Wormwood, betrays that man is essentially made for heaven and that the blessings prepared for man cannot be understood by those in hell. The following words of Screwtape, which John R. Willis finds to be “Lewis at his finest,”²⁴ will be Lewis’s final message to us, expressing his own hope for heaven.

²⁴ John Randolph Willis, *Pleasures Forevermore* (Loyola Univ. Press, 1983), p.132.

Those who turn down the devil's temptation will enjoy such blessings in heaven as this:

He had no faintest conception till that very hour of how they would look, and even doubted their existence. But when he saw them he knew that he had always known them and realised what part each one of them had played at many an hour in his life when he had supposed himself alone, so that now he could say to them, one by one, not "Who are you?" but "So it was you all the time" [...] He saw not only Them; he saw Him.[...] What is blinding, suffocating fire to you, is now cool light to him, is clarity itself, and wears the form of a Man. You would like, if you could, to interpret the patient's prostration in the Presence, his self-abhorrence and utter knowledge of his sins [...] on the analogy of your own choking and paralyzing sensations when you encounter the deadly air that breathes from the heart of Heaven. But it's all nonsense. Pains he may still have to encounter, but they *embrace* those pains. They would not barter them for any earthly pleasure. All the delights of sense, or heart, or intellect, with which you could once have tempted him, even the delights of virtue itself, now seem to him in comparison but as the half nauseous attractions of a raddled harlot would seem to a man who hears that his true beloved whom he loved all his life and whom he had believed to be dead is alive and even now at his door. He is caught up into that world where pain and pleasure take on transfinite values and all our arithmetic is dismayed. (*Screwtape*, 158-160)

Chapter 4
Science-fiction Trilogy (1938-1946):
The Battle between Good and Evil

I Introduction

Out of the Silent Planet (1938), *Perelandra* (1944), and *That Hideous Strength* (1946) are a science-fiction series which is usually referred to as Lewis's S. F. trilogy or the Ransom trilogy after the name of its protagonist Elwin Ransom.

The central theme of this trilogy is mythopoeic struggle between metaphysical good and evil. The stories show such a strong theological and ethical concern that they may as well be classified as theological science fiction, or rather, even theology in the framework of science fiction.

Out of the Silent Planet and *Perelandra* are imaginative attempts at depicting paradisaical worlds that have never fallen. They show what it is like when evil is brought into completely innocent worlds. *That Hideous Strength*, on the other hand, is an eschatological story, taking place on the earth where evil has already taken root deeply.

As the trilogy moves from *Out of the Silent Planet* to *That Hideous Strength* the intrinsic nature of good and evil becomes more and more clear. At the same time the salvation theme, or the theme of each individual's attaining Reality also becomes more and more manifest.

II *Out of the Silent Planet* (1938)

The story of *Out of the Silent Planet* is as follows:

Elwin Ransom, a Cambridge Philologist, is kidnapped and brought to Mars by his old classmate Devine and Devine's companion Weston. On Mars, or "Malacandra" as it is called in this book, they are going to offer Ransom to Malacandrian inhabitants as a sacrifice. However, Ransom is not killed by Malacandrian people nor is he even harmed at all. On Malacandra, there are three rational species, or three kinds of "*hnau*" in their language. They are *hrossa* ("*hrossa*" being the plural form of "*hross*"), an otter-like species that is good at poetry and hunting; *sroni* (sg. *sorn*) with a tall man-like figure that have the widest knowledge, and *pfifltriggi* (sg. *pfifltrigg*) that are the best craftsmen of the three. Ransom finds that each of the three species, having its own merit, respects the other and all live together peacefully. He also learns that the Malacandrian people are obeying their Creator whom they call Maleldil, that there is a sort of angelic species called *eldila* (sg. *eldil*), and that the chief *eldil*, called Oyarsa, is acting as the genius angel of the planet.

While living among *hrossa*, Ransom realizes how advanced they are in religion and ethics, though at first they looked little different from unintellectual animals on the earth. He notices that their morality is even superior to that of human beings. Then, when talking with a *sorn*, he realizes how learned *sroni* are, and how ignorant he himself is compared to them. Thus, he realizes that it is wrong to think as many people on the earth that the Malacandrians are inferior to human races.

However, Weston and Devine never realize this, and shoot three *hrossa* with a rifle, thinking they are mere beasts. After the murder,

Devine and Weston are caught and judged by the Oyarsa and sent back to the earth. Ransom comes back with them of his own will.

<Evil in *Out of the Silent Planet* >

Lewis stresses that the essence of evil is “pride”. As a Christian he follows St. Augustine in believing that the original sin of our ancestors was the sin of wishing to be on their own and turning from God to themselves.¹ It was a proud attempt to try to set themselves in the centre of their life, instead of seeing God to be the centre. In the orthodox Christianity self-centredness is identified, or at least closely connected, with pride, which has been regarded as the most serious sin. Lewis, too, regards them as almost identical and treats self-centredness as the most conspicuous characteristic of evil. In *Out of the Silent Planet*, the self-centredness appears especially in man’s way of measuring everything according to human customs, common sense, or conveniences. Weston’s humanism is shown to be self-centred and treated as evil. Weston aims to invade Mars in order to open a new territory for man so as to make the human species survive eternally in the universe if the earth should be some day uninhabitable. In *Out of the Silent Planet* it is shown that though man is the sovereign of the creatures on the earth, in the universe as a whole he is not entitled to dominate other creatures on other planets. This denial of man’s unlimited right over the outer space comes probably from the medieval idea of man, with which Lewis is so familiar, that man is no more than one of the many species of creatures that is allocated its place between angels and animals in the hierarchical ladder of “the Great Chain of Being”² and not privileged with such supreme power as God’s. If there are other species on other planets, they may have the

¹ Cf. St. Augustine, *City of God*, pp. 471-473 & 552-554; St. Augustine, *On Free Will*, Japanese tr. by Imaizumi and Izawa, pp.67-69.

² Cf. Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Harvard Univ. Press, 1936 & 1964), p. 59.

same right to their planets as man does to the earth; and if man were to invade other planets, the act should be unlawful and wrong, even for the humanistic purposes. It is significant that Lewis thus sees the generally praised modern humanism as little more than ego-centrism of human beings. In 1963, thirty years after the publication of *Out of the Silent Planet*, Lewis saw the new tendency in science fiction to express the sinfulness of human kind, and approved:

most of the earlier [science-fiction] stories start from the opposite assumption that we, the human race, are in the right, and everything else is ogres. I may have done a little towards altering that, but the new point of view has come very much in. We've lost our confidence so to speak, [...] This is surely an enormous gain. ("Unreal Estates," *On Stories*, p. 147)

Though it is well known among Lewis critics that Lewis says he has "never started from a message or a moral [...] The story itself should force its moral upon you" ("Unreal Estates," 145), in *Out of the Silent Planet*, the ethical message is quite intentional, for he says in "A Reply to Professor Haldane,"

Out of the Silent Planet[...] is an attack, if not on scientists, yet on something which might be called 'scientism'--a certain outlook on the world which is casually connected with the popularisation of the sciences [...] the belief that the supreme moral end is the perpetuation of our own species, and that this is to be pursued even if, in the process of being fitted for survival, our species has to be stripped of all those things for which we value it--of pity, of happiness, and of freedom. ("A Reply to Professor Haldane," *On Stories*, 71-72)

In "Religion and Rocketry" Lewis says, "Man destroys or enslaves every species he can."

It is interesting to wonder how things would go if they met an unfallen race. At first, to be sure, they'd have a grand time jeering at, duping, and exploiting its innocence; but I doubt if our half-animal cunning would long be a match for godlike wisdom, selfless valour, and perfect unanimity. I therefore fear the practical, not the theoretical, problems which will arise if ever we meet rational creatures which are not human. Against them we

shall, if we can, commit all the crimes we have already committed against creatures certainly human but differing from us in features and pigmentation. ("Religion and Rocketry," *World's*, 89-90)

Thus, he finds an archetype of self-centred fallen human behaviours in the acts of the white toward the black and the red men in the past age of colonization and expresses anxiety about man's future attempt at colonizing the other planets. He even says, "I have wondered before now whether the vast astronomical distances may not be God's quarantine precautions" ("Religion and Rocketry," 91).

In this work, Lewis shows his opinion against such man-centred philosophies as "scientism", not by condemning them with critical words, but by presenting other ways of thinking so as to suggest by contrast that many of human standards or human ways of thinking are not necessarily right or absolute. The art he employs here is similar to that which Swift does in *Gulliver's Travels*.³ Swift sees the English ways of life and thought from outside and presents newer points of view by introducing imaginary species--such as dwarfs, giants, or a horse-like race--and by looking at English life through their eyes. Likewise, Lewis leaves the earth and introduces new innocent species to reflect on man's ways of life and thought so as to overcome what Chad Walsh calls our "planetary provinciality."⁴

First of all, Lewis reverses the common assumption that man is more advanced than the inhabitants of Mars. Malacandrian inhabitants have better morality, wider knowledge, deeper insights, and more ingenious skill in crafts than we humans. Furthermore, unlike man who is contaminated by original sin, they are not fallen, and, in the sense of being free from evil, can be called literally "good" and "better" than the terrestrial people. This innocence of the Malacandrian world is implied in the planet's name: as Roger L. Green and

³ Jonathan Swift, *Gulliver's Travels*, eds. Peter Pixon and John Chalker; introd. Michael Foot (Penguin, 1967; rpt. 1987).

Walter Hooper suggest, "Malacandra for Mars might derive from the Latin *malo*--'I would rather be'--'would to God that we were there', [...] in this case a straightforward desire in an unfallen world."⁵

In contrast to the earth under Satan's control, there is no evil on Malacandra. The nearest thing to evil on Malacandra is a large sea animal called "*hnakra*" which reminds us of a Leviathan. However, even that *hnakra*, with large black jaws that swallow *hrossa*, is not seen as evil. A *hross* says,

The *hnakra* is our enemy, but he is also our beloved. We feel in our hearts his joy as he looks down from the mountain of water in the north where he was born; we leap with him when he jumps the falls; and when winter comes, and the lake smokes higher than our heads, it is with his eyes that we see it and know that his roaming time is come. We hang images of him in our houses, and the sign of all the *hrossa* is a *hnakra*.(75)

Lewis has felt a keen longing for northern mythology since he was a boy. In Lewis, the north is associated with mythological world, and here also *hnakra* can be seen as a mythological figure. It has both awfulness and attractiveness like mythological gods. In reading myth we accept the two seemingly incompatible sides of holiness. *Hrossa* see and accept *hnakra* the same way. Or we may see it as an embodiment of the force of Nature which is sometimes threatening and sometimes pleasant. Chad Walsh suggests that "The *hnakra* [...] seems to supply an element of menace that makes every day significant because a shade less certain,"⁶ and this is probably one of the right interpretations. At any rate, Lewis holds that myths are beyond the grasp of reason, for they are a way to grasp holy reality directly through imagination without logical analysis or criticism. In *Till We Have Faces*, a pagan priest says, "Holy wisdom is not clear and thin like water, but thick and dark like blood. Why should the Accursed not

⁴ Chad Walsh, *The Literary Legacy of C. S. Lewis* (Harcourt, 1979), p. 107.

⁵ Green and Hooper, *C. S. Lewis*, p. 172.

⁶ Walsh, *Literary Legacy*, p. 93.

be both the best and the worst?"(50) and in *Out of the Silent Planet*, too, we do not have to interpret *hnakra* exclusively one way. At least it is clear that *hnakra* is not such an evil creature as to be the opposite of the good.

On Malacandra, where there is no evil, creatures naturally follow Maleldil. There, all the rational species are called "*hnau*". But as the story moves it becomes clear that it is only those voluntarily following Maleldil that can be rightly called "*hnau*". Those who disobey the Creator, such as Weston and Devine, are nothing more than "bent" *hnaus*. Here we see Lewis's opinion "that good should be original and evil a mere perversion,"⁷ as he follows St. Augustine's idea of evil as perversion of good. This idea is consistently shown throughout *Out of the Silent Planet*.

Since Malacandra is a paradise without any evil, its inhabitants do not have even a word referring to "evil" or "bad". The nearest equivalent they have for "bad" is "bent". This successfully shows that the "bent" relation with Maleldil is the essence of evil, for, as Hart points out, "The literal meaning of 'bent' makes its metaphorical sense much more precise and powerful than the vague term 'evil.'"⁸ The Oyarsa of Malacandra calls Satan, or the Fallen Angel, "the Bent One" (121) with capitalization as if it were his proper name (and because it is literally the "proper", or fit, name for him). Satan's rebel against God is the archetype of bent deeds, which makes him the personification of "bentness". The Malacandrian Oyarsa tells Ransom that Satan, or the Bent One, was expelled from heaven to be confined to Thulcandra (i.e. the earth) as its Oyarsa when he reveled against God. The Malacandrian Oyarsa tells Ransom further that the earth, whose guardian angel is Satan, is now cut out from the rest of heaven under Satan's influence. The Oyarsa says,

⁷ Lewis, "Evil and God," *God*, p. 23. Cf. St. Augustine, *The City of God*, p. 472.

⁸ Dabney Adams Hart, *Through the Open Door* (The Univ. Of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 34.

Ransom of Thulcandra. Creatures of your kind must drop out of heaven into a world; for us the worlds are places in heaven.[...] Thulcandra is the world we do not know. It alone is outside the heaven, and no message comes from it. (120)

The earth is a silent planet, as the title of this book shows. M. C. Sammons suggests that the idea of the earth as “the Silent Planet” has possibly come from a medieval diagram of the universe:

There are eight strings, eight musical modes, and eight celestial spheres. But earth makes nine--one too many--thus destroying the perfection of the scheme. In *Survival of the Pagan Gods*, a book Lewis refers to several times in *The Discarded Image*, we learn that in 1518 Gafurio, basing this theory on Cicero, corrected this little inconsistency by declaring that earth, being motionless, was therefore silent. So earth’s Muse (Thalia) does not take part in the Music of the Spheres.⁹

However, what is more important is, as the Malacandrian Oyarusa says, that the earth is now “the very stronghold of the Bent One” (142) and has cut itself off from heaven. Having lost communication with heaven, it is “silent” to God’s territory.

Lewis illustrates how alienated the earth is from the rest of the heaven by the bent man’s incapacity to communicate in Malacandrian language. Weston’s case is conspicuous. He and Devine do not see Oyarusa nor eldils (which is another symbolic fact to show how evils fail to recognize the heavenly things, and which will lead to an important theme in *Till We Have Faces*), and think the voice of Oyarusa comes from one of the *hrossa* by ventriloquism. Then, as he presumes that the Malacandrians are not intelligent enough to understand the complicated adult language of the human beings and treats them as if they were much more primitive levels of species than man, he shouts, “Every one who no do all we

⁹ Martha C. Sammons, *A Guide Through C. S. Lewis's Space Trilogy*

say--puuff! Bang!--kill him [...] You do all we say and we give you much pretty things.” And then, showing a cheep necklace of beads, he says, “Pretty, pretty! See! See!” and bobbing up and down from the knees and holding his head on one side, he repeats, “Diddle, diddle, diddle” (127-128) believing this buffoonery of his should be very impressive to the Malacandrians. Malacandrians, watching him, just laugh, but Weston does not understand their laughter and thinks they simply do not understand him. After that, when he has somehow realized that Malacandrians are intelligent enough to communicate, he still fails to make himself understood, even with Ransom’s help as his translator. His words betray their fundamental meaninglessness once put into the simple Malacandrian language. Thus, just as Swift’s Gulliver finds it hard to make the Houyhnhnms understand the corruption of judicial officers of England and has to translate the words “perjury and bribery” into “the art of proving by words multiplied for the purpose, that white is black, and black is white, according as they [i.e., those who perjure] are paid,”¹⁰ so Ransom finds it difficult to translate Weston’s seemingly heroic, humanitarian justification of the invasion of Malacandra into Malacandrian language. He has to paraphrase Weston’s “To you I may seem a vulgar robber, but I bear on my shoulders the destiny of the human race,” into “Among us, Oyarsa, there is a kind of *hnau* who will take other *hnau*’s food and—and things, when they are not looking. He says he is not an ordinary one of that kind. He says what he does now will make very different things happen to those of our people who are not yet born” (135) etc. Thus, for instance, here, he has to confess that on the earth there are such evil conduct as robberies, and reminds us readers that to “bear the destiny of the human race” is not necessarily a good thing but rather neutral, and can easily turn to evil, as Weston’s aim does. Then, when Weston says, Life is greater than any system of

(Cornerstone Books, 1980), p. 48.

¹⁰ Swift, *Gulliver’s Travels*, p.295.

morality,” Ransom finds it really hard to translate his words: “He says [...] that living creatures are stronger than the question whether an act is bent or good--no, that cannot be right—he says it is better to be alive and bent than to be dead—no--he says, he says--I cannot say what he says, Oyarsa, in your language” (136). Weston’s point is that human beings are more advanced in science and life style than the Malacandrians, and as such have right to supersede them because the higher people has the natural right to supersede the lower ones. Yet, when it is translated into the simple language, we see it is nothing other than the self-centered policy of aggression and, as Kazuo Takeno remarks, the logic of cruel murder behind the mask of scientism.¹¹ And as Verlyn Flieger points out, here is seen Lewis’s belief in the power of language as the conveyer of truth and his favourite motif that the evils betray their emptiness through the emptiness and meaninglessness of their words:

One is inclined to agree with Humphrey Carpenter that “the serious themes of *Out of the Silent Planet* come dangerously near to being lost in farce when Weston and Devine behave like a cartoon-strip caricature of the Englishman among the natives.”* [...] But it is precisely here that knowledge of Barfield’s theory makes all the difference. Weston’s inability with the language is not simply a satiric device, it is a part of Lewis’s theme.[...] As Ransom tries to mediate between modern and archaic modes of thought and speech, we experience with an immediacy which no amount of paraphrase could convey the dissociation and abstraction that separate man from his surroundings, dissociation typical not just of the language, but of the spiritually arid society it represents. Every windy phrase, every rhetorical abstraction, appears absurd and inflated when translated into primal, concrete poetic diction.¹²

In this *prima facie* farce scene, we see Lewis’s criticism of modern world,

¹¹ Takeno, *The World of C. S. Lewis*, p.208.

¹² Verlyn Flieger, “The Sound of Silence: Language and Experience in *Out of the Silent Planet*,” in Peter Schakel J. and Charles A. Huttar eds., *Word and Story in C. S. Lewis* (University of Missouri Press, 1991), pp.55-56. (*Carpenter, *Inklings*, 220)

including ourselves. As Flieger points out,

Ransom, as tongue-tied as the worried mother on the road back in England, cannot *bend* his language to Weston's ideas. And the fact that those ideas are not only familiar but acceptable to modern science, to modern philosophy, and to anyone who can read a newspaper or a textbook, that they are easily expressible in modern English, says much about how far Lewis feels we have come, and in what direction. (*Italics mine*)¹³

Because the earth is thus alienated from heaven, it is natural that the standards of value and the measure of good and evil on the earth have become different from those in heaven.

For example, Weston aims at colonization of Mars from his humanistic hope for the preservation of human species. However, it is unthinkable on Malacandra that anyone should hope for eternal continuity of his own race. The people of Malacandra readily accept it as Maleldil's way that "a world is not made to last for ever, much less a race"(100).

Weston thinks that Malacandrian people do not go out to gain a new planet in the universe because they do not have the necessary skills and knowledge. However, in reality, Malacandrian people are advanced enough in science to travel through space. They have not invaded other planets not because they could not, but because their morality is so advanced as to rightly control the advanced science. The Malacandrian Oyarsa says to Weston,

Many thousands of thousand years before this [...] the cold death was coming on my harandra. Then I was in deep trouble [...]for the things which the lord of your world, who was not yet bound, put into their minds. He would have made them as your people are now--wise enough to see the death of their kind approaching but not wise enough to endure it.[...] They were well able to have made sky-ships. By me Maleldil stopped them.

¹³ Flieger, p.56.

(139)

Weston laughs at the Malacandrian people as they are going to die with the planet Mars without making any effort to avoid such a fate. However, the Oyarsa of Malacandra tells him that it is first of all not wiser to try to survive so desperately:

The weakest of my people does not fear death. It is the Bent One, the lord of your world, who wastes your lives and befouls them with flying from what you know will overtake you in the end. If you were subjects of Maleldil you would have peace. (140)

For the people on the earth death is a punishment for their fall and therefore fearful. Yet, for those who believe in Maleldil, death is the way to His country. For them, it is a bliss. The fact that most people on the earth are afraid of death is an indication of how much we human beings have fallen away from the original paradisaical confidence in Maleldil.

Moreover, it is self-centred of man to think of the continuity of the human race as something of the greatest importance. This self-centredness of man in putting his own race in the central position in the universe, failing to see it as no more than one of the various races made by God, comes from pride, which is Satan's sin. Thus man's fear of death shows again that the earth is "the Silent Planet", alienated from the uncorrupted heaven.

In contrast to Mars, the earth is so under Satan's influence that even ordinary people tend to disobey Maleldil. Ransom, who is not especially bad by the terrestrial standard, is not an exception. When he has to go and see the Oyarsa, he chooses to go *hnakra* hunting before that. In that choice he is not conscious of his own disinclination to obey the order of the Oyarsa, or of Maleldil. He honestly believes that he is just thinking that "There is time for that after the hunt. We must kill the *hnakra* first" (80). However, it is all the same disobedience and a sin. In the Old Testament, King Saul of Israel, once blessed

by God, has to lose his throne for a seemingly unavoidable and therefore small transgression of making a burnt offering to God when the prophet Samuel, who should have come to do the offering, came late (I Samuel 13:13-14). It is the same with Ransom. From his small disobedience, too, comes a serious result: the murder of the *hrossa* by Weston and Devine could have been prevented if Ransom had obeyed the order, and Ransom is not only guilty for the disobedience to Maleldil and the Oyarsa but is also responsible for his friends' death. It is the death of innocent ones for the sin of Ransom. Ransom has to make atonement by suffering a long journey to see the Oyarsa and the dangerous return trip to the earth. In Lewis's fiction, every sin has to be made up through hardship before it is forgiven--though it is also important by the way that, in Lewis, the one who undergoes the hardship by way of atonement always gets help from God. Ransom is helped by a *sorn* in achieving his atonement.

When we think of pride and self-centredness as the greatest sin, we find that the most egoistically self-centred one in this book is Devine. He is wholly obsessed by self-interested greed for money. He does not care for others at all and offers Ransom to Malacandrian people when he thinks some sacrifice is needed in order to take gold from Mars. Seeing Devine, who wishes nothing but to live a luxurious life back on the earth, Oyarsa says thus:

this Thin One who sits on the ground he has broken, for he has left him nothing but greed. He is now only a talking animal and in my world he could do no more evil than an animal. If he were mine I would unmake his body for the *hnau* in it is already dead. (139)

In *The Problem of Pain*, Lewis illustrates his idea of people in hell as the "remains" of man, who has been "banished from humanity"(113). Devine is now only the "remains" of a human, not a human. He is thus the most hellish type in this story.

However, everything that is treated as unfavourable by Lewis in this book is

not such an overt evil as Devine's greed. As we have seen above in the case of Weston's humanism, some ideas which we usually take for granted or even regard as virtuous are seen critically. Ethics and value standards of the fallen earth and those of Malacandra cannot be the same though not essentially different.

Desire for power, which is everywhere on the earth is not to be seen on Malacandra, because there, everyone is contented to serve Maleldil through the Oyarsa. Different from them, man is always pursuing power and always interested in who is the ruler or the head of a town, a country, a planet, etc. Ransom asks which of the three races of the *hrossa*, the *sroni*, or the *pfifltriggi* is the ruling class. However, on Malacandra, all the *hnaus* are equal under Maleldil, and no one thinks of becoming a ruler. They live in harmony, respecting other races for their respective merit. Ransom at first guesses the *sroni* to be the ruling class because they are the most advanced in science and have the widest knowledge about the universe. He is then axiomatically considering that the most intelligent race must be superior to the other two. Yet, as Lewis believes the truth of myth and allegory as well as that of science, so Malacandrian people accordingly know that poetry and craftsmanship, the virtues of *hrossa* and *pfifltriggi*, are as important as scientific knowledge. Science and technology are an art of power that enables us to do and control a lot of things. And to see scientific knowledge more important than art and craftsmanship is a sign of man's fallenness connected with the desire for power.

Besides, it might also be seen that Ransom's keen interest in the ruling power is another indication that the earth is a fallen planet under Satan's control. For, as we have seen in *The Great Divorce*, Lewis says quoting Milton's Satan, "The choice of every lost soul can be expressed in the words 'Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven'" (*Divorce*, 69).

The following dialogue among some *sroni* about human wars, slavery etc. shows Lewis's criticism of man's attachment to power.

“It is because they have no Oyarsa,” said one of the pupils.

“It is because everyone of them wants to be a little Oyarsa himself,” said Augray.

“They cannot help it,” said the old *sorn*. “There must be rule, yet how can creatures rule themselves? Beasts must be ruled by *hnau* and *hnau* by *eldila* and *eldila* by *Maleldil*. These creatures have no *eldila*. They are like one trying to lift himself by his own hair [...]” (102)

Furthermore, the inhabitants of Malacandra are free not only from the desire for power but also from the desire for possession. For example, a *sorn* says when Ransom gives him a watch, “This gift ought to be given to a *pfifltriggi*. It rejoices my heart, but they would make more of it” (107). He sees the watch quite disinterestedly and considers what is the best way to treat it rather than whether he wants it or not. The contrast between this *sorn* and greedy Devine shows the difference between Malacandrians and men.

Malacandrian people know how to control their desires. Or rather, they have no excessive desires and therefore do not have to control themselves in order to follow *Maleldil*’s voice. For instance, though making children is as great a pleasure for *hrossa* as for men, they do not make too many children. A *hross* is surprised to hear that men are so eager to repeat the sexual pleasure that they sometimes make too many children to provide them with enough food. He says it is the same as wishing to eat all day long or to sleep after enough sleep. When Ransom asks him in retort, “But a dinner comes every day. This love, you say, comes only once while the *hross* lives?”(72) the *hross* answers,

But it takes his whole life. When he is young he has to look for his mate; and then he has to court her; then he begets young; then he rears them; then he remembers all this, and boils it inside him and makes it into poems and wisdom.[...] A pleasure is full grown only when it is remembered. You are speaking [...] as if the pleasure were one thing and the memory another. It is all one thing. (73)

Lewis is not ascetically against having pleasures. On the contrary, he positively appreciates pleasures, since he finds “*pleasures* are shafts of the glory” sent from God (*Malcolm*, 89). What he is against is *pervertedly excessive* attachment to pleasures. Pursuit of pleasures goes wrong when the repetition of pleasures apart from its source, i.e. God, becomes the primary objective, and on Malacandra, there is no such inordinate pursuit.

Besides, on Malacandra, that is within the Reality of heaven, pleasures also become real the way they do not on the earth. In *Letters to Malcolm*, Lewis talks of resurrection in heaven that it would be the senses rather than the body that are to resurrect:

At present we tend to think of the soul as somehow “inside” the body. But the glorified body of the resurrection as I conceive it--the sensuous life raised from its death--will be inside the soul. As God is not in space but space is in God.[...] in the sense-bodies of the redeemed the whole New Earth will arise.[...] Sown in subjectivity, it rises in objectivity. (*Malcolm*, 122-123)

The sensual pleasures we have on earth are subjective. They are felt only in ourselves, and their memory cannot be communicated to others without words, pictures or some other means. But none of these means are objective enough to express the inner pleasures exactly as they are felt inside us. However, as can be seen in the above quotation, Lewis believes that such pleasures on earth will be revived in heaven as objective realities. On Malacandra, the appreciation of a pleasure does not end with the moment of the pleasant experience. It is consummated for the first time when the pleasure is given concrete Reality in a remembered form, for example, in poetry, as if it were raised in heaven. Compared to this, the way we have pleasures on the earth is incomplete.

* * *

Thus, on Malacandra, neither the *hrossa* nor the *sroni* nor the *pfifltriggi* have too much attachment for such desires as power, possession or sexual

pleasures, all of which are often inordinately strong on the earth. Attachment to one's own desire is attachment to one's self, and the absence of attachment to desire means the absence of self-attachment. In *The Problem of Pain*, Lewis says,

What is outside the system of self-giving is not earth, nor nature, nor "ordinary life", but simply and solely Hell.[...] The golden apple of selfhood [...] To be found with it in your hands is a fault: to cling to it, death. (140-141)

Throughout *Out of the Silent Planet*, thus, it is implied that the earth is now out of the heavenly region, for general ideas on the earth are based on the principle of hell, though most people are not aware of it. At the same time, however, it is also implied that such dominance of the hellish principle will not last for ever. Though the earth is at present keeping silence to the rest of heaven, it will be opened in the near future. Malacandrian Oyarsa says to Ransom,

[Y]our world is not so fast shut as was thought in these parts of heaven.[...] The year we are now in [...] has long been prophesied as a year of stirrings and high changes and the siege of Thulcandra may be near its end. Great things are on foot. (142-143)

This "Great things" must be referring to the second coming of Christ or, within the framework of the Ransom science fiction trilogy, the eschatological victory of good over evil in *That Hideous Strength*.

III *Perelandra* (1944)

The second of Lewis's space trilogy is *Perelandra*. This is a story of "paradise protected" or "Paradise Lost prevented" based on the story of Satan's temptation of Eve. Especially, Milton's *Paradise Lost*, one of Lewis's favourite poetical works, must have been in his mind when he wrote *Perelandra*.

The outline of its story is as follows:

Elwin Ransom, who has been to Mars in *Out of the Silent Planet*, is now called from heaven and carried in a coffin to Venus, which is called *Perelandra* in this trilogy.

This *Perelandra* is still a young planet where islands float in the sea, changing their shapes according to the movement of waves. It is a paradisaical world. As in the garden of Eden, trees grow, and they bear such aromatic and sweet fruit as Ransom has never tasted before. On an island Ransom meets a woman who is green from the top to the toe, who is called Green Lady in this story. She is the first Queen of *Perelandra* and to be the first Mother as well. Unlike man who has long since fallen, she is still in a completely innocent state. While man has fallen through misuse of free will, she is not even conscious that she is following Maleldil of her free will. She is not aware that one could possibly disobey Maleldil at all. She is surprised to hear from Ransom that men on the earth live on fixed lands; because, though there is a fixed land also in *Perelandra*, Maleldil forbids her and King, her husband, to live on that land.

In the mean time, Weston arrives at *Perelandra* by spaceship. Now he has become a worshipper of the Life-force, believing in the Creative Evolution. He insists that the Life-force, the Spirit, God and also Evil are all one and the same thing under different names. He even tries to identify himself with the Evil, who he thinks is the same as God and Power.

However, when he calls out, "I am the Universe. I, Weston, am your God and your Devil. I call that Force into me completely..."(96), he suddenly falls down as if in a fit. When he wakes up again, he is possessed by the Devil and become Un-man who has completely lost Weston's humane part. He begins the temptation of Green Lady, trying to seduce her to settle herself on the fixed land against Maleldil's forbiddance. Then, Ransom realizes that the prevention of her fall is the task imposed on him by Maleldil. The temptation goes on ceaselessly days and nights, as Un-man does not need to sleep. Through long struggle, first by argument and then by physical combat, Ransom finally breaks Un-man's head and throws him into the infernal fire underground, while he himself is wounded in the ankle bitten by Un-man.

After that there is the coronation of the first King and Queen by the Oyarsas of Mars and Venus, followed by the naming of lands and animals by the new King. Having attended the coronation, Ransom is sent back to the earth in the coffin again.

The story was originally published as "Voyage to Venus," and reprinted as *Perelandra*, suggesting the significance of the planet's name. Martha Sammons points out, "*Per* means perfect in Latin. *Peril* suggests the 'almost Fall.' Lewis spells it 'Parelandra' in *OSP* [*Out of the Silent Planet*], suggesting 'paradise'."¹⁴ Hooper and Green suggest "Peri-landra", i.e. "fairlyland", as well as "Paradise" from "Parelandra" in the first edition of *Out of the Silent Planet*.¹⁵ Besides, I see that "Perelandra" also suggests "perennial land", as it finally avoids Un-man's temptation and will enjoy eternal bliss from Maleldil, free from that death or decay which is the punishment for sin.

Lewis says the story of *Perelandra* began with his "mental picture of the

¹⁴ Martha C. Sammons, *A Guide Through C. S. Lewis's Space Trilogy*, p. 170.

floating islands" ("Unreal Estates," *On Stories*, 144). On the other hand, Lewis's biography and his own letters show he wrote it just after *The Screwtape Letters* and *A Preface to 'Paradise Lost'*. Therefore, it is probably because he had been concentratedly considering the nature of temptations in studying Milton's Satan and in writing *The Screwtape Letters* that the image of floating islands developed into the present story of temptation.

<The Essential Character of Evil in *Perelandra* >

St. Augustine defines evil as *privatio boni*, deprivation of good, or perversion of it. He says, "it is not by nature but by a perversion that the rebellious creation differs from the good, which adheres to God,"¹⁶ and this is especially relevant to *Perelandra*.

Evil's perversity is conspicuous in the way Un-man tempts Green Lady. He first tries to persuade her by logical argument, and when he has failed in this, tries to move her through her imagination. (This is a reflection of Lewis's conviction that man consists of reason and imagination and is influenced by both elements.) And Un-man's temptation, either logical or imaginative, always consists of perversion of Reality.

Un-man's logic is perverted because he takes up truth and then infers false implication from that truth. For instance, he first pretends to accept Maleldil's forbiddance and then argues that although to live actually on the Fixed Island is prohibited, to make a story about it is not. He says,

The world is made up not only of what is but of what might be. Maleldil knows both and wants us to know both. (104)

The logic is not totally wrong, since its premiss (i.e., Maleldil's

¹⁵ Hooper and Green, p. 172.

¹⁶ St. Augustine, *City of God*, p. 472.

forbiddance) at least is true, but subtly crooked. He speaks as if Green Lady's disobedience is a possibility or "what might be," though in fact, it is nothing but what should never be. Therefore, his logic is a perversion half depending on a false proposition. Besides, it is wrong also because to think of disobedience in mind even without actually doing it is itself a sin: as Jesus teaches his disciples that a sin in one's heart is already a sin before committed in action (cf. Matthew 5.28). Furthermore, making such a story would be a misuse (that is again a perversion) of imagination which is given by God as a faculty to grasp Reality.

When Un-man thus suggests to her to make up a story of breaking Maleldil's forbiddance, Green Lady reveals her innate innocence and faith in Maleldil, telling Un-man,

But if I try to make the story about living on the Fixed Island I do not know how to make it about Maleldil. For if I make it that He has changed His command, that will not go. And if I make it that we are living there against His command, that is like making the sky all black and the water so that we cannot drink it and the air so that we cannot breathe it. But also, I do not see what is the pleasure of trying to make these things. (112)

Since she recognizes Maleldil as the source of the whole world as well as of her life, she cannot even imagine doing anything against Him. Disobedience is not at all "what might be" for her; it is merely an impossible unreality, and that, a most miserable one. Besides, here we see her belief in Maleldil's reasonableness and justice. She cannot imagine He would change the command capriciously. Such strong faith in Maleldil is what defends Green Lady against temptation, and it is this faith that Eve fails to keep either in Genesis or in Milton's *Paradise Lost*.

Un-man's perversion is seen also in his next assail. He tells Green Lady that to make up a story is a new good which she does not yet know. He says that if she refuses it, it should be like refusing the waves of new good which Maleldil sends to her. In thus talking of supposed disobedience as if it were something good, he is trying to take advantage of the fact that everything still looks good to

her innocent eyes. Presenting evil as a good, he is perverting the idea of both good and evil.

