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Licensing of a lower-cost production process to an asymmetric Cournot duopoly ディミトリ, リティシェフ application/pdf An outside inventor of a new production process seeks to license it to Cournot duopolists which have unequal ex ante costs. Distinguishing “leading-edge” innovations (new cost below both firms’ costs) from “catch-up” innovations (new cost between the two firms’ costs), we compare the equilibria of two license-selling mechanisms: exclusive license auction and non-exclusive price-setting. In contrast to the often-studied case of an innovation that reduces the cost of any licensee by the same amount, we show that licensing of a new process may attenuate the ex ante cost asymmetry, allow the inefficient firm to leapfrog its competitor, and raise the licensee’s net profits. 学習院大学経済学会 2009-01 eng departmental bulletin paper VoR http://hdl.handle.net/10959/683 https://glim-re.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/591 AN00038827 00163953 學習院大學經濟論集 The journal of Faculty of Economics, Gakushuin University 45 4 325 336 https://glim-re.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/591/files/keizai_45_4_325_336.pdf application/pdf 137.9 kB 2012-03-15