Furthermore, seeing Ransom hesitate to tell her about death, Un-man says that death is a new good and yet Ransom is rejecting it only because he is a sort of person who sticks to the old goods too much to accept new ones; that because Ransom is himself rejecting the new good “death”, he wants to keep it also from her. Un-man even calls Ransom “evil” for rejecting death. In this argument, Un-man presents death as a good though it is in fact a great evil, and then, on that false premise, condemns Ransom as evil. If death were really good, Ransom’s attitudes would be wrong, but Un-man’s logic is false altogether because the first premiss “death is good” is false.

As man’s original sin of disobedience was committed through misuse of free will, Un-man tries to make Green Lady use her free will wrong way. While talking with Ransom, she notices that she also has free will and that she can disobey Maleldil if she chooses. This means that the one who brings the consciousness of free will into Perelandra is not Satan or Un-man but Ransom. Though he is Maleldil’s agent on Perelandra, as a man who is from the human society infected by original sin, he is not able to avoid infecting the innocent Green Lady with the characteristic of fallen men, that is, with the tendency of regarding free will not as God’s gift but man’s own attribute. On the other hand, the fact that Ransom has made her aware of her own free will can also be interpreted as an indication that it is Maleldil’s will that she knows of her freedom to choose. When obedience to God is in question, free will is always ambivalent. It enables one to obey God freely, but on the other hand, it also makes it possible for one to fall away from Him. Of course, if the awareness of free will on the part of Green Lady is Maleldil’s will, Maleldil wants her free obedience. But instead of telling her so, Un-man tells her that Maleldil has made her aware of it as the first step to her independence from Him:

Maleldil is beginning to teach you to walk by yourself [...] You are becoming your own. That is what Maleldil wants you to do.[...]But could the taking away of your hand from His--the full growing up--the walking in your own way--could that ever be perfect unless you had, if only once, *seemed* to disobey Him? (115-116)

When Green Lady asks him “How could one seem to disobey?” Un-man answers,

By doing what He only *seemed* to forbid.[...] A real disobeying, a real branching out, this is what He secretly longs for: secretly, because to tell you would spoil all.[...] These other commands of His--to love, to sleep, to fill this world with your children--you see for yourself that they are good. And they are the same in all worlds. But the command against living on the Fixed Island is not so. You have already learned that He gave no such command to my world. And you cannot see where the goodness of it is.[...] It is mere command. It is forbidding for the mere sake of forbidding.[...]In order that you may break it.[...] Do you think He is not weary of seeing nothing but Himself in all that He has made?[...] To find the Other--the thing whose will is no longer His--that is Maleldil's desire. (116-117)

Because what Maleldil wants is a real obedience, Un-man's interpretation is again perverted.

These words of Un-man involve the theological problem of the difficulty of knowing God's will. In real life, it is impossible for human beings to prove any commandment to be in fact God's will, and it is natural for them to wonder whether or not a commandment is really God's will, especially when the commandment seems unreasonable. In that case, if one is to accept it as God's will, one should accept it through faith, just on the ground that it is told by the authority of God, or of Jesus.

Green Lady has the faith required here. When Ransom, opposing Un-man, says, “Where can you taste the joy of obeying unless He bids you do something for which His bidding is the only reason?” she instantly understands him, saying:

Oh, how well I see it! We cannot walk out of Maleldil's will: but He has given us a way to walk out of *our* will. And there could be no such way except a command like this. Out of our own will. It is like passing out through the world's roof into Deep Heaven. (118)

The two interpretations of Maleldil's forbiddance, i.e. Un-man's and Ransom's, are not real alternatives for Green Lady, whose understanding is not clouded through original sin, and who holds a true discrimination between falsity and the real truth. Her response to Ransom is as if she has just been reminded of the obvious truth by him.

Perverse nature of evil becomes clearer in the next temptation, where Un-man tries to build up another false logic by perverting a truth. Pretending to agree with Green Lady that she must give up her own will and obey Maleldil's will, he tells her that in order to give up her own will truly, it is necessary to give up her innermost will and desire, that is, the desire to follow Maleldil. His logic is like putting the cart before the horse. When the ultimate objective is to follow Maleldil, in order to abandon one's self will for achieving that objective, he says one should abandon even one's intrinsic will to obey Maleldil. Actually, it is only when one's self-centred will hinders one from following Maleldil that one should abandon one's own will.

Then, when Ransom tells her the story of the Fall of Adam and the disastrous corollary of disobedience to Maleldil, Un-man takes his story and continues it to tell her about the Incarnation, as a greatest good resulting from the disobedience.

The idea that Adam's fall has in the long run turned out to be good because it brought about God's Incarnation, Passion, Death, and Resurrection, opening a way for men to become sons of God is called the idea of *felix culpa*. A most well-known passage expressing this idea is in Milton's *Paradise Lost*, where Adam exclaims to see a prophetic vision of Christ's redemption and regained

Paradise on the earth:

O goodness infinite, goodness immense!
That all this good of evil shall produce,
And evil turn to good; more wonderful
Than that which by creation first brought forth
Light out of darkness! Full of doubt I stand,
Whether I should repent me now of sin
By me done and occasioned, or rejoice
Much more, that much more good thereof shall spring,
To God more glory, more good will to men,
From God, and over wrath grace shall abound. (XII, ll. 469-478)¹⁷

This is “Milton’s version of the idea expressed in the Mass for Holy Saturday: *O felix culpa talem ac tantum meruit habere redemptor*—‘O blessed sin (or crime) that was rewarded by so good and so great a redeemer!’”¹⁸ Arthur O. Lovejoy in “Milton and the Paradox of the Fortunate Fall” points out that this idea of *felix culpa* is not Milton’s invention but a recurrent Christian thought since as early as the fourth century or even before that time. He explains the idea thus:

It is a paradox which has at least the look of a formal antinomy. From the doctrinal premises accepted by Milton and implicit in the poem, the two conclusions between which Adam is represented as hesitating were equally inevitable; yet they were mutually repugnant. The Fall could never be sufficiently condemned and lamented; and likewise, when all its consequences were considered, it could never be sufficiently rejoiced over. [...] No devout believer could hold that it would have been better if the moving drama of man’s salvation had never taken place: and consequently, no such believer could consistently hold that the first act of that drama, the event from which all the rest of it sprang, was really to be regretted. Moreover, the final state of the redeemed, the consummation of human history, would far surpass in felicity and in moral excellence the pristine happiness and innocence of the first pair in Eden--that state in which, but

¹⁷ John Milton, *Paradise Lost*, ed. Scott Elledge (Norton, 1975), p.276.

¹⁸ Scott Elledge, “Background Notes on Certain Important Concepts and Topics in *Paradise Lost*,” in *Paradise Lost*, by John Milton, ed. Scott Elledge (Norton, 1975), p. 398.

for the Fall, man would presumably have remained.¹⁹

However, in *Perelandra*, Lewis opposes this idea of *felix culpa*. The idea can lead to approval of Adam's sin and involves possibility of seeing the Fall as a part of God's providence. Lewis's emphasis is on the point that evil is evil even when it results in whatever good.

For though the healing what was wounded and the straightening what was bent is a new dimension of glory, yet the straight was not made that it might be bent nor the whole that it might be wounded. (215)

Ransom says to Un-man, "Of course good came of it. Is Maleldil a beast that we can stop His path [...]? Whatever you do, He will make good of it. But not the good He had prepared for you if you had obeyed Him.[...] And there were some to whom no good came nor ever will come"(121). The some "to whom no good came nor ever will come" are those who are in hell, especially Satan. Ransom's question, "tell her all. What good came to you?" (121) is directly addressed to Satan in Un-man, and Un-man cannot answer him but only gives a long howl like a dog. This howling is Satan's confession of his defeat to God and of the misery he has been tasting ever since his fall. In Lewis's fiction, evil is always powerless when faced by the real good. Here is no exception.

In fact, the powerlessness of evil can be seen not only here but throughout *Perelandra*. First of all, Satan could not have taken Weston's body if Weston had not called him into himself. Then it is because Satan has no power to do any positive evil strong enough to destroy Green Lady's soul that the worst he could do is to cut her from God, the positive Good. The case is the same as that of Screwtape the devil who advises a younger devil to try to keep men away from God rather than try to positively put any evil thought in their minds, as we have

¹⁹ Arthur O. Lovejoy, "Milton and the Paradox of the Fortunate Fall," *ELH* (1937), pp. 162-163.

seen in our previous Chapter.²⁰ Of course, the devil tries to cut man off from God also because alienation from God is itself the worst state of life. And the fact that this most evil state of life would make men miserable again shows the negative powerlessness of evil: while the good has a positive power to make creatures happy, evil can never make anyone, even the evil ones themselves, happy.

* * *

Un-man's temptation through imagination reflects Lewis's conviction that although imagination is an intuitive power into truth and reality, it has also its frailty, susceptible to the devil's attack.

He stirs pride in Green Lady through her imagination. Telling Green Lady about women on the earth, that they have greater wisdom than men and that wisdom gives them almost divine beauty, he suggests to her that if she should dare to live on the Fixed Island, the knowledge from that new experience would greatly increase her beauty:

They always reach out their hands for the new and unexpected good, and see that it is good long before the men understand it. Their minds run ahead of what Maleldil has told them. They do not need to wait for Him to tell them what is good, but know it for themselves as He does. They are, as it were, little Maleldils. And because of their wisdom, their beauty is as much greater than yours [...] (106)

In *the Book of Common Prayer* (1662) of the Church of England, the well known "Prevent us, O Lord, in all our doings," is a prayer asking God's grace anticipating one's actions or need ("prevent" coming from Latin *prevenir*, i.e. "to come before, precede or anticipate,")²¹ So, if she should "run ahead" of Maleldil, instead of asking Him to "prevent" her, it should be a proud act of rejecting God's

²⁰ Cf. "It is funny how mortals always picture us as putting things into their minds: in reality our best work is done by keeping things out" (*Screwtape*, p. 25).

²¹ <http://www.worldwidewords.org/topicalwords/tw-pre1.htm>.

grace, wishing to be a “little Maleldil, and should be her fall. Though Un-man talks as if being a “little Maleldil” were a virtue, it is only a false pretense. Or, Un-man may really believe it to be a virtue. Yet if so, it is a mistake characteristically devilish, for it was Satan’s sin that he thought it good and tried to take the place of God and became a rebellious angel.

Un-man’s various stories of heroic women, who achieve great self-sacrificial deeds for the good of their family even without the family’s understanding, affect Green Lady. He nearly succeeds in building Green Lady’s self-image as a heroic great Queen who, in spite of the King’s opposition, carries out the great deed of getting independence of Maleldil so as to be “like Maleldil” herself. “[T]he first hint of a self-admiring inclination to seize a grand role in the drama of her world” (133) is a symptom of pride, the essence of the Fall.

Then, as Un-man gives her a feather coat, showing her her image in a mirror, we see him try to teach her vanity and thereby further stir her pride. Just as a picture of a woman with a mirror in her hand, expressing her “vanity”, has been traditionally an emblem of Pride,²² when Green Lady is looking into the mirror, Ransom clearly reads incipient pride in her face, which makes him decide to prevent further temptation by killing Un-man through physical combat.

Ransom’s act of crashing Un-man’s head and throwing him into the subterranean fire can be interpreted as an execution of the sentence of God on Satan that the seed of Eve “shall bruise your head, And you shall bruise His heel” (Genesis, 3,15, *NKJV*), and so is it that Ransom is bitten in his ankle. And thus, in *Perelandra*, it is shown that in the long run, Lewis’s evil is weaker than the good, both intellectually and physically.

<Misery of Evil>

²² Cf. for example, James Hall, *Dictionary of Subjects & Symbols in Art* (Harper & Row, 1974), “Pride”, p. 253.

Lewis portrays evil as intrinsically miserable. This is also true of Weston. His misery is revealed when Un-man recovers Weston-consciousness for a short time. For those bound to hell, life is continual degradation into darkness. Weston, who is now in hell, has come to see man's life that way.

Picture the universe as an infinite globe [...] We are born on the surface of it and all our lives we are sinking through it. When we've got all the way through then we are what's called Dead: we've got into the dark part inside, the real globe. If your God exists, He's not in the globe--He's outside, like a moon. (168)

In Weston's view all men are born on the surface of the earth and gradually sink down deep into the absolute darkness. This darkness is decisively alienated from God. Lewis in *The Great Divorce* expresses his idea that for those who choose hell, the world will turn out to have been from the beginning a part of hell (*Divorce*, 7). Weston has been in hell's darkness since the beginning when he identified God with the Devil and chose that Devil for God.

Weston cries out from hell, describing the world around him as, "Darkness, worms, heat, pressure, salt, suffocation, stink" (169). Hell is such a hideous and awful place even for those who have chosen the Devil's way, while being at the same time such darkness and void as almost nonexistent. Weston now feels that hellish darkness even more realistic than heaven. It is another example of the perversion of evil. He does not, or cannot, believe in God's salvation and finally drawn into hell by Satan, crying,

Oh, my God![...] Oh! Ransom, Ransom! We shall be killed. Killed and put back under the rind.[...] Don't let them get me again.[...] O, God, here comes the dark!(171)

His repentance and cry for heaven come too late. Weston is lost forever the same way as Marlow's Faustus who cries to God for salvation when it has

already become too late.²³ Lewis believes that “No soul that seriously and constantly desires joy will ever miss it” (*Divorce*, 72-73) and therefore that all who really wish heaven can enter it. On the other hand, however, he also admits that when a person goes too far into evil he would not be able to come back to the way to heaven, even when he has realized the hideousness of hell.

<Faith and Providence>

In *Perelandra*, as in other works, Lewis expresses his idea of the right faith in God. Lewis admits that the existence of evil can be an obstacle to faith.²⁴ In *Perelandra*, too, Ransom in his struggle with Un-man cannot help doubting the goodness and justice of Maleldil. He wonders why Maleldil does not come and help him in the battle against the evil.

Why did no miracle come? Or rather, why no miracle on the right side? For the presence of the Enemy was in itself a kind of Miracle.[...] He could not understand why Maleldil should remain absent when the Enemy was there in person.(140)

Ransom feels as if Maleldil is *Deus absconditus*, but in Lewis’s stories--in *The Chronicles of Narnia*, in *Till We Have Faces* and also in the Ransom trilogy --God is never *absconditus* even when He seems to be. Sincere prayers and questions are always answered:

as suddenly and sharply as if the solid darkness about him had spoken with articulate voice, he knew that Maleldil was not absent.[...] And then--he wondered how it had escaped him till now--he was forced to perceive that

²³ Christopher Marlowe, *Doctor Faustus*, ed. John D. Jump (Methuen, 1965; rpt. 1969), pp.146-147. Faustus at his last moment cries thus:

My God, my God! Look not so fierce on me!
 Adders and serpents, let me breathe awhile!
 Ugly hell, gape not! Come not, Lucifer;
 I’ll burn my books!—Ah, Mephostophilis! (Scene XIX, ll.187-190)

²⁴ Cf. Lewis, *Pain*, passim. etc.

his own coming to Perelandra was at least as much of a marvel as the Enemy's. That miracle on the right side, which he had demanded, had in fact occurred. He himself was the miracle. (140-141)

With this revelation about his role on Perelandra, he remembers the impression which he had on the voyage to Mars, that "the triple distinction of truth from myth and of both from fact was purely terrestrial--was part and parcel of that unhappy division between soul and body which resulted from the Fall" (143-144).

Since Perelandra is continuous with, or in fact a part of, heaven, the physical combat of Ransom against Un-man in its material dimension of that world is at the same time a metaphysical battle of Maleldil through Ransom against Satan. The victory of Ransom over Un-man means not only the prevention of Venus's fall at the crucial point of its history but also triumph of Good over Evil on the mythological level.

In *Perelandra*, Maleldil, or God, saves Venus through Ransom as His agent. On the earth, He got incarnated Himself for the redemption of mankind. At the same time, He has made men sons of God through the Son. Once men have become sons of God, then, God can use one of them on Venus, instead of sending the Son, his second person, again.

The name "Ransom" means "redemption". And this family name of Ransom suggests Maleldil's providence that Ransom has been selected and predestinated, since the time of his forefathers, to "ransom" Perelandra.

As Walsh points out, on Perelandra "he truly earns the name of Ransom, as he enacts the role of a kind of savior, a little Christ, in rescuing that virgin planet from the downfall that Tellus suffered."²⁵ Setsuko Nakao also sees "a Christ figure" in Ransom as the "Saviour for the Perelandra", while noting on the other

²⁵ Chad Walsh, "Reeducation of the Fearful Pilgrim," in Peter Schakel ed., *The Longing for a Form* (The Kent State Univ. Press, 1977), p. 71.

hand that “Ransom is not Christ personified, for their situations are radically different.[...] Ransom is Christian faith personified,”²⁶ and points out the similarity between Jesus Christ and Ransom: the vehement agony, exhaustion, the bleeding wound in the heel, etc. She also says that Ransom’s journey through the underworld in the struggle with Un-man reminds us of Christ’s death before the Sabbath.²⁷ Robert Smith also sees a “Christ-imagery” in Ransom.²⁸ Yet, neither Walsh, or Nakao, or Smith says Ransom is an allegory of Christ, and they are right on this point. For, we learn in Lewis’s *The Allegory of Love* that he thinks of allegory as an embodiment of something immaterial or less real than the allegorical figure²⁹ and Christ is definitely not less real than Ransom. It would be better to see Ransom’s victory as a case of fulfillment of the Old Testament prophesy of Satan’s defeat.

* * *

In Milton’s *Paradise Lost*, Eve is tempted by her own physical hunger as well as by Satan.

Meanwhile the hour of noon drew on, and waked
 An eager appetite, raised by the smell
 So savory of that fruit, which with desire,
 Inclined now grown to touch or taste,
 Solicited her longing eye[...] (IX, ll. 739-743)³⁰

However, Lewis has excluded such physical temptations as hunger and focused the problem on such spiritual matters as reason and pride. By this he stresses the point that obedience to God depends on man’s will.

Lewis says about the obedience to God, “If you ask why we should obey

²⁶ Setsuko Nakao, “Surprised by Joy: the theme of Salvation in the Fiction of C. S. Lewis,” Diss. Sophia Univ. 1985, p. 182.

²⁷ Nakao, pp. 180-181.

²⁸ Smith, p. 74.

²⁹ Cf. Lewis, *Allegory*, p. 45.

God, in the last resort the answer is, 'I am.' To know God is to know that our obedience is due to Him" (*Joy*, 185). He finds that God deserves our unconditional obedience just because God is God. Yet, while the apple in Genesis is regarded as a pledge of obedience, eating of which is evil only because it is the transgression of God's inhibition, Lewis's Fixed Island turns out to be more than a mere pledge of faith. Maleldil's inhibition has a positive good in itself. Green Lady notices this and says to Ransom,

How could I wish to live there except because it was Fixed? And why should I desire the Fixed except to make sure--to be able on one day to command where I should be the next and what should happen to me [...] to draw my hands out of Maleldil's, to say to Him, 'Not thus, but thus' [...] That would have been cold love and feeble trust. (208)

Trying to live on the Fixed Land is like trying to keep today's manna for tomorrow's use. It is a wish to get an assurance for future. Such a wish cannot come except from a doubt about God's providence, that is, doubt that God should see and provide beforehand all what we need. True faith does not allow for any such doubt. As Kilby and Manlove suggest, "the floating islands adjusted to the movement of the water [could] be a symbol of the Christian's abandonment to God's daily direction,"³¹ and "a near-perfect (the element missing is choice) emblem of that endless delighted self-resignation which is at the heart of the Lady's innocence."³² To have faith means to believe that God always gives us enough and be satisfied with what is given. Green Lady in her innocence sees this, while Un-man has never seen any good in Maleldil's forbiddance nor notice anything wrong in living on the Fixed Island. Thus, while the innocent knows good and evil, the evil one does not understand either good nor evil. The evil is weaker than the good even also in understanding. Green Lady says,

³⁰ Milton, *Paradise Lost*, p. 201

³¹ Clyde S. Kilby, *The Christian World of C. S. Lewis* (Eerdmans, 1954), p. 99.

it is waking that understands sleep and not sleep that understands waking. There is an ignorance of evil that comes from being young; there is a darker ignorance that comes from doing it, as men by sleeping lose the knowledge of sleep.[...] It was by the Evil One himself that he brought us out of the first. Little did that dark mind know the errand on which he really came to Perelandra! (209)

We may as well notice here that the problem involved in Maleldil's forbiddance is also that which Socrates (or Plato) has taken up in *Euphyphro*, namely, the problem of whether the good is good because God wills it or God wills it because it is good. Socrates's question is, "whether where the right is, there also is holiness, or where holiness is, there also is the right."³³ Socrates sees that the right involves holiness, but not *vice versa*. Lewis, however, answers to the problem as that God's will is good for the very reason that it is God's will but at the same time the good becomes God's will because it is good. Maleldil's forbiddance should be observed not only because it is His forbiddance but also because the forbiddance itself is good. The two propositions in Plato is not real alternatives, but two sides of one and the same thing. Lewis maintains: "God is not merely good, but goodness; goodness is not merely divine, but God" ("The Poison of Subjectivism," *Christian Reflections*, 80).

* * *

Thus in this book, Lewis attempts to answer the long discussed theological problem of the relationship between God's will and free will of man as His moral agent. When a man tries to do some hard task which he believes to be what God wants him to do, does he do so because he has chosen to do it or because God wills it? In Ransom's case, when he feels unavoidable responsibility to protect Perelandra, he does not see the task as merely forced upon him. In the faith in Maleldil, his will is at one with His. Then, "Predestination and freedom were

³² Manlove, p. 120.

apparently identical. He could no longer see any meaning in the many arguments he had heard on this subject”(149). He hears the voice, “My name also is Ransom”(148). This must be the voice of Jesus who has once sacrificed Himself to ransom the humankind, the One that really deserves the name of “Ransom”. True redemption can be made only through true faith, and in true faith, man’s will and God’s will is ultimately at one. This is the atonement in the real sense of the word, “at-one-ment”. Moreover, here is also expressed Lewis’s conviction that true faith must go together with action, and that, in every moment of one’s life. He holds in *Letters to Malcolm*: “We have been speaking of religion as a pattern of behaviour--which, if contentedly departmental, cannot really be Christian behaviour” (*Malcolm*, 31). He says that the Lord’s prayer, “Thy will be done,” is the petition “not merely that I may patiently suffer God’s will but also that I may vigorously do it.[...] In the long run I am asking to be given ‘the same mind which was also in Christ’[...] ‘Thy will be done--by me--now’”(Malcolm, 26).

Ransom gains such true atonement through the physical combat against Un-man. Therefore the combat turns out to be not only for the ransom of Perelandra but also for the sake of Ransom’s redemption of himself. Or rather, when we remember that Perelandra is still in a state of unfallen innocence and needs no redemption, the significance of his name “Ransom” lies in the very fact that he is the one who achieves real ransom of himself from original sin. Actually, Ransom ceases to get older since his voyage to Perelandra, which is a sign of the fact that he has regained the paradisaical state of life, as a regenerated man. His trip to and from Venus in a coffin, the battle against the devil deep under the sea and in the long way through womb-like darkness are all symbolically suggesting Ransom’s death of old self before regeneration, showing him undergo mythical death and rebirth in what may be called a “metaphysical”

³³ Plato, *Euphyphro*, *Plato I*, pp. 45-47.

world of *Perelandra*.

IV *That Hideous Strength* (1946)

The last of the Ransom trilogy, *That Hideous Strength*, is a story of battle between evil that is trying to dominate the earth and Maleldil's good force that tries to prevent it. The protagonist of this story is a young couple, Mark Studdock and his wife Jane. Though they are human, they are involved in the metaphysical battle between supernatural powers and, in spite of being a man and wife, join the opposite parties and respectively experience the evil and the good from within.

The outline of the story is as follows:

Mark is a fellow at Bracton College at Belbury, where the National Institute of Co-ordinate Experiment (ironically abbreviated as "N.I.C.E.") is going to be established. This institute claims to be aiming at scientific control of the mankind so as to efficiently improve the human race as a whole and offers Mark a post which at first seems to be good, though the first thing he is told to do is nothing better than writing fraudulent newspaper articles in order to make the public accept the N.I.C.E.'s brainwashing experiments on criminals, under a pretext of psychological treatment. He hesitates a little, but begins working for the N.I.C.E. anyway, even without consulting his wife. As a result, then, he loses his original post at the College.

Meanwhile, Jane sees in her dream a prisoner having his head screwed off. The prisoner is François Alcasan, a guillotined murderer, though Jane does not know about the execution until she reads the next morning paper. As she is scared by the dream for the identity of the prisoner in the dream and the executed Alcasan, one of Mark's colleagues at Bracton College, Mr. Dimble, and his wife advise her to go to St. Anne's to see a woman, Grace Ironwood. At St. Anne's Jane is told by Grace that

she must have a power to see real things in her dream because one of her ancestors had such clairvoyant power and she has probably inherited that power.

The people at St. Anne's are a group of men and women who are preparing for a war under Ransom against the evil power which is now working through the N.I.C.E. They ask Jane to join them. At first, Jane refuses the offer because she wishes to be left alone, but then she has another dream back at home--this time, a dream of a corpse with a long beard--and goes to St. Anne's after all. There, she meets the Pendragon of the group, who is Ransom, now called "the Fisher King". He is unable to walk because of the wound he got in the struggle with Un-man, but he has got younger since he came back from Perelandra and now looks as if he were little more than twenty though in fact he is in his late forties. Somehow Jane feels comfort when she is with him.

In the N.I.C.E., Mark is shown a "Head", which is the executed Alcasan's head kept from decaying in the laboratory, provided nutrition and oxygen through tubes. The N.I.C.E. people call this "resurrection" and try to hypertrophy the brain in an attempt at creating a new intellectual species of mankind. They even regard it literally as their own "Head", or commander.

Meanwhile, the dead old man with a long beard who appeared in Jane's dream turns out to be an ancient druid Marlin, a famous magician at the time of King Arthur, buried somewhere under Bracton Wood. Both the N.I.C.E. and Ransom's company believe that the party which succeeds in getting Marlin's help will win the battle, and try to find his burial place with Jane's dream as a clue. However, he wakes up in his grave before either of them finds him, and comes to St. Anne's by himself. He becomes Ransom's man, while the N.I.C.E. mistakes a tramp for Marlin

and takes him back to their institute. Since the members of the N.I.C.E. believe that Marlin speaks in Latin, they talk to the tramp in Latin and naturally fail to make themselves understood. Ransom sends the real Marlin into the N.I.C.E. in the disguise of an interpreter. At a banquet there, Marlin confuses, by magic, speech of the N.I.C.E. people and completely demolish the N.I.C.E.'s organization. In the confusion, most of the central men of the N.I.C.E. die, killing each other or committing suicide, or in a flood and an earthquake.

The end of the N.I.C.E. is the end of Ransom's task on the earth. Perelandra's Oyarsa, the gurdian angel Perelandra, comes to take him away to his planet, where Ransom is to be healed his wound and live an eternal life. Mark and Jane start their new life together.

The structure of this story is the most diagrammatically meticulous of all Lewis's works. Throughout the book, there can be seen clear dichotomy of good and evil: St. Anne's and the N.I.C.E., Ransom and the Head, Logres and Britain, and Mark and Jane. In the N.I.C.E., distrust, lies and inner conflicts are daily routine, while at St. Anne's, people live in trust and honest harmony. The N.I.C.E.'s Head is artificially kept from decaying. It is unnatural. On the other hand, St. Anne's head, Pendragon Ransom, can be said *supernatural* who has ceased to get older since his voyage to Perelandra. The parallelism is such that D. E. Glover comments on it:

In fact, the one major criticism which we might make is that the very elaborateness of and precision of balance and antithesis in the structure tend to deflect our attention from the theme so that the structure becomes sometimes overelaborate and draws attention to itself.³⁴

Through the opposition of the N.I.C.E. and St. Anne's, Lewis makes the

nature of the good and evil into relief against each other and especially draws our attention to those evils which threaten the people in the modern scientific era.

<Morality and scientism>

Lewis has often been regarded as against science, especially for writing this story, in which, the N.I.C.E., a scientific organization, is a manifest evil. However, Lewis avowdly denies that he is against science itself. He admits its utility and explicitly writes in a passage in the story that the physical sciences are “good and innocent in themselves”(203). In “A reply to Professor Haldane,” Lewis writes,

The ‘good’ scientist is put in precisely to show that ‘scientists’ as such are not the target. To make the point clearer, he leaves my N.I.C.E. because he finds he was wrong in his original belief that ‘it had something to do with science’ [...] To make it clearer yet [...] the man almost irresistibly attracted by the N.I.C.E. is described [...] as one whose ‘education had been neither scientific nor classical--merely “Modern”.’[...]And finally, what we are obviously up against throughout the story is not scientists but officials. [...]

What, then, was I attacking? Firstly, a certain view about values: the attack will be found, undisguised, in *The Abolition of Man*. Secondly, I was saying [...] that to be a friend of ‘The World’ is to be an enemy of God. (*On Stories*, 73)

What he thinks wrong is “‘scientism’--a certain outlook on the world which is casually connected with the popularisation of the sciences” (“A reply to Professor Haldane,” *On Stories*, 71), which sometimes neglects the vital moral law. Lewis is also against the naturalism which assumes that nothing exists outside the natural world that is objectively provable by scientific experiments, and this naturalism is also involved in scientism. By holding naturalism and denying the intuitive power of aesthetic imagination and moral consciousness, the

³⁴ D. E. Glover, p. 115.

scientism deprives people of the way to the metaphysical objective Reality, i.e., God's Reality. The only truth left for the people will be, then, scientific material facts, which they cannot but take as the only "reality". Furthermore, since those facts are proven by science and in that sense "objective", scientific facts become the only "objective reality" to them. The moral law, which is an integral part of the true objective Reality, is wrongly taken as merely subjective.

As we have seen in Chapter 3, Part I, Lewis in *The Abolition of Man* strongly expresses his misgivings about the moral subjectivism, emphatically insisting that value and moral good and evil exist objectively, independent of man's feelings. When man should abandon the traditional value and morality, nothing but power and desire would move the mankind. Then whatever progress science may make, it would be used not for the good of all the men but for only a few.

Man's conquest of Nature, if the dreams of some scientific planners are realized, means the rule of a few hundreds of men over billions upon billions of men. There neither is nor can be any simple increase of power on Man's side. Each new power won by man is a power over man as well.[...]

The final stage is come when Man by eugenics, by pre-natal conditioning, and by an education and propaganda based on a perfect applied psychology, has obtained full control over himself. Human nature will be the last part of Nature to surrender to Man[...]

For the power of Man to make himself what he pleases means, as we have seen, the power of some men to make other men what they please. (*Abolition*, 71-72)

In *That Hideous Strength*, Lewis gives illustrations to what he says in *The Abolition of Man*. Science has its limitations. It cannot, at least not yet, grasp all the objective truth even on the material level. When scientists come to doubt their scientific capacity of attaining truth, there is a possibility of their degradation, especially when they have abandoned morality on the ground that the moral law is not "objective", i.e. scientific, truth:

The physical sciences [...] had already, even in Ransom's own time, begun to be warped, had been subtly manoeuvred in a certain direction. Despair of objective truth had been increasingly insinuated into the scientists; indifference to it, and a concentration upon mere power, had been the result.[...] The very experiences of the dissecting room and the pathological laboratory were breeding a conviction that the stifling of all deep-set repugnances was the first essential for progress. And now, all this had reached the stage at which its dark contrivers thought they could safely begin to bend it back so that it would meet that other and earlier kind of power.[...] You could not have done it with Nineteenth-Century scientists. Their firm objective materialism would have excluded it from their minds; and even if they could have been made to believe, their inherited morality would have kept them from touching dirt.[...] It was different now. Perhaps few or none of the people at Belbury knew what was happening; but once it happened, they would be like straw in fire. What should they find incredible, since they believed no longer in a rational universe? What should they regard as too obscene, since they held that all morality was a mere subjective by-product of the physical and economic situations of men? The time was ripe. From the point of view which is accepted in Hell, the whole history of our Earth had led up to this moment. (203)

In 1992, John Lucas says in a lecture given to mark the 50th anniversary of *The Abolition of Man*,

'The Abolition of Man', [...] was a sustained attack on hard-line scientific anti-humanism.[...] The intervening fifty years have largely vindicated Lewis.[...] the values of the humanistic West are in the ascendant, and even in philosophy, though there are still subjectivists who maintain that all our values are but projections of our personal attitudes, they mostly now admit that this is an 'error theory', which goes against the grain of our ordinary understanding, and needs to be argued for pretty convincingly, if it is ever to get off the ground. The onus of proof is on the sceptic, not the defender of objectivity, and talk of the inevitable decline of western values seems strangely dated to modern ears.³⁵

Lucas also says that "Lewis was particularly afraid of genetic engineering, and in

³⁵ John Lucas, "The Restoration of Man, *Theology* Vol. XCVIII, No. 786

this, again, he was prescient.”³⁶

Frost in the N.I.C.E. tells Mark “to be strictly objective.” When the N.I.C.E. people charge Mark of murder that Mark has actually had nothing to do with, Frost says to him,

Resentment and fear are both chemical phenomena. Our reactions to one another are chemical phenomena. Social relations are chemical relations. You must observe these feelings in yourself in an objective manner. Do not let them distract your attention from the facts. (255)

He reduces everything to the level of chemical science which he thinks explains even our mental attitudes by the movement of atoms in our brains. He tries to repress or destroy man’s natural moral reactions, for he believes such moral reactions are nothing more than subjective distractions from the chemical facts which he takes for the only reality.

Lewis thinks of morality as consisting of three parts: harmony within each individual, harmony between man and man, and relationship between man and God (*Mere Christianity*, 67). In the N.I.C.E. all of three parts of morality are shown to be corrupted.

In the relationships to other people, the N.I.C.E. members do not have any standard of good and evil to move or bind them through their conscience, for they have abandoned morality altogether. They might do anything without guilty feelings. Therefore, no one can trust even his own fellows. They try to control others by deception, by lies and power, and even take it for granted to do so. Miss Hardcastle says to Mark, “don’t believe everything you’re told” (70).

Deception and secret are manifold and everywhere in the N.I.C.E. The Director of the N.I.C.E., Horace Jules, thinks he has the real power as the head of the institute. However, he is actually nothing but a figurehead who is set to the

(Nov./Dec., 1995), pp. 445-456. Quot. from p. 446.

³⁶ Lucas, p. 450.

position just because he happens to be well-known among the nation. The person in the real power is the Deputy Director, Wither. But still, he does not have the highest power in the N.I.C.E. though most members of the institute are deceived and believe he does. In the central room of the N.I.C.E., there is the guillotined François Alcasan's "Head" that only a few of the innermost circle of the institute know. Those few in the know are taking orders given through its mouth, believing them to be orders of Alcasan who has survived death. However, the orders are actually coming from the supernatural evil power that is now invading the earth through the N.I.C.E. Only Wither and Straik know that fact and they keep silent about it.

Deception and untruthfulness is also seen in the way the N.I.C.E. people draw its would-be members into the institute. When Mark is offered a post, he is not told the details of the work, nor whether his position would have a viable future. While he is still undecided, the N.I.C.E. entraps him by making it impossible for him to keep his present job at the college. Mark is then hired by the N.I.C.E. for less than half the salary offered him at first.

The ultimate means by which the N.I.C.E. controls men is by threatening. As Straik says, "No one goes out of the N.I.C.E. Those who try to turn back will perish in the wilderness" (80), a true scientist Hingest, who has found the N.I.C.E. wrong and tries to go out, is killed on his way. The N.I.C.E. steals Mark's wallet and leaves it near the spot of the murder so as to trump up a charge, and tries to keep him in their control by threatening him with arrest. Even when there is not so much as to be called deception, there is no honesty nor frankness in the N.I.C.E. Miss Hardcastle says to Mark, "Making things clear is the one thing the D. D. [i.e. the Deputy Director, Wither] can't stand, [...] That's not how he runs the place" (97). What is expected of the members of the N.I.C.E. is what they call "elasticity" (94ff.), or puppet-like obedience to whatever orders given them.

The N.I.C.E. will take any means to achieve its aims. It makes a mock riot

and puts the whole town under its own emergency police so as to cut the town off from the outer world and establish absolute control over it. Then it fabricates some articles in the papers to justify that emergency control.

Such lawlessness is justice from the viewpoint of the N.I.C.E. people, to whom reign by virtue or the moral law is from the first outset out of the question. Besides, since they reject any objective standard of good and evil, they find everything justifies itself by the mere fact of occurring: as Frost says, "Existence is its own justification" (295). This corruption of morality is prominent when we compare the N.I.C.E. to St. Anne's and see the clear difference between the good and the evil parties. In St. Anne's there is no need for deception where the people voluntarily get together around Ransom and are ready to fight for the good.

If lawlessness and deception are two characteristics of the N.I.C.E., its slight on personal dignity is another. Though the N.I.C.E. aims at improving the level of man's intelligence, it does not try to achieve that end by the education of all the people. Frost says,

A large, unintelligent population is now becoming a deadweight.[...] You are to conceive the species as an animal which has discovered how to simplify nutrition and locomotion to such a point that the old complex organs and the large body is therefore to disappear. Only a tenth part of it will now be needed to support the brain. The individual is to become all head. The human race is to become all Technocracy. (258-259)

Lewis holds that man was created by God as having both mind and body. Senses and emotions are as important as the intellectual "head" for man not only in keeping physical life but also in getting knowledge about the reality of his own existence, such as about his relationships with others or about his relationship with God, so that he might be able to remain, or become "man" as is intended by God. However, the N.I.C.E. people fail to see man in this way and do not hesitate to liquidate those whom it finds unnecessary. Other people, whom the N.I.C.E. finds worth keeping, are kept alive only to be used by it, having had their

humanity and individuality destroyed or deprived. Mark is told, "You've got to make yourself useful" (70).

Wither says to Frost on greeting Mark, "You need not doubt that I would open my arms to receive--to absorb--to assimilate this young man" (243). These words of Wither sound as if he were about to devour Mark to show his wholehearted welcome. And here, we see Lewis's idea which is also in *The Screwtape Letters* and later in *Till We Have Faces*, that evil ones devour those whom they love. Actually, by absorption and assimilation, the N.I.C.E. is going to reduce Mark to its mechanical part. In order for that they force him to undergo a series of objectivity trainings to kill his humane sensibility.

It is also shown that in the N.I.C.E., morality within each individual, that is, the right harmony in each man is also broken. The people in the N.I.C.E. not only neglect or destroy others' humane personality but also willingly give up their own humanity.

The most conspicuous example of this is Wither. In this book, we see a ladder of people from heaven to hell and this Wither is the most hellish damned one, who has thrown away his own humanity completely.

In *The Problem of Pain*, Lewis writes,

The characteristic of lost souls is "their rejection of everything that is not simply themselves" [...] The taste for the other, that is, the very capacity for enjoying good, is quenched in him except in so far as his body still draws him into some rudimentary contact with an outer world. Death removes this last contact [...] And what he finds there is Hell. (*Pain*, 111)

Wither has long rejected the world around him, and that rejection has now become his nature.

What had been in his far-off youth a merely aesthetic repugnance to realities that were crude or vulgar, had deepened and darkened, year after year, into a fixed refusal of everything that was in any degree other than

himself. He had passed [...] into the complete void [...] (353)

Like Un-man in *Perelandra*, he needs little sleep, and works like a machine.

He had learned to withdraw most of his consciousness from the task of living, to conduct business, even, with only a quarter of his mind. Colours, tastes, smells, and tactual sensations no doubt bombarded his physical senses in the normal manner: they did not now reach his ego. The manner and outward attitude to men which he had adopted half a century ago were now an organization which functioned almost independently like a gramophone and to which he could hand over his whole routine of interviews and committees. (250)

Since he has determinedly refused all the realities, to say nothing of the Reality of heaven, he has already been damned before he dies. When he is confronting his physical death it does not come home to him at all. Whether he is physically dead or not does not make any difference to him:

He had willed with his whole heart that there should be no reality and no truth, and now even the imminence of his own ruin could not wake him.[...] With eyes wide open, seeing that the endless terror is just about to begin and yet (for the moment) unable to feel terrified, he watches passively, not moving a finger for his own rescue, while the last links with joy and reason are severed [...] (353)

Another example is Frost. He has long been a materialist who believes that "all which appears in the mind as motive or intention is merely a by-product of what the body is doing"(357). He is the type of such a strict naturalist as we have seen Lewis argue against in *Miracles* that holds if our mental processes were determined wholly by the motions of atoms in our brains, we should have no reason to suppose that our beliefs are true; and hence we should have no reason for supposing our brains to be composed of atoms (cf. *Miracles*, 19).

To Lewis, materialism is self-contradictory and cannot be true, and naturalism is discredited for the same reason. In *That Hideous Strength*, Frost's

materialism which denies any voluntary motive or intention may have been only a theoretical belief at first, but, since he got into the N.I.C.E., he has actually come to taste that cerebrally entertained theory:

Increasingly, his actions had been without motive. He did this and that, he said thus and thus, and did not know why. His mind was a mere spectator. He could not understand why that spectator should exist at all. He resented its existence, even while assuring himself that resentment also was merely a chemical phenomenon. (357)

He has reduced himself to a mechanical being without any free will. Only once, he has nearly realized that “he had been wrong from the beginning, that souls and personal responsibility existed” (358). However, he so much hates to accept this half-seen truth that, instead of admitting it, he flings himself into fire, half suspecting that “death itself might not after all cure the illusion of being a soul” (358).

In Frost, Lewis shows how strict materialism can lead to denial of genuine free will. Although man as a soul has freedom that always accompanies personal responsibility, Frost has given up his free will given by God, thereby denying himself the status of a respectable soul, and by himself ceases to be a man.

<Weakness of the N.I.C.E.>

The N.I.C.E. appears as a powerful institute to its members as well as to the outer world, with a strong hierarchy inside and with its own private police force outside. However, when confronted by the genuine good, it reveals its weakness likewise as the evils in *The Screwtape Letters*, *Out of the Silent Planet*, *Perelandra* and in *The Chronicles of Narnia*.

Frost has clairvoyant power and reads Jane’s mind from within the N.I.C.E. when she is at home. However, once she is in St. Anne’s, he can no longer look into her thoughts, while Jane sees things going on in the N.I.C.E., such as

Alcasan's head and Hingest's murder. This asymmetry is an example of the good's superiority over evil.

Another example of the N.I.C.E.'s weakness when faced by good is the fact that contrary to the expectations of the N.I.C.E., plans carried out by them sometimes had an effect favourable to St. Anne's objectives.

In *The Problem of Pain*, Lewis says,

A merciful man aims at his neighbour's good and so does "God's will", consciously co-operating with "the simple good". A cruel man oppresses his neighbour, and so does simple evil. But in doing such evil, he is used by God, without his own knowledge or consent, to produce the complex good--so that the first man serves God as a son, and the second as a tool. (*Pain*, 99)

This is true in this story. Jane is once arrested by Miss Hardcastle and tormented physically, burned by a cigarette. But this torment drives her to join St. Anne's, though before the arrest she would rather stay alone without joining either the N.I.C.E. or St. Anne's. Therefore, by arresting Jane, the N.I.C.E. only pushes her into Ransom's hand and thus works for the good without knowing it.

Likewise, Mark sees significance in Christianity for the first time when he is involved in the N.I.C.E. His interest has never been in religion, or justice, or pleasure, or beauty. What he has wanted all his life is to get into some inner ring, "to be an insider" (245) of some exclusive elite group in the society that he belongs to. When he has been caught in custody as a suspect of Hingest's murder, he realizes that he has never really liked the people in such inner rings and how foolish he has been to have kept himself away from pleasant good people in order to be with those he did not like.

The hours that he had spent learning the very slang of each new circle that attracted him, the perpetual assumption of interest in things he found dull and of knowledge he did not possess, the almost heroic sacrifice of nearly every person and thing he actually enjoyed, the miserable attempt to

pretend that one could enjoy Grip, or the Progressive Element, or the N.I.C.E.--all this came over him with a kind of heart-break. When had he ever done what he wanted? Mixed with the people whom he liked? Or even eaten and drunk what took his fancy? (246-247)

The confinement by the N.I.C.E. thus leads him to self-recognition. Likewise, when the N.I.C.E. forces him to undergo the objectivity training, the result turns out to be something quite unexpected to the N.I.C.E. In the training, the N.I.C.E. exposes Mark to abnormal, disgusting things one after another so as to desensitize his ability to make moral and aesthetic judgments, expecting that he will in the end get used to such things and cease to react to them psychologically. However, the abnormal, disgusting things only make him notice, in comparison, the beauty and rightness of ordinary things which he has taken for granted and in which he has not till then seen any particular goodness at all.

Furthermore, when Frost tells Mark to step on a figure of Christ on the cross, Mark feels himself too helpless not to obey the command, and in that helplessness, suddenly realizes that there is a real meaning in the figure.

Obviously, if he disobeyed, his last chance of getting out of Belbury alive might be gone.[...] He was himself, he felt, as helpless as the wooden Christ. As he thought this, he found himself looking at the crucifix in a new way--neither as a piece of wood nor a monument of superstition but as a bit of history. Christianity was nonsense, but one did not doubt that the man had lived and had been executed thus by the Belbury of those days.[...] It was a picture of what happened when the Straight met the Crooked, a picture of what the Crooked did to the Straight--what it would do to him if he remained straight. It was, in a more emphatic sense than he had yet understood, a cross. (336)

This is Mark's first religious experience. And thus, the N.I.C.E. unintentionally leads him toward Christ, and again works for the good while trying to do evil.

Furthermore, at the end of the battle between St. Anne's and the N.I.C.E.,

the guardian gods of Venus and Mars come down on the earth and give power to Ransom's party, but it is the N.I.C.E. that has initially opened the way for them. As is said in *Out of the Silent Planet*, the earth was cut off from heaven and there were no comings and goings between them. However, since the N.I.C.E. called in the supernatural evil power in order to dominate the earth, the frontier between the earth and the outer supernatural region of heaven has been broken. Ransom says,

The Hideous Strength holds all this Earth in its fist to squeeze as it wishes.[...] If of their own evil will they had not broken the frontier and let in the celestial Powers, this would be their moment of victory. Their own strength has betrayed them. They have gone to the gods who would not have come to them, and pulled down Deep Heaven on their heads. (293-294)

Just as Satan in Milton's *Paradise Lost* is definitely powerless before God though he is as strong as the God's general archangel Michael, so the evil power embodied in the N.I.C.E. is weak before the power of Deep Heaven, or Maleldil, though it is as strong as Ransom's force. Now that it has called gods before the ordained time of the Last Judgment, it has to be judged and executed without waiting Jesus's Second Coming.

Wither, one of the few that know the evil power behind the Head of Alcasan, also knows its intrinsic powerlessness thus:

powers more than human had come down to destroy Belbury[...]It meant that his own dark Masters had been completely out in their calculations. They had talked of a barrier which made it impossible that powers from Deep Heaven should reach the surface of the Earth.[...] All their polity was based on the belief that Tellus was blockaded, beyond the reach of such assistance and left [...] to their mercy and his. Therefore he knew that everything was lost (352-353).

The confusion of language at the banquet of the N.I.C.E., especially the

confusion of Jule's speech before the N.I.C.E. members, reminds us not only of the Tower of Babel but also of Milton's Satan who is transformed into a serpent in the middle of his speech, being deprived of language.³⁷

Marlin's sentence on the N.I.C.E. people, "*Qui Verbum Dei contempserunt, eis auferetur etiam verbum hominis*" (They that have despised the word of God, from them shall the word of man also be taken away)"(351), is Heaven's sentence on the falsehood and lying in the N.I.C.E. In the epitaph to *That Hideous Strength* Lewis quotes David Lyndsay's description of the Tower of Babel:

THE SHADOW OF THAT HYDDEOUS STRENGTH
SAX MYLE AND MORE IT IS OF LENGTH
(from *Ane Dialog*) (*Hideous*, 3)

The N.I.C.E.'s attempt at making a new life is as serious a hubris as building the Tower of Babel, and is punished accordingly. Besides, in Lewis's fiction, the creature's command of language is a token of the right relationship between the creature and the Creator. Just as God in the New Testament is identified as the Word, the word cannot stay with those who are against God.

<Salvation theme--Attainment of Reality>

In *That Hideous Strength*, side by side with the conflict between the supernatural good and evil, the theme of salvation of individuals is of central importance. It concerns morality between man and God, or of the right relationship of man to the ultimate Reality.

Wither and Frost have chosen to abandon and destroy their own spiritual existence and succeeds in it. They will never be saved, for they have rejected their own status as a living spiritual creature, alienated themselves from God. They wish to be Creators themselves like God, trying to make a new life, but

³⁷ Milton, *Paradise Lost*, X ll. 504-509, p. 226.

actually, they have become even less than human beings. There is not a human left in them, and they will never get into God's Real world, either.

Mark, the only person in this book who moves into the N.I.C.E. and then leaves it for St. Anne's, descends the ladder of good and evil and then re-ascends it. Mark alone experiences the evil of the N.I.C.E. and the good of St. Anne's both from within. His degradation is quite gradual and the process is often unnoticed even by himself. When he joins the N.I.C.E., he does not suspect the evil nature of the institute. He is surprised when he is told to write false press articles on a riot which has not occurred yet. He asks the N.I.C.E. people, "But how are we to write it tonight if the thing doesn't even happen till tomorrow at the earliest?" (130) They laugh at him and say there is no need to wait for a thing to happen when he is writing a story about it in order to control the public opinion. When laughed at, Mark does not get offended but joins the laughter himself, throwing away the hesitation to do the wrong deed, calling the hesitation as "a faint prejudice" (130). As the devil in *The Screwtape Letters* remarks, "the safest road to Hell is the gradual one [...] without sudden turnings [...] without signposts" (*Screwtape*, 65), so the N.I.C.E. draws in Mark without letting him notice his degradation; though in his heart, Mark knows the fabrication of the articles to be wrong:

This was the first thing Mark had been asked to do which he himself, before he did it, clearly knew to be criminal. But the moment of his consent almost escaped his notice; certainly, there was no struggle, no sense of turning a corner.[...] it all slipped past in a chatter of laughter, of that intimate laughter between fellow professionals, which of all earthly powers is strongest to make men do very bad things before they are yet, individually, very bad men.(130)

It is his fear of being excluded from the N.I.C.E.'s inner ring that makes him take the wrong step. And the atmosphere of the seemingly warm laughter helps to take it. As we have seen, Lewis says he is showing in this book that "to be a

friend of 'The World' is to be an enemy of God." Then it is Mark's case that he is referring to. The wish to be inside some exclusive worldly society would cloud one's moral judgment and makes one do whatever will please that society regardless of whether it is right or wrong.

He comes lowest when he is ordered to bring Jane to the N.I.C.E. He intuitively knows that Jane would not fit in the N.I.C.E. and hesitates to obey the order. However, when the order changes into a threat, he makes up his mind as: "He must get her, to save his life.[...] They would kill him if he annoyed them: perhaps behead him [...]"(185). Here he is no more than a self-centred coward who would sacrifice his wife to save his own life. We are reminded of a passage in Lewis's *A Preface to 'Paradise Lost,'* where he points out that Eve's decision to make Adam share her fate of death is actually a decision of "Murder" (*Preface*, 125). If her decision is a murder, then Mark's decision to take Jane with him to the N.I.C.E. is also to be seen as an incipient case of murder.

Yet, while getting so mean towards Jane, Mark is conversely saved by her existence; and significantly, the very moment of his meanest decision against her almost coincides with the beginning of his salvation. It accords with the fact that Jesus says, "For I did not come to call the righteous, but sinners, to repentance" (Matthew 9:13 *NKJV*) as well as that, in Christianity, Salvation and repentance occur often when the sinner is most sinful--as is the case with St. Paul.

When he thinks of bringing Jane to the N.I.C.E., he realizes the fundamental difference and incompatibility between Jane and the N.I.C.E. Then, he comes to see the baseness of the N.I.C.E. for the first time.

Her presence would have made all the laughter of the Inner Ring sound metallic, unreal; and what he now regarded as common prudence would seem to her, and through her to himself, mere flattery, back-biting and toad-eating. Jane in the middle of Belbury would turn the whole of Belbury into a vast vulgarity, flashy and yet furtive. (171)

The presence of the good in the middle of evil necessarily shows off the hideousness of that evil. Later in the N.I.C.E.'s custody, Mark realizes that Jane embodies the whole good world where he has never entered:

She seemed to him, as he now thought of her, to have in herself deep wells and knee-deep meadows of happiness, rivers of freshness, enchanted gardens of leisure, which he could not enter but could have spoiled. She was one of those other people [...] who could enjoy things for their own sake. She was not like him. It was well that she should be rid of him. (247-248)

As has been seen in the case of Wither, the loss of “the taste for the other” (*Pain*, 111) is a sign of damned souls. “The taste for the other”, the capacity of enjoying things for themselves, i.e. not for their pragmatic or economic value, is a mark of good ones. When Mark recognizes this capacity in Jane, and comes to see other people as Jane would see them, he begins to change. He comes to care for the good things, and begins to hate evil, and so comes to hate the N.I.C.E. His first religious experience of seeing a significance in the cross occurs because he has thus already turned himself towards the good.

In the end Mark runs to St. Anne's, having been slapped on his back by Marlin. The pain he has got from the slap has been such that “Mark's bones ached at the memory as long as he lived” (352). This pain that he brings in himself all his life is that of expiation of his sin committed in the N.I.C.E.

* * *

Jane is by nature on the good's side, which, for instance, is shown by the fact that, at the first encounter with Ransom, she felt comfort and beauty in his voice. It is the beauty intrinsic in a heavenly existence, and unless Jane does not have an inner eye to recognize it, she would not find his voice even attractive.

Still, at first, she had also quite a strong egocentricity. Before she meets Ransom, she told herself to be careful not to be let in for anything. Though she is inclined to help Ransom's group, she is still unwilling to surrender herself to

them. She wants to be in a detached position, as she has always wanted to be on her own. Such unwillingness to self-surrender is in fact one of her conspicuous characteristics.

One had to live one's own life. To avoid entanglements and interferences had long been one of her first principles. Even when she had discovered that she was going to marry Mark if he asked her, the thought, "But I must still keep up my own life," had arisen at once and had never for more than a few minutes at a stretch been absent from her mind. (72)

As she hates to get tied down, she has avoided even having children. This wish to be self-centredly on her own is a sin to be repented, for it is the wish "to become, as it were, based on oneself, and so remain"³⁸, which, as Lewis is never tired of stressing, is the core of man's original sin and an expression of pride.

However, when she sees Ransom, everything goes differently from her original intention of keeping her own life without getting involved.

Jane looked; and instantly her world was unmade. On a sofa before her, with one foot bandaged as if he had a wound, lay what appeared to be a boy, twenty years old[...]
"Thank you, Grace," the man was saying, "Is this Mrs. Studdock?"
And the voice also seemed to be like sunlight and gold.[...] She was shaken: she was even shaking. She hoped intensely that she was not going to cry, or be unable to speak, or do anything silly. For her world was unmade: anything might happen now. (143)

Ransom points out to her that she is wrong about her idea about marriage and obedience. She has thought it has nothing to do with Mark whether she is to remain at St. Anne's or to go home. When Ransom says it is difficult to accept her as one of his group because Jane is the wife of a N.I.C.E. member, she feels bitter with Mark: "Why should he and his affairs with the Feverstone man intrude themselves at such a moment as this?" (145) She has insisted on the "equality,

³⁸ St. Augustine, *City of God*, p. 571.

and free companionship”(148) of the two sexes in marriage. But what she has actually meant by “equality” is nothing but lack of mutual responsibility. Ransom tells her that free companionship belongs not to marriage but to friendship.

[O]bedience--humility--is an erotic necessity. You are putting equality just where it ought not to be.[...] But you see that obedience and rule are more like a dance than a drill--specially between man and woman where the roles are always changing. (148-149)

This image of obedience as a dance is Lewis’s image of heaven. He stresses in *The Problem of Pain* and in several other places that the principle of Heaven is mutual “self-giving” (*Pain*, 140), which has a rhythm like a dance. Even God Himself is in the dance. He has given His Deity away and become a Man on earth. Jesus Christ the Man has surrendered Himself back to God the Father, and been raised to heaven again. A pattern of “descent and re-ascension” produced by such acts of self-surrender makes up the universal movement in Heaven’s dance. In *Perelandra*, Lewis describes the image of heaven as a self-giving dance:

In the plan of the Great Dance plans without number interlock, and each movement becomes in its season the breaking into flower of the whole design to which all else had been directed. Thus each is equally at the centre and none are there by being equals, but some by giving place and some by receiving it, the small things by their smallness and the great by their greatness, and all the patterns linked and looped together by the unions of a kneeling with a sceptred love. (*Perelandra*, 217)

In this image of heaven as a ever-changing dance, not as a fixed equality, we see Lewis’s conviction that democracy and legal equality is only the second best to the order through mutual voluntary obedience. Ransom tells Jane that “Equality guards life; it doesn’t make it. It is medicine, not food”(148). Lewis supports democracy as a system of government, but this is only because he thinks

“that no man or group of man is good enough to be trusted with uncontrolled power over others. And the higher the pretensions of such power, the more dangerous [...] both to the rulers and to the subjects” (“A Reply to Professor Haldane,” *On Stories*, 75). Yet here, Lewis suggests that though voluntary obedience would be impossible in the world of politics, in marriage, where the husband and the wife are connected by love, harmony by mutual obedience can, and should, be realized.

To go back to Jane, her arrest by the N.I.C.E.’s emergency police on her way and the following physical torment she gets from Miss Hardcastle symbolically atone for her pride of wishing to be too independent. It is especially true when we remember that she becomes a real member of St. Anne’s when she has come through that torment.

At the St. Anne’s she learns, through her faith in Ransom, to love Mark and to obey Maleldil. When asked if she obeys Maleldil, she confesses to Ransom, “I know nothing of Maleldil. But I place myself in obedience to you” (229). Ransom answers to this, “It is enough for the present.[...] when you mean well, He always takes you to have meant better than you knew. It will not be enough for always. He is very jealous. He will have you for no one but Himself in the end” (229-230). As Yahweh said, “I, the Lord your God, am a jealous God” (Exodus 20:5, *NKJV*), and demands his people to worship him alone, Maleldil also wants to have his people to himself alone.

Ransom’s words turn out to be true later when she suddenly feels Maleldil’s presence. When she gets His self-revelation, she has been thinking about love for Mark and love for Maleldil. She was told by Ransom that in rejecting Mark, she was rejecting “the masculine itself: the loud, irruptive, possessive thing” (315-316). She was told that it is pride that made her reject such possessive masculinity. He said,

The male you could have escaped, for it exists only on the biological level.

But the masculine none of us can escape. What is above and beyond all things is so masculine that we are all feminine in relation to it. You had better agree with your adversary quickly.(316)

When she heard this she did not understand why Mark and “What is above and beyond all things,” that is, Maleldil, can be thus connected. However, when she feels Maleldil’s presence just beside her, all at once she understands His masculine force and apprehends that she is femininely dependent on Him. In this revelation, she realizes that Maleldil is really demanding her whole being and that, the demand is “the origin of all right demands” (318). This is the same experience as that which Lewis has had in his conversion and describes in *Surprised by Joy* (cf. *Joy*, 181). Before his conversion he always wanted “not to be ‘interfered with.’” He says, “I had wanted (mad wish) ‘to call my soul my own’” (*Joy*, 182). However, God did not allow him to remain his own master. Lewis remembers God said to him, “I am the Lord,” “I am that I am,” “I am” (*Joy*, 181). Likewise, Jane is swept by Maleldil’s presence and undergoes a spiritual transformation.

In this height and depth and breadth the little idea of herself which she had hitherto called me dropped down and vanished, unfluttering, into bottomless distance, like a bird in a space without air. The name me was the name of a being whose existence she had never suspected, a being that did not yet fully exist but which was demanded. It was a person [...]yet also a thing, a made thing, a thing being made at this very moment, without its choice, in a shape it had never dreamed of. (318-319)

This is the religious faith Jane has attained in the end.

Huw Mordecai in “The Problem of Co-Inherence” points out that in Charles William’s idea of “Co-inherence” or of “the Practice of substituted love,” it is to be understood that “Sin dispossesses us of our capacity for free will, reason and love. It is only by the indwelling of the Spirit of God that we begin to possess these qualities, and so become our true selves. Because this act of indwelling is

also an act of creation, it would be wrong to conceive of the Spirit as a gift given by God which 'I' receive. It is only through this receiving that the 'I' exists, that 'I' become."³⁹ Mordecai then quotes from R. C. Moberly's *Atonement and Personality* the following passage, which Mordecai finds "legitimate Williams' argument" that all Christians need to bear another's burdens while having his own burdens borne:

never am I, as I, so capable, so personal, so real; never am I, in a word, as really what the real 'I' always tried to mean; as when by the true indwelling of the Spirit of God, I enter into the realization of myself; as when I at last correspond to, and fulfil, and expand in fulfilling, all the unexplored possibilities of my personal being, by a perfect mirroring of the Spirit of Christ; as when in Him and by Him I am, at last, a true, willing, personal response to the very Being of God.⁴⁰

Here, Jane has achieved her own atonement by giving up her own burden of sin of pride to Ransom so as to exist as a real personality for the first time. Jane's sin, Pride, is regarded as the most serious sin in the Christian tradition, but in spite of that, she is saved. This is because she has a will to follow Ransom, and, following Ransom, she is in fact following Maleldil through him; and no one who has a will to obey God will be damned in Lewis's work.

* * *

Ransom, who has led Jane to Maleldil, is raised to Heaven by eldila. Thus, in this book, Jane raised Mark up to the world of Ransom, Ransom leads Jane up to Maleldil, and eldila from Heaven raises Ransom to Deep Heaven. In each case, it is someone just one level nearer to Maleldil who leads Mark, Jane or Ransom in the direction to Heaven.

³⁹ Hum Mordecai, "The Problem of Co-Inherence: Can R. C. Moberly Bear the Burdens of Charles Williams?" *Theology*, Vol XCVIII, No. 786 (Nov./Dec., 1995), pp. 456-461. Quot. from p. 460.

⁴⁰ Quoted by Mordecai from R. C. Moberly, *Atonement and Personality* (John Murray, 1901), p. 252.

In *The Discarded Image*, Lewis points out that in the medieval and Renaissance times people believed “the Principle of the Triad”: “it is impossible that two things only should be joined together without a third. There must be some bond in between both to bring them together.[...] god does not meet man. They can encounter one another only indirectly; there must be some wire, some medium, some introducer, some bridge--a third thing of some sort--in between them”(Discarded, 44).

In *That Hideous Strength*, then, we see the triad of Mark-Jane-Ransom, Jane-Ransom-Maleldil, Ransom-eldila-Maleldil. There needs some agent when someone is to go up onto the next step of the ladder toward Maleldil.

Another important point in the salvation of Mark and Jane is that in each case, it is the existence of Jane or Ransom itself that moves them. That is, they are not persuaded by the words but feel some heavenly quality in the other and are attracted by it. When there is something good in a person, it reveals by itself, and moves others.

<Problem of Suffering>

In *That Hideous Strength*, those who are gifted some special power suffer much more than the others in trying to work for good. The problem of suffering in this book is then mainly that of the suffering of those selected by God. This is connected with Lewis’s belief in vicarious suffering of Jesus for our fallen humanity.

Jane is annoyed by her role as a seer. She says, “I want to lead an ordinary life.[...] It’s unbearable. Why should I be selected for this horrible thing?”(66) and tries to avoid seeing prophetic dreams. Marlin is also afraid when he has to go alone into the N.I.C.E. to destroy it, and tries to avoid that role. But still, both Jane and Marlin have to overcome their fright and carry out their tasks. Above all, Ransom is selected to bear a continuous pain from his wound in the ankle

which he got in combat with Un-man. When he has made his own atonement on Perelandra, he still has to suffer pain for the others. The blood that never stops dripping from his ankle now is shed for the redemption of the other humanity. Once, Christ died on the cross, and as it is written in the New Testament that “Neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us” (Hebrews 9:12), he is raised to heaven after the redemption. The blood of Christ is the token of redemption for us all, and so is Ransom’s. The name “Ransom” may then have come from God’s providence that he was, together with Christ, to redeem mankind.

Lewis in *Miracles* finds vicariousness to be one of Nature’s fundamental characteristics that has culminated in Jesus’ vicarious death for the whole humanity. The vicarious suffering is, to Lewis, a part of the Natural order. Therefore, though the reader may suspect an allegory of Christ in the suffering of Ransom or Jane, their sufferings are not to be regarded merely as allegories of Christ’s agony. Nor should we see Christ’s own suffering in their pain. Lewis is not the same as such a theologian as Tillich, who sees Christ in every man’s suffering thus: “God, as manifest in the Christ on the Cross, totally participates in the dying of a child, in the condemnation of the criminal, in the disintegration of a mind, in starvation and famine, and even in the human rejection of Himself.”⁴¹ Ransom and Jane endure and surrender themselves to the pain and it is they, helped by Maleldil, who suffer. Yet at the same time their sufferings are sufferings for others as Jesus’s suffering was for the whole human race.

⁴¹ Paul Tillich, *The Eternal Now* (1956, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1963), p. 46.

V Myth

Lewis believes in the truth of myth as an expression of reality. Christianity is for him, “myth which is also a fact” (“Myth Became Fact,” *Dock*, 66), and even pagan mythologies have some truth in it.

My present view [...] would be that just as, on the factual side, a long preparation culminates in God’s becoming incarnate as Man, so, on the documentary side, the truth first appears in mythical form and then by a long process of condensing or focusing finally becomes incarnate as History. This involves the belief that Myth in general is not merely misunderstood history [...] nor priestly lying [...] but, at its best, a real though unfocused gleam of divine truth falling on human imagination. (*Miracles*, 137-138n.)

This belief is reflected many ways in this trilogy. As Martha C. Sammons points out, “much of his material is actually rooted in the ancient medieval way of seeing life,”⁴² we see much of the medieval mythological Ptolemaic idea of the universe here. In the trilogy, Sammons sees the ideas of Music of the Spheres, the Great Dance, the Great Chain of Being, and angels and guardian angels of the planets. As to the Music of the Spheres, we have already seen in relation to the connotation of “the Silent Planet.”⁴³ Although I suspect Sammons reads more meaning than Lewis intends about the silence of the earth, Sammons is very illuminating in pointing out the medieval cosmology and mythical ideas in the trilogy. The idea of the Great Dance, that compares the ideal harmony of all the creatures to a dance, is manifestly expressed in the hymn of eldila in *Perelandra*.⁴⁴ Besides, in *That Hideous Strength*, the ideal marriage is compared to “Dance”, where man and woman are always changing their roles and becoming the ruler in turns (149). The Oyarsas and eldila are respectively equivalents of

⁴² Sammons, p. 41.

⁴³ See above, p. 214; and Sammons, p. 48.

⁴⁴ See above, p. 263; and *Perelandra*, p. 217.

guardian angels and angels in the medieval cosmology, and the idea of the “Great Chain of Being”, that is, from A. O. Lovejoy’s famous definition, “an immense, or [...] infinite, number of links ranging in hierarchical order from the meagerest kind of existents, which barely escape non-existence, through ‘every possible’ grade up [...] to the highest possible kind of creature, between which and the Absolute Being the disparity was assumed to be infinite--every one of them differing from that immediately above and that immediately below it,”⁴⁵ is seen in the ladder of Maleldil - eldil - *hnaus* (including man and Green Lady) - animals (e.g. Dolphins on Perelandra and animals in St. Anne’s).

As in the actual life Lewis denies such scientism as considers the scientific world view to be the only right way of seeing the universe, in the trilogy, he presents these mythological concepts as a sort of reality. While travelling from the earth to Mars, Ransom finds the light around the spaceship so overwhelmingly bright and realizes it was wrong of him to have thought the universe to be empty space.

[H]e found it night by night more difficult to disbelieve in old astrology: almost he felt, wholly he imagined, ‘sweet influence’ pouring or even stabbing into his surrendered body. (*Silent Planet*, 31)

The “influence” here is the power of planets that was believed in the old cosmology to flow into (*in+fluo*) people on the earth and affects their fates and humours. Lewis must have written this passage with the medieval idea of the universe in mind.

Ransom feels on his way back to the earth from Malacandra, “that the distinction between history and mythology might be itself meaningless outside the Earth” (*Silent Planet*, 144-145). Such a way of regarding myth as truth is actually a reflection of Lewis’s own conviction. In *Miracles*, Lewis says of a

⁴⁵ Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Harvard Univ. Press, 1936 &

time when the New Creation through Christ will be accomplished:

The archaic type of thought which could not clearly distinguish spiritual "Heaven" from the sky, is from our point of view a confused type of thought. But it also resembles and anticipates a type of thought which will one day be true. That archaic sort of thinking will become simply the correct sort when Nature and Spirit are fully harmonised--when Spirit rides Nature so perfectly that the two together make rather a Centaur than a mounted knight. (164)

Heaven in the trilogy is uncorrupted, and therefore, the estrangement between the spiritual world and Nature has never occurred. It is still a mythical world, and Lewis is suggesting it is the original and proper state of the universe as is intended by God.

1964), p. 59.

VI Conclusion

In this trilogy, Lewis thus presents the nature of good and evil through the contrast or conflict between them. Especially, he illustrates the perversion and powerlessness of evil. In *Out of the Silent Planet* he calls for our reflection on fallen humanity. In *Perelandra*, he shows evil to be miserable as well, while stressing God's absolute goodness and justice, denying the notion of *felix culpa*.

In *That Hideous Strength*, there are various themes and questions woven within the framework of romance: the elements from Arthurian legend such as the conflict between Logres and Britain; criticism of the modern lack of attention to moral laws, reflections as to the right relationship between a man and his wife, and between man and God; the problem of suffering and redemption, and so on. Through the conflict between the N.I.C.E. and Ransom, Lewis again depicts the hideousness, falsity, and weakness of evil before the good.

Lewis's evil in the trilogy, as in his other stories, may appear too idealistic in that it does not show such powerful inexorability as it does in the actual world, but this weakness of evil is a reflection of Lewis's conviction that in Reality, on the metaphysical, mythical level in the world of God, evil is ultimately the loser and weaker than the good, being no more than its perversion.

Chapter 5 The Chronicles of Narnia (1950-1956)

I Introduction

From 1950 to 1956, Lewis published a series of fairy tales for children: The Chronicles of Narnia. This series consists of seven books of *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe* (1950), *Prince Caspian* (1951), *The Voyage of the Dawn Treader* (1952), *The Silver Chair* (1953), *The Horse and his Boy* (1954), *The Magician's Nephew* (1955), and *The Last Battle* (1956), describing the history of an imaginary country, Narnia, from its genesis to apocalypse. The Creator of the Narnian world is a lion named "Aslan" (the Turkish word for "Lion"¹ (*Letters to Children*, 29)), who is said to be "the King of the world and the son of the great Emperor-beyond-the-sea" (*Lion*, 75). He is not only the Creator but also the Lord, the Saviour, and the Judge at the last judgment at the end of Narnian world, being a counterpart of both the Father and the Son in the Holy Trinity.

Yet, despite the obvious parallel between Aslan and the Christian God, Lewis is rejecting allegorical interpretations of his stories. As we have seen, he says "[e]verything began with [his mental] images," which had nothing to do with Christianity ("Sometimes Fairy Stories May Say Best What's to Be Said," *On Stories*, 46). The Chronicles is, first of all, a work of imagination. The Narnian World is "supposition" rather than "allegory". He wrote in 1954 in a reply letter to a fifth grade class in Maryland,

I did not say to myself "Let us represent Jesus as He really is in our world by a Lion in Narnia.": I said "Let us suppose that there were a land like Narnia and that the Son of God, as He become a Man in our world, became a Lion there, and then imagine what would happen." (*Letters to Children*, 44-45)

This way of writing is different from making an allegory. If we read the Chronicles on the assumption that it is a biblical allegory, our reading should necessarily be static and allows us little free response, for it is to be a sort of corresponding-passages-hunt. On the other hand, "supposition" allows for far freer responses.

And yet, on the other hand, there is no denying that, as Lewis's own letter above suggests, in a sense Aslan is the Narnian equivalent of God and Christ. He is the central figure of the whole Chronicles in relation to whom all the characters and their behaviour can be assessed. There, we see Lewis's idea of how and when creatures are likely to be right or wrong, and what kinds of characters are in a right or wrong relation to God.

Now, in writing *The Chronicles of Narnia* in the form of fantasy, Lewis has two advantages in expressing his idea of Reality, especially of the reality of good and evil.

One is that in fairy tales, good and evil are divided so manifestly that the reader may see the difference between them more clearly than in actual life. There, it is possible to present even all the characters either as good or evil without presenting middle ones, so as to show off their different natures, just as presenting black and white without presenting gray would show off the contrast between the two colours.

In the Chronicles, dichotomy of the good and evil can be seen everywhere. In *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe*, for example, Aslan is opposed to the White Witch; Edmund is opposed to the other children when he is on the Witch's side; and all the good animals are opposed to those under the Witch. In *Prince Caspian*, the old Narnians are against the new comers; Caspian is against Miraz; and Trumpkin is in contrast with Nikabrik, respectively representing the good and evil in some way or other. *The Last Battle* not only shows us the conflict

¹ This is written in a letter to his goddaughter, Sarah.

between Narnia and Calormen but also such oppositions as between the King and the wicked ape, Aslan and Tash, the faithful and the sceptic, and those who are saved and those who are not.

In fairy tales, the good are good and become happy, while the evil are bad and to be conquered and punished. Different from the actual life where the problem of suffering of innocent people who do not deserve it, or at least do not seem to deserve it--disease of newly born babies, death of young people in wars, etc.--presents difficulty in believing God's goodness and omnipotence, fairy tales make one easily and naturally feel God as good and almighty. If this feeling takes root in the reader, it may help him or her to believe in God's goodness and power in actual life, too, because one's conviction is often influenced by his or her feelings and sensibility as well as by intellectual thinkings, especially when the truth of the conviction is hard to prove by reason alone.

Another advantage is that in the fairy tales, Lewis has the best opportunity of directly impressing the reader's imagination with such sense of good and evil as he thinks is disappearing nowadays and necessary to preserve. As we have seen in our Part I, Chapter 4, Lewis maintains that literature can be an important means by which each generation learns to make "the good Stock responses," that is, proper and fundamental aesthetic or ethical responses, such as "love is sweet, death bitter, virtue lovely" (*Preface*, 57). In the *Chronicles*, Lewis is sowing the seed of such "good Stock response" by illustrating what the good and evil are like, rather than theologically or theoretically discussing them. As Peter Schakel suggests, the primary appeal of the *Chronicles* "would be to the heart, not the head."²

Besides, what is characteristically important about Lewis is that he thus shows the good and evil not because he intentionally aims at moral effect but because he, as an author and not as a teacher, just finds it fit for the story he wants

² Peter J. Schakel, *Reading with the Heart* (Eerdmans, 1979), p. 6.

to write. He says in "A Reply to Professor Haldane," "In my romances the 'good' characters are in fact rewarded. That is because I consider a happy ending appropriate to the light, holiday kind of fiction I was attempting" ("A Reply to Professor Haldane," *On Stories*, 69).

Schakel also rightly suggests,

The Chronicles are classics because of the way the intellectual reinforces the imaginative, and there is value for adults in seeing and discussing both aspects together; for them, and for children increasingly as they grow older, a response with the head can and should follow a response of the heart.³

In the Chronicles, imaginative enchantment is the primary, and the moral follows it naturally.

* * *

In *Mere Christianity*, Lewis lists up seven virtues that have ever since the medieval church enunciation traditionally been regarded as necessary for salvation (*Mere Christianity*, 70-74). Four of them are called "Cardinal" virtues which are sometimes classified as four "natural" virtues. They are "Prudence, Temperance, Justice and Fortitude" which are originally found by Plato to be virtues corresponding to the natural constitution of man, that is, "Prudence corresponded to the intellect, temperance to feeling, and fortitude to will. Justice was a social virtue and regulated the others."⁴ The other three are "Theological" virtues which are particularly Christian, representing the Pauline triad of "Faith, Hope, and Charity" that are enjoined in I Corinthians, 13:13 (*Mere Christianity*, 71 & 113). These three theological virtues that St. Paul finds to be essential are of vital importance also in *The Chronicles of Narnia*. Therefore, we shall discuss the Chronicles first in respect of faith, charity and hope, and then consider the

³ Schakel, *Reading with the Heart*, p. 135.

⁴ R. H. Mounce, "Seven Cardinal Virtues," *Evangelical Dictionary of Theology*, Walter A. Elwell ed. (Baker, 1984), p. 193.

problem of disbelief and evil. To do this coherently, we discuss the seven stories of the Chronicles together, instead of discussing each volume one by one, as we did in the Ransom trilogy.

* * *

The history of Narnia recorded in the Chronicles is as follows:

In *The Magician's Nephew*, the Narnian world is created by Aslan. Two children, Digory and Polly, come to Narnia by the magic rings made by Digory's uncle, Andrew, and witness the creation. The creation is absolutely good, and yet, already at the time of the creation, an evil Witch has entered the Narnian world, whom Digory on his way from England unintentionally picked up and brought in with him. Aslan tells him to get a magic apple from a garden beyond the Western Wild and to plant it in Narnia so that the tree should keep the Witch away. Digory achieves that task, and a long spell of peaceful time begins in Narnia.

In the age of *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe*, however, that peace has been broken, and Narnia is reigned by a White Witch, who is keeping Narnia in the winter all the year around. Four brothers and sisters from England, Peter, Susan, Edmund and Lucy Pevensie, come to Narnia through a magic wardrobe. Lucy, who has entered Narnia first, and Peter and Susan at once make friends with good Narnians and begin fighting for them against the Witch. Yet Edmund is snared by the Witch's enchanted candies, betrays them, runs for the Witch, and is nearly killed by her. In order to save him, Aslan offers himself to the Witch and is killed instead. Yet, the Witch enjoys her victory only for a short time, for Aslan comes back to life and helps the children (including Edmund, who has repented and become good) who finally kill the Witch. Aslan enthrones the children as the Kings and Queens of Narnia and they long reign the country

very well, till they come back to the human world where only a few minutes have relapsed since they went into Narnia.

In *Prince Caspian*, Caspian, the lawful prince of Narnia, has his throne and life endangered by his uncle Miraz, and calls for help by a magic horn. By its magic, the Pevensie children are drawn into Narnia. They help Caspian in his battle against Miraz and make him the King.

The Voyage of the 'Dawn Treader' is the story of Caspian's voyage in search of seven lost faithful lords who have been banished by Miraz. Lucy and her cousin Eustace Scrubb join the voyage.

In *The Silver Chair*, Caspian is now old but his heir, Prince Rilian, is missing. Eustace and one of his school mates, Jill Pole, are called from the human world and, on Aslan's order, find Rilian in custody of a Green Witch and rescue him.

The Horse and his Boy begins in Calormen, Narnia's neighbour. A boy named Shasta, who has discovered that his father is going to sell him as a slave, starts a journey for Narnia before being sold. A talking Narnian horse, Bree, hoping to go back to Narnia, gives him a ride. On their way, they meet an aristocratic Calormene girl, named Aravis, who has escaped a forced marriage and is now journeying for Narnia with her talking horse, Hwin, and join them. Then they hear that the Calormenes are going to attack Narnia. Shasta runs to Archenland, which is an ally to Narnia, and tells its King about the crisis. Narnia is saved. Meanwhile, it turns out that Shasta is the crown prince of Archenland who was kidnapped when he was a baby. Shasta gets married to Aravis and becomes the King.

The Last Battle shows us the eschatological picture of the Narnian world. A wicked ape, Shift, covers a donkey, named Puzzle, with a lion's hide and presents him as "Aslan," assuming himself as his priest. He says Aslan and the Calormene god, the evil Tash, are the same thing and

demands worship and offerings from the Narnians. The King Tirian argues against Shift and gets caught. As Tirian prays for help, Jill and Eustace are drawn into Narnia by magic and rescue him. A battle occurs between the Narnians and the Calormenes. Tash appears. Yet, Aslan also appears and, with Aslan's coming, Tash disappears. Aslan opens a door that leads to Aslan's country, or heaven, and before that door, all the Narnians are judged and divided into two groups: one is to enter through the door into Aslan's country and the other is to be banished into darkness. All those who love and keep faith in Aslan enter Aslan's country. The children from human world also come into Aslan's country, never to be sent back, for they are dead in England in a train accident. Yet, their earthly death is not their end: the true story begins here when the Narnian world ends and they begin to live in the Aslan's country.

II Faith

Terence Penelhum in his *Problems of Religious Belief* points out that the word “faith” means either acceptance of the proposition that God exists (its Latin equivalent is *fides*) or personal commitment to God (*fiducia*).⁵ He says that one can believe God’s existence without committing himself to Him; i.e., there is *fides* without *fiducia*.

Lewis, too, is conscious of the difference between these two kinds of faith, though he does not use the words, “*fides*” and “*fiducia*.” In an essay “Is theism important?” where he discusses the utility and necessity of theological proofs, he distinguishes what he calls “faith-A” and “faith-B.” Faith-A is “a settled intellectual assent” that God exists. Faith-B is “a trust, or confidence, in the God whose existence is thus assented to. This involves an attitude of the will” (*Dock*, 172-173).

The problem of faith in Narnia is in the main in the realm of *fiducia*, or personal commitment to Aslan. In Narnia, Aslan’s relation to his creatures is easier to be seen than that of God to man in our actual world, because while the Christian God of ours is supernatural, Aslan is not. In Narnia, there is no division between supernatural reality and the actual life. Aslan interferes in the creatures’ life in person. He is the Lord not only metaphysically but also secularly. Or rather, to the Narnians, what we call metaphysical world is not metaphysical at all. In Narnia, then, different from our world where the existence of God is often in question, there are only a few who doubt the existence of Aslan. His authority as the Lord is also so obvious that the problem for the most characters is not whether they should obey him but how they should obey him. Lewis is always emphasizing the importance of whole commitment of self to God in all the departments of life. In *Letters to Malcolm*, for instance, he says,

⁵ Terence Penelhum, *Problems of Religious Belief* (Macmillan, 1971), pp. 112ff.

“We have no non-religious activities; only religious and irreligious.[...] We have been speaking of *religion* as a pattern of behaviour--which, if contentedly departmental, cannot really be Christian behaviour” (30-31). It is not enough to know that God exists. One should always try to see and carry out God’s will. Lewis finds the Lord’s Prayer, “Thy will be done” to be the petition: “not merely that I may patiently suffer God’s will but also that I may vigorously do it. I must be an agent as well as a patient.” He says, “I am asking that I may be enabled to do it. In the long run I am asking to be given ‘the same mind which was also in Christ’” (*Malcolm*, 26). Thus, true faith should be accompanied by action.

In Narnia, the importance of active commitment to Aslan is expressed by the fact that only those who are carrying out or at least trying to carry out Aslan’s will are able to know him. Even those who believe Aslan fail to recognize him when they are momentarily not ready to see and do what he wants them to do.

In *Prince Caspian*, for instance, when the Pevensie children are hurrying their way to rescue Caspian, Aslan appears. Then, it is Lucy alone that recognizes him at once. She reads his will in his face that they should take a path up the gorge through the forest and go where he is waiting. However, Peter does not see him and chooses the way down in the opposite direction. Susan almost sees Aslan, but she feels too tired to go up and wouldn’t let herself see him lest she should have to come up to him. Next day, she confesses this to Lucy after she eventually came to see Aslan:

I really believed it was him--he, I mean--yesterday.[...] I mean, deep down inside. Or I could have, if I’d let myself. But I just wanted to get out of the woods and--and--Oh, I don’t know. (*Caspian*, 132)

It is difficult to keep following Aslan’s will incessantly. The way he points to is not necessarily an easy one, though it is always the right one. Those like Susan, who is not strong enough, are easily tempted to choose the easier way even when they suspect that the harder way should be the one to take. They

consciously or unconsciously try not to see him, because they know that once they should meet him they should have no choice but to obey him however hard the way may be. Leanne Payne remarks, "A root meaning of the term to obey is to listen."⁶ Christ always follows the Father by listening to His will. For those in Narnia, too, seeing is following and when they do not want to follow they would not see. Men can shut their mental eyes and give up the eyesight of their own will. Until they reopen their eyes of faith, their physical eyes do not see Aslan even when he is before them. This is why Susan fails to see him in the woods though she fundamentally believes in him. Faith in the sense of *fiducia* calls for the will to follow the Lord incessantly, and she lacks it.

Later, Susan turns out to be the only one who has been to Narnia and yet forgets it. Back in the human world, she gets wholly occupied in her daily life with dresses, parties, etc., and loses interest in Narnia. She comes to regard Narnia as no more than an imaginary country which she made up with her brothers and sister in their childhood just for fun. In *The Screwtape Letters*, Lewis points out that the ordinary every day routine has the power of making people think of the supernatural as something unbelievable and unrealistic (*Screwtape*, 13). The visible worldly life tends to feel more realistic than the supernatural world. This is also true to Susan. As Evan K. Gibson remarks, she is the most practical one of the four children.⁷ It is Susan who first thinks of provisions against cold and hunger both in *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe* and in *Prince Caspian*--and therefore the one that would most easily feel the practical ordinary life to be the most "real" thing (cf. *Lion*, 54; *Caspian*, 98).

On the other hand, just opposite to Susan who loses sight of Aslan whom

⁶ Leanne Payne, *Real Presence*, p. 162. Payne does not give any etymological explanation here, but John Ayto's *Dictionary of Word Origins* tells us that "obey comes via Old French obeir from Latin obedire, which meant literally 'listen to.'" (John Ayto, *Dictionary of Word Origins* (Archade, 1990), p. 369).

⁷ Evan Gibson, *C. S. Lewis, Spinner of Tales: A Guide to His Fiction*

she has nearly seen, Edmund comes to see Aslan when he believes Lucy who says she has seen him, though at first he did not see him at all. Edmund believes her because he remembers that when they first came to Narnia it was also Lucy who first found and told them about Narnia, and that though they did not believe her story at first, eventually they themselves strayed into Narnia to find out that she had been right. When all the Pevensie children meet Aslan face to face afterwards, Aslan says to him “Well done” (*Caspian*, 133). Edmund’s sight of Aslan is a reward for his believing without seeing. As Jesus once said to Thomas, “Blessed are those who have not seen and yet have believed” (John: 20:29, *NKJV*), Edmund is blessed by Aslan. In Edmund’s case, then, it is his belief that allows him to see.

The reason why Lucy sees Aslan when the others do not is that she alone keeps her eyes, with all her heart and mind, open to him all the time. She never doubts he is good, and follows him unconditionally with love. When she sees him, she runs to him almost before she knows it.

She never stopped to think whether he was a friendly lion or not. She rushed to him. She felt her heart would burst if she lost a moment. (122-124).

She is an *anima naturaliter Christiana*, a born Christian, who naturally loves God. She believes in Aslan literally “as a child.” (cf. Matthew 18:3) And it is because she believes in Aslan so firmly that she is able to lead the other children to Aslan when they have lost sight of Him. In *Prince Caspian*, it can be said that Peter and Susan come to see through Lucy’s perseverance and suffering for them, for Lucy has had considerable difficulty in getting them to see Aslan.

In the *Chronicles*, Lewis repeatedly emphasizes the importance of will to believe. While in his apologetic works such as in *Mere Christianity* and

(Erdmans, 1980), p. 136.

Miracles he tries to establish logical arguments for the existence of God, in his fiction, he admits that all that human reason can do for the acquirement of faith is to show the high probability of God's existence. After all, we need to believe without a decisive proof. In *The Voyage of the 'Dawn Treader'*, the daughter of a retired star tells Edmund who is wondering whether he can trust her or not,

You can't know [...] You can only believe--or not.
(*Dawn Treader*, 170)

Though her words in this context do not refer to the belief in God, or in Aslan, they show us what Lewis thinks to be the essence of faith. St. Tertullian says "*credo quia impossibile est*" (*De Carne Christi*, V). And St. Augustine also is believed to say, "*credo quia absurdum*" (*Confessions*, vi.5).⁸ Ever since then, a long line of philosophers has seen man's limitations in logical thinking in the attempt to know God's existence and found the will to believe necessary: Kant, Descartes, Pascal, William James, etc. are all in this line, and Lewis here follows them.

In Narnia, such volitional faith is approved most strongly in *The Silver Chair*. There, two children, Jill and Eustace, with their Narnian guide called Puddleglum are nearly ensnared by the Witch who has hold Prince Rilian captive underground for years. She tries to make them believe that Aslan and all the upper world are nothing but dreams. She says that Aslan must be a cat transformed in their dream, and that the sun is no more than a imaginary copy of a lump. When she tells them thus, it is impossible for them to produce counter-testimony against

⁸ It is generally accepted that St. Tertullian says this in *De Carne Christi*, V; and St. Augustine, in *Confessions*, VI. 5., yet, in fact, there is no exact equivalent passage by Tertullian in the extant texts, and as far as I see in the Loeb edition, there cannot be found the passage by St. Augustine, either.--Cf. St. Augustine, *Confessions* I of 2 Vols., tr. By W. Watts in 1931, Loeb Classical Library (Harvard Univ. Press; Heinemann, 1977); *Dictionary of Christianity* (『キリスト教大

her, because in the underground where they are now, neither the sun nor Aslan is ever to be seen. When the Witch plays an enchanting lyre which deprives them of clear thinking, the children and Puddleglum themselves almost believe the Witch's words. Puddleglum, however, manages to keep sane by stepping barefoot on her fire of incense and extinguishing it. When the pain of the burned feet awakes him from the enchanted dreamy state, he declares to go on believing in Aslan and Narnia whatever the Witch may say. He says,

Suppose this black pit of a kingdom of yours is the only world. Well, it strikes me as a pretty poor one. And that's a funny thing, when you come to think of it. We're just babies making up a game, if you're right. But four babies playing a game can make a play-world which licks your real world hollow. That's why I'm going to stand by the play-world. I'm on Aslan's side even if there isn't any Aslan to lead it. I'm going to live as like a Narnian as I can even if there isn't any Narnia.(156-157)

Puddleglum's logic is similar to that of Pascal, known as "Pascal's Wager," in his *Pensées*. Pascal's idea is this: we have either to believe in God or not to believe but our reason is not capable enough to judge which position to take. Therefore, our choice is, as it were, a wager in which we have to choose our side without any guarantee of the result. In the wager of faith, if you bet that God exists and win, you can attain God who is eternal beauty and even if you lose, you lose nothing. Therefore you had better bet on God's existence, that is, you had better believe in God.⁹

This logic may seem mercenary and insincere. Actually, however, it is a positive confession of the will to believe in God in a world where His existence is never to be proved definitely. As a basic assumption of this logic, there is at least the belief that a life in God's world is more desirable than anything else. In

事典』(Kyo Bun Kwan(教文館), 1963; rpt. rev. 1968.)

⁹ Blaise Pascal, *Penses*, ed. Lon Brunschvicg (1897; Garnier-Flammarion, 1976), pp. 113-114.)

the statement that in case God does not exist, even if we lose the world, we lose nothing, it is implied that if God does not exist the world is worthless and meaningless. Above all, here is a will to put the whole self at stake for the belief in God. It is the will for the total commitment to God, and can be called positive “faith” or *fiducia*. Therefore, in *The Chronicles of Narnia*, faith is a matter of voluntary will even on the cognitive level. No one is allowed to remain passive if he is to be in the right relation to Aslan.

On the level of action, it is even truer. In *The Silver Chair*, Jill is called for to be active throughout the story in her relation to Aslan. At the beginning, in England, she prays with Eustace to Aslan to bring them to Narnia and has that prayer granted. In Narnia, when Jill first meets Aslan, he tells her that he has called them from England for a task. Jill is surprised to hear this because she has thought it was because they prayed to Aslan that they have been brought to Narnia. Yet Aslan says to her,

You would not have called to me unless I had been calling to you. (*Silver Chair*, 28)

Just as Christ said to his disciples, “You did not choose Me, but I chose you and appointed you that you should go and bear fruit, and that your fruit should remain” (John, 15:16, *NKJV*), Aslan is telling her that even in her wish to come to his country, there was Aslan’s providence that she should come and accomplish a good deed. But all the same, it was necessary for her to call on Aslan of her own will. Aslan’s providence and her prayer worked together. Here, there would be no point in asking whether it was Jill’s will or Aslan’s that brought her to Narnia. Aslan’s initial calling, the unconscious response of Jill who did not know herself that it was response, and Aslan’s response to her respondent prayer--all of them worked together in union. At any rate, even though the first initiative was on Aslan’s side, Aslan demands man’s playing an active part in their relationship.

In *The Horse and his Boy*, Aslan accompanies Shasta on his journey for a long time without revealing himself, like Christ on the way to Emaus (Luke 24:13-16). Shasta notices that some very large creature is following him, gets frightened, and at last ventures to ask “Who are you?” Then Aslan speaks to him for the first time in answer, “One who has waited long for you to speak” (*Horse*, 138). Communication between Aslan and a man has to be on the man’s own will as well as Aslan’s. Revelation of Aslan thus calls for active commitment of the man who receives it.

What is also important is that, to be able to recognize Aslan’s revelation, one should be honest before him. As Lewis is to take up as a main theme later in *Till We Have Faces*, as long as a man hides his sinfulness under the veil of self-justification or self-deception, he can never meet God face to face, because while he hides his true face, he has no face with which to encounter God. In *The Silver Chair*, Eustace falls off from a high cliff soon after their arrival in Narnia. It is Jill’s fault. He falls to save her from falling when she has gone needlessly too near the edge of the cliff just to boast her courage and got dizzy. When she meets Aslan, she confesses that she is to blame for his fall. When Jill says to Aslan, “I was showing off, sir,” he says, “That is a very good answer” (*Silver Chair*, 28). It is her honesty he approves of here. And it is this honesty that has first of all made it possible for her to meet Aslan.

Furthermore, even when one gets Aslan’s revelation, it is not the end. Nor is *Sola fides* enough. The revelation is to be kept alive in the mind of the recipient through conscious effort. In *The Silver Chair*, Aslan gives Jill four instructions to achieve her task and tells her to remember them by heart and repeat them all the time. Revelation, unless it is consciously remembered, will be forgotten sooner or later.

It is also necessary for a man to keep his mind consciously clear. In our actual world, even if there is God, it is difficult to know His will. This is the

same also in Narnia. Aslan gives warning to Jill after he has given her the four signs,

Here on the mountain I have spoken to you clearly; I will not often do so down in Narnia. Here on the mountain the air is clear and your mind is clear; as you drop down into Narnia, the air will thicken. Take great care that it does not confuse your mind. (*Silver Chair*, 30)

Aslan thus demands continuous effort on the part of man to keep his mental eyes open. The essential thing is invisible. Aslan says to her further,

And the signs which you have learned here will not look at all as you expect them to look, when you meet them there. That is why it is so important to know them by heart and pay no attention to appearances. (*Silver Chair*, 30-31)

In spite of Aslan's warning, however, Jill neglects to repeat the given signs when she is tired. As a result, she soon forgets some parts of them and confuses others so as to miss three of them. Lewis is conscious that man is "at once rational and animal" (*Regress*, 13) so that one's physical weakness may sometimes hinder his spiritual faith. In the *Chronicles*, Jill's case is an example showing how that weakness may hinder one's active faith. Still, people in the *Chronicles* are called for to get over such difficulty and carry out their tasks. They may go astray but finally would be able to achieve Aslan's will as long as they are trying to, and as long as they are honest enough to admit their faults and ready to come back to the right way. As Clyde S. Kilby points out, in Narnia, "though evil succeeds it is never quite able to take over completely. Though Prince Rilian was, by normal standards, insane twenty-three hours of the day, he was himself one hour. The suggestion is that a very little bit of genuine reality, with Aslan's help, is capable of clearing the air of the unreality which fools man most of the time."¹⁰ This can

¹⁰ Clyde S. Kilby, *The Christian World of C. S. Lewis* (Eerdmans, 1964), p. 137.

also be said of Jill when she finally succeeds in finding Rilian and rescuing him after repenting her negligence. The fourth sign--that is the last "bit of genuine reality" to use Kilby's words--clears the air of the Witch's unreality for her. Robert Houston Smith sees Plato's theory of recollection in Jill's forgetting the signs given on the mountain:

It follows from this conception of the soul's descent into the earthly miasma that the soul will grow forgetful of its heavenly origin during its earthly incarnation.[...] Jill's mind does indeed grow forgetful and confused, as it must in spite of Aslan's caution. But, clouded though the soul's vision of the good is on Earth, there remains in each person a flickering, sputtering flame of divine truth that can be fanned into a clearer, more illuminating light under suitable circumstances. This concept is, of course, Plato's famous theory of recollection, and Lewis accepted the insight unhesitatingly.¹¹

There is a point in this remark. Yet in Jill's case, it is because of her laziness that she forgets the signs and should not be regarded as a natural consequence of her descent into Narnia as if she were not responsible for that. It is her sin. And what is also important is that it is her repentance and regained will to achieve Aslan's will that enable her to find the "truth" that has been clouded.

All those who truly wishes to follow a good God is following Aslan. It is also true when an honest man has believed in the wrong god. A young Calormene, Emeth, in *The Last Battle* has worshipped the god Tash all his life, as he was born and brought up in a country where Tash is believed in as the good deity though in fact he is an evil and awful god. (Lewis expresses the crooked nature of Tash by the description: "having a bird's head, he couldn't look at you straight" (*Last Battle*, 121).) When Emeth meets Aslan for the first time in his life at the entrance to Aslan's country, Aslan tells him,

Child, all the service thou hast done to Tash, I account as service done to

¹¹ Smith, *Patches of Godlight*, pp. 186-187.

me. Not because he and I are one, but because we are opposites. I take to me the services which thou hast done to him. For I and he are of such different kinds that no service which is vile can be done to me, and none which is not vile can be done to him. Therefore if any man swear by Tash and keep his oath for the oath's sake, it is by me that he has truly sworn, though he know it not, and it is I who reward him. And if any man do a cruelty in my name, then, though he says the name Aslan, it is Tash whom he serves and by Tash his deed is accepted. (*Last Battle*, 149)

As long as one is trying to do the will of the good god, it does not matter whether one calls the god Tash or Aslan. A real act of pursuing good is in reality an act of faith in Aslan. Aslan knows better than the young man himself that it is Aslan whom he belongs to; that he is obeying him though unconsciously. The name Emeth must have come from the Hebrew word “emeth,”[אמת] that means “truth” with the implication of “faithfulness” and “permanence” as Lewis says he has learned from *Encyclopedia Biblica* (1914).¹² Aslan tells Emeth, “Beloved, [...] unless thy desire had been for me thou wouldst not have sought so long and so truly. For all find what they truly seek.” (*Last Battle*, 149)

The salvation of Emeth who has worshipped the wrong god might be seen as implying universalism. However, the point here is not that every believer of any religion will be saved in the long run. What is stressed here in the case of Emeth is that no one who truly seeks for good cannot long keep following what is actually an evil. These words of Aslan remind us of what Lewis refers to as “the dialectic of Desire” in his autobiographical allegory, *The Pilgrim's Regress*, which we have seen in the Part I of this thesis in the chapter on Lewis's argument from Imagination.¹³ A man's true desire to attain what is really vital for his life is never satisfied until he gets the object, which, in Lewis's view in the actual life, is God, heaven and Christianity. In the process of “the dialectic of Desire,” anything that is not the true object of the desire betrays its falsity once it is really

¹² Cf. Lewis, *Abolition*, p. 28n.

experienced, even if it has appeared to be the most desirable thing on earth. This is why the long endurance of Emeth's faith is a proof of its rightness.

Yet, on the other hand, Lewis never advocates religious pluralism. Rather, he seems to be nearer to Karl Rahner who sees some truth in pagan religions while admitting, "It is possibly too much to hope, [...] that the religious pluralism which exists in the concrete situation of Christians will disappear in the foreseeable future."¹⁴ Then we see Emeth as a type of what Rahner conceives as "an anonymous Christian"¹⁵ as follows:

God-pleasing pagan was already a theme of the Old Testament, and especially since this God-pleasing pagan cannot simply be thought of as living absolutely outside the concrete socially constituted religion and constructing his own religion on his native foundations [...] if we wish to be Christians, we must profess belief in the universal and serious salvific purpose of God towards all men which is true even within the post-paradisean phase of salvation dominated by original sin.[...]

Christianity does not simply confront the member of an extra-Christian religion as a mere non-Christian but as someone who can and must already be regarded in this or that respect as an anonymous Christian. It would be wrong to regard the pagan as someone who has not yet been touched in any way by God's grace and truth. If, however, he has experienced the grace of God [...] then he has already been given revelation in a true sense even before he has been affected by missionary preaching from without.¹⁶

In the Chronicles, faith in Aslan is vital for every creature. And that faith should be both *fides* and *fiducia*: belief in Aslan's existence and authority as the Lord, and commitment of the self to him with the active will to do his will.

¹³ See above, pp. 15-21.

¹⁴ Karl Rahner, *Theological Investigations*, vol. 5, tr. Karl-H. Kruger (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1966), p. 133.

¹⁵ Rahner, p.133.

¹⁶ Rahner, pp. 122-131.

III Charity

In *Mere Christianity*, Lewis points out that “Charity” or “‘Love’ in the Christian sense” is a state not of the feelings but of the will. It is different from natural likings or affection. Natural likings and dislikes are neither sin nor virtue. They are just facts. Charity towards another person or another self is the wish and will to do it good “just because it is a self, made (like us) by God, and desiring its own happiness as we desire ours” (*Mere Christianity*, 114-115). In man’s relation to God, Charity means the will “to do His will,” for, Lewis says, “If we are trying to do His will we are obeying the commandment, ‘Thou shalt love the Lord thy God’” (*Mere Christianity*, 116).

In this light and from what we have discussed on the problem of “faith” in the Chronicles, we see that in Narnia, charity and faith are indivisible. We may say that what Lewis sees in faith in the sense of *fiducia*, or the active will and commitment of oneself to do Aslan’s will is in large part what he sees in charity towards God. Lucy’s faith in Aslan is unconditional, childlike love that involves her wish to follow him for ever. In *The Last Battle*, those who are to follow the way into Aslan’s country are marked not only by their faith but also by their love for Aslan himself. Therefore, it can be said that real faith in Aslan is accompanied by charity, and *vice versa*.

IV Hope--Into Narnia and to Aslan's Country

The third of the theological virtues is Hope: that is, the hope for God's kingdom and for a regenerated life. It is, in Lewis's words, "a continual looking forward to the eternal world" (*Mere Christianity*, 116). In Narnia, this hope takes the form of hope for Aslan's country. In the Chronicles, three worlds exist: Narnia, the human world from which children visit Narnia, and Aslan's country which is the counterpart of heaven, that is, God's Kingdom.

When human children go to Narnia, or when Narnian people (or beasts) go to Aslan's country from Narnia, it is usually Aslan who sends them from one world to another. The comings and goings between the human world and Narnia are either by magic or through Aslan's direct working. In either case, there is some supernatural power at work. It is said that magic is "the only way of getting to Narnia" (*Dawn Treader*, 11), though it is not necessarily magic by a human magician. Actually, except in *The Magician's Nephew* where it is by magic rings made by Uncle Andrew that human children go to Narnia, the children are all drawn into Narnia or stray into it by a certain power which is beyond human control. The initiative is on Aslan's side. Besides, it is always Aslan who decides when they should go back to the human world. Children have no choice even of whether to stay or to go back. Then, there is Aslan's providence also in the Children's roles in Narnia. Tasks are always assigned to them, rather than chosen by them, and they have to carry them out readily and voluntarily.

Besides, it is only children who can go to Narnia, which symbolically shows, "unless you are converted and become as little children, you will by no means enter the kingdom of heaven" (Matthew, 18:3, *NKJV*). Thus, Narnia is not only another world for the children from human world. It is also an entrance to the Real Aslan's country, or heaven. When Lucy, Edmund, and Peter are

killed in our world in a railway accident, they are moved to Narnia and then go to Aslan's country from Narnia. Narnia is, for them, a world bridging the human world and Aslan's heaven. As Michael Edwards points out, they "enter it by magic as the figure of grace, and although it is not heaven (it is not Aslan's own country) all the children who are admitted there know it to be better than this world. It stands between our life on earth and our future life in heaven, and it represents in part [...] the experience of heaven that we have on earth."¹⁷

From the genesis in *The Magician's Nephew* to the apocalypse in *The Last Battle*, we see a *καιρος* under Aslan's providence leading to the coming of his kingdom. After the invasion of evil into the innocent young Narnia in *The Magician's Nephew*, that is a disaster equivalent to the Fall in Genesis, the long term of the White Witch's evil reign. At the same time, there also is a prophesy that "when two Sons of Adam and two Daughters of Eve sit in those four thrones [at the castle of Cair Paravel], then it will be the end not only of the White Witch's reign but of her life" (*The Lion*, 77). This is a prophesy of the conquest of the original evil in the Narnian world, as there was the prophesy of Jesus Christ's victory in ours. Also, just as Jesus prophesied his Suffering to the disciples, when in *The Magician's Nephew* Aslan prophesies Narnia's hard times under the Witch, he suggests his own suffering to come:

Evil will come of that evil, but it is still a long way off, and I will see to it that the worst fall upon myself. (*Magician's*, 126)

Aslan's death on the Stone Table is vicarious death for Edmund. It is a sacrifice of the innocent for the life of the guilty who really deserves death. It is an act of totally disinterested love, and his resurrection with the break of the Stone Table (which has laws on it as Mose's tables of testament did) symbolizes the

¹⁷ Michael Edwards, "C.S. Lewis: Imagining Heaven," *Literature & Theology*, 6, No. 2 (1992), pp.111-112.

victory of love over the mercilessly exacting laws. Here, as Glover points out, “The Deeper Magic of mercy triumphs over the Deep Magic of the law of justice.”¹⁸ Sammons also sees “the stone knife as symbols for God’s law, which requires death as a penalty for sin. When the sacrifice is over, the Table is divided in two as was the veil in the Tabernacle after Christ’s crucifixion.”¹⁹ At the same time, Aslan’s death and rebirth is also a prototype of the death of old self and regeneration through the atonement, though in Aslan’s case, the death he has suffered is not for his own sin but Edmund’s. Through Aslan’s death and rebirth, Edmund is remade into a good being. Tamnus the Faun’s being turned into a stone statue and coming back to life by Aslan’s breath also significantly follows most clearly the pattern of death of the old self (which was under the power of the White Witch, the evil) and rebirth by Aslan (or by God).

If *The Magician’s Nephew* is Narnia’s genesis and *The Last Battle* is its apocalypse, *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe* is its equivalent to the story of Jesus’s atonement of original sin. *The Horse and His Boy*, *Prince Caspian*, *The Voyage of the Dawn Treader*, and *The Silver Chair* are stories of people who live between that atonement and the end of time when Aslan comes back to judge them. During that time, as in the *anno domini* eras of our world, people may know Aslan and come to live in faith, or they may drift away from him. They are given free choice whether or not to obey him. Lucy and Reepicheep are among those who believe and follow Aslan from the first. Edmund and Eustace are regenerated into his followers. There are also those in Calormen who follows the god Tash instead of Aslan. Yet the people are not forever given that free choice. Aslan opens a door which leads to another world from Narnia twice, that is, in *Prince Caspian* and in *The Last Battle*. Each time, the door divides people into those who follow Aslan and those who do not. Yet it is only in

¹⁸ Donald E. Glover, *The Art of Enchantment* (Ohio Univ. Press, 1981), p.142.

¹⁹ Martha C. Sammons, *A Guide Through Narnia* (Harold Shaw, 1979), p. 124.

Prince Caspian that people are free to choose which way to take.

In *Prince Caspian*, the door leads to the human world. It is for those Narnian people whose ancestors came from there. Aslan lets them themselves decide whether to go to the human world through the door or to stay in Narnia. None have to go out through the door if they want to stay in Narnia; neither are those who choose to go out of Narnia condemned for preferring being away from Aslan's world. They are even approved by Aslan for their faith in him to believe his words that the door really leads to the world for men. Aslan says to the first man who has decided to go through the door:

It is well chosen [...] And because you have spoken first, strong magic is upon you. Your future in that world shall be good. Come forth. (*Prince Caspian*, 186)

It is probably because Narnia is not made up as an allegory of the Christian City of God that these people are not punished for choosing to live out of it. Or it may be because when one believes in Aslan, Aslan is there with him whatever world he is in.

However, in *The Last Battle*, the case is different. Aslan opens a door to his country from Narnia, and then people (and talking beasts) are divided by Aslan before the door into two groups: those who are going to Aslan's country and those who are not. It is the Last Judgment. This time, no one has any choice which group to join.

But as they came up to Aslan one or other of two things happened to each of them. They all looked straight in his face; I don't think they had any choice about that. And when some looked, the expression of their faces changed terribly--it was fear and hatred [...] lasted only for a fraction of a second. You could see that they suddenly ceased to be Talking Beasts. They were just ordinary animals. And all the creatures who looked at Aslan in that way [...] disappeared into his huge black shadow, which [...] streamed away to the left of the doorway.[...] But the others looked in the face of Aslan and loved him, though some of these were very frightened at

the same time. And all these came in at the Door, in on Aslan's right.
(*Last Battle*, 140)

Their love for Aslan may be mixed with fear and yet be true expression of faith. Here, Lewis is suggesting his belief that God is awful as well as attractive.

It is significant that the judgment is done not through inquiry and answer, but simply by meeting with Aslan face to face. There is no room for pretence or lying. Clyde S. Kilby says, "Narnia is less a place divided into good and bad-acting creatures than those with a 'germ' of goodness or badness developing towards fulfillment."²⁰ Above all, meeting with Aslan has such strange and strong power as to reveal and fulfill that 'germ' and essential character of the one who sees him. In *Prince Caspian*, when a man beating a boy sees Aslan, he turns to a tree with the beating stick as one of its branch. Pig-like nasty boys become pigs, and a teacher who immediately loves Aslan begins dancing. This meeting with the Lord is then the most crucial thing to determine whether one is to be saved or not, which is to be an important theme later in *Till We Have Faces*.

<Longing>

Many of those who go to Aslan's country or to Narnia have had a special sort of longing for Aslan or for Aslan's country. The longing is the same sort of desire as that "Joy", which we have seen in Chapter 1 of the first part of this thesis, that Lewis sees to have been a desire for heaven.

Shasta in *The Horse and his Boy* longs for Narnia, which is to the north beyond the hill. He has been brought up like a slave by a Calormene but, in fact, he is a Narnian prince kidnapped by the man when he was a baby. He does not know his own identity, and his yearning for Narnia is an unconscious longing for the place he really belongs to. It is described as this:

²⁰ Kilby, *The Christian World of C. S. Lewis* (Eerdmans, 1964), pp.141-142.

[H]e was very interested in everything that lay to the Norse because no one ever went that way and he was never allowed to go there himself. When he was sitting out of doors mending the nets, and all alone, he would often look eagerly to the Norse.[...] Shasta thought that beyond the hill there must be some delightful secret. (*Horse*, 12)

This description reminds us of the young Lewis's own longing for the Castlereagh Hills that he saw from the nursery windows, which he remembers thus:

They were not very far off but they were, to children, quite unattainable. They taught me longing--*Sehensucht*. (*Joy*, 12)

Jewel, the unicorn, has also an unconscious longing for Aslan's country. Aslan's country is the real and eternal home for his people, and it is why Shasta, Jewel and others feel such a longing for it. It is a sort of homesickness. Jewel cries out with joy when he comes and sees Aslan's country:

I have come home at last! This is my real country! I belong here. This is the land I have been looking for all my life, though I never knew it till now. The reason why we loved the old Narnia is that it sometimes looked a little like this. Bree-hee-hee! Come farther up, come farther in! (*Last Battle*, 155)

Here, Smith again reads Plato's theory of recollection.²¹ Brewer agrees with Smith and adds to reminds us that "This idea follows the earlier conception of Augustine as well."²² Indeed Plato says in *Phaedrus* that "every soul of man has by the law of nature beheld the realities" and "gain from earthly things a recollection of those realities" (249E).²³

Few then are left which retain an adequate recollection of them; but these when they see here any likeness of the things of that other world, are stricken

²¹ Smith, pp. 188-189.

²² Brewer, p. 12n.

²³ Plato, *Phaedrus*, in *Plato I*, p. 483.

with amazement and can no longer control themselves; but they do not understand their condition, because they do not clearly perceive. (250 A-B)²⁴

Likewise, Jewel somehow recognized images of Aslan's country in Narnia and loved them, though he did not understand his condition, because he did not clearly perceive.

The most conspicuous and straightforward of all who long for Aslan's country is Reepicheep, the mouse. He got a prophesy when he was still in his cradle:

Where sky and water meet,
Where the waves grow sweet,
Doubt not Reepicheep,
To find all you seek,
There is the utter East. (*Dawn Treader*, 24)

Ever since that time, he has yearned for the utter East, believing that Aslan's country is there. He is glad to join King Caspian's voyage to the east because he thinks it is the way for realization of his lifelong dream. He rejoices to hear that in order to wake three Narnian lords from enchanted sleep, King Caspian has to sail as near to the world's end as he can and leave at least one member of his crew there. It is said that the one who is to be left behind "must go on into the utter east and never return into the world." Reepicheep then eagerly insists that he should be the one who is to be left, saying, "That is my heart's desire" (*Dawn Treader*, 175). The firmness of his determination to go to Aslan's country is expressed in his words on his parting from others.

While I can, I sail east in the Dawn Treader. When she fails me, I paddle east in my coracle. When she sinks, I shall swim east with my four paws. And when I can swim no longer, if I have not reached Aslan's country, or shot over the edge of the world in some vast cataract, I shall sink with my

²⁴ Plato, *Phaedrus*, pp. 483-485.

nose to the sunrise[...] (*Dawn Treader*, 180)

This obstinacy and courage in the pursuit of Aslan's country, against every possible hardship, take him there at the end of the voyage.

<Courage>

It is significant that Reepicheep, who is the first in the Chronicles to go to Aslan's country is so courageous. In fact, his first characteristic has been courageousness all his life. When Caspian and his councils are discussing how to fight with Miraz, Reepicheep and his mice are the first that propose "storming Miraz in his own castle that very night" (*Caspian*, 77). During the voyage on the *Dawn Treader*, he jumps into the sea all by himself as soon as he sees a group of sea people with long spears in their hands, who look hostile. When the ship comes near the end of the sea, his courage as well as yearning for Aslan's country keeps him going without fear, while Caspian and Edmund show a little hesitation because no one knows what is beyond that end. Furthermore, Reepicheep chivalrously values his honour most, which fortifies his courageous attitudes although he cares for his honour rather excessively that once Aslan tells him, "I have sometimes wondered, friend, [...] whether you do not think too much about your honour" (*Caspian*, 177). Too much concern about one's honour can lead to pride, and Aslan is here warning against it, reminding him that his honour must not be the primary thing. Yet, Aslan does so affectionately, as he knows Reepicheep is not proud of his honour though he much values it and that he is firmly on the right way.

In any case, courage is regarded as a necessary condition if one wants to follow Aslan as far as his country. When Susan has failed to see Aslan in the wood because of her unconscious desire to avoid taking the harder road to him, Aslan tells her, "You have listened to fears, child" (*Caspian*, 133). Without courage, it is difficult to overcome hardships and keep following Aslan.

In *Mere Christianity*, Lewis tells us that the “Fortitude,” or courage, enunciated as a “Cardinal” virtue in Christianity includes not only the kind of courage to face danger but also the courage to stick to virtues under hardships. He says, “You will notice, of course, that you cannot practice any of the other virtues very long without bringing this one [i.e. Fortitude] into play” (*Mere Christianity*, 73). Susan is an example of those who thus sometimes fail to follow God even though fundamentally having faith and love for him.

<The door to Aslan’s country>

On the other hand, while one needs courage and faith, the way to enter Aslan’s country is at least open to everyone of every world, to humans as well as to Narnians. When Aslan sends Lucy and Edmund back to the human world, he says to her, who says she will miss him in her world,

But you shall meet me, dear one [...] But there I have another name. You must learn to know me by that name. This was the very reason why you were brought to Narnia, that by knowing me here for a little, you may know me better there. (*Dawn Treader*, 209)

These words imply that God, Jesus and Aslan are all one under the different names. Lewis believes in God’s Incarnation as a myth that became a fact. As R. J. Reilly points out, not only Narnia but in the human history, too, after the Incarnation,

fact and myth do not necessarily exclude each other; pre-Christian myth (as in Lewis’s scale) may be largely non-factual, but post-Christian history will be not only factual but still mythic as well.²⁵

What Aslan says above is that when we have an eye of faith we will meet him

²⁵ R. J. Reilly, *Romantic Religion: A Study of Barfield, Lewis, Williams, and Tolkien* (Univ. of Georgia Press, 1971), p.115.

here in this world, too. Aslan says, “There is a way into my country from all the worlds” (209).

John Hick, who has seen people in many races holding different religions and seem to be saved by their religious belief and practices, says in *The Metaphor of God Incarnate* that “although our age is increasingly post-traditionally Christian, it may well be receptive to a non-traditional Christianity centred upon the universally relevant religious experience and ethical insights of Jesus when these are freed from the mass of ecclesiastical dogmas and practices [...] Unlike the traditional version, such a non-traditional Christianity must of course see itself, not as the one and only ‘true religion’, but as one authentic spiritual path among others, open to influences from the wider religious experience of humankind.”²⁶

Although Lewis himself firmly believes that Christianity is the only way to salvation, in Narnia, he perhaps unintentionally heralds the movement of today’s multi-cultural, multi-religious movement. When Lucy asks Aslan how to get to his country from the human world, he says,

I shall be telling you all the time [...] But I will not tell you how long or short the way will be; only that it lies across a river. But do not fear that, for I am the great Bridge Builder. (*Dawn Treader*, 209.)

For us human beings, the way to Aslan’s country, or heaven, will open when we die, that is, when we go across the river. Yet, Narnian people, for whom Aslan’s country is not metaphysical but is in the same spatio-temporal dimension, can go there even without once dying. For them, doors to heaven are hidden in quite ordinary places. In *The Last Battle*, for instance, those who keep faith in Aslan find Aslan’s country in a stable, where those who disbelieve him find nothing extraordinary. Then, the fact that it is hidden thus from the unfaithful people emphasizes again the importance of having an inner eye of faith.

²⁶ John Hick, *The Metaphor of God Incarnate* (SCM,1993), pp. 13-14.

Aslan's country is like Plato's world of Idea. In it, Narnia looks just like the old Narnia but holds deeper reality; only it is more real. Lewis compares the new Narnia in Aslan's country to the world reflected in a looking-glass.

the scene in the mirror, or the valley in the mirror, were in one sense just the same as the real²⁷ one: yet at the same time they were somehow different--deeper, more wonderful, more like places in a story: in a story you have never heard but very much want to know. The difference between the old Narnia and the new Narnia was like that. The new one was a deeper country: every rock and flower and blade of grass looked as if it meant more. (*Last Battle*, 155-156)

Looking at the new Narnia, Digory says, "It's all in Plato, all in Plato" (*Last Battle*, 154). It is the real country of which our world is only "the Shadowlands" (*Last Battle*, 165). It might seem peculiar that Lewis sees the world in the mirror more real than our actual world, but it is probably an influence of the medieval model of the universe that he has studied as a literary scholar. In *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Literature*, Lewis says that the Medieval mythical model of the world is "our universe inside out" (*Studies*, 62). Conversely, if our universe is inside out, it also follows that, another world which opens inside this actual world naturally seems greater, or sometimes more significant. The light of the sky which is outer than the earth in our universe is shining inside in the Real World. Thus, in the eschatological scene in *The Last Battle*, Jewel, the unicorn, leads the others farther and farther into Aslan's country, crying, "Come farther up, come father in!" (144, 155-157)

In the new Narnia Lucy finds a garden up the hill. Inside it she recognizes yet another Narnia which looks just like the first new Narnia that she has found in the Aslan's country.

²⁷ In this context "real" means "actual" and not in Platonic sense of having idealistic reality.

Lucy looked hard at the garden and saw that it was not really a garden at all but a whole world, with its own rivers and woods and sea and mountains. But they were not strange: she knew them all.

‘I see,’ she said. ‘This is still Narnia, and, more real and more beautiful than the Narnia down below, just as it was more real and more beautiful than the Narnia outside the Stable door! I see...world within world, Narnia within Narnia...’

‘Yes,’ said Mr Tumnus, ‘like an onion: except that as you go in and in, each circle is larger than the last.’ (*Last Battle*, 162-163)

Thus, in the Real World, such as Aslan’s country, what is in the smallest innermost point can also be the greatest. This is sometimes true also in our actual world, when we consider the meaning of things: the innermost things often have the most precious meaning. Seeing the new Narnia in the stable, Lucy reminds us of Christ’s Incarnation:

In our world too, a Stable once had something inside it that is bigger than our whole world. (*Last Battle*, 128)

Here Kathryn Lindskoog sees Lewis’s claim “that everywhere the great enters the little, and that its power to do so almost proves its greatness.”²⁸ Hope in the Chronicles is the hope for such a meaningful country of Aslan that lies inside of and at the same time further up the Narnian world.

Besides, Aslan’s country is also something like the empirical heaven that surrounds the whole cosmos in the Ptolemaic world picture. In the New Narnia, Lucy finds that “the huge mountain which they had called Aslan’s country” is “part of a great chain of mountains which ringed round the whole world.” (*Last Battle*, 163). In the medieval picture of the universe, the empirical heaven which is spacially the most outside has the most profound, greatest significance. Likewise, Aslan’s country which is the most meaningful is, while in the deepest

²⁸ Kathryn Lindskoog, *C. S. Lewis, Mere Christian* (1973; rev. Inter Varsity Press, 1981), p. 39.

and highest part of the New Narnia, paradoxically, at the outermost as well. What is significant here is that, for those who, like Lucy, has real eyes to see, such outermost reality is not at all a far away thing. She finds “whatever she looked at, however far away it might be, once she had fixed her eyes steadily on it, became quite clear and close as if she were looking through a telescope” (*Last Battle*, 163). As Lucy’s words above suggest, in our world, too, things and moments of great importance may be hidden in a quite ordinary place and time, and we may notice them if our minds are open; and once we notice them, however far away they may seem at first, if we keep our eyes on them, they will become near and clear to us.

V Disbelief

Yuko Noro sees the theme of *Prince Caspian* as the battle against disbelief.²⁹ Caspian says to Trumpkin who asks ‘But who believes in Aslan nowadays?’

I do,[...] And if I hadn’t believed in him before, I would now. Back there among the Humans the people who laughed at Aslan would have laughed at stories about Talking Beasts and Dwarfs. Sometimes I did wonder if there really was such a person as Aslan: But then sometimes I wondered if there were really people like you. Yet there you are. (65)

<Open scepticism>

Though most of the inhabitants of Narnia believe in Aslan, there are a few that are sceptical about him. Trumpkin in *Prince Caspian*, who is a dwarf and subject of Caspian, is one of the few that take Aslan for a superstition. When Caspian is going to blow the magic horn which is believed to bring Aslan’s help, Trumpkin does not believe its power and says to the prince, “Your Majesty knows I think the Horn [...] and your great King Peter--and your Lion Aslan--are all eggs in moonshine”(85-86).

And yet, his scepticism is different from a settled disbelief. He eventually meets Aslan and comes to believe in him. When he first sees Aslan, though he is afraid of him, he totters towards him instead of getting away. This is a deed of self-surrender. At a glance, he apprehends the authority of Aslan as the Lord and follows him at once. We can say from this that, since, as we have seen above,³⁰

²⁹ Yuko Noro(野呂有子) “Prince Caspian—Fighting against disbelief”(『カスピアン王子のつのぶえ』——不信との戦い——) in Kazumi Yamagata(山形和美), Kazuo Takeno(竹野一雄) eds., *A Reader’s Guide to the Chronicles of Narnia*, (Kokken (国研出版, 1988), pp. 123-141.

³⁰ Cf. this chapter, section II “Faith”, pp. 282-283 above.

only those who are ready to trust in Aslan have an inward eye to recognize him as the Lord, Trumpkin is a type who is already on the way to faith even while he is still doubting Aslan's existence.

Virtually, Trumpkin has already been obeying Aslan since the time when he was still a sceptic. Having once told the Prince that he thinks Aslan and the magic of the horn to be mere superstitions, when he sees the Prince still keep his belief in Aslan and in the power of magic horn, he not only agrees that the Prince should blow it but also willingly offers to go on an errand to meet the saviour or saviours who are expected to come by the magic. He says,

I know the difference between giving advice and taking orders. You've had my advice, and now it's the time for orders. (87)

Through this obedience, he is obeying Aslan through Caspian. It is this readiness to act in obedience to the orders of the one he has once decided to follow, even in face of occasional doubt about the virtue of the orders, that is characteristic of him and that eventually leads him to the faith in Aslan. When he meets Peter, Susan, Edmund and Lucy who have been drawn to Narnia by the horn, he does not at once recognize their capacity as saviours, since they appear to be merely ordinary children. But once he finds their fighting ability in archery and sword to be even stronger than his, he comes to believe that they are the true ancient Kings and Queens brought back by the magic as saviours; and once he believes, he becomes a most faithful subject of the four children.

Trumpkin's scepticism, then, can be called "open scepticism". It is scepticism of those who have an open mind, ready to admit the mistake in its disbelief and accept belief when sufficient evidence turns up.

<Closed scepticism>

On the other hand, there is such scepticism as can be called "closed

scepticism” that would never lead to faith. Nikabrik, who is also a dwarf, is one with this sort of scepticism. He somehow misconceives that the dwarfs are not treated rightly in the Narnian society, and this misconception has nurtured hostile feelings in him towards other species. His inner hostility keeps him from collaboration and sympathy with others in the critical moment of his country. He thinks that they might as well call on the Witch for help if the Witch could be stronger than Aslan. If the Witch is evil and Aslan is good, it does not matter to him at all. In that sense, he is amoral. The only thing that is important to him is such power as will be strong enough to bring his party victory. Besides, he doubts that Aslan is really on their side. When the help does not come for some time after Caspian has blown the horn, he says to the Prince,

If there ever was a High King Peter and a Queen Susan and a King Edmund and a Queen Lucy, then either they have not heard us, or they cannot come, or they are our enemies [...] Either Aslan is dead, or he is not on our side. Or else something stronger than himself keeps him back. And if he did come--how do we know he'd be our friend? (*Caspian*, 143-144)

When he says this, he has brought two friends with him, who are allegorical figures of “hatred” and “hunger” that express Nikabrik’s inner hatred and dissatisfaction. He projects these negative hostile feelings on other people and suspects enemies in Peter, Susan, Edmund, Lucy and Aslan, for those who are fundamentally opposed to the outer world should necessarily see enemies everywhere. After all, Nikabrik is killed by Edmund and Caspian who prevent him from calling up the Witch by black magic. Hatred makes people go astray. Caspian shows sympathy for Nikabrik who died out of hatred.

I am sorry for Nikabrik [...] though he hated me from the first moment he saw me. He had gone sour inside from long suffering and hating. If we had won quickly he might have become a good Dwarf in the days of peace. (149)

His scepticism is in clear contrast with the firm faith of Trufflehunter, a badger. Trufflehunter never doubts the power of the horn when the help they are expecting does not come soon. He says, “The help will come [...] I stand by Aslan. Have patience, like us beasts. The help will come” (*Caspian*, 141).

In Narnia, animals are often more faithful than man and dwarfs. The animals who believe do so firmly to the end. Trufflehunter takes such obstinacy in belief for granted. He says.

No credit to me, your Majesty, I’m a beast and we don’t change. I’m a badger, what’s more, and we hold on. (149)

There is nothing proud about him here. The fact that men and dwarfs often fall into scepticism when animals hold on to faith shows that in Narnia, man is not necessarily superior to animals.

The most obstinate sceptics in the Chronicles are the dwarfs in *The Last Battle*. When they have once been deceived by Shift, they become determined no longer to believe in anyone rather than believe and be deceived again. Even when they meet the real Aslan, they reject him, saying,

No thanks. We’ve been fooled once and we’re not going to be fooled again. (69)

They have decided to live their own life not depending on any authority, and thus closed by themselves the way to faith.

Their principle now is: “The Dwarfs are for the Dwarfs” (135). Here, Lewis again follows St. Augustine to see man’s original sin as essentially the sin of falling away from God in an attempt to be on his own.³¹ The dwarfs with this principle are guilty of the same sin as Adam’s. They see only darkness even when they are in the bright field that leads to Aslan’s country, and this is because

of this sin. In *Mere Christianity*, Lewis says,

God [...] shows much more of Himself to some people than to others--not because He has favourites, but because it is impossible for Him to show Himself to a man whose whole mind and character are in the wrong condition. (140)

Those who reject Aslan cannot recognize any blessing Aslan is offering to them. So it is natural that they cannot enjoy anything good in Narnia, for every good thing in that world comes from its creator Aslan. Dwarfs therefore have come to see no any light when they have closed their spiritual eyes to him. Lucy feels sorry for them and asks Aslan to do something for them. Yet, while Aslan treats them to a great feast on her request, he says to her, "I will show you both what I can, and what I cannot, do" (*Last Battle*, 134). When the dishes, such as pies, tongues and good wine, appear, they eat and drink, but they taste like a raw cabbage leaf or an old turnip or dirty water. Here again, it is shown that by rejecting Aslan altogether, they have abandoned the capacity for tasting Aslan's blessing properly. They physically receive the food, but cannot receive spiritual good, that is the enjoyment of eating, which is to accompany the physical good. Aslan says of them who have spiritually imprisoned themselves in the darkness:

They will not let us help them. They have chosen cunning instead of belief. Their prison is only in their own minds, yet they are in that prison; and so afraid of being taken in that they cannot be taken out.(135)

William James in his *The Will to Believe* stresses the importance of the will to believe in God, pointing out that in our relation to God we cannot remain neutral:

We cannot escape the issue by remaining sceptical and waiting for more light, because, although we do avoid error in that way if religion be untrue, we lose the good, if it be true, just as certainly as if we positively chose to

³¹ Cf. St. Augustine, *City of God*, p. 477.

disbelieve.[...] Scepticism, then, is not avoidance of option; it is option of a certain particular kind of risk. Better risk loss of truth than chance of error,—that is your faith-vetoer’s exact position.³²

The dwarfs, who “have chosen cunning instead of belief” are precisely among such faith vetoers as are debunked by James. After all, the dwarfs never again accept Aslan either as their Lord nor as their Creator, nor enter Aslan’s country. This is the result of their closed scepticism.

<Scepticism about Aslan’s goodness>

The scepticism of Trumpkin and Nikabrik is about Aslan’s existence and power as the saviour. In *The Last Battle*, the King Tirian and others suffer from another kind of scepticism, that is, scepticism about Aslan’s goodness.

The wicked ape, Shift, pretends to be Aslan’s priest and begins to have the animated Narnian trees cut down and sold to Calormen. As the trees are cut down one by one, the dryad of each tree falls dead, crying for help from Tirian, the King. Tirian also hears that a Narnian horse was harnessed and whipped by a Calormene. When he hears that these awful deeds were all done by Aslan’s order, he cannot but lose confidence about the nature of Aslan’s goodness. When his unicorn Jewel asks him how Aslan could command such dreadful things, he can only say,

He is not a tame Lion [...] How should we know what he could do? (28)

This is not the expression of his doubt about the righteousness or rationality of Aslan. Neither does he doubt that Aslan is the absolute Lord. Yet, he has now come to fear that Aslan’s absolute transcendence and freedom beyond all

³² William James, *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy* (Longmans Green, 1898), p.26.

human prediction are such that Aslan's good might be something that has been called evil in human ethics. He says,

Do you think I care if Aslan dooms me to death? [...] That would be nothing, nothing at all. Would it not be better, to be dead than to have this horrible fear that Aslan has come and is not like the Aslan we have believed in and longed for? It is as if the sun rose one day and were a black sun. (28-29)

A man's concept of good and evil decides the way he lives. His ethical, moral, and much of his social principles depend on it. Therefore, if he comes to suspect that God's goodness might be different from what he has believed to be good, he should lose himself not knowing whether he should obey God or follow his own conscience. Thus, though Tirian is ready to obey Aslan whether or not Aslan's demands appear to him good, he fears that his ethical standards should be overturned. Tirian's doubt about Aslan is different from Nikabrik's. Nikabrik, though he suspects that Aslan might be their enemy, does not care whether Aslan is good or evil at all.

Tirian's doubt and fear are soon cleared when he has discovered Shift's tricks, and he is reassured that Aslan is good and absolute the same way as he has believed him to be. However, this problem of scepticism about Aslan's goodness deserves further consideration. Especially, the recognition that "He is not a tame lion," has a special importance when we consider Lewis's idea about God.

Throughout the Chronicles, it is emphasized that Aslan is "not tame." Already in *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe*, Lucy is told so. When she first hears that Aslan is a lion, she asks Mr. Beaver, "Then he isn't safe?" Then, Mr. Beaver definitely answers, "Safe?[...] don't you hear what Mrs Beaver tells you? Who said anything about safe? 'Course he isn't safe. But he's good. He's the King. I tell you" (*Lion*, 75).

Lewis's God is always awful as well as good. Jung thinks that God has an

evil side besides the three Persons,³³ but in Lewis's opinion God is awful because He is God of righteousness as well as God of love. He is not such a maternal, tender God, as is thought of by Shusaku Endo, a Japanese Catholic novelist.³⁴ Lewis is aware that in the Bible, "All the most terrifying texts come from the mouth of Our Lord" (*Dock*, 232). He says in *Letters to Malcolm* that "a safe god, a tame god, soon proclaims himself to any sound mind as a fantasy" (*Malcolm*, 76).

Lewis's God is described as "good and terrible" (*Lion*, 117). Martha Sammons points out, "This paradox of being at the same time both 'terrible' and 'good' is a key idea in Charles William's *Descent into Hell*, where 'terrible' means 'full of terror.'"³⁵ Thus, in *The Magician's Nephew*, when Polly and Digory first see Aslan, they are fascinated by Him, while at the same time afraid of Him.

[T]hey were terribly afraid it would turn and look at them, yet in some queer way they wished it would. (100)

In *The Last Battle*, the statement "He is not a tame lion" is repeated even three times in exactly the same words. In the first context, it refers to the complete freedom of Aslan, that his comings and goings are unpredictable by such things as movement of stars because he is "not a slave of the stars but their Maker" (20). This recognition of Aslan's freedom gradually comes to involve the fear that his freedom might be something tyrannous. When Tirian is dismayed at the news that Narnian trees are being cut down by Aslan's order and

³³ C. G. Jung, "Answer to Job," *Psychology and Religion: West and East*, vol. 11 of the *Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, second ed., tr. R. F. C. Hull, eds., Herbert Read, Michael Fordham, Gerhard Adler, and William McGuire (Princeton Univ. Press, 1969), p. 383 & pp. 423-424.

³⁴ Cf. e.g., Shusaku Endo (遠藤周作), *Silence* (『沈黙』) (Shincho(新潮社), 1981).

³⁵ Martha C. Sammons, *A Guide through Narnia*, p.76.

asks Jewel, "Is it possible?" Jewel answers him, "I don't know [...] He is not a tame Lion" (24).

In the third context, Tirian expresses his own doubt about Aslan's goodness, as we have seen above, that since Aslan is not tame, he might be totally beyond all the limited conception of mortal creatures, and then his goodness might not necessarily agree with such ideas of goodness as conceived by them.

From the ancient days of Greece, man has been asking questions about God's goodness as well as His existence. Lewis summarizes the problem in *The Problem of Pain*:

If God were good, He would wish to make His creatures perfectly happy, and if God were almighty He would be able to do what He wished. But the creatures are not happy. Therefore God lacks either goodness, or power, or both. (14)

Even if evil is theoretically explained, for example, by the orthodox Augustinian doctrine of Free Will,³⁶ actually men do not think of their own miseries or unhappiness in terms of Adam's fall when they are actually suffering.

This problem of pain leads to the problem of evil and suffering as we shall discuss in the next sections.

³⁶ St. Augustine, *City of God*, pp. 471-473 & 552-554; St. Augustine, *On Free Will*, Japanese tr. By Imaizumi and Izawa, pp. 67-69.

VI Evil in The Chronicles of Narnia

<Nature of Evil in the Chronicles>

As is always the case in Lewis's works, the core of evil nature in the Chronicles is pride. Especially, self-centredness of those who are proud is emphatically illustrated.

In the Chronicles, the one that is most proud is Queen Jadis, the Witch, in *The Magician's Nephew*. She has made war with her sister for the throne, and, finding it hard to win, ruined her sister together with the whole world by destructive spells of magic. She would rather destroy everything than let others dominate it. When she has ruined the world, however, she does not feel guilty at all. In her opinion, the one to blame is her sister. She says,

It was my sister's fault.[...] At any moment I was ready to make peace--yes, and to spare her life too, if she would yield me the throne. But she would not. Her pride has destroyed the whole world. (*Magician's*, 59-60)

Actually, it is Jadis herself who is proud. A proud man, or woman, would find it unbearable to see any other person assume a superior position to him- or herself.

In *The Magician's Nephew*, Uncle Andrew is presented as another proud person. Likewise as Jadis, he is self-centred, and thinks himself to be especially privileged to do anything. He does not care whether or not others may suffer from it at all. He says to Digory,

Men like me, who possess hidden wisdom, are freed from common rules just as we are cut off from common pleasures. Ours, my boy, is a high and lonely destiny. (*Magician's*, 23)

Digory at once sees through Andrew's conceit and says to himself, "all it means [...] is that he thinks he can do anything he likes to get anything he wants"

(*Magician's*, 24). Andrew, who regards himself as above all laws, is practically amoral and does not feel guilty when he kills guinea-pigs in his experiment. In his opinion, he has a proper right to do so because they are his own, which he bought for himself. To him they are no more than materials for his experiment. He does not see these animals as God's creatures that have been given right to live. Not only that, he even uses human children for his experiment as if they, too, were nothing but materials. In order to prove that his magic rings really have power to send people into other worlds, he tries one of them on Polly by deception, and that, without having any guilty conscience. He gives it to her as if it were an ordinary ornamental ring and has her put it. When Polly has disappeared from his room, though Digory condemns him for playing such a nasty trick on a girl, he even boasts about himself:

I am the great scholar, the magician, the adept, who is doing the experiment. Of course I need subjects to do it on. (27)

He treats her as an object, having abandoned humane relationship with her. He sees others not in what Martin Buber calls an "*Ich und Du*" relationship but in that of "*Ich und Es*."³⁷

Besides, here we see Lewis's criticism of experiments on living animals in laboratories. In a pamphlet, "Vivisection," he says that those who vivisect animals are usually materialists who do not believe that animals have souls. Yet, he also points out that the very same materialists in other contexts often do not see any radical difference between man and the other animals.

Once the old Christian idea of a total difference in kind between man and beast has been abandoned, then no argument for experiments on animals can be found which is not also an argument for experiments on inferior men. If we cut up beasts simply because they cannot prevent us and because we are backing our own side in the struggle for existence, it is only logical to

³⁷ Martin Buber, *Ich und Du* (Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1979), p. 9 et passim.

cut up imbeciles, criminals, enemies, or capitalists for the same reasons. Indeed, experiments on men have already begun. We all hear that Nazi scientists have done them. We all suspect that our own scientists may begin to do so, in secret, at any moment. (*Dock*, 227)

One of the characteristics of fairy tales is that, in them, evil can be shown, without seeming unrealistic, in such an emphatic and visible form as it would never be seen in our actual life. Here also, Andrew's false logic is presented in such emphasized words as cannot be heard other than in stories. But we may as well notice that the same sort of logic as Andrew's sometimes passes for valid in our actual life, where experiments are made on animals, or even on human beings as in hospitals and various other places. Only, in our world, the evil is hidden under the pretext, for example, of the contribution to the progress of science or medical treatment.

The self-justification of Jadis for having destroyed the world with all the people in it is exactly the same as Andrew's. The people of Charn are her people, and because they are her own, she has a legitimate right to kill them if she likes. She says to Digory,

You must learn, child, that what would be wrong for you or for any of the common people is not wrong in a great Queen such as I. The weight of the world is on our shoulders. We must be freed from all rules. Ours is a high and lonely destiny. (*Magician's*, 61)

Though the queen looks more majestic and her words at first sound truer than Andrew's, Digory soon sees that what she is saying is nothing different from what his uncle said. Jadis and Andrew are wrong in believing that the one who is in a position above others and has powers to control their destiny has a right to do anything to them. They have abandoned the moral law, or the laws of human nature, which one must keep in order to remain human. Through their pride, Jadis and Andrew have strayed out of the natural way, and gone outside of

humanity.

In our life, men sometimes approve of pride when it seems to be an expression of self-respect. However, in *The Chronicles of Narnia*, as in any other writing of Lewis, pride is without exception treated as serious evil and it is never regarded so trivial as can be condoned. For instance, it is only a little bit of pride on the part of Jill that makes her show off on the cliff and causes Eustace fall off, and yet she has to make up for it later by carrying out a task given by Aslan. In *The Magician's Nephew*, Digory strikes the mysterious bell to see what would happen, though he knows by a warning poem that the stroke might bring about something terrible. Jill has tried to stop him, but his curiosity has been too strong. Curiosity is one of Digory's characteristics and in itself not a bad thing. When grown up, certainly because of this keen desire for knowledge, he becomes "a famous learned man, a professor, and a great traveller" (*Magician's*, 170-171). However, too much curiosity is a wish to overreach human limitations and a sin known as hubris ever since the days of Sophocles. As with the case of Oedipus, Digory wants to know even what he should not know. As a result, he wakes Jadis from an enchanted sleep and causes her to come into Narnia. The same as Jill, Digory has to atone for the sin by carrying out a task which is assigned by Aslan. Lewis says in *The Problem of Pain*, "The guilt is washed out not by time but by repentance and the blood of Christ" (49). Passing of time, alone, does not take away any man's sin. A man who has committed a sin needs to make up for it before he can get atonement. In Narnia this is the same.

In *The Horse and his Boy*, pride of Aravis and Bree shows off its falsity in contrast to the humble modesty of Shasta and Hwin. Aravis comes from a house of high rank in Calormen. Bree is a talking horse who has served as a war horse. They are both strongly conscious of their lineage and proud of it. However, their pride is in fact nothing more than vanity. At the city gate of Tashbaan Aravis

feels unhappy because she is in her disguise as a common travelling girl and not paid any reverence from the people of the city. She thinks she deserves more and complains to Shasta,

I ought to be riding in on a litter with soldiers before me and slaves behind, and perhaps going to a great feast in the Tisroc's palace (may he live for ever)--not sneaking in like this. It's different for you. (*Horse*, 51)

In this, we see “the sense of injur'd merit” which Lewis sees as a conspicuous characteristic of Milton's Satan.³⁸ Shasta does not understand her feeling.

Bree also vainly boasts to Hwin,

I think, Ma'am [...] that I know a little more about campaigns and forced marches and what a horse can stand than you do. (*Horse*, 117)

However, actually the stronger one is Hwin who insists on going even when Bree says he is too tired to walk. She says,

I feel just like Bree that I can't go on. But when Horses have humans (with spurs and things) on their backs, aren't they often made to go on when they're feeling like this? and then they find they can. I m-mean--oughtn't we to be able to do even more, now that we're free. It's all for Narnia. (*Horse*, 116-117)

Then, it is Shasta who runs by himself to help Aravis from a lion which is almost tearing her with its claws. That time Bree frees himself away from the danger, betraying his cowardice, and Aravis is saved by the one whom she has despised. Humbleness is the opposite of pride. It is a great virtue of Jesus who “humbled Himself and became obedient to the point of death, even the death of the cross” (Philippians 2:8 *NKJV*) while pride is the greatest vice of Satan. Shasta and Hwin are humble, but being humble does not lessen their courage in the face of hardship.

³⁸ John Milton, *Paradise Lost*, ed. Scott Elledge (Norton, 1975) I. 98: cf. Lewis,

It is the proud ones who are in reality weaker and inferior.

Bree's vanity is also seen in the fact that he is much too anxious about his appearance. As he was brought up in Calormen away from Narnia, he does not know much about the way talking horses behave themselves. When he comes near to Narnia, he gets nervous just because he is afraid that his manners would be different from those of other talking horses in Narnia so that he might look foolish among them. When he hears that in Narnia no one mounts a talking horse, he does not feel like rejoicing.

This reminded poor Bree again of how little he knew about Narnian customs and what dreadful mistakes he might make. So while Hwin strolled along in a happy dream, Bree got more nervous and more self-conscious with every step he took.[...] "Do Talking Horses roll? Supposing they don't? I can't bear to give it up."(*Horse*, 176)

Hwin, who is much wiser and less self-conscious, answers rightly:

I'm going to roll anyway [...] I don't suppose any of them will care two lumps of sugar whether you roll or not. (*Horse*, 176)

When Bree and Hwin meet Aslan and find him a real Lion, although they are both frightened, Hwin chooses to give herself up to Aslan. She said, "Please, [...], you're so beautiful. You may eat me if you like. I'd sooner be eaten by you than fed by anyone else" (*Horse*, 169). Gerald Reed here remarks, "Hwin's humility, presenting her body "a living sacrifice" (Rom. 12:1 *KJV*) to Aslan, was the key decision in her life."³⁹ Aslan answers to her with blessing, saying, "I knew you would not be long in coming to me" (169). And while Hwin's humility thus gives her courage to surrender herself to Aslan, Bree's pride only leads to cowardice which makes him run away. His fright is terrible all the more

Preface, pp. 95-96.

³⁹ Gerard Reed, *C. S. Lewis and the Bright Shadow of Holiness* (Beacon Hill

because he didn't expect Aslan to be a real lion but thought "the Lion" was only a metaphor to express Aslan's strength. He even told to Aravis, "Even a little girl like you, [...] must see that it would be quite absurd to suppose he is a *real* lion. Indeed it would be disrespectful" (*Horse*, 168). (This remark of Bree reminds us of the Episcopal Ghost in the *Great Divorce* who we saw above.)⁴⁰ Aslan tells him,

Now, Bree, [...] you poor, proud, frightened Horse, draw near. Nearer still, my son. Do not dare not to dare. Touch me. Smell me. Here are my paws, here is my tail, these are my whiskers. I am a true Beast. (*Horse*, 169)

This calling of Aslan makes Bree realize his self-conceit. Bree answers, "I'm afraid I must be rather a fool." Aslan approves this, saying, "Happy the Horse who knows that while he is still young. Or the Human either" (*Horse*, 169). This symbolically shows, as long as one is proud or self-conceitedly believes oneself wiser than one really is, one cannot even dare to come near to ultimate Reality, that is God, or, in Narnia, Aslan.

* * *

If pride is the greatest sin, and the essence of evil as Lewis conceives of, another conspicuous characteristic of evil is alienation from others, especially self-alienation from anything good. In *Letters to Malcolm*, Lewis writes, "*pleasures* are shafts of the glory as it strikes our sensibility" (89). All pleasures are from God, reflecting His glory. It is natural then that those who reject that source cannot possibly taste what comes from it. Therefore, those who reject Aslan in the Chronicles are cut off from enjoying pleasures. Thus, in *The Last Battle*, we have seen that the dwarfs who have chosen to live by themselves away from Aslan lose the power of enjoying the good as it really is, and taste the most

Press, 1999), p. 122

⁴⁰ See above, pp. 162-163 ; and Lewis's *Divorce*, p. 45.

delicious dishes as almost uneatable food. Then, for the same reason, they see nothing but darkness when they are bathed in the light which comes from Aslan's country (*Last Battle*, 131-132).

It is also the same with Andrew. He hears nothing but a lion's roaring when he is actually hearing Aslan's songs of creation. Although at first he nearly understood it to be a song, he hated the song and tried hard to make himself believe that it is only roaring so that eventually, he actually comes to hear it as he wanted. Lewis makes a comment on this:

Now the trouble about trying to make yourself stupider than you really are is that you very often succeed. (*Magician's*, 117)

God has given man the freedom of will, enabling him not to obey God. Andrew also has this freedom not to hear Aslan's voice. Though he is not exactly Aslan's creature, we may regard Andrew's attitude towards Aslan as an example of the way evil people behave themselves towards God, since Aslan once tells Lucy that he is also in our world under "another name" (*Dawn Treader*, 209), which we understand to be "God" or "Jesus Christ." Those who want to avoid encounter with God's reality, as Andrew who dislikes to hear Aslan's song, would in the end lose the power of seeing it.

Self-alienation from the good means not only alienation from good things but also from good people. When Andrew says to Digory, "Ours, my boy, is a high and lonely destiny" (*Magician's*, 23), he is right though only partly. He is indeed lonely but he is deceiving himself in regarding himself higher than other people. He is lonely not because he is surpassing others but just because he is self-alienated from them by seeing them not as human beings but as tools and materials to use. Edmund in *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe* is also in a state of alienation from the other children when he is bribed by the Witch with candies.

The most conspicuous example is Eustace Scrubb in *The Voyage of the 'Dawn Treader'*. He is so self-centred as to care nothing about other people. When drinking water is running short on board, he thinks it is quite fair that he should be provided enough even when the others are having their rations cut down. He tries to steal some water, and even in that act, actually believes he is right. He writes in his diary:

Woke up in the night *knowing* I was feverish and *must* have a drink of water. Any doctor would have said so. Heaven knows I'm the last person to try to get any unfair advantage but I never *dreamed* that this water-rationing would be meant to apply to a sick man. In fact I would have woken the others up and asked for some only I thought it would be selfish to wake them.[...] I always try to consider others whether they are nice to me or not. (66)

A really self-centred person like Eustace here sees everything by his own measure. It is always the others that are wrong. Therefore, he always thinks himself to be in the right even when it is obvious to the others that he is wrong. Eustace thinks others to be unfair and ill-natured to him when they actually treat him as well and kindly as they can. When he is sea-sick, Lucy comes to give him some cordial but he only aggressively growls to her, "Oh, go away and leave me alone" (28). He finds his room "the worst cabin of the boat, a perfect dungeon" and complains that he has to share it with Edmund and Caspian while Lucy, who is the only girl, keeps a room to herself (31).

About himself, he does not see any faults or weak points. For instance, though he is a coward, he does not admit it even to himself. He gets frightened when large waves wash the ship. Yet, finding the others take such waves for granted, he can even regard them as cowards with the following distorted logic:

I have seen the boat nearly go under any number of times. All the others pretend to take no notice of this, either from swank or because Harold [Eustace's father] says one of the most cowardly things ordinary people do

is to shut their eyes to Facts. (31)

As Jadis projects her own pride on her sister, Eustace projects his own self-centredness and cowardice on others. And thinking himself in every respect right while seeing others wrong in almost every point, he has alienated himself from them all. The fact that he turns into a dragon in an island shows this in a visible form. As Payne points out, "A dragon is not only a selfish monster that hoards treasures, but it is also a very lonely creature. One cause of its loneliness is that it likes nothing better to eat than fresh dragon as well as other animals and human beings."⁴¹ A dragon lives alone away from human society. It is a symbol of alienation from others. The figure of a dragon that Eustace has changed into is an externalization of his inner self which has been cut from all the others.

Besides, as C. N. Manlove points out "the islands are potential symbols of selfishness, cut off from one another."⁴² The voyage of the *Dawn Treader* can symbolically be seen as the children's pilgrimage of getting over the selfishness, and this is especially true of Eustace.

* * *

Another characteristic of evil that Lewis perceives is its effect to make people unable to distinguish the right from the wrong or to understand either of them while good people understand both. As Green Lady in *Perelandra* says, "it is waking that understands sleep and not sleep that understands waking" (*Perelandra*, 209), those who are in the wrong do not understand that they are wrong. For instance, Eustace writes his condemnation of others in his personal diary, which shows that he really believes in the faults of others. And this wrong belief strengthens the evil ones' self-centred conviction that everything they do is

⁴¹ Leanne Payne, *Real Presence*, p.64.

⁴² C. N. Manlove, *C. S. Lewis: His Literary Achievement* (Macmillan, 1987), p. 148.

approvable. Again, we see it is an intrinsic weakness of evil that it even lacks self-knowledge.

In Lewis's work, evil is always weaker than the good. Though in the Chronicles, evil fights against the good, and though the evil is never completely extinguished, it is always the evil side which is defeated in the end. For example, in *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe*, when Aslan comes into Narnia which has long been suspended in winter by the White Witch's magic, the spell is broken and snow begins to thaw even before Aslan works anything against the Witch. His mere presence is strong enough to break her magic. At one point she makes an agreement with Aslan that she will spare Edmund's life on the condition that Aslan be killed instead. However, when she tries to make sure that Aslan will keep his promise, she is fiercely growled at by him and cannot but run away for her life. Furthermore, though the Witch has once killed Aslan and appeared to have won, Aslan comes back to life, and she is defeated. After all, in killing Aslan as a sacrifice, she has done nothing but help Edmund's atonement. Once, Christianity says, Satan's temptation brought about Christ's Incarnation, Suffering, Death and Resurrection, which opened for every man possibility of becoming a son of God. In Narnia, too, the Witch's temptation of Edmund and following fall of him result in the good which she never expected. Here is again Lewis's favorite theme that evil becomes the Good's tool (cf. *Pain*, 99). Such an evil one as the Witch works for the good without any intention to do so.

Another characteristic of evil as Lewis conceives of is the loss of speaking ability. In the last of Lewis's science-fiction trilogy, *That Hideous Strength*, proper speech is taken away from the evil party of the N.I.C.E. (343-351). There, Lewis uses language as something which symbolizes the proper relation between the giver of the language, i.e. God, and the creatures who are given it. In Narnia, too, the power of speech is a token of blessing of and selection by Aslan. At the beginning of Narnia, Aslan chooses a pair from each species of animals and give

them words, giving a warning not to lose them:

Creatures, I give you yourselves.[...] The Dumb beasts whom I have not chosen are yours also. Treat them gently and cherish them but do not go back to their ways lest you cease to be Talking Beasts. For out of them you were taken and into them you can return. Do not so. (*Magician's*, 109)

Adam was made from earth, and when he disobeyed God, he was doomed to return to ashes. What Aslan tells the animals not to do is to turn away from him as Adam did from God. As long as they are Aslan's people they will hold speech. When they cease to be so, they should lose it. The loss of speech then shows the loss of his blessing. This is a sort of testament between Aslan and the beasts. Thus in *The Last Battle*, a cat named Ginger that pretends to believe in Aslan without any real faith, using Aslan's name in an act of cunning, goes dumb. For, by committing perjury and profanity, he has broken the original testament with Aslan.

When the creatures are wrong, even when they are not positively evil, their speech may be affected, if not altogether taken away. In *The Horse and his Boy*, when Shasta talks as if there is little difference between riding a horse and riding a donkey, Bree gets offended because he thinks himself to be better than donkeys. It is a sign of his pride, and because this pride is wrong, his words become more like the neighing of an ordinary horse, rather than speech.

Lewis depicts evil as unmistakably hateful and hideous, and often despicable and awkward as well. The Witches and Shift, for example, are wholly hateful, while Andrew, and Bree in his wrong moments, look absurd and despicable. As we have seen, Lewis finds one of the important role of literature in its "insisting on certain Stock themes--as that love is sweet, death bitter, virtue lovely, and children or gardens delightful" (*Preface*, 57). And those stock themes surely must include that evil is hideous and hateful. Besides, as Lewis says "mere Christianity commits every Christian to believing that 'the Devil is (in

the long run) an ass” (*Preface*, 95), it must be from his actual conviction, and not simply for amusing literary effects that he depicts his evil characters as often laughably absurd. David Holbrook criticizes Lewis for the hate which, Holbrook thinks, Lewis’s Narnia invokes in children. He says in his psychological study of Narnia,

There are parents who [...] found their children were unduly upset by them [i.e. “Narnia” books]. I even heard of one psychotherapist who would not allow his children to read the books because they were “so full of hate.”[...] However, there is one thing about which Lewis is always solemn and serious: the need to chastise. Throughout all his work there are passages that invite the enjoyment of hurting and humiliating others.[...] How is it that Lewis’s incitements to enjoy what, after all, seems to be cruelty has come to be accepted as a religious message, and good children’s fiction? Because, I believe, it is offered as having a “corrective” message; and also because it is especially directed to those who don’t believe. In a way it represents a kind of militant fundamentalism.⁴³

Yet I believe this remark of Holbrook is misleading. Even if Narnia is “so full of hate” against evil (though I myself feel that the overall atmosphere of Narnia is full of love and joy, not of hatred), the Chronicles will not give children, nor adult readers, “enjoyment” of hurting the evil ones. We see no characters in Narnia feel enjoyment of that sort, and neither would the readers if they are to sympathise, or identify themselves, with the characters. I should rather say, the Narnian books, by illustrating evil’s absurdity and weakness as well as its hatefulness, teaches children to learn the right courage to face the adverse conditions and evils of life.

⁴³ David Holbrook, *The Skeleton in the Wardrobe: C. S. Lewis’s Fantasies: A Phenomenological Study* (Associated University Presses, 1991), pp. 9&24-25.

VII The Problem of Suffering in Narnia

What is closely connected with the problem of evil is the problem of suffering.

Lewis has interpreted man's suffering as God's "megaphone to rouse a deaf world, "which calls men's attention back to God Himself, preventing man from settling in earthly happiness apart from Him (*Pain*, 81). Sometimes, Lewis compares God to a dentist who gives his patient pain in order to cure him (*Mere Christianity*, 169), or to an artist who never gets tired of rubbing and scraping so as to improve his work (*Pain*, 30-31). He says that we are as it were God's patients or artefacts. And yet, when he has lost his beloved wife, Joy, of cancer, he finds it hard to keep such straight forward faith in God's goodness, though, as the case with Tirian, he does not doubt God's existence or genuine authority. Lewis's feelings of those days are expressed in *A Grief Observed*, written soon after Joy's death:

If God's goodness is inconsistent with hurting us, then either God is not good or there is no God: for in the only life we know He hurts us beyond our worst fears and beyond all we can imagine. If it is consistent with hurting us, then He may hurt us after death as unendurably as before it.[...] No, my real fear is not of materialism.[...] Sooner or later I must face the question in plain language. What reason have we, except our own desperate wishes, to believe that God is, by any standard we can conceive, 'good'? Doesn't all the *prima facie* evidence suggest exactly the opposite? What have we to set against it? (*Grief*, 25-26)

Eventually, Lewis resumes his trust in God as he has reflected on his sceptic feelings about God and found them to be testimony of weakness of his faith. Then he comes to understand the pain he has suffered from his wife's death as God's ordeal:

God has not been trying an experiment on my faith or love in order to find

out their quality. He knew it already. It was I who didn't.[...] He always knew that my temple was a house of cards. His only way of making me realize the fact was to knock it down. (*Grief*, pp. 42-43)

When everything seems all right, we tend to be contented with ourselves as well as with the world around us. However, it would be a self-deception to think that our earthly life apart from God is enough to make us happy. Yet, Lewis says, when we have pain we cannot deceive ourselves but are forced to reflect on what it is that is wrong with us. Through reflection, we might notice that it is God alone that can give us real lasting happiness. Consequently, pain will lead us to God.

In the Chronicles pain as Aslan's megaphone works on Eustace. He has been so self-centred that he could not have possibly heard others if they had tried to change him. However, when he has transformed into a dragon, he is forced to reflect on himself. As Payne says, "Eustace begins to experience how lonely it is to be a monster. He begins to realize what kind of person he has been."⁴⁴

He realized that he was a monster cut off from the whole human race. An appalling loneliness came over him. He began to see that the others had not really been fiends at all. He began to wonder if he himself had been such a nice person as he had always supposed. He longed for their voices. (*Dawn Treader*, 83)

After this recognition, he becomes considerate for the others, positively ready to help them. Thus, when he becomes a dragon outside, he becomes human inside. It is the first step for his regeneration. The pain of loneliness in his heart has been a "megaphone" to awake his humanity and conscience.

Conversely, it is also true that in the Chronicles where pain is Aslan's tribulation or "megaphone" for the good of the sufferers, it is only good people, or people belonging to Aslan, that have capacity for feeling pain in their heart. The

⁴⁴ Payne, p. 64.

evil ones, such as Jadis, Andrew and the White Witch never feel it. They are simply defeated by Aslan or physically perished.

* * *

Lewis follows St. Augustine in believing that the origin of evil and sufferings in this world is man's disobedience to God through misuse of free will. Yet as John Hick in his *Evil and the God of Love* points out, in the Christian tradition, there is another view of the problem of evil which is as noteworthy as that of St. Augustine. It is St. Irenaeus's view.⁴⁵ Irenaeus, alike with Augustine, sees original sin as the result of misuse of free will.⁴⁶ However, different from Augustine, who sees the original paradisaical state of man as nearly perfect, Irenaeus sees the man in his original state as infantile and imperfect. He thinks man is intended, by God, to grow into maturity through experiences.

God had the power to give man perfection from the beginning, but man was incapable of receiving it, because he was an infant.[...]

Man had received the knowledge of good and evil.[...] Through the magnanimity which God gave him, man has known both the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience, so that the eye of his mind, having experienced both, might with discernment choose the better, and be neither slothful nor neglectful of the commandment of God. He learns from experience that disobeying God, which robs him of life, is evil.[...] But how could he have discerned the good without knowing its opposite? For first-hand experience is more certain and reliable than conjecture.⁴⁷

In Irenaeus's view, experience of evil is even necessary to a man's spiritual growth. Therefore, it becomes natural that through the bitter experience and following tribulation, a man may come into the right relation with God. Although in Augustine's view, which Lewis follows in his avowedly Christian apologies,

⁴⁵ cf. John Hick, *Evil and the God of Love*, second ed. (Macmillan, 1970), passim.

⁴⁶ St. Irenaeus, *The Scandal of the Incarnation*, tr. John Saward, selected and introduced by Hans Urs von Balthasar (Ignatius, 1981), p.68.

⁴⁷ Irenaeus, (IV, 38,1 & 39.1), pp. 66 & 68.

there seems no necessity of tribulation for a man's salvation, in the Chronicles, Lewis takes in Irenaeus's view of suffering as well and treats tribulation also as God's tool for the spiritual growth of the creatures. Evil causes suffering, but Aslan also makes people suffer when it is necessary. As in the Old Testament Yahweh has given the people of Israel a lot of sufferings and tribulations, so Aslan also gives the chosen ones hard times for their good. This is especially true of Shasta, who does not seem to have committed any particular sin to atone for when he is given a hard task by Aslan.

The task is to run to the King Lune of Archenland to tell him that Rabadash, the Prince of Calormen, is invading Archenland so as to make it a foothold to make war with Narnia. Shasta is at that time exhausted from fighting with a lion to save Aravis's life, but he has to do the errand all the same.

Shasta's heart fainted[...] for he felt he had no strength left. And he writhed inside at what seemed the cruelty and unfairness of the demand. He had not yet learned that if you do one good deed your reward usually is to be set to do another and harder and better one. (*Horse*, p.124)

Shasta's suffering here is taken as good for his own spiritual growth as well as for the good of Archenland.

Likewise, Digory also grows through suffering. In the Chronicles, suffering is often tribulation *as well as* redemption of a sin. In order to keep Jadis, the Witch, whom he brought into the Narnian world out of Narnia, Digory has to go to the paradisaical garden on Aslan's errand to take a magic apple. At the tree, he meets the Witch, who tries to seduce him to take one for his mother instead of bringing it back to Aslan. It is a great temptation for him because his mother is now ill in death bed and the magic apple would cure her. The errand is, first of all, redemption of his sin to have brought evil, i.e. Jadis, into Narnia. Yet at the same time, it is a tribulation for him. After a severe inner conflict, he finally rejects the Witch's words and comes back to Narnia with an apple, without

having taken one for his mother or for himself, for he knows that his mother would approve him of keeping his promise with Aslan, rather than of getting her the healing apple in the wrong way. When he meets Aslan again for the first time after the errand, he finds himself having changed. "This time he found he could look straight into the Lion's eyes. He had forgotten his troubles and felt absolutely content" (*Magician's*, 154). It shows that through the hard task he has made atonement for his sin of too much curiosity and resumed the right relationship with Aslan.

Jill in *The Silver Chair* also grows through her task of rescuing Rilian, acquiring humbleness to admit her fault in neglecting Aslan's order, and learns to believe in Aslan even when he does not seem to exist. The hard task is a tribulation for her as well as the atonement for her pride that made Eustace fall off the cliff.

It is important that Jill and Digory get helps from Aslan in their tasks. Jill is given signs and a great helper Puddleglum, and Digory is given Fledge, a winged horse to carry him. Aslan calls for atonement, but at the same time helps people in making it. Furthermore, when Digory has lost the hope of curing his mother and is feeling desperately sad, Aslan rewards him for his suffering and honesty with a magic apple. The apple is a gift that is more than Digory deserves. Yet, it is also given rightly. Aslan tells Digory that if he had stolen an apple in the garden, it would have cured his mother, but things more terrible than death would have fallen on her and Digory. He says also that now that the apple is given properly from his own hands, it will bring her joyful happiness. Here we see another important conviction of Lewis that though God demands people to make up for their sins, when the atonement has been made, He gives them more than they deserve. God is not only just but more than just—this we shall see as a central theme in his last novel *Till We Have Faces*.

When we think of Aslan's love that is more than justice, we must think of

his death for Edmund. Edmund would have been killed by the Witch as the result of his sin of betrayal. As the Witch reminds Aslan, “every traitor belongs to me as my lawful prey and that for every treachery I have a right to a kill”, that is the law fixed by “the Magic which the Emperor put into Narnia at the very beginning” (*Lion*, 128). Yet, though Witch does not know herself while boasting to be the executioner, even in that apparently merciless law, there is a hidden mercy of God, for it is not necessarily to be the traitor (in this case Edmund) himself that should be killed; and in fact, it has been God the Emperor’s providence that Aslan should die for him. As the Witch says, her right is to “a” kill, not “the” killing of the traitor. And when Aslan prophesied in the creation of Narnia, “I will see to it that the worst falls upon myself” (*Magician’s*, 126), he is referring to his death to ransom Edmund. Furthermore, “though the Witch knew the Deep Magic, there is a magic deeper still which she did not know.[...] that when a willing victim who had committed no treachery was killed in a traitor’s stead, the Table would crack and Death itself would start working backwards” (*Lion*, 148). This deeper magic is, as Kayoko Kawasaki remarks, surpassing the Deep Magic, while fulfilling it.⁴⁸ Aslan has come to Narnia to fulfill the law just as Christ has “not come to destroy but to fulfill” the law (Matthew, 5:17, *NKJV*).

In Narnia, the deeper magic of love has been there since before the dawn of time when the deep magic of the law was set. This signifies that love is more fundamental and of more radical importance than the law of justice. The law is for the peace of the world and cannot have been there before the world; yet the love of God is eternal and the first principle of all the relations. St. John says “God is Love” (I John, 4:8) and Lewis in *The Four Loves* also stresses the same

⁴⁸ Kayoko Kawasaki(川崎佳代子) “The Lion and the Witch—An Adventure of the Wordrobe” (『ライオンと魔女』—衣装だんすの冒険) in Yamagata and Takeno eds., *A Readers Guide to the Chronicles of Narnia* (『ナルニア国年代記』)

by calling God “Love Himself” (7). Besides, what is also important about Aslan’s death is, as John Willis points out, “Aslan died only for the boy Edmund. Similarly, the passion of Christ must be understood as applying to the single individual. It would be quite false to infer that the extreme suffering of the Passion was due to the large number of people who needed saving. It would have been just the same even if only one individual had been involved.”⁴⁹

Thus, Aslan’s relation to the creatures is also individual, and since Aslan does not destroy but fulfills the law, not only does he show mercy to everyone that obeys the law but also does he do justice to every individual, and that, without breaking even natural (i.e. scientific physical) laws of cause and effect. The Witch had an apple by stealing it but Aslan does not prevent it from bringing her eternal life. Yet, it does not make her happy. He says,

Things always work according to their nature. She has won her heart’s desire; she has unwearing strength and endless days like a goddess. But length of days with an evil heart is only length of misery and already she begins to know it. All get what they want: they do not always like it. (*Magician’s*, 162)

Lewis shows that nothing in Nature is in itself good or bad or evil. Each is good when it is used properly and in right relation with God; it becomes evil when its relation with God goes wrong or when it is used wrong way. Here, the apple goes evil for the Witch who has got it wrongly. It makes her suffer, while it works good for Digory and his mother who have got it rightly.

読本』, p. 117.

⁴⁹ John Randolph Willis, *Pleasures Forevermore*, p. 67.

Chapter 6

Till We Have Faces: A Myth Retold (1956)

-----Lewis's Last Fiction: Attainment of Reality

<Introduction>

All Lewis's fiction and stories have been concerned with the World of Reality, or heaven, and with man's attainment of it. As we have seen, in *The Great Divorce*, Lewis writes, "Heaven is reality itself. All that is fully real is Heavenly" (69), and describes Heaven as a firm, concrete, objective Reality. In *The Screwtape Letters*, the devil Screwtape tries to conceal from man not only the truth of Christianity but all kinds of reality: the real state of one's true self, the moral law of right and wrong, and above all, the existence of heaven which is the metaphysical, objective world. There, knowledge of reality is always assumed to be a way to the Real, or to God. The mythical world in the science-fiction trilogy, *Out of the Silent Planet*, *Perelandra* and *That Hideous Strength*, is an illustration of Lewis's concept of heaven. One of the most important themes of the trilogy is the antithesis of good and evil, which is an aspect of the ultimate reality and closely related with another main theme: the theme of salvation, or of regeneration in the Real World. In *The Chronicles of Narnia*, the right relation of the creatures to the Creator Aslan is a most important theme. In it, the Real World is called Aslan's country, which is the object of keen longing of many a character. At the eschatological end of the Narnian world, all good creatures find eternal life there.

Thus, Lewis consistently keeps on presenting us man's way to Reality. As a novel that deals with man's participation in that Reality, *Till We Have Faces* is the consummation of Lewis's imaginative works. In the earlier works, such as *The Chronicles of Narnia* or the science-fiction trilogy, main characters go so far

as to enter heaven and enjoy the life there, but, except for the Spirits in *The Great Divorce*, they do not yet really share the “Real,” objective, concrete existence of that World. They are still observers, though it is implied that they are soon to get in “farther up and farther in” as the people of Narnia at the end of their world (*Last Battle*, 144, 155-157) or, as Ransom at the end of the trilogy, be healed in heaven and become a part of it (*Hideous*, 367). In *Till We Have Faces*, however, the protagonist, Orual, finally regenerates as a “Real” woman in God’s country and literally acquires the true “Reality.”

Besides, in *Till We Have Faces*, several important themes and problems that Lewis has dealt with in the earlier works reappear as crucial problems in the process of Orual’s salvation, and are given solutions. Pride is the sin that Lewis always warns against as the greatest evil, and it is also presented here as the most serious factor of Orual’s fall. The problem of possessiveness of natural maternal love, which has been presented in *The Great Divorce*, is again presented here in *Till We Have Faces*. In *The Chronicles of Narnia*, the blindness of those who reject God is stressed and their incapacity for enjoying good is shown; and the same is true also in this work, resulting in the central catastrophe in the story. The honesty to the Lord, which is approved, for example, in Jill in *The Silver Chair* of the *Chronicles*, is also an essential condition of Orual’s salvation. Especially, man’s potentiality to partake of Reality is more manifestly expressed here than in any of the earlier works. With all these recurrences of important motifs, this is to be seen as the perfection of Lewis’s work.

Moreover, this work can also be seen as the consummation of Lewis’s approach to the Reality because in this story the knowledge of several aspects of the Reality--or realities--and the acquisition of that Reality, which have been regarded as separate matters in earlier works, are focused into the one point of the protagonist’s getting Reality in the whole sense. Orual’s recognition of God the ultimate Reality, her realization of the reality of her inmost guilty self, together

with her recognition of the true cause of ruin of her sister, Psyche, and the consequent salvation of Orual and her attainment of Reality, are closely united and achieved almost simultaneously.

Yet not only that, *Till We Have Faces* achieves the deepest psychological profundity of all Lewis's stories. Up to this novel all of Lewis's characters are either good or evil. Though some characters change from bad to good or vice versa, it is hard to find those who have aspects of both serious vices and strong virtues simultaneously. Plato's view that knowing good is one with being good¹ has been also true of Lewis. In his fiction, up to *Till We Have Faces*, evil lacks true knowledge of good and evil. In *Screwtape Letters*, in *Perelandra*, and in *That Hideous Strength*, the evil ones do not understand good, and in *The Chronicles of Narnia*, the evil ones are all self-conceited and do not know they are wrong. Indeed, there are no evil characters who well understand their evilness and yet keep on being evil. True self-recognition necessarily turns a man to good, which leads to his salvation, however sinful he may have been till he realizes his real self. Yet, in our actual life, there are a lot of people who know their own sinfulness and yet cannot get rid of it. St. Paul says, "For what I am doing, I do not understand. For what I will to do, that I do not practice; but what I hate, that I do" (Romans, 7:15, *NKJV*). As this is the universal situation of man, such a clear dichotomy as Lewis has presented so far seems too simple in actual life. Such simpleness is a characteristic of fantasy worlds, and perhaps has much to do with the fact that all his stories so far have been mythopoeic or written in the form of fantasy. The form of a novel demands more complex and, in a sense, more realistic treatment of the problem of good and evil. Now for the first time in *Till We Have Faces*, Lewis goes beyond such simple moral dichotomy and treats the matter more profoundly in the form of a novel, which is yet also

¹ Plato, *Plato V: The Republic I*, pp. 92-93.

mythopoeic.

* * *

Till We Have Faces is, as its subtitle *A Myth Retold* shows, a retold version of the myth of Cupid and Psyche, based on that story in *Metamorphoses* by Lucius Apuleius (ca. 123-ca.170). In Apuleius's version, the story goes as follows:

Once there was a king who had three beautiful princesses. Especially the beauty of the youngest, named Psyche, was such that the men of the country began to worship her instead of Venus. Venus got jealous of her for that, and ordered her son Cupid to make Psyche fall in love with the basest man in the world. Cupid, however, fell in love with her. On the other hand, it was decided by Apollo's oracle that Psyche should be offered to the God of the mountain in "deadly nuptial rites." It was said that she was to be the bride of some immortal thing, mischievous and fierce, who "flies through aether and with fire and sword/ Tires and debilitates all things that are."² The King and the Queen left her on the mountain in deep grief, lamenting that she should die there as a sacrifice. In the meantime, Cupid prepared a stately palace for Psyche and had the West-Wind carry her away from the mountain to the palace. There, he visited her by night, but forbade her to see his face.

After that, Psyche's two sisters went to the mountain to mourn for Psyche. Unexpectedly, however, they found Psyche alive in the god's palace. They burned with envy upon seeing the palace because it was far more splendid than theirs. Therefore, they conspired to rob Psyche of that happiness. They made her believe that her husband was a monstrous

² Apuleius, *The Golden Ass*, tr. Robert Graves (Farrar, Straus & Young, 1951), p. 100.

dragon and induced her to cut his head off by the light of a lamp while he was sleeping. When Psyche lit the lamp, however, she saw the glorious face of Cupid which was far from a hideous dragon. She was so fascinated by it that she gazed on him insatiably, till a drop of hot oil fell on his shoulder and woke him. Cupid, being aware of her betrayal, flew away without a word.

Psyche set off wandering in search of Cupid, while the two sisters were led to their death by deception and so revenged. Then, however, Psyche fell into Venus's hands. Venus set upon her a series of tasks which were meant to be impossible to finish, but she managed to carry them all out, each time with some unexpected miraculous help. In the end, she was made a goddess by Jupiter in order to marry Cupid who had already forgiven her. Venus also was reconciled with her and they were all happy ever after.

When rewriting the myth, Lewis has taken great liberties in altering Apuleius's version, as he says in the note to the text that in relation to his work, Apuleius is "'a source,' not an 'influence' nor a 'model'"(313). For instance, he has named the country Glome and calls the two elder sisters Orual and Redival, who have no names in Apuleius's version. He has also changed Psyche's name to Istra, and uses "Psyche" as the nickname used only by Orual. He has then newly introduced some important figures, such as the Fox, the tutor of the princesses, and Bardia, the captain of the King's guards, respectively a type of Greek rationalist and a naive, unsophisticated yet pious worshipper of the native goddess, Ungit (the Glome equivalent to Venus).

Furthermore, Lewis makes the mythical world of the gods spacially continuous with the actual human world. The gods' mountain is within a few

hours' journey from the King's palace. Thus myths and gods are as real as visible daily life to the people of Glome. With all these alterations, Lewis shifts the focus of the story from the mythical world to that of men, in order to make the story "a work of (supposed) historical imagination. A guess of what it might have been like in a little barbarous state on the borders of the Hellenistic world of Greek culture, just beginning to affect it" (*Letters*, 273). From this and other information in the text, Doris T. Myers even argues that "It seems plausible that Glome is in Scythia, wherever that is, and this conclusion fits with the thematic unity of *Till We Have Faces*, for 'Scythia' had a literary significance for the ancient Greeks comparable to that of Conrad's Africa. It was the Greek 'heart of darkness.'" ³

Instead of Psyche, the eldest sister Orual is the protagonist, and in Lewis's version, the responsibility for Psyche's ruin rests solely on this Orual. Unlike the sisters in Apuleius's version, who go to the mountain and see Psyche's palace together, Orual alone visits the mountain, to see Psyche, and on her personal judgment orders her to light the lamp. Then, she even uses threats in making that order, because, unlike the Psyche in Apuleius's version, this Psyche would not easily agree to betray her husband. The focus of the story is on the psychological make-up of Orual that causes her to ruin Psyche; and on Orual's spiritual growth and salvation after the ruin of Psyche.

In the note, Lewis says that when he first read Apuleius's story, he felt Psyche's palace must have been "invisible to normal, mortal eyes"(313).

³ Doris T. Myers *Bareface, A Guide to C. S. Lewis's Last Novel* (Univ. of Missouri Press, 2004), p.165. The other reasons Myers gives are, for example, it "lies in a northwesterly direction from the city of "the Great King," which is what the Greeks always called the king of Persia," and "Tarin is an ambassador from the 'Great King' (*TWHF*, 254). Herodotus reports that some Scythians paid tribute to Persia in the time of Darius I (d. 486 B.C.).[...]" (pp.164-165).

Accordingly, in his version, Psyche's palace is invisible to Orual, and, as a result, she thinks Psyche is either seeing an illusion or otherwise deceived by some villain into a belief that such a palace exists. She forces Psyche to betray her husband not because she wants to destroy Psyche's happiness but because she sincerely believes that it would be for Psyche's good to discover his true nature. It is not till Psyche has done the fatal deed that Orual realizes her mistake. Thus, Orual is not malicious. Different from Psyche's sisters in Apuleius, she has cherished and brought up Psyche, even though Psyche is only her half-sister from a different mother, who died delivering Psyche. While Apuleius's sisters are beautiful, Orual is extremely ugly. Her ugliness is such that even her real father says to her, "You're not asking me to believe that any woman, let alone such a fright as you, has much love for a pretty half-sister? It's not in nature"(60-61). However, she loves Psyche in fact so deeply as to even ask her father to let her die instead of Psyche in the Great Offering. This eldest sister, who is only a nasty villain in Apuleius's version, has, in Lewis's version, certain virtues as well as defects. In *Till We Have Faces*, Lewis's concern is not with such clearly dualistic conflict between good and evil people as we have seen in his other stories but with the frailty and sinfulness of human nature that seem almost unavoidable, even to good-minded people. He shows how such human frailty hinders man from experiencing the true reality, and that through salvation by God man can get over, or be cured of, that frailty so as to attain Reality. Orual is to be seen as an Everyman rather than a type of either good or evil. Then theologically, *Till We Have Faces* involves theodicy, or the problem of the righteousness of God the Creator, who seems to be responsible for the intrinsic weakness and fallibility of man.

The story is told all from Orual's viewpoint, instead of an omniscient viewpoint used in mythology. When Psyche has lit the lamp, the god appears in a great storm and passes sentence on Orual:

‘Now’ Psyche goes out in exile. Now she must hunger and thirst and tread hard roads. Those against whom I cannot fight must do their will upon her. You, woman, shall know yourself and your work. You also shall be Psyche.” (173-174)

Ever since then, she cannot but live with this sentence in mind, reflecting upon her deed against Psyche. The fact that the god’s palace was invisible to her is interpreted and re-interpreted by Orual herself. The whole narrative expresses the change in her view of herself, of other people, and of the gods. Through that change, the process of Orual’s salvation by the god is presented. With Orual, the reader is also forced to re-interpret the invisibility of the castle and to think over the character of Orual, of God, and of Reality.

The narrative of *Till We Have Faces* is divided into Book I, which occupies about four-fifths of the volume, and Book II. The first book is written in the form of Orual’s accusation of the gods, in which she remembers how she has loved Psyche ever since she was a baby, how the gods have deprived her of Psyche, and how she has been driven by their trick to destroy Psyche’s happiness. Then, in the second book, we see her regeneration through true self-recognition and atonement with the gods. Following this, I shall now consider her fall by analysing her psychology and, after that, examine the process of her salvation, considering also Psyche’s fall and salvation.

<The Fall of Orual>

Orual at first thinks it is because the god has hidden the truth from her that she has failed to see the palace. She thinks therefore it is by the gods’ malice that she has mistaken the identity of Psyche’s husband. However, in reality, the cause of Orual’s failure lies on her own part. Only, it is so complicated that she is not aware of it herself. We can, however, identify at least four causes. In the first place, there is an intrinsic weakness of human senses. Secondly, there is the

naturalistic education Orual has got from the Fox. The third is the latent self-centredness in her affection for Psyche, and the last but the greatest is Orual's pride, combined with a complex feeling of jealousy both towards the god and Psyche.

The first cause may make us feel that her missing the palace is not to be regarded as entirely her sin. From Lewis's first impression of the myth, Orual as an ordinary human being would not be able to see it (*Letters*, 273). Lewis is so conscious of the limitation of human senses, and writes, for example, in *A Grief Observed*:

Five Senses; an incurably abstract intellect; a haphazardly selective memory; a set of preconceptions and assumptions so numerous that I can never examine more than a minority of them--never become even conscious of them all. How much of total reality can such an apparatus let through?(51)

Then, the second cause, naturalism and materialism, is what Lewis in actual life finds to be hindering many twentieth-century people from believing in the supernatural Christian God. In Glome, whose capital is within an hour from the god's mountain, Orual has been brought up between the pagan Ungit worship of the native people and the rational materialism of the enlightened Greek tutor, the Fox. Ungit's priest insists on the nonsense of trying to explicate or find logical inconsistency in the god's mystery. He says, "Holy places are dark places. It is life and strength, not knowledge and words, that we get in them. Holy wisdom is not clear and thin like water, but thick and dark like blood" (50). On the other hand, the Fox teaches Orual that everything is "part of the same web, which is called Nature, or the Whole" (85), and "gods [...] are all folly and lies of poets"(28). Thus, she has been influenced by both rationalism and religious mystery. As a result, when Psyche is seeing a palace where she sees nothing, Orual wonders whether Psyche's husband is a real god and has prepared a palace

which is seen only by Psyche, or he is a mountain vagabond and somehow deceiving Psyche into seeing an illusion. Yet, after all, still wondering, she unconsciously manages to believe that the husband is not such a good god as Psyche finds him to be, because she inwardly hates to give up Psyche to the god. And this is the third, and much greater cause: the self-centredness of her love.

Since Orual has brought up Psyche by her own hand, she has been, as it were, Psyche's mother as well as sister. She is happy to be so, and wishes to keep Psyche dependent on her forever. However, if Psyche has really become the god's bride, and lives in a castle which is even invisible to her, it means that Psyche is now definitely out of her reach. Orual remembers her own feelings at the moment when she learned that Psyche saw a palace where she saw nothing:

I suppose my first thought must have been, "She's mad." Anyway, my whole heart leaped to shut the door against something monstrously amiss--not to be endured. And to keep it shut. (117)

Though in fact the palace is real, its reality is, to Orual, "something monstrously amiss."

The reality is so completely unacceptable to her that she rejects it unconsciously, taking heed only of such propositions which justify an attempt to take back Psyche. In fact, there is a moment when the castle appears before her eyes. Yet it does not work as a true revelation to her, for she would not believe what she sees. In *Miracles*, Lewis says, "Seeing is not believing"(7), remarking that a materialist could remain a materialist even when he sees something supernatural, because he would take the phenomenon merely as an illusion. Whether or not a person understands the real meaning of God's revelation depends on his philosophical stance. Orual, too, takes the palace as an illusion, and here, the Fox's rationalism helps it. Yet, her true feeling then is expressed in her own recollection:

I must ask forgiveness of Psyche as well as of the god. I had dared to scold her [...] but all the time she was far above me; herself now hardly mortal....if what I saw was real. I was in great fear. Perhaps it was not real. I looked and looked to see if it would not fade or change. Then as I rose [...] almost before I stood on my feet, the whole thing was vanished. (133)

At this moment, Orual does not understand what it is she fears. Yet, it is the fear of decisively losing Psyche who has been obedient to her. From this fear, she rejects the revelation, and it is always the case in Lewis's fiction that anyone who tries to reject reality would miss it.

Lewis writes to Clyde S. Kilby:

Orual is (not a symbol) but an instance, a 'case' of human affection in its natural condition, true, tender, suffering, but in the long run tyrannically possessive and ready to turn to hatred when the beloved ceases to be its possession. What such love particularly cannot stand is to see the beloved passing into a sphere where it cannot follow. (*Letters*, 274)

Psyche calls Orual "Maia," which means in Greek "good mother, fostermother, nurse."⁴ As Doris T Myers points out, this name signifies Orual's chief relationship with Psyche.⁵ Some critics saw the Hindu connotation of "Maya" (meaning "illusion"),⁶ and as Myer says, "This significance [i.e. Maya] is not, of course, impossible: it is a loose pun, and certainly Orual lived under illusion for most of her life." However, I agree with Myer who continues, "the Greek meaning is arguably more important to the novel as a whole, since Orual's role as mother to Psyche is her chief justification for her decision to force Psyche to betray her lover."⁷

⁴ "μαία" *Bible Works*, Version 5.0.0 .34a Liddell-Scott Lexicon, (Bible Works, LLC, 2001).

⁵ Myers, p. 188.

⁶ Cf. Schakel, *Reason and Imagination in C. S. Lewis*, p. 188 note; Myers, p. 188.

⁷ Myers, p. 188.

Orual's fear of losing Psyche comes from two-fold jealousy. For one thing, she gets jealous of the gods for taking her child. Lewis says natural maternal love tends to be self-centred and possessive. It "needs to be needed" (*Four Loves*, 34). Many a mother cannot stand it when her children no longer need her support and become independent. This is also true of Orual. Though she would not forgive those who accuse Psyche of assuming the goddess, neither can she bear to let anyone else make Psyche happy, let alone to have her taken away. Orual self-centredly wants to be the most important one for Psyche, and in Lewis's works, such self-centredness is identified with the sin of pride, which is, with the jealousy caused by it, the greatest cause of Orual's failure in perceiving the god's reality. For, in a jealous attempt to keep Psyche, Orual is proudly trying to put herself in a God-like position to Psyche: the Bible says God is "jealous" (e.g., Exodus 20: 5) in the sense that He is "requiring exclusive loyalty and wholehearted worship and service,"⁸ "Intolerant of disloyalty or infidelity; autocratic,"⁹ and Orual is demanding the same from Psyche. Then, as Lewis warns in *The Four Loves*, "Love, having become a god, becomes a demon" (54). Though her love for Psyche has been good, when it claims priority over the god's love, it turns out to be evil, just as the rebellious angel in the Christian legend was thrown out of heaven and became the Devil in hell when he demanded superiority over the Son. The serious consequence of this is that, as Lewis emphasises in *Mere Christianity*, as long as a person is proud and looking down on others, he cannot see anyone above himself, and therefore cannot know God, who is infinitely above any human being (*Mere Christianity*, 109). Thus, it is inevitable that Orual, setting herself proudly in a god's position, misses the god's reality and fails to see the palace.

⁸ *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English*, revised edition, ed. A. S. Hornby (Oxford Univ. Press, 1974).

⁹ *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, 3rd ed. (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992; Electronic version licensed from INSO).

Then, at the same time as being jealous of the god, Orual is also jealous of Psyche, which comes from Orual's hidden inferiority complex about her features. In the pagan society of Glome, people do not know a god who loves the ugly as well as the fair and beautiful. Ungit is believed to prefer the fair Psyche to the ugly-faced Orual. Orual herself expects no love from gods. As a woman, she has completely abandoned the hope of being loved. Thus, the Fox's affection and friendship, Bardia's loyalty, and Psyche's love are the only loves that she thinks she can expect. Among these, Psyche's love counts for the most. Because Orual has seen it as her right and duty to give Psyche maternal instruction, as Psyche's supervisor, Orual can be indulged in a sense of superiority. Therefore, the fear she has felt at the sight of the palace is also the fear of allowing Psyche to be superior to her as a god's bride. Actually, in the deepest part of her heart, Orual has long been jealous of Psyche's beauty, though she has hidden such feelings even from herself. However, when Psyche comes to obey the god instead of her, she "learned [...] how one can hate those one loves" (127). This hatred is a manifestation of the jealousy which has always been latent in her. This jealousy can also be seen in her later determination, when she is facing her first single-handed combat, to be braver than Psyche was in the Great Offering. She recollects her feelings of the time:

How would it be if [...] my courage failed me? [...] And so she would be far above me in everything: in courage as well as in beauty [...]. "She shall not," I said with my whole soul. (200)

* * *

With these feelings of competitive envy and self-centredness, Orual can still believe her love for Psyche to be genuinely selfless, because she does not realize her own jealousy at the bottom of her heart. She would kill Psyche as well as herself unless Psyche lights the lamp, believing she is making the threat solely out of love for Psyche. In fact, as the Fox rightly remarks, it is "one part love, five

parts anger, and seven parts pride” (148) that drives Orual to think of killing Psyche rather than leaving her with her husband. Lewis says that “Pride” is essentially competitive because it is “the pleasure of being above the rest” (*Mere Christianity*, 107). So when she finds she can no longer indulge herself with that pleasure, she becomes cruel even to that Psyche whom she thinks she selflessly loves. Psyche, promising her to betray the god in order to keep Orual alive, rightly identifies Orual’s self-centred anger and despair:

You are indeed teaching me about kinds of love I did not know. It is like looking into a deep pit. I am not sure whether I like your kind better than hatred. Oh Orual--to take my love for you, because you know it goes down to my very roots and cannot be diminished by any other newer love, and then to make of it a tool, a weapon, a thing of policy and mastery, an instrument of torture. (165)

Lewis is keenly conscious of the cruelty of love perversely used as a weapon. In *The Great Divorce*, we have seen a case of a dwarf Ghost, who takes the pity of his wife and uses it as a weapon in an attempt to keep her in hell with him. In *Till We Have Faces*, the Fox once tries to keep Orual from fighting in combat, crying and addressing Orual’s pity for him because he should miss her if she were killed, though he soon admits he was wrong to have tried to move her by taking advantage of her love. Orual is the same as the dwarf Ghost in *The Great Divorce*. In a revelational vision towards the end of her life, Orual sees how she and the Fox kept Psyche from her happiness, pretending that they would miss her too much to live without her, and knowing Psyche loved them so much that she could not possibly ignore their sufferings.

Yet, on the other hand, Orual is in fact confused at Psyche’s marriage, and that confusion is aggravated by the fact that while already (unconsciously) jealous of the god and Psyche in their marriage, she still wonders if Psyche’s husband is a real god or not. In *The Four Loves*, Lewis describes the feelings of those who, like Orual, have had their beloved taken away by God, into a religious life which

they do not understand:

“This” is “All nonsense, all bloody high-brow nonsense, all canting humbug.” But [...] “Supposing--it can’t be, it mustn’t be, but just supposing there were something in it?” [...] How if the deserter has really entered a new world which the rest of us never suspected? But if so, how unfair! [...] Why was it never opened to us? “A chit of a girl [...] being shown things that are hidden from their elders?” And since that is clearly incredible and unbearable, jealousy returns to the hypothesis “All nonsense”. (47)

Those who feel this way usually do not notice their jealousy hidden behind their confusion. This is also true of Orual. Though it is mostly because of her jealousy and pride that she fails to see the palace, we could not blame it as preposterously unnatural that she does not see the jealousy and pride in herself. Lewis seems to be sympathetic to those people, including himself, who do not even notice how they are sinful in nature. He says,

I do not think it is our fault that we cannot tell the real truth about ourselves; the persistent, life-long, inner murmur of spite, jealousy, prurience, greed and self-complacence, simply will not go into words. But the important thing is that we should not mistake our inevitably limited utterances for a full account of the worst that is inside. (*Pain*, 48)

Leanne Payne says, “As Lewis’s great mythic work *Till We Have Faces* dramatically illustrates, the fallen self cannot know itself.[...] Orual is really Lewis, and her tale is not only his but it is the story of all men: it is the story of the old Adamic self, faceless (or having a thousand faces) and fallen from the Presence.”¹⁰ This story is an attempt to go beyond the intrinsic subjectivity of the fallen self, and to acquire the true objectivity of that which is reality.

Orual’s narrative is retrospective, and in that, something like an autobiography. Lewis himself published his autobiography, *Surprised by Joy*, in

¹⁰ Payne, *Real Presence*, pp. 53; 57.

1955, one year before *Till We Have Faces*, and as Peter Schakel suggests, the experience of writing it might have made him realize that the autobiographical form is suitable for expressing what is intrinsically subjective as objectively as possible:

The subjectivity and selectivity in *Surprised by Joy* seem to have opened the way for Lewis to write *Till We Have Faces*, his next book [...]. As Lewis had before attempted to tell the story of his conversion objectively and at a distance, so had he also attempted much earlier an objective account of the story of Cupid and Psyche, but had been unable to find the right “form” for it. Now the right form comes to him [...] Orual’s account of her life, like Lewis’s account of his own in *Surprised by Joy*, is retrospective, subjective, and selective.¹¹

Yet still, while we have to admit the unavoidable subjectivity of any human being’s self-account, the important point of this story is that Orual is also responsible for her failure to perceive objective reality and has to realize her fault before she gets her salvation. Especially, Lewis shows how pride and jealousy are in fact two sides of one and the same thing which may hinder one from God and His reality.

<The Fall of Psyche>

Lewis writes to Kilby that Psyche is a born Christian, “*anima naturaliter Christiana*” (*Letters*, 274). She never doubts that her husband is a real god though she has never seen him. This shows her natural readiness for the god. While Orual rejects the god’s mystery, saying, “What lover would shun his bride’s eyes unless he had some terrible reason for it?” (152), Psyche apprehends the god’s divinity and accepts it.

Lewis says “every good man or woman is like Christ” (*Letters*, 274), and we

¹¹ Schakel, *Reason and Imagination*, p. 160.

find that Psyche resembles Jesus in many ways. She has healing hands; She longs for the god's mountain as her real home; she dies on the tree as a sacrifice and receives a new life at the god's palace--all these remind us of Jesus Christ. For by these Psyche also works miracles and experiences her incarnation (born in a country which is not her real home, that is, in the god's mountain), passion, death and resurrection.

Yet she is still different from Jesus. For, after all, she commits the sin of disobedience. In her forced betrayal, she does not see, or tries not to see, that the god is the god of justice as well as the god of love. She believes, like St. John, that "God is love" (I John, 4,8). She says to Orual, "He cannot be cruel like you. I'll not believe it. He will know how I was tortured into my disobedience. He will forgive me" (166). When she says this, she inwardly knows that "all [her] happiness may be destroyed forever" (166). Yet, against her fear, she is trying to keep her trust in her husband. As Lewis says in *Mere Christianity*, "Love, in the Christian sense, does not mean an emotion. It is a state not of the feelings but of the will" (*Mere Christianity*, 113). Psyche probably knows this intuitively when she says she *will* not believe the god's cruelty. However, as Lewis says that "To trust [God] means, of course trying to do all that He says" (*Mere Christianity*, 127). Psyche also understands that an act of disobedience is contradictory to her trust in the god, even though it is forced disobedience, and that perhaps the god would not condone it. Psyche is right, though, she is still a little mistaken to call it a "cruelty". It is because the god is righteous that she cannot simply be forgiven her sin of betrayal. As we saw the White Witch in Narnia say, "[E]very traitor belongs to me as my lawful prey and [...] for every treachery I have a right to a kill" (*Lion*, 128), the same law of justice is also working here. Until some atonement is made, the sinner should be in evil's hand. The god tells Orual on the night of Psyche's fall, "Those against whom I cannot fight must do their will upon her" (173-174). Until redemption of her sin against the god is made, it is

impossible even for him to forgive Psyche and take her into heaven again. By the god's providence, that redemption is to be made not solely by herself; but all the same, until it is made, she is banished from heaven.

In Apuleius's version, Psyche's wandering is not necessarily a punishment for her betrayal. It is to find her husband who has angrily flown away that she sets out on the journey. In *Till We Have Faces*, however, Psyche's wandering is a forced exile as a punishment for her sin.

<The Veil: Orual's Recognition of Reality>

The night she has ruined Psyche, Orual has resolved to go veiled permanently so as to hide her face from all others. Lewis originally intended the title of the book to be "Bareface," and changed it into *Till We Have Faces* at the publisher's request on the ground that Bareface "might be mistaken for a Western."¹² But Lewis himself thinks the original title to be more appropriate, as he wrote in a letter on 29 February, 1956:

One other possible title has occurred to me: *Till We Have Faces*. [...] I must, however, warn you that no one on whom I've tried it thinks it an improvement on Bareface.¹³

This shows the central significance of the veil and the process of Orual's unveiling in the whole story.

On the day of her father's second wedding, she is told to wear a veil lest she should frighten the bride with her ugly face. Ever since then, Orual has always regarded veils simply as a means for the ugly to hide their ugliness. For instance, when she sees the priest wearing a bird-mask at the House of Ungit, or the girls serving the goddess with their faces painted as thick as masks, Orual

¹² Roger Lancelyn Green & Walter Hooper, *C. S. Lewis* (Harcourt, 1976), p. 261.

¹³ Green & Hooper, *C. S. Lewis*, p. 261..

misconceives their masks to be the same disguise as her veil, though in fact, they are symbols of the goddess' mystery. She thinks that it is because the gods are ugly that they need such veils and masks. When she hears that Psyche's husband does not show his face, she says to her,

Holy darkness, you call it. What sort of thing? Faugh! it's like living in the house of Ungit. Everything's dark about the gods. (124)

She conceives that the gods are awful because they are hidden, and suspects they have kept Psyche's palace from her sight just out of malice, so that what she does for Psyche's good should work adversely. Thus, while she is blaming herself for having ruined Psyche, she also pities herself for having been driven to do such a deed. She is convinced that the gods hate her (4). Her veil, which she wears to cover her ugliness, is also the means to hide and keep herself as far away from them as possible.

However, after dozens of years since Psyche's ruin, she happens to find a little shrine whose goddess is named Istra, the same as the true name of Orual's Psyche. The myth of this goddess Istra gives her a great shock because it is almost the same as the story of herself and Psyche and different only in that, in the myth, the eldest sister ruined Istra solely from jealousy. It is this sacred story that makes her write a case against the gods.

For years now my old quarrel with the gods had slept.[...] I no longer meddled with them.[...] Now, instantly, I know I was facing them--I with no strength and they with all; I visible to them, they invisible to me.[...] Well, I could speak, I could set down the truth (244-245).[...]

They would not tell me whether she was the bride of a god, or mad, or a brute's or villain's spoil. They would give no clear sign, though I begged for it.[...] And because I guessed wrongly they punished me--what's worse, punished me through her. And even that was not enough; they have now sent out a lying story in which I was given no riddle to guess, but knew and saw that she was the god's bride, and of my own will destroyed her, and that for jealousy. (249)

As we have seen above, actually, it is not the gods that have hidden the truth from her but Orual herself. Shutting the door of her mind, she has covered her eyes with a spiritual veil. Therefore, the veil that Orual wears after Psyche's ruin is an external expression of her covering her inner eyes to the god's reality. Or rather, it is even a symbolical manifestation of her rejection of the god altogether, with all the blessings he would give her.

This is apparent in the fact that when she has rejected the god's reality, she also fails to taste the honeycake and wine which Psyche gives her in his country. To her eyes and palate, they are nothing but dark berries and water. In *The Last Battle*, we have seen Dwarfs who reject Aslan see only darkness in the bright light and taste delicious dishes as almost inedible things (*Last Battle*, 132-135). By rejecting Aslan altogether, they have abandoned the capacity for tasting Aslan's blessing properly. They physically receive the food, but cannot receive spiritual good, that is, the enjoyment of eating, which is to accompany the physical good. The same is true with Orual here. Besides, as Leanne Payne points out, Lewis believes in communion as a mythical way of participating in God's reality.¹⁴ Therefore, it is natural that Orual here fails to taste the god's honeycake (a sort of bread) and wine, since she is here rejecting his reality altogether. She would not participate and is so unable to share in the god's communion.

When she becomes the Queen, her persona of the queenship also works as a veil for her. Just as in the Greek theatres personae are masks that actors wear to hide their faces, Orual's persona also hides her real face and character. She even tries to hide them from herself, too, because when Orual awakes in the Queen, she has to suffer from remembering Psyche and her ruin, and from "a great and anguished wonder" (184) whether Psyche is alive. However, what she is trying

¹⁴ Payne, p. 29 ff.

to hide from others as well as from herself is so deep-rooted in her self that the process of hiding it under the veil of the queenship becomes a process of banishing her personality altogether:

[T]he Queen of Glome had more and more part in me and Orual had less and less. I locked Orual up or laid her asleep as best I could somewhere deep down inside me; she lay curled there. It was like being with child, but reversed; the thing I carried in me grew slowly smaller and less alive. (226)

In Greek, the word “*psyche*” means “soul.” When Orual loses her Psyche, she loses her *psyche*, too, under the persona of the Queen. The term of Psyche’s exile is a term of exile also for Orual’s soul. This is an achievement of the god’s sentence, “You also shall be Psyche.” This becomes even truer when we see the statue of the goddess Istra, for it is covered with a veil between the harvest season and spring, and this veil is a symbol of the exile and absence of the goddess. Thus, Orual and Istra wear a veil the same way, and both of them are void of their soul while they are veiled.

Until Orual hears the myth of the goddess Istra, Orual has lived thus, having her self shut up inside herself, and avoiding meeting with the god. And then, even the god has not been able to force her to turn to him. Lewis believes that since God has given us men free will, it is impossible for even the omnipotent God to keep us from turning away from Him against our will, because it would be to give and keep back free will at the same time, which is logically and intrinsically impossible and nonsensical. “His omnipotence means power to do all that is intrinsically possible, not to do the intrinsically impossible” (*Pain*, 16). When she begins to make a charge against the god, however, she has ceased to be wholly turned away from the god. In accusing him, she is addressing him and calling for an answer even though she does not have any real hope of getting one. Orual ends her book of complaint with these words:

I say the gods deal very unrightly with us. For they will neither [...] go away and leave us to live our own short days to ourselves, nor will they show themselves openly and tell us what they would have us do.[...] But to hint and hover [...] to be dead silent when we question them and then glide back and whisper (words we cannot understand) in our ears when we most wish to be free of them, and to show to one what they hide from another [...]. Let them answer my charge if they can. It may well be that, instead of answering, they'll strike me mad or leprous or turn me into beast, bird, or tree. But will not all the world then know (and the gods will know it knows) that this is because they have no answer? (249-250)

Against her expectation that "they have no answer," however, the god answers her. His answers come in an unexpected way, and on several occasions they lead her to know herself gradually but truly.

First of all, she hears from a man that when she loved Psyche and neglected Redival, Redival felt lonely, missing Orual terribly. Orual is surprised to hear this, because she never suspected that Redival could suffer loneliness. She has been jealous of Redival for her beauty. In her settled conviction, it is Orual herself that is "the pitiable and ill-used one" (256). Therefore, at first she would not believe the man. Yet all the same, his words force her to reflect on her cold attitudes to Redival. This is the first time that she finds any fault in herself, who has so far been totally self-righteous.

Secondly, when Bardia is dead, his wife Ansit accuses Orual of exhausting him to death with piles of work at the court.

He had worked himself out--or been worked.[...] I know well enough that you were not lovers. You left me that. The divine blood will not mix with subjects', they say. You left me my share. When you had used him, you would let him steal home to me.[...] Faugh! You're full fed. Gorged with other men's lives, women's too: Bardia's, mine, the Fox's, your sister's--both your sisters'. (260-265)

On hearing this, Orual does not understand the truth of these words. Instead, she

sees jealousy in Ansit who blames her thus. This jealousy is directed to Orual as a woman, not to the Queen, and stirs up Orual under her queenship. Inwardly, Orual has loved Bardia, but because of her ugly face, she has given up hoping even so much as to be seen as a woman. Therefore, by wearing the veil and ceasing to be Orual, she has escaped from the sense of despair and humiliation of loving someone without any hope of being loved back. However, now that she sees Ansit jealous of her as a woman, her hitherto repressed, jealously competitive self bursts out. Before she knows it, she jumps up, pulling her veil aside, and shows her face to Ansit, shouting, "Are you jealous of this?" (262) as if mocking Ansit for being jealous of such an ugly woman, and at the same time deriding herself for her ugliness. The moment she has unveiled herself, the true Orual that has hidden under the Queen comes out. On her face, Ansit sees her concealed love for Bardia. And this unveiling, though it is only momentary, is the beginning of the true self-knowledge which she has firmly rejected.

And now those divine Surgeons had me tied down and were at work. My anger protected me only for a short time; anger wearies itself out and truth comes in. For it was all true--truer than Ansit could know. I had rejoiced when there was a press of work, had heaped up needless work to keep him late at the palace [...]. Anything to put off the moment when he would go and leave me to my emptiness. (266)

The next new year, Orual sees a dream in which the King, her deceased father, tells her to take the veil away, and takes her down deeper and deeper into the rooms underground. As Schakel points out, this going down "from Pillar Room to Pillar Room below it--clearly symbolizing a psychological descent into herself"¹⁵ reveals her own deep psychology. In the deepest room, the King shows her face reflected in a mirror, but what she sees there is the face of Ungit whom she has feared and hated:

¹⁵ Schakel, *Reason and Imagination*, p. 74.

But my face was the face of Ungit as I had seen it that day in her house.
“Who is Ungit?” asked the King.

“I am Ungit.” My voice came wailing out of me and I found that I was in my own chamber. So it had been what we call a dream. (276)

When she wakes up from the dream, she moves on to yet another step of self-recognition.

This vision, anyway, allowed no denial. Without question it was I who was Ungit. That ruinous face was mine. I was [...] that all-devouring womblike, yet barren, thing. Glome was a web--I the swollen spider, squat at its center, gorged with men's stolen lives. (276)

Once Psyche was offered to the god as his bride. Then the god was believed to be also the Shadowbrute, who would devour the bride. Ansit, who sees divine blood in Orual, says, “Perhaps you [...] love like the gods. Like the Shadowbrute. They say the loving and the devouring are all one, don't they?” (264-265) So, here, Orual's recognition: “It was I who was Ungit,” is the recognition that she has been greedily exacting and devouring the love of the people around her. Since Orual has thought of the god as something horrible, her recognition here is only of the ugliness of her mind.

In Glome, what is considered as Ungit herself is a shapeless stone. The sacred stone is, like the rock out of which Moses got water (Exodus, 17:1-6), a blessing to those who believe in Ungit, but a barren destructive thing to those who do not hear her words, as the rock which marred Jeremiah's girdle is a symbol of such a destructive power (Jeremiah, 13:3-7). Here, this sacred stone of Ungit plays the same role as the rocks in the Old Testament, in which a rock often provides faithful men with a place of safety (e.g. Jeremiah, 48:28), but gives “no peace [...] for the wicked” (Isaiah, 48:22 *NKJV*).

Thus, Orual finds no blessing in the jealous goddess whom she identifies herself with:

I thought how the seed of men that might have gone to make hardy boys and fruitful girls was drained into that house, and nothing given back; and how the silver that men had earned hard and needed was also drained in there, and nothing given back; and how the girls themselves were devoured and were given nothing back. (269-270)

In fact, however, the god's jealousy and devouring are different from Orual's. Though the god is "jealous" the god's jealousy that demands exclusive loyalty of the beloved is for the good of his beloved because what it aims at is the true atonement (in the sense of at-one-ment) of the beloved man and the god who is the only source of all happiness. On the other hand, Orual's jealousy is futile and hinders the beloved's true happiness. It ruins Psyche's happiness with the god. It prevents the Fox from going back to his homeland which he has keenly longed for. It breaks the peaceful life of Bardia and his wife by keeping him needlessly at court and making her jealous. In the same way, the god's devouring and that of Orual are different. Though the god devours the beloved, it is for the good of the one devoured. Just as when we eat, the food is once unmade and lives again as a part of our body, so when the god devours men, they are "unmade" to be "no one" (307) so that they may live more fully, united with God and participating in the god's life. On the other hand, Orual's devouring is only destructive.

However, although she does not see this difference yet, she is at least right in realizing her self-centred greediness. When she has realized such ugliness of her heart, she tries to kill herself to put an end to it. Significantly, then, for the first time in many years she goes out barefaced. She says it is because the veil would no longer help her to walk in the street unrecognized, now that all men know the veiled Queen. However, as we have seen, her veil has been the

expression of her inner disguise as well as outer, so the fact that she has thus gone out unveiled shows that she has now unveiled her mind. Now she is ready to accept the god whom she has long rejected. When she is about to throw herself in the river, she hears the god's voice, "Do not do it" (279), and follows the order obediently at once.

The god says to Orual, "You cannot escape Ungit by going to the deadlands, for she is there also. Die before you die. There is no chance after." (279) In Christianity, God is the God for the dead as well as for the living, but man is given opportunities to start a new life only before his physical death. Only those who choose to die to their old self and to live in Christ can be given an eternal, regenerated life after death. As Naoyuki Yagyū remarks, the god's words remind us of St. Paul expressing the state of having died to his old self before the physical death: "I have been crucified with Christ; it is no longer I who live, but Christ lives in me" (Galatians 2:20, *NKJV*).¹⁶ Orual is enjoined to follow St. Paul and to learn to obey God instead of being hostile to Him as she has been all her life.

It is interesting that when she has come to see herself as an Ungit by misunderstanding the goddess's true nature, she begins to change to be really like Ungit. When she realizes her ugliness, she starts trying to be good though not successfully at first:

I would set out boldly each morning to be just and calm and wise in all my thoughts and acts; but before they had finished dressing me I would find that I was back [...] in some old rage, resentment, gnawing fantasy, or sullen bitterness.[...] I could mend my soul no more than my face. Unless the gods helped. (282)

Orual feels as if the gods do not help her. Actually, however, they are

¹⁶ Yagyū, *Theology of the Fairyland*, p.350.

working for her good. Here Orual has acquired the humbleness to admit she needs to be helped by the gods, and in Lewis's fiction, no one who sincerely asks God for help is ignored. Lewis says in *Mere Christianity*,

You must ask for God's help. Even when you have done so, it may seem to you for a long time that no help, or less help than you need, is being given. Never mind [...] and try again. Very often what God first helps us towards is not the virtue itself but just this power of always trying again. (91)

At this stage, however, her proud self-righteousness is not yet completely rooted out. Having realized the self-centredness, she is still boasting that her love for Psyche at least has been true and selfless. It is again in a dream that she finally recognizes her self-centredness towards Psyche, too, and knows herself truly. In the dream, she is made to read her complaint against the gods. While reading it, she realizes that it is not the one she has written with great care but only a grumbling. She finds herself saying:

You said a brute would devour her. Well, why didn't it? I'd have wept for her and buried what was left and built her a tomb and...and...But to steal her love from me! [...] The girl was mine. What right had you to steal her away into your dreadful heights? You'll say I was jealous. Jealous of Psyche? Not while she was mine.[...] But to hear a chit of a girl who had (or ought to have had) no thought in her head that I'd not put there, setting up for a seer and next thing to a goddess...how could anyone endure it? [...] We want to be our own. I was my own and Psyche was mine and no one else had any right to her.[...] Mine! Do you not know what the word means? (290-292)

She now realizes it was her self-deception that made her think she loved Psyche totally unselfishly:

The complaint was the answer. To have heard myself making it was to be answered. Lightly men talk of saying what they mean.[...] When the time comes to you at which you will be forced at last to utter the speech which

has lain at the center of your soul for years [...] you'll not talk about joy of words. I saw well why the gods do not speak to us openly, nor let us answer. Till that word can be dug out of us, why should they hear the babble that we think we mean? How can they meet us face to face till we have faces? (294)

In order to meet God face to face, we must have a real face. We, however, usually conceal our wicked self, that is our real face, under its complex disguises, for we are apt to hesitate to see the dark side of our minds. Yet, Orual now comes to see it, and it is because she has had at least sincere honesty while accusing God. She wrote,

Since I write this book against gods, it is just that I should put into it whatever can be said against myself. (74-75)

Such honesty before God is essential to recover a right relationship with Him.

The self-recognition she has thus acquired is painful to her. Yet, it is the beginning of her real atonement. It is also true of Orual that "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. If we confess our sins, He [God] is faithful and just to forgive us our sins and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness." (I John, 1:8-9, *NKJV*).

In a series of dreams after that, Orual tries to do the several tasks which Psyche in Apuleius's version carries out with great trouble. Orual fails in all of those, but then, she sees her sister Psyche carry them out easily and even happily. The Fox appears and tells Orual that this is because she "bore nearly all the anguish" (300) for Psyche. Now that she knows how selfish she has been against Psyche, these words are a great comfort to her. She no longer boasts of her suffering for Psyche. She is now humble enough to be grateful to the god for allowing her to suffer for her. The only task Psyche has to do with great pain is to go down to the Deadland to fetch the beauty to make Ungit beautiful. In these sufferings, Orual atones for Psyche's sin of betraying her husband, and Psyche

redeems Orual's ugliness. This "bearing anguish" of Orual and Psyche for each other echoes Charles William's "doctrine of substituted love,"¹⁷ which tells us that it is a law in the universe that all creatures have to bear someone else's burden. In *Till We Have Faces*, the atonement of Orual and Psyche are made thus through their sufferings for each other.

Besides, Lewis perhaps owes this idea of dividing the sufferer's role into two to Shelley's *Prometheus Unbound*. There, Lewis finds Asia's vicarious suffering for Prometheus. Lewis holds that Asia's difficult descent to the depth of the earth and her final re-ascension, which brings about Prometheus's liberation, have an obvious dramatic advantage. He says,

Most of us, while we read this act, are too absorbed, I fancy, by the new sensation it creates in us.[...] I believe that no poet has felt more keenly, or presented more weightily the necessity for a complete unmaking and remaking of man, to be endured at the dark basis of his being. ("Shelley, Dryden and Mr. Eliot," *Selected Essays*, 207)

In the eschatological scene at the end of the story, when the god has come down "to judge Orual" (307), she stands side by side with Psyche, looking at their figures reflected in a pool. Her face is no longer ugly but as beautiful as Psyche's:

Two Psyches [...] both beautiful (if it mattered now) beyond all imagining, yet not exactly the same. (307-308)

This is the final achievement of the sentence "You also shall be Psyche." The god, who seemed to her never to help her, has in fact been helping her so that her ugliness should be thus redeemed. Orual is now "united with the Divine Nature" (304), as Psyche has been as a god's bride. As Schakel remarks here,

¹⁷ Charles Williams, *Descent into Hell*, pp. 98-99.

this “ultimate union with Love, with the divine” is the point “toward which everything in *Till We Have Faces* has been pointing.”¹⁸

Lewis believes that the redemption Christ has achieved for man is more than mere atonement for man’s original sin. It opens the possibility for man to share the Son’s life.

God became man to turn creatures into sons: not simply to produce better men of the old kind but to produce a new kind of man. It is not like a horse to jump better and better but like turning a horse into a winged creature. (*Mere Christianity*, 180)

Lewis conceives of men in heaven as gods and goddesses.

It is a serious thing to live in a society of possible gods and goddesses, to remember that the dullest and most uninteresting person you can talk to may one day be a creature which, if you saw it now, you would be strongly tempted to worship, or else a horror and a corruption such as you now meet, if at all, only in a nightmare. (“The Weight of Glory,” *Toast*, 109)

Lewis in *Mere Christianity* calls those who have come to share in Jesus’ life as “New Man”(181), and it is such “New Man” who becomes these “gods and goddesses” in heaven. The beauty of the unveiled Orual before her death is that of such a redeemed “New” woman who is to be like a real goddess.

At the end of her life, Orual writes to the god:

I ended my first book with the words no answer. I know now, Lord, why you utter no answer. You are yourself the answer. Before your face questions die away. What other answer would suffice? Only words, words; to be led out to battle against other words. Long did I hate you, long did I fear you. I might-- (308)

We do not know what she intended to write after “I might” because she falls dead

¹⁸ Schakel, *Reason and Imagination*, p. 84.

before she has finished the sentence. But it is clear that she dies in a state of profound faith in the god. Her words, "Before your face questions die away," remind us of Job who, in the midst of his complaint about his suffering and objection to God, was met by God and at once surrenders himself in faith to God. Job said "I have heard of You by the hearing of the ear, But now my eye sees You. Therefore I abhor myself, And repent in dust and ashes" (Job, 41:5-6, *NKJV*). God is beyond all words and Himself is the answer to all doubts and questions.

* * *

As to the problem of theodicy, that is, the problem of God's responsibility for Orual's fall and suffering, Lewis definitely shows that it is Orual's pride that is to blame, and God is not only just and blameless but more than just in helping Orual attain Reality.

Milton once wrote *Paradise Lost* to "justify the ways of God to men."¹⁹ So *Till We Have Faces* justifies the ways of God (the one true God to Lewis) to Orual. As in the fall of Milton's Adam, predestination is denied and man's free will is emphasized, so in the fall of Orual, her pride, not the god's will or malice, is shown to be the cause.

Not only that, but just as God in *Paradise Lost* is shown to be more than merely just, so is the god in *Till We Have Faces* not only righteous but also merciful. Orual is writing her charge, calling for justice. Yet the Fox says to her, "Infinite hopes--and fears--may both be yours. Be sure that, whatever else you get, you will not get justice" (297). He is right. Orual's salvation begins even while she is still accusing the god, when she rather deserves punishment than salvation. If the god is merely just without mercy, she would not have been saved. He demands repentance and atonement, but what he gives in return is more than forgiveness. As God not only forgave Adam's sin but opens a way for

¹⁹ Milton, *Paradise Lost*, Book I, l. 26.

men to be sons of God when they have accepted atonement by Jesus, so the god in *Till We Have Faces* not only forgives Orual but gives her a regenerated life in which she is far more splendid and beautiful than in her original state. Though she fails to change herself, she is changed by the god.

When she dies, she has become like Ungit in the real sense, having atoned for her sinful self-centred jealousy through her sufferings in life as well as in her dreams; and partly by having had it ransomed by Psyche in the visions, too. Although she does not know it, she is loved and admired by the people. The young priest Arnom praises her thus: “the most wise, just, valiant, fortunate and merciful of all the princes known in our parts of the world” (308-309). Lewis shows in Orual that though human beings may never be able to be free of self-centredness, if we earnestly endeavour to be good, with our eyes towards God in whatever manner (as long as it is sincere), we will be saved and made good by God’s providence.

Orual’s faith at the end of her life is the strongest faith a person can acquire. Lewis always insists that true faith is not only an intellectual assent to the proposition that God exists but also an unreserved commitment of one’s self to Him. It involves active will and endeavour to do God’s will. In *The Chronicles of Narnia*, man is shown to be intended by God to keep following God’s will, though on earth it is not always easy even to know what He wants us to do.²⁰ In *Mere Christianity*, Lewis proposes that, in order to be good sons of God, we should first pretend to be already His sons by “dressing up” as the real Son of God instead of just trying to follow Jesus’ commandments.

If you simply ask your conscience, you get one result; if you remember that you are dressing up as Christ, you get a different one. There are lots of things which your conscience might not call definitely wrong (specially things in your mind) but which you will see at once you cannot go on doing

²⁰ Cf. e.g., *Silver Chair*, p. 30; *Caspian*, pp. 110-113.

if you are seriously trying to be like Christ (*Mere Christianity*, 159).

It is in a sense very hard to be really good like Christ himself, but Lewis believes that “in another way it is far easier” than keeping rules because, mysteriously, “The real Son of God is at your side” (*Mere Christianity*, 159).

It is a living Man, still as much a man as you, and still as much God as He was when He created the world, really coming and interfering with your very self; killing the old natural self in you and replacing it with the kind of self He has.[...] turning you permanently into a different sort of thing; into a new little Christ [...] which shares in His power, joy, knowledge and eternity. (*Mere Christianity*, 161)

Though Orual does not consciously try to be like Christ, what she actually does is the same. She surrenders her old self and tries to become a regenerated being, wishing help from the gods. Four days before her physical death on earth, Orual in her vision finds Psyche has been, or has become “a real woman” (306) whom Orual herself has become exactly like. Orual and Psyche both become truly like Christ, who is the real Man.

Of all the characters in Lewis’s fiction, Orual is the only one who undergoes this final regeneration into a Real woman, who “shares in [the Son’s] power, joy, knowledge and eternity” (*Mere Christianity*, 161). The knowledge Orual has acquired about Reality is firsthand knowledge that only regenerated ones can acquire. The knowledge is firsthand because, for one thing, she is now, through the visions, within the realm of Reality. More importantly, however, this is because she is now sharing in the Real Existence of God as a Son (or a Daughter) of God, herself having become a part of Reality. We have seen Lewis believe that human beings are capable of perceiving Reality through our imagination as well as our reason and morality. However, such perception by means of our limited imagination, reason and morality is different from real experience. Yet, Orual’s experience is actual and gives her the true knowledge.

In *Till We Have Faces*, Lewis shows how real faith and real knowledge accompany each other. Faith and knowledge never contradict each other in Lewis's belief. On the contrary, it is only through real faith that man can know the Real World truly.

<The Corinthians>

St. Paul writes to the Corinthians:

Love suffers long and is kind; love does not envy; love does not parade itself, is not puffed up; does not behave rudely, does not seek its own, is not provoked, thinks no evil; does not rejoice in iniquity, but rejoices in the truth; bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things. (1 Corinthians, 13:4-7, *NKJV*)

Orual's love, at first, has not been charity. It has been a natural affection and falls short of true love in almost every quality that is mentioned by St. Paul, though she assumes her love is true. Though Orual is conscious of her long suffering for Psyche, the cause of the suffering is in fact Orual herself, and Psyche is also suffering for her. Then, though she believes she has been most affectionate and kind to Psyche, actually she has cruelly destroyed her happiness. Though Orual never suspects that she holds any jealousy against Psyche, deep in her heart, she has envied Psyche for her beauty and nuptial happiness. She boasts about herself for loving Psyche, and in a rude way forces her to obey her command even with a threat. Though she demands justice and truth of the god, what she really wants is only such justice and truth as is pleasant or convenient to herself. She has had to learn true love, which she does through suffering and self-recognition. Indeed, she lives through St. Paul's lessons literally. St. Paul continues thus:

But when that which is perfect has come, then that which is in part will be done away. When I was a child, I spoke as a child, I understood as a child,

I thought as a child; but when became a man, I put away childish things. For now we see in a mirror, dimly, but then face to face. Now I know in part, but then I shall know just as I also am known. And now abide faith, hope, love, these three; but the greatest of these is love. (I Corinthians, 13: 10-13, *NKJV*)

At first, she sees darkly with a veil before her eyes, as if through a glass. When she comes to know herself “as she is known” by the god without self-deception, she knows and sees the god “face to face.” Then, what is imperfect in her, that is, “that which is in part” is done away with to be unmade, and she is remade as a new, regenerated woman.

In fact, Orual at first lacks not only charity but all the three cardinal theological virtues that St. Paul enjoins. She does not have faith in the gods at all. She sees Ungit as awful and hostile to her, and even thinks the gods are malicious. She says, “[T]here is no creature [...] so noxious to man as the gods” (249). Then she has no hope, either, for she has despaired of being loved by any but a few. She does not hope to be loved by the gods, nor wish to be in the gods’ country with Psyche, either. She does not even hope that the gods will answer her charge against them. At the end of the novel, however, she dies with faith in the god, and with true love not only for the god but for Psyche, the Fox, and others, blessed in hope and with a new, eternal life.

<Myth>

In Part I, we have seen that Lewis has a conviction that a myth can reveal some deeper reality than what we see in our daily life. This conviction is reflected also in this work.

Orual’s dream of a descent into the deep underground to see her own face in a mirror gives her a true revelation of her hidden self. As myth is to be understood by the imagination, so is this vision seen through the imagination: The King says to Orual in the vision, “There’s no Fox to help you here,[...] We’re far

below any dens that foxes can dig”(275). Since the Fox stands for rationalism, as Schakel points out, the play on the word “fox” in these words signifies that “The level of understanding [...] for which she now is reaching lies beyond the scope of reason.”²¹ A true divine revelation is to be received through imagination, whether it is in the form of myth or of vision. And here, incidentally, we see that though Lewis regards himself as an medievalist and sees the world as a medievalist would have seen it (cf. “*De Descriptione Temporum*,” *Selected Essays*, 13-14), he is still a twentieth-century man who knows something about depth psychology. This dream, as a revelation of Orual’s sub-conscious ego, is true and real. Yet, what is more important is that Orual’s atonement is made in her visions and dreams. Thus, these dreams are real in a more positive sense than in being a revelation of the truth. What has happened in them actually changes the relation of Orual to the god, or God, i.e. to the ultimate Reality. The dreams, therefore, belong to the sphere of reality. Accordingly, Orual comes to find dreams and visions as real as actual life, or even more. She says,

And for all I can tell, the only difference is that what many see we call a real thing, and what only one sees we call a dream. But things that many see may have no taste or moment in them at all, and things that are shown only to one may be spears and water-spouts of truth from the very depth of truth. (277)

Now, if we think of the myth-theme in the process of Orual’s conversion, we shall find that *Till We Have Faces* is not only a retold version of Apuleius’s myth but also a quite meticulous retold version of the Christian myth. In the Christian myth that Lewis finds to be a myth which has become fact (cf. *God*, 66), he sees five stages of man’s salvation. First, God has given us men conscience and imagination, in order to send us messages through them. Through our

²¹ Schakel, *Reason and Imagination*, p. 74.

conscience, we perceive the universal moral law, though no one in human history has ever succeeded in obeying the law completely. At the same time, through our imagination, we receive foretastes of heaven in beauty and pleasures, which stir our longing for heaven and move us towards it. Secondly, when we do not listen to His messages, God gives us some pain to remind us that all is not well with us. When we become uneasy and reflect on ourselves, we may find through our conscience that we have broken some moral laws and done wrong to the One who has given them to us, or we may notice that pleasures on earth are from the first not meant to be everlasting nor to give us ultimate satisfaction. Pain is intended to make us realize "God is the only comfort" though "He is also the supreme terror" (*Mere Christianity*, 37). Thirdly, God has given men pagan mythology, especially, myths of dying gods who die and come to life again. These heathen myths foretell the Christian myth (*Miracles*, 117-119). Fourthly, He has revealed Himself to the Jewish people. Finally, he incarnated Himself as Jesus Christ and saved the whole human race. This incarnation is a historical fact, but at the same time God's myth.

When we see Orual's growth, *Till We Have Faces* follows this development of Christian myth closely. Parallel to the man in the first stage of the Christian salvation myth, Orual cannot help feeling the pleasantness of nature even when she misconceives both the gods and the world as hostile to her. When she goes to the mountain to gather Psyche's remains, she is struck with sudden joy:

I came on a sad errand. Now, flung at me like frolic or insolence, there came as if it were a voice[...] "Why should your heart not dance?" [...] My heart to dance? Mine whose love was taken from me, I, the ugly princess who must never look for other love [...]. And yet [...] The freshness and wetness all about me [...] made me feel that I had misjudged the world; it seemed kind, and laughing, as if its heart also danced. Even my ugliness I could not quite believe in. Who can feel ugly when the heart meets delight? (95-96)

This feeling of delight and beauty that penetrates into her is a foretaste of the god's country. Secondly, she suffers much from her conscience, knowing it was she that ruined Psyche. She knows she has done wrong to the god as well as to Psyche, while she still believes that she, too, can blame the gods for misleading her to ruin Psyche. The continuous pain in her heart makes her reflect on herself, and on her relation to the god and to Psyche. Thirdly, the god reveals the truth through the myth of Istra, the goddess, as well as through dreams and visions. Finally, the god comes to Orual to meet her face to face and gives her a new life.

Besides, in Orual's visions and dreams in *Till We Have Faces*, we see patterns of descent and re-ascension, vicarious suffering and selectiveness, which Lewis in *Miracles* remarks to be conspicuous characteristics of Jesus' Incarnation, suffering, death and rebirth that are reflected in the whole Nature.²² The pattern of descent and re-ascension is, for one thing, in Orual's veiling and unveiling. During the period when Orual is hidden under the persona of the Queen, she is buried "deep down" inside her and "lay curled" (226) as a baby in a mother's womb, but she is eventually to be born again. Secondly, Psyche's exile is also a part of this pattern. It deprives Orual of her psyche, or "soul." As a separation of soul and body, this is a sort of death and mythical descent. When Orual and Psyche meet again at the end of the story, the body and the soul are re-united and the mythical re-ascension is fulfilled. Thirdly, Orual in her dream has to go deep underground to recover her identity, and this is also a part of the pattern of descent and re-ascension.

As for the vicariousness, we have seen in the visions of Orual that Orual's hard labour relieves Psyche's hardship, while Psyche's pain in getting beauty from the Deadland is for the good of Orual. Thus, each vicariously suffers and redeems the other. The atonement need not necessarily be made by the sinner

²² Cf. for the four principles of Nature that Lewis finds to have their archetype in the Incarnation, our pp. 66-69 above.

him/herself. In our world, it was Christ that died on the cross for our sins. This is the same here. Besides, we see here a combination of the pattern of mutual vicarious sufferings and the theme of descent and re-ascension, which implies that the total conversion and atonement, the death of the old self and the regeneration, done from the bottom of one's deepest part of existence, can be possible with the help of others--or in our case, with Christ's help and vicarious suffering.

Selectiveness is seen first of all in Psyche's selection as the god's bride. This selection, which is fortunate for Psyche, is also the selection of Orual for suffering. For, through Psyche's marriage, Orual is selected to suffer from being confronted by the god's reality when she is not yet ready for it. The important thing is that just as the suffering of Jewish people is reckoned to be a token of their status as the people "chosen" for heaven, Orual's selection for suffering is also a selection for salvation. The selectiveness of Orual's salvation is especially seen in the fact that it is the sinful Orual, who has been hostile to the gods, and not the Priest or the pious people of Glome, who is to be saved by the god, meeting him face to face.

This retold version of the myth of Cupid and Psyche is also a re-interpretation of it. The reader reads the myth from a new angle through Orual's viewpoint. That process of reading is first to be an attempt to see the myth with logical rationality. The significant thing about this novel is, however, that as a result of Orual's repetitive re-interpretations, the rational interpretation turns out to be wrong, or insufficient, and the mythological interpretation turns out to be the literal truth. In the twentieth century, there was a general de-mythologizing movement in and outside the church.²³ We have seen that such philosophers as Northrop Frye and Roland Barthes, as well as Liberal Christians think that rational interpretations of a myth are more real than the myth itself.²⁴ However,

²³ Cf. e. g., Bultmann, *New Testament and Mythology*.

²⁴ Cf. e.g., Northrop Frye, *The Great Code* (1982; Ark paperback, 1983), pp. 31

in Lewis's version, it is the myth that is real. In it rationalism is only a veil that covers the deeper truth. Orual tells Psyche to "come back to the real world" (124-125), but eventually, the real world turns out not to be the human world of Glome but that of the gods.

What is also important is that when the story reveals the reality of the god's world, it does not come back to the original Greek mythological world. The myth it shows to be real is Orual's salvation myth, ending with her becoming a Real Woman, as Jesus was the Real Man. This myth is Christian, rather than pagan Greek. It goes beyond the Greek version in that Orual's story is, like that of the story of Cupid and Psyche, one of alienation from and reunion with the God of Love; but the God in *Till We Have Faces* is "Love" in the true Christian sense who is righteous as well as loving, and not condoning or doting but always working for the true good and happiness of the beloved.

According to one of Lewis's letters to Kilby, this story takes place when the Hellenistic world of Greek culture began to affect the barbarous states around it (*Letters*, 273). However, Orual's story should not be regarded as something of the faraway past which has little to do with us in the present time. In "God in the Dock," Lewis says that accusing God in the face of such disasters as war, poverty and disease, instead of reflecting on the sinfulness of human beings, is one of the characteristics of modern men.

The early Christian preachers could assume in their hearers, whether Jews, Methuents or Pagans, a sense of guilt.[...] Thus the Christian message was in those days unmistakably the Evangelium, the Good News.[...] The ancient man approached God (or even the gods) as the accused person approaches his Judge. For the modern man the roles are reversed. He is the judge. (*God*, 244)

Therefore, essentially the same story might occur even today. Richard B.

& 51; Roland Barthes, *Mythologies* (Seuil, 1957), passim.

Cunningham sees in Orual a type of post-Christian man, who, because of the lack of awe before God, “is more ready to present a ‘case against the gods,’ if they exist, than to hear the case of the gods against man.”²⁵ We can read the story of Orual as our own story, since pride, jealousy, limited perception, deep but egocentric affection for our family, and doubt about God’s Reality are all our problems as much as Orual’s. Her fall might possibly be our fall, too. Yet more importantly, Lewis presents us with the fact that we have a way to achieve Real Existence in the Real World as does Orual in *Till We Have Faces* .

²⁵ Richard Cunningham, *C. S. Lewis, Defender of the Faith* (The Westminster Press, 1987), p. 65.

Conclusion

We have seen how the ultimate objective Reality has always been Lewis's concern. After the spiritual pursuit, the answer he has found is that the world was created and is governed by the absolute, only and unique God, as is asserted by traditional orthodox Christianity. He has also come to believe in Heaven as God's country and the world of objective Reality. As an objectivist, he has a firm belief in the intelligibility and logos of the universe, which is governed by the objective moral law, which leads to the belief in God, the Logos and an absolutely good Designer of the world. This belief of the logos of the universe runs through all his writings, often latently as an underlying assumption and affects the readers both through their hearts and minds even when they are reading his nonapologetic works, such as *The Chronicles of Narnia* and *Till We Have Faces*. And what makes this possible is his conspicuously strong imaginative power as well as his rational power of inference and argument. He reassures us that our existence has real, objective meaning, because we have been created by such a God and because we will someday, in heaven, participate in God's ultimate Reality.

As a conclusion of this book, then, I could now say Lewis's world-wide popularity both in and outside Christian countries greatly depends on this fact that he represents not only Christianity but also the whole objective Reality. He calls our attention to the objective truth of what is really vital for us as human beings, appealing to something which is common among almost all the people of all faiths, as a fundamental strand of human religious experience and psychology. His argument from morality has been not only an argument for Christianity but an argument for the objectivity of the moral law as well, emphasizing it as the universal law of Human Nature. Human nature as well as the universe is intrinsically good.

With this belief in the logos and goodness of the universe he has been able to give many readers today, both in and outside Christianity, a sense of security and significance in their lives, reassuring them that the world is, after all, not absurd, whatever evil and pain one may suffer in it. Lewis assumes he is addressing the readers in the post-Christian era in which scientism is dominant. However, in fact, the world today is not so adverse to Christianity as he supposes. Many people want a firm foothold in life and are ready to accept Christianity only if they are given sufficient ground. And many of such people find Lewis convincingly enough. Even when his logic is found to have some insufficiency, it does not seem to weaken his argument seriously, for his power lies in the fact that he knows the limitation of our reason alone, and moves us not only by rational argument alone but by addressing our whole being, to our imagination, to our feelings, as well as to our intellect.

Now in the 21st century, a lot of people are also aware of the limitation of purely rational, theoretical belief, and tend to Spiritualism. And some of them find Lewis's writings illuminating, especially for his "Joy" experiences and such remarkable intuition into evil and human nature as is found in *The Screwtape Letters*. For instance, Simon Chan in his *Spiritual Theology*, quoting Lewis, says, "When it comes to devils, C. S. Lewis identifies two errors to avoid. 'One is to disbelieve in their existence. The other is to believe, and to feel an excessive and unhealthy interest in them. They themselves are equally pleased by both errors and hail a materialist or a magician with the same delight.'* Our present world, unfortunately, seems to be polarized between these extremes. A rationalistic worldview has created a backlash of spiritualistic reductionism and Satan worship."¹ Lewis's work, then, is exactly what is wanted for not neglecting

¹ Simon Chan, *Spiritual Theology, A Systematic Study of the Christian Life* (InterVarsity Press, 1998), p.69. *Quot. from Lewis, *The Screwtape Letters* (New York: Macmillan, 1943), p. 9.

either rational side nor spiritual side of man, and neither falling into spiritual reductionism nor into materialism.

Secondly, his case for Christianity more heavily depends on the argument for the existence of God than on Christology or on the theology of the Cross,² and in that, his apologetics will be quite relevant to all those who are concerned with the Ultimate Existence. He is generally sympathetic to other religions, though he himself is a firm believer in the unique truth of Christianity. He grants Pantheism as “the permanent natural bent of the human mind” (*Miracles*, 86-87), and finds that the essential parts, or the best parts, of Buddhism, Judaism, Platonism, Islam and Hinduism are all true. These world religions are unacceptable only because they are insufficient or because they are only “heresies”³ of some other religions.

² For instance, in *Surprised by Joy*, Lewis spends more than 188 pages of the total 190 to show how he became a mono-theist before describing how he became a believer in Jesus Christ. Yet even there, he does not give us a definite reason. He just says, “I know very well when, but hardly how, the final step was taken. I was driven to Whipsnade one sunny morning. When we set out I did not believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, and when we reached the zoo I did. Yet I had not exactly spent the journey in thought” (*Joy*, p. 189).

³ On Pantheism, he says, “If ‘religion’ means simply what man says about God, and not what God does about man, then Pantheism almost is religion” (*Miracles*, 87). As to Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam, he expresses an awareness that they also hold much or at least part of the truth, as he says:

[T]he only two things really worth considering are Christianity and Hinduism. (Islam is only the greatest of the Christian heresies, Buddhism only the greatest of the Hindu heresies. Real Paganism is dead. All that was best in Judaism and Platonism survives in Christianity.) [...] We may [...] divide religions, as we do soups, into ‘thick’ and ‘clear’. By Thick I mean those which have orgies and ecstasies and mysteries and local attachments: Africa is full of Thick religions. By Clear I mean those which are philosophical, ethical and universalizing: Stoicism, Buddhism, and the Ethical Church are Clear religions. Now if there is a true religion it must be both Thick and Clear; For the true God must have made both the child and the

Significantly then, in his fiction, we see some pagans who receive salvation. A conspicuous example is the young pagan, Emeth, in *The Last Battle*, whose life long worship for the evil god Tash is taken by Aslan as true service to Aslan Himself. His salvation in this story must have come from Lewis's actual belief. For, Lewis wrote a letter to a lady on 8 November 1952:

I think that every prayer which is sincerely made even to a false god or to a very imperfectly conceived true God, is accepted by the true God and that Christ saves many who do not think they know Him. For he is (dimly) present in the *good* side of the inferior teachers they follow. (*Letters*, 247)

Actually, Lewis thinks that the people who never hear of Christianity as well as who honestly reject it can be saved, though those who know Christianity but without serious consideration chose not to follow Christ, whether from laziness or from easy skepticism, cannot be saved. Discussing the problem whether man can lead a good life without believing in Christianity, Lewis says,

We all know [...] men like Socrates and Confucius who had never heard of it, or men like J.S.Mill who quite honestly couldn't believe it. Supposing Christianity to be true, these men were in a state of honest ignorance or honest error. If their intentions were as good as I suppose them to have been (for of course I can't read their secret hearts) I hope and believe that the skill and mercy of God will remedy the evils which their ignorance, left to itself, would naturally produce both for them and for those whom they

man, both the savage and the citizen, both the head and the belly. And the only two religions that fulfil this condition are Hinduism and Christianity. But Hinduism fulfils it imperfectly. The Clear religion of the Brahmin hermit in the jungle and the Thick religion of the neighbouring temple go on side by side. The Brahmin hermit doesn't bother about the temple prostitution nor the worshipper in the temple about the hermit's metaphysics. But Christianity really breaks down the middle wall of the partition. It takes a convert from central Africa and tells him to obey an enlightened universalist ethic: it takes a twentieth-century academic prig like me and tells me to go fasting to a Mystery, to drink the blood of the Lord. (*God*, pp.102-103)

influenced. ("Man or Rabbit," *Dock*, 110)

Alan Lee Brewer points out that "Lewis, like Barth, does not, limit salvation to those who are a part of the visible church. Although Christ is the absolute necessity in salvation, this does not mean that one must have a knowledge of Christ in this lifetime in order to be saved."⁴ Brewer says,

His stress lies upon the more personal aspects of Christianity, and most of the references to the church which he does make are in this personal context. Institutional religion is largely ignored, especially in his fiction.[...] One primary reason for this is Lewis's own admission that he had a great deal of difficulty with mainstream movements and with the corporate activities of the church such as worship. Lewis feared the church's tendency to become a club, a social or political organization, rather than place of worship.⁵

John Hick in "The Non-Absoluteness of Christianity" remarks;

The Second Vatican Council (1963-1965) highlighted and consolidated the new thinking that had been taking place for a number of years among some of the more adventurous Roman Catholic theologians. Vatican II in effect--though not of course in so many words--repealed the *extra ecclesiam nulla salus* doctrine by declaring that there is salvation outside the visible church; the redemption bought by the blood of Christ is offered to all human beings even without their formal entry into the church. Thus, speaking of Christ's redeeming sacrifice, Vatican II taught:

All this holds true not only for Christians, but for all men of good will in whose hearts grace works in an unseen way. For, since Christ died for all men, and since the ultimate vocation of man is in fact one, and divine, we ought to believe that the Holy Spirit in a manner known only to God offers to every man the possibility of being associated with this paschal mystery.*

The possibility of salvation was thus officially extended in principle to the whole world. This extension was reiterated even more strongly in the first

⁴ Alan Lee Brewer, "The Anthropology of Choice," Diss. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary 1989, p.176.

⁵ Brewer, pp. 169-170.

encyclical, *Redemptor Hominis* (1979), of Pope John Paul II, in which it is declared that “man--every man without exception whatever--has been redeemed by Christ, [...] because with man--with each man without any exception whatever--Christ is in a way united, even when man is unaware of it.”**

(*Pastral Constitution on the Church, par. 22.

***Redemptor Hominis* (London; Catholic Truth Society, 1979), par.14.)⁶

From this we may say that in advance of the global ecumenical movement of this century, Lewis here sees the truth outside of the principle *extra ecclesiam nulla salus* .

Hick, who has seen various races of people with different religions apparently saved by their religious belief and practice, thinks of the possibility of “multiple incarnations” thus,

When God became incarnate as Jesus he was humanly conscious of that aspect of the divine which can be conceived in Jewish terms, namely as the personal heavenly Father.[..] But incarnated as Gautama Siddhartha, the Buddha, the Logos was humanly conscious of that aspect of the divine which could be conceived in quite different terms, as the eternal reality of *nirvana* [...]. There would thus emerge a theology of religions which stresses the infinite nature of the Godhead, exceeding the scope of all our concepts, and the salvific efficacy of the variety of ways formed around the different incarnations that have occurred throughout human history.⁷

We see Lewis conceive of something like multiple incarnation in his imaginary world, for he writes about the Christ-figures in his own fiction:

Aslan [...] is an invention giving an imaginary answer to the question, ‘What might Christ become like, if there really were a world like Narnia

⁶ John Hick, “The Non-Absoluteness of Christianity,” in John Hick and Paul F. Knitter eds. *The Myth of Christian Uniqueness* (SCM, 1987), pp. 16-36. Quot. pp. 20-21.

⁷ Hick, p. 98.

and He chose to be incarnate and die and rise again in *that* world as He actually has done in ours?’ This is not allegory at all.[...] The incarnation of Christ in another world is mere supposal; but *granted* the supposition, He would really have been a physical object in that world as He was in Palestine [...] Again, Ransom (to some extent) plays the role of Christ not because he allegorically represents Him (as Cupid represents falling in love) but because in reality every real Christian is really called upon in some measure to *enact* Christ. (*Letters*, 283)

From what we have seen above, we can say that in Lewis’s fiction and in his actual belief, too, all the believers in good deities virtually believe in the God of Christianity whether or not they themselves know Whom they are really believing in, and in that sense, they are virtually Christian. Then, as he says here that all true Christians are to enact Christ, it follows that, in his writings, all true believers of good deities are to enact Christ whether they are on the conscious level Christian or pagan, and by so doing, they are to attain their salvation.

Now in such an imaginary country as the fantasy world of Narnia or of the Ransom-trilogy or Glome in *Till We Have Faces*, if a pagan enacting Christ can be seen as another Christ (by supposition), instead of being an allegory of Christ, this is very near to the concept of the multiple incarnations that the religious pluralists today think of, in spite of the fact that Lewis is one of the most avowedly confident and positive advocates of Christian absolutism.

It is interesting to see, too, that Hick himself finds a certain multiple incarnation theme in Lewis’s imaginary world, seeing Narnia as an allegory, whether or not he knows that Lewis denies its being an allegory. Hick says, “And many today have had the scope of their theological imaginations enlarged by C. S. Lewis’ allegory of Narnia with the numinous figure of Aslan, who is the divine Logos incarnate as a mighty lion.”⁸ If what Hick says is true, Lewis is contributing to world-wide sympathy between people of different religions, now thirty-five years after his death through his uniquely Christian imagination.

Furthermore, there is yet another significant affinity of Lewis for religious pluralism today. Hick says, to see various great world religions, “I suggest that these different conceptions of salvation are specifications of what, in a generic formula, is the transformation of human existence from self-centredness to a new orientation centred in the divine Reality.”⁹ And this “transformation of human existence from self-centredness to a new orientation centred in the divine Reality” is exactly what Lewis as a fiction writer keeps on illustrating. In the last of *Till We Have Faces*, Orual finds herself to have been transformed from a self-centred existence into a goddess-like “real woman” (306), and as we have discussed before, this is the consummation of all the pieces of his fiction. Such an image of a “real” goddess-like woman is presented also in one of Lewis’s most impressive sermons, “The Weight of Glory,” which we have already referred to in the previous chapter.¹⁰ There, he compares our potential glory after this life to that of “a society of possible gods and goddesses” (“The Weight of Glory, *Toast*, 109). This may sound too pagan to some ears, especially because it is in a church sermon, and seem embarrassing.¹¹ Even though there is a passage in the

⁸ Hick, p. 90.

⁹ Hick, p. 136.

¹⁰ See p. 365.

¹¹ The passage, which we have seen, states, “It is a serious thing to live in a society of possible gods and goddesses, to remember that the dullest and most uninteresting person you can talk to may [...]” Yet, significantly for instance, John A. Sims in his *Missionaries to the Skeptics*, quoting from this paragraph, silently (either consciously or unconsciously) omits “to live in a society of possible gods and goddesses” and quotes instead, “It is a serious thing to remember that the dullest and most uninteresting person you can talk to may one day be a creature which...you would be strongly tempted to worship, or else a horror and a corruption such as you now meet only in a nightmare” (John A. Sims, *Missionaries to the Skeptics, Christian Apologists for the Twentieth Century, C. S. Lewis, Edward John Carnell, and Reinhold Niebuhr*, Mercer Univ. Press, 1995, p.85). Sims quotes from *The Weight of Glory and Other Essays*, ed. By Walter Hooper (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1965), pp. 18-19. Yet in this Macmillan edition (1965), Lewis’s original is the same as in the Collins edition

gospel of John where Jesus says to the Jews, “Is it not written in your law, ‘I said, “You are gods”?’” (John, 10:34, *NKJV*), “gods and goddesses” would not be generally regarded as a Jewish image nor a Christian one. Yet, now that we understand Lewis’s affinity for pagan mythologies, we can understand this passage and assume that the words might have slipped naturally in through his literary imagination.

On the other hand, Lewis has never gone so far as to believe in religious pluralism. Rather, his view seems to be nearer to Christian inclusivism. And the most important thing here is that, if there are pagan elements in Lewis’s imaginative world, it is the pagan world after Christ, that is, the world for whom Christ has already atoned and opened the way for salvation. There, those who have eyes of faith that identify the way can find the door to heaven. In *The Voyage of the ‘Dawn Treader,’* the third of the Chronicles, when Lucy asks Aslan if he is also there in our human world, Aslan answers her “I am,” and tells her that in the human world he has “another name” (209), and she must learn to know Him by that name. As Paul Fiddes in “C. S. Lewis the Myth-Maker” comments here, “Though the name ‘Christ’ is not spoken, we notice that the enigmatic Christological title ‘I am’ has been, and often is.”¹² The worlds in Lewis’s fiction are, though pagan, all the same, the worlds which are to be saved by the same Christian God that Lewis believes in. They are, if we may use Karl Rahner’s words, “anonymous Christian”¹³ worlds.

At the end of the Narnian world, when Jewel, the unicorn, enters Aslan’s country, he finds that his real life begins now in that land. He realizes that his life on earth has only been a prelude to the life there. His shouts with joy, “I have come home at last! This is my real country! I belong here. This is the

which I am using as the text.

¹² Paul S. Fiddes, “C.S. Lewis the Myth-Maker,” *A Christian for All Christians*, eds. Walker & Patrick, p. 145.

¹³ Rahner, *Theological Investigations*, V, p. 133.

land I have been looking for all my life, though I never knew it till now” (*Last Battle*, 155) expresses Lewis’s hope and conveys it to us so powerfully that we almost share, even for a while, his hope and conviction that man is made for heaven. We almost feel assured that heaven is the real objective World of Reality and we are someday to enjoy the life there: Our life on earth, with all its pains and pleasures, is only a prelude to the real, joyful life in heaven. And because this world is already redeemed by Christ, and we are to be sons and daughters of God through Jesus Christ our Lord, our existences have precious meanings. This hope and “Yes” to our life here and now is felt throughout his fiction and moves readers so much. Many of those who read *The Chronicles of Narnia* or his science-fiction trilogy read them repeatedly, and what so attracts them to Lewis again and again must be this bright hope for the life, both in this world and in the Real World of heaven, which is God’s country.

